Hard-won progress on the southern front

Ukraine, with heavy losses, achieves progress on the southern front and at Bachmut. Russia is undertaking a relief attack in the northeast. What is the situation and what is needed?

This analysis incorporates findings from visits on the southern front in July 2023. The status reproduced is time-delayed and omits precise location and troop movement information. 

After Ukraine ventured only exceedingly small advances for a long time, larger Ukrainian formations are now being deployed again east of Robotyne. Ukraine is making progress, but has not yet broken through the Russian defenses.

Ukraine continues to suffer heavy losses in its advances in the flat, heavily mined terrain, currently primarily from Russian artillery and rocket artillery.

South of Velika Novosilka, Ukraine is bringing the village of Staromajorske under control. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in early June, Ukrainian forces thus covered about 12 kilometers. 

The distance from Staromajorske to the strategically important only railroad line through the southern corridor is still 40 kilometers. It is 115 kilometers to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.

In addition to the counteroffensive in the south, Ukraine continues the local counterattack near Bachmut. Ukrainian forces reach the village of Andriivka south of Bachmut on the railroad line between Bachmut and Horlivka.

Russia is conducting a relief attack in the northeast from Kreminna toward Zaritchne-Lyman, where it advanced 5-6 kilometers. It is possible that Ukraine will retreat here to the western bank of the Scherebez River in the medium term.

In southern Ukraine, the extensive and managed Russian minefields continue to be the biggest obstacle to the Ukrainian offensive. Mines are constantly being re-laid with mortars as Ukraine removes or detonates mines.

Mine removal in flat, open terrain with wide visibility and under constant surveillance by many Russian drones is difficult and dangerous for Ukraine. 

Russia has more drones and seems better able to use them. Ukraine's previous advantage in drones is diminishing, in part because powerful Russian electronic warfare is becoming more effective against Ukrainian drones. 

The newly delivered cluster munitions put Ukraine in a recognizably better position against the expanded Russian defenses. The new Ukrainian advances in southern Ukraine and south of Bachmut are also made possible by cluster munitions.

The protracted and arduous fight against Russian artillery in recent weeks reduced the Russians' traditional superiority in artillery, improving the conditions for Ukrainian attacks.

At the same time as front-line action, Ukraine is very specifically and systematically combating Russian logistics, command, control, and communications in the rear. By apparently lifting a restriction on the use of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, important strikes against large ammunition depots in Crimea are succeeding.

Russia fires mortars, artillery, and drones indiscriminately into Ukrainian cities and settlements near the front lines, e.g., from Enerhodar toward Nikopol and from Russia into the Sumy region, for training purposes.

Ukraine needs more technology to remove and detonate mines. It may need entirely novel solutions for huge, managed minefields, which urgently need to be thought about in the West as well.

Ukraine continues to need more artillery ammunition and support for ammunition logistics, even though it is now able to gradually build up its own production capacity for 155mm caliber ammunition. The EU has produced paper since March so far, but unfortunately no ammunition yet.

EU and member states should think about increasingly producing ammunition, spare parts, and technology directly in Ukraine or scaling production there. Ukraine is creating the conditions for this.

Ukraine is rapidly expanding its own drone production, but needs support for critical components. Ukraine needs more drone defense systems and better electronic warfare to counter Russian drones.

Ukraine further needs more air defense systems and guided missiles. It is possible that the MIM-23 Hawk repurchased by the U.S. from Taiwan can improve the situation on the front lines in this regard. 

A steady supply of accurate long-range weapons and ammunition is particularly important for Ukraine. In addition to Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, Taurus and ATACMS should finally be delivered.

Ukraine still needs multi-role combat aircraft as soon as possible, and the planned delivery of F-16s should be accelerated to the maximum.

And: In Ukraine, many schools, if they have bunkers, want to resume classroom operation in September after an extended period of online schooling. However, the school buses are now in military use. Ukraine needs school buses.

Ukraine continues to have significant resources that have not yet been used in the counteroffensive. Breakthroughs and transition to movement warfare remain possible, although the first weeks of the counteroffensive were terribly slow.

The situation could change more rapidly strategically if Ukraine brings the only rail line in the southern corridor and/or the approaches to Crimea within range of its precision weapons. In any case, long-term, systematic, and industrially backed support is needed.

All Ukraine Updates: Nico Lange | Lage in der Ukraine

Map: @War_Mapper