For a Forward-Looking Intermarium

Whenever the Intermarium alliance has been proposed, it has always been thought of as a defensive alliance of Central and Eastern European states. When it was first proposed by Marshal Josef Piłsudski in the 1920s, it was conceived of as an anti-Bolshevik alliance, to counter the real and present threat of Soviet imperialism. The idea has seen some revival in recent years, as the resurgent nations of Central and Eastern Europe seek to chart their own destinies rather than follow the path of the aspiring global hegemons, but also as they sense increased danger, not only from Russian imperialism in the east, but also Western decline and American cultural hegemonisation from the West. In this essay, I will posit an alternative view of the Intermarium and and alternative path for it, informed by recent changes in the international situation as well as the international framework proposed in my proposal for a European nationalist foreign policy. 

Marshal Piłsudski envisioned a confederacy of states, not an alliance, which would serve as a bulwark against both the East and the West. In Piłsudski’s view, the Intermarium would have included Poland, Ukraine, the three Baltic States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and even extended as far south as what was then the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, thus connecting by land the Three Seas - Adriatic, Baltic and Black (or in Polish, Morze Adryatickie, Morze Bałtyckie and Morze Czarnem hence the popular nickname ABC). Complementing the proposed confederacy, which would have been structured in the tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the Prometheist project, an initiative for dissolving the Russian Empire and later Soviet Union by supporting the national liberation struggles of the non-Russian ethnic groups within these states. Later proposals for the Intermarium, such as Émile Durand’s envision a defensive alliance and political-economic bloc that’d countermand the destructive influences of both Russia and the West.

Any discussion of the Intermarium will always include the military threat posed by Russia, from historical Russian expansionism in Eastern and Central Europe, to its contemporary war against Ukraine. However, since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, new data has come to light. It has shown that while the Russian state still has the will for imperialism and expansion, at least in its leadership caste, it may be severely lacking in the means to pursue empire and expand. It has shown itself to be militarily incompetent and dare I say, weak. Indeed, so weak has this purported grand enemy turned out to be, that it has been stopped in its track by a country 1/5th of its size. In order to engage Ukrainian forces, the Russians have been forced to withdraw the men and military equipment from everywhere along Russia’s frontiers, including those borders with other proposed Intermarium countries. Indeed, as the Wagner mutiny in the summer of 2023 showed, Russia has few forces it could spare to stop a surprise movement in its rear. We may even speculate that if there were a combined two-pronged Finnish-Baltic-Polish push to Murmansk and St. Petersburg right now, there’d be no Russian soldiers to stop it, as they’re all currently fighting in Ukraine. 

With that in mind, we must therefore modify the idea of the Intermarium to serve the needs of Central and Eastern European nations in particular and white people in general, especially considering the very probable disintegration of the Russian Federation and also the demographic profile of this disintegration. In a previous essay, I contended that the Russian Federation is rather close to disintegration, that the West fears this disintegration and that the various areas of the post-Russian space will be carved up, whether by annexation or hegemonisation, primarily by China and Turkey. What I left out of that essay and will explore in this one, is the idea of a third player in that game, who will serve as a competitor to China and Turkey and stand for the white people of the post-Russian space, as China stands for the Mongoloids and Turkey for the Turkics. I propose that this player be the Intermarium, conceived not as a defensive alliance against Russia, but as an alliance which will represent white interests in the post-Russian space, including the interests of white Russians. 

I believe that nobody would object to the contention that allowing China and Turkey to have the run of the post-Russian space would be very bad not only for Central and Eastern European nations, but also white nations in general. China and Turkey should both be considered dangerous anti-white regimes hostile to the West and driven primarily by resentment of Western civilisation. For this reason, it is important to both deny them full control of the post-Russian space as well as gain control of parts of it, to redirect its resources towards the protection of the Intermarium members states as well as protect the remaining Russian white population from the depredations of these powers and their nonwhite (and crucially, anti-white) clients. It is imperative that the gates of the steppe be firmly in European hands, as invaders from the east have bedevilled European civilisation since its very beginning. The same paths taken by the Huns, Cumans, Mongols and later Bolsheviks to menace Europe must be closely guarded by a heavily armed Intermarium, both to keep the fighting away from the core territories of the member states, but also as a means of denying the enemy the many resources of this region. For this reason, the influence of the Intermarium, whether through direct membership or alliance, must extend at a minimum to the Ural Mountains and the city of Astrakhan and the Volga delta, which would form the minimum eastern boundary of Europe. 

In contrast to previous Prometheist attempts to mobilise the ethnic and racial minorities of Russia against the central power in Moscow, the Intermarium should instead focus on mobilising the Russian, the white Slavic ethne against the centre. This should be done both on moral grounds, as these are white people who deserve our racial solidarity, but also on practical grounds, seeing as how these are the highest quality people in the Russian Federation and as such their friendship would be most useful. Past Russian dissolutions, in 1917 and 1991 frayed the empire at the edges. The impending third dissolution can be made the final dissolution insofar as the Slavic Russian core of the empire is targeted and convinced to relinquish its imperial ambitions towards its white Western neighbours. This endeavour will be made easier by the fact that the Russian government in Moscow is currently engaged in the racial replacement of white Russians with minorities and immigrants and seems to prefer dealing with these easily controlled nonwhite minorities. Of course, given that we’re also predicting a Russian government collapse, the Intermarium alliance must be poised to project military, diplomatic and cultural power in the post-Russian space, to ensure that any polities that arise to replace the Russian Federation are friendly, rather than hostile to the Intermarium member states. In due time, such polities that arise to replace the Russian Federation and belong to either the Slavic or Ugro-Finnic (Uralic) people groups should be integrated into the Intermarium alliance as member states. Some areas, such as Rostov region or Karelia and Kola could be integrated into existing Intermarium states (in our example Ukraine and Finland, respectively). Others may arise to become independent states which can then receive Intermarium membership as a means of protecting them from Chinese, Turkish or other influences. 

This new direction of the Intermarium alliance, as not primarily a defensive alliance against the Russian but an influence-projecting alliance directed at the post-Russian space would grant several advantages to the prospective member states. Firstly, it would push the zone of conflict away from them and into the post-Russian space, preferably far to the east. Secondly, it’ll appropriate the resources of the post-Russian space, or at least its European part which are still substantial for the Intermarium member states thus strengthening their economic position in the world and developing a vast hinterland for them. This will be especially important insofar as the world moves, as is suspected by some commentators, towards deglobalisation and global resources and markets become unavailable. Thirdly, it’ll allow for purpose and directionality to form, not only in the state, but also in the general cultures of the member states (and after a fashion, an overarching culture for the alliance), hopefully starting a civilisational renaissance that’ll be very useful in fending off cultural attacks from the West. Fourthly, it’ll allow to finally end the centuries-long conflicts between the Intermarium member states and Russia by integrating ethnic Russians into the alliance and refocusing the alliance efforts on countering rising Chinese and Turkish influence. It would turn the old enemy into a wartime friend.

In order for such a forward looking Intermarium to succeed in its mission, five capacities must be developed by the alliance. 

1. The ability to project military power into the post-Russian space.

All soft power, whether it is economic, diplomatic or cultural power rests on hard power, which is to say the power to compel people and to kill and destroy them if they refuse to comply. This is military power. The Intermarium has since the first proposition of the very idea been seen as a defensive alliance against Russia or even the West. I propose that it be radically rethought as an alliance which will have a proactive and engaged foreign policy, including a policy of military intervention in its neighbouring regions, primarily the post-Russian space, but also if the need arises, its European neighbours to the West and South, such as for example a hypothetical destabilising and Islamising Germany. For this, the alliance must develop not only combat power, but also the ability to project this combat power deep into the Eurasian landmass, ideally to the Urals and Volga and beyond. For this reason, the capacity for overland power projection must be emphasised and to a limited extent, sea power projection in the Black Sea as well. This will likely come at the expense of naval power and naval power projection in the Adriatic and Black seas and the alliance should focus on defending its territorial waters in these seas. The ability to send troops, supplies and equipment deep into the post-Russian space, however, will depend on land-based logistics. This will necessarily mean a development of railway infrastructure to connect not only the Intermarium to the post-Russian space, but also internally. For a proactive Intermarium alliance, the member states should be able to quickly mobilise and move their forces to wherever they're needed. Since the alliance will consist mostly of clear land powers with little naval presence and over a vast territory, this will necessitate the development of an Intermarium-wide network of railroads along with fast train infrastructure which will help economically integrate the states but whose primary purpose will be the rapid movement of men and material for their armies in cases of wars and emergencies. 

This will necessitate standardisation of rail gauges, rail regulation and creation of a single railroad authority and should have as its theoretical goal the ability to move a ton of food, a ton of bullets and a battalion of men by rail from Dubrovnik to Tallinn, or from Szczecin to Sevastopol in 24 hours or less.

These rail logistical routes could be complemented by an air-transport fleet for rapid and emergency deployment, although the bulk of the logistics, whether military or civilian, should be rail-bound. Developments in materials technology in the coming few decades should make high-speed rail transport viable at scale, however, significant investment in this sector will be necessary and it’s likely that the only actors wealthy enough to invest in it will be governments. Of course, the vital security aspect of the railroads will necessitate that governments be heavily involved in the development of this rail network as well.

In this area, the Intermarium alliance will have an advantage over its projected rivals for domination of the post-Russian space because it is likely to take charge of European Russia, which already has a well-developed if outdated railway network. Making friends of the post-Russian polities in this space will allow for this network to be captured intact and then developed into forward power projection potential.

Of course, in order to have power projection, the Intermarium alliance must first have power to project. This will necessitate a rearmament and remilitarisation of society, with as many as possible military capabilities being produced within the alliance itself. Societies will necessarily have to become more militaristic before such policies are implemented, which the member states and the alliance itself must ensure, hence the necessity for a common cultural policy.  

2. A common and forward-looking cultural-diplomatic policy 

While hard power can secure an area and even intimidate a few people, ultimately, nations and countries can only be fully secured using soft power, which is to say economic and cultural power and of the two, cultural power is greater because the mind is still, even in our degenerated age, the master of the body, at least among the people who form opinions and set policy for the rest of humanity. The white Slavic Russian population currently has no culture to speak of, certainly no high culture. It is not allowed to have one, since culture can serve as a central organisational principle for people, and people with such principles tend to form organisations. The Russian government fears organisations and especially self-organising peasants. For their own part, the ruling class of the Russian Federation have a mongrelised version of Soviet high (I’m using this term provisionally) culture syncretised with the culture of the Russian underground. Of course, the people making up the Russian ruling class are merely upjumped post-Soviet apparatchiks, mostly from the second and third echelons of the old Soviet ruling class and ethnically ambiguous and heavily admixed, therefore their culture is crass, pornographic and obsessed with vulgar displays of their newly accumulated wealth. When Russians find themselves craving the aesthetic and spiritual nourishment of high culture, they often have to satisfy themselves with foreign imports, and this has been so for a very long time, dating as far back as the 18th century, at least. 

This cultural vacuum, however, cries to be filled. Young Russians are currently adopting the culture of their steppe and Caucasian replacements out of a mixture of the human submission reflex and desperation, but what if an alternative culture can be developed for Russians that’d give meaning and direction to their lives, specifically a direction favourable to abandoning the Muscovite centre and aligning closely with their racial kin in the Intermarium states, while simultaneously protecting them from the rot of rapidly Islamising post-Soviet criminal culture.

Since we’ll be targeting the best and most intelligent Russians, this should be a sophisticated and educated culture, though unafraid to probe the nether reaches of the human psyche. This new culture should be predicated on the assumption that it is the culture of the True Rus, its sociopolitical direction taken from those of the medieval Rus and its general aesthetic direction a mixture of medieval and modern iterations of the True Rus spirit, whether the early princedoms or the later Cossack culture. In its literary aspect, which will be crucial because Russians are a literary people, this culture must be built upon a rejection of authors like Pushkin or Lermontov, who are propagators of the imperial idea and build on the legacy of authors such as Gogol and Chekhov, who are its mockers. Above all, the neurotic humourlessness of “serious” Russian literature as produced by Pushkin, Dostoyevsky and the myriad Soviet and post-Soviet authors must be rejected, instead embracing the good cheer even in the face of great suffering that we observe in authors such as Chekhov and Daniil Kharms. 

The new high culture will shape and define a generation of young and talented Russians who should, when the time comes, become the ruling class of the new states of the post-Russian states. Seeing as how one of the goals of the forward-looking Intermarium project will be to include these post-Russian states and stand united against Chinese and Turkish influence in the post-Russian space, this culture must also be compatible with the cultures of the Intermarium member states and the alliance’s elite culture. Let me briefly explain what I mean by elite culture. The term serves to represent the beliefs, habits, folkways, prejudices and tastes of the decision-making, administrating and opinion-making class(es) of a political entity, whether it’s a state or an organisation of states. We have a contemporary example with the emergent EU culture, the culture of Eurocrats and EU member state elites who are markedly different from their co-nationals, but very similar to each other. While it is not clear at present whether this culture was fully emergent or guided in its development by an interested party, it is nevertheless both inevitable that the Intermarium, as a particularly close alliance of states, will develop such an elite culture and it is best that this culture be guided in its development to a disposition which will be the most beneficial for the alliance as a whole while respectful of the needs and rights of its member states. 

Of course, the Intermarium states must lead by example and so, this new culture must not only be developed for the post-Russian space, but for domestic consumption as well. The way towards resisting cultural rot from the West and mobilising societal resources for the Intermarium project, as well as other, domestic projects of the member states is precisely a new high culture that will inspire the talented youth to nationalism, self-sacrifice and pursuit of salutary values. It must, however, satisfy the eternal hungers of the noble soul and as such, it must be world-conscious rather than parochial, grand (even grandiose) rather than petty and imperial (in the cultural sense). Relating to point 1, this culture must also be militaristic, it must glorify military service and martial values, especially for men. The alliance elite should lead by example and have skin in the game for the Intermarium project to pass muster with the masses or to succeed at all. For this and other reasons, it must also reject Western cultural forms, not only of the left but also of the right, even as it absorbs all that is useful from both the West and the East. My old essay on dissident high culture, written for the West, may be useful to those who’d endeavour to build such a culture. 

3. A forward-looking and independent economic policy

The proposed Intermarium alliance would be a very large block of states in terms of area, population and economic relevance. This economic relevance can be even further increased by developing an internal trade network that’ll allow for sophisticated division of labour within the alliance and for each region to develop its unique competitive advantages. As global sea lanes become less stable due to projected decreases in American power and interest in policing them, the importance of this internal network will increase exponentially. In a time when it’ll become a challenge to ship goods from Shanghai to Los Angeles, it must become trivial to transport goods by rail from Dubrovnik to Tallinn if the alliance is to seize its moment in history.

The first step on this journey is to disentangle the Intermarium economies from the broader European system, primarily the German industrial engine. While it is natural that Europe, insofar as it is a single bloc be led by Germany, the present German state, with its sick, post-Nuremberg culture and predatory economic practices against what it perceives to be the EU periphery, cannot be trusted in this role. Naturally, the very idea of Intermarium rejects the notion of Europe as a single bloc and sees its destiny as lying between the Oder and Don, or in our proposed forward-looking Intermarium, the Oder and Volga. Therefore, it feels no need for German leadership or tutelage. Instead, the Intermarium alliance should focus on internal economic development, seeking autarky whenever it’s possible and foreign trade with friendly nations which can be counted on to reliably deliver the necessary goods. Priorities should always be given to reinvestment of earned wealth into industrial and technological development. For example, the newly-discovered oil and gas deposits in the Black Sea off the Ukrainian and Romanian coast should be developed and exploited and not only should this resource be used to power domestic alliance industry, but the proceeds from selling these resources abroad should also be directed by the states and economic elites into the development of sophisticated industrial and technological capacity, chief among them the capacities that’ll allow the alliance as much independence from the rest of the world as possible. In particular, the member states should give incentives and go to great lengths to attract their expatriates who currently live in the West who have technical know-how and experience in sophisticated technological and industrial processes. To a lesser extent, Westerners dissatisfied with the state of their own homelands can be courted and recruited to work in the newly rising industrial engines within the alliance, with the caveat that large numbers of foreigners, especially if concentrated in a single place or industry can introduce political problems into the equation. 

Of course, when attracting, retaining or indeed, developing high quality labour we must look to the reasons as to why these educated and skilled workers have migrated, intend to migrate or never developed their skills. The usual explanation is that they sought better pay in the West, and it may be true, but as costs of living increase and quality of life decreases in the West, especially in terms of safety and community, the question arises as to why these young people keep migrating West. The answer may be that for all its faults, the West may treat them better than their native countries which are still poisoned with the post-communist, mafia-inspired anti-culture of which the most disgusting examples would be Russian gopnik and Serbian turbofolk/gaser culture. These cultures have no patience for intellect, for learning or for honour or civilisation of any kind, favouring violence, deception, materialism, the abuse of drugs and alcohol, promiscuous sex and gratification of low passions. They produce lowbrow music and fashions and create a climate of hostility towards anyone who seeks spiritual, aesthetic or intellectual fulfilment. It would be bad enough that these anti-cultures were merely allowed to exist, but they are favoured by the state (at least in Russia and Serbia) and ubiquitous in society, even societies adjacent to these lands. Of course this culture does not exist in a vacuum, but in a legal and social environment where the only way to attain any form of status or wealth is through criminality and oligarchic capitalism, as opposed to creating wealth for the benefit of one’s country and broader society. For this reason, an economic renaissance of the East is only possible if its legal framework is reformed to truly crack down on crime, especially organised crime and economic reform to dislodge entrenched oligarchies is enacted. The two problems are of course, related, with many oligarchs being criminals or at least linked to criminals and many criminal organisations being either protectors or proteges of oligarchs. These phenomena exist to varying degrees in all proposed Intermarium states except Finland and must be dealt with if the alliance is to be economically or culturally viable. 

4. A clear and focused diplomatic strategy

The biggest barrier to the formation of Intermarium today is not so much the abundance of conflicts between the proposed member states, but rather the disjointed foreign policy of the proposed member states towards external actors. The biggest example would be the disconnect between Poland’s and Ukraine’s Russia policy with Hungary and to a lesser degree Slovakia’s attempts to make a separate peace with the current Russian state. If the alliance is to materialise, all member states would fundamentally have to agree to have a single diplomatic policy with regard to the Russian Federation and the post-Russian state. The Intermarium alliance, as proposed, would present an even greater restriction on sovereignty for states than NATO. For this reason, a country shouldn’t apply, nor should it be considered for membership unless it is prepared to accept these restrictions. However, Hungary is not an essential member of the alliance. A bare-bones Intermarium alliance can be formed of just Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states and Finland, with Czechia and Slovakia being bonus members, if they choose to take part. It’d be better for the Intermarium alliance to be smaller, but more united in foreign policy than large and divided, like NATO is today. 

Having achieved a degree of unity with regard to foreign policy, the alliance should have concrete and achievable goals around which it will base its actual policies and relations with various states. Being founded as an alliance for the protection of Central and Eastern European states, here including some of the future states that could arise in the European part of the post-Russian space, its paramount goal should be precisely that. In the early days, it should have the policy of weakening the Russian Federation to hasten its inevitable end, but also to make sure that its end comes in such a way which is favourable to the plan outlined in this essay - that the white Russian nationals, of Slavic or Ugro-Finnic descent be reorganised into national states of their own and integrated into the Intermarium Alliance which will then so bolstered counter the rising influence of Turkey and China in the post-Russian space. 

For this to succeed, the alliance must have a secure rear, meaning that it must not have enemies to the West when it Is pursuing an aggressive foreign policy to the East. Friendly relations with Western Europe remain of paramount importance, especially with Germany and the Scandinavian nations, with Austria and Italy also being in consideration. Particular care must be taken in cultivating friendly relations with these states, inasmuch as such relations do not infringe upon the sovereignty and security of the Intermarium states. For example, the alliance should be friendly with Germany, but not at the cost of accepting nonwhite immigrants brought over by Germany under programs of European load-sharing, nor should it allow the German industrial sector to subordinate the economies of the member states (as is partially the case today). 

As American power and interest in Europe decline, the world may see the emergence of a new regional hegemon in Western Europe. Whichever state takes this position must be courted and approached with a degree of caution but always treated with reverence. The Intermarium should not involve itself in Western European affairs excessively unless its own safety is directly threatened and steps must be made to secure a degree of reciprocal non-interference from the Western European states, particularly the regional hegemon. Nevertheless, given the dire demographic profiles of Western Europe, we can expect the region to become unstable and possibly to suffer state collapse and dysfunction, thus necessitating Intermarium intervention if not to stabilise it, then at least to prevent a Grand Emirate of Fransiyyah from emerging in the middle of Europe and potentially threatening the alliance itself.

Naturally, as part of its cultural and economic policy and also on the grounds of racial solidarity as well, the Intermarium alliance should make accommodation for all white Europeans who wish to extricate themselves from their hypothetically destabilising states and start a new, safer and more prosperous life in the lands of the Intermarium member states. Even now, there is much fallow land in sparsely populated southeastern Poland and Ukraine where these people could settle, to say nothing of the vast post-Russian space which should, if this plan is followed, be integrated into the Intermarium alliance.

With regard to diplomatic relations in Asia, the Intermarium should seek out allies to firstly destabilise the Russian Federation and hasten its decline and later to curb Turkish and Chinese influence over the post-Russian state. At the same time, states which are pawns in this great game should not be treated with excessive hostility, even if they find themselves in the Turkish or Chinese spheres of influence, but rather given incentives to align themselves with the Intermarium. Of course, the maximum extent of the alliance must stop at the river Volga and Ural mountains, for the simple reason that anything beyond that is not only difficult to defend without a massive overhaul of the land logistics system and great breakthroughs in transportation and energy technology, but also civilisationally and racially incongruent with the alliance as it is proposed. 

In the later stages, once the Russian Federation has collapsed and its European territories have been integrated into the Intermarium, the alliance should start looking for Asian allies to counter the rising power of Turkey and China. The first and most obvious choice would be Japan, which not only is the first state to openly declare territorial pretensions towards the Russian Federation (see the section on the Kuril Islands in this essay), but is also a historic and current rival of China, bracketing its access to the world ocean. The Intermarium alliance should therefore cultivate diplomatic relations with Japan and find ways to coordinate combined efforts to frustrate China’s ambitions in the post-Russian space. Japan is also a wealthy nation with a high degree of technological sophistication which can be very useful to an alliance which will need every advantage to develop its economic and military capabilities if it is to stand up to China and Turkey in the post-Russian space.

Along similar lines, overtures to friendship can be extended to India, which is a rival of China and can be a source of raw materials for the Intermarium. However, India’s distance from the post-Russian space and its general lack of interest in this region will mean that there’s little coordination which can be achieved by the two parties. This will relegate the Indo-Intermarine relations to trade and mutual political and diplomatic support, such as for example recognising each others’ claims, which can prove important in the long run. Other countries too will likely arise as local enemies of China, including South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam and Australia, however their distance and projected disinterest in the post-Russian space (with the possible exception of Korea) will mean they’ll have a similar role as India in their relationship with the Intermarium. 

Finding a viable counterweight to Turkey may be more difficult or at least less obvious. Nevertheless, I believe that Iran can over time become a friend to the Intermarium, but only after the Russian Federation, which is its ally at this moment is dissolved and new states arise in the post-Russian space. Iran’s long historic rivalry with Turkey is unlikely to end and if Turkey’s pan-Turkic ambitions come to fruition, then Iran may find itself bracketed by armed and aggressive Turkic states to its northeast and northwest. Absent the Russian Federation, Iran may find itself in need of a new friend and the Intermarium alliance can be such a friend. 

Where things may become complicated with Iran is if it decides to become a competitor in the struggle for the post-Russian space. It may present itself as a protector of the Persian or Persianate populations of this space, or try to absorb Shia muslims in its orbit, notably Lezgins in Dagestan. However, it is in a much worse position to do this than either Turkey or China and will likely not be a serious contender in the game. Of course, the Intermarium can strategically support Iran against Turkey and China to undermine their ambitions. All of this is predicated on the assumption, however, that Iran does not ally itself with China and thus become a direct competitor to the alliance.

Nowhere else in Turkey’s near abroad does a suitable counterweight state appear, not in the middle East and not in the Balkans. It’d appear that the Intermarium alliance might have to confront Turkey directly, if not in open conflict, then in armed standoff even as we compete for influence in the post-Russian space. Because of the geography involved, such a standoff will necessarily be at least partially naval in nature, which brings us to this capacity which must be developed. 

5. A sensible naval policy and steps towards reglobalisation

Regardless of whether Intermarium comes to be in its Piłsudskian form or the bare-bones form I suggested earlier, it will primarily be an alliance of land powers with no significant navies. The Three Seas alliance ironically, can only be a land power and not a significant naval force simply due to the fact of its geography and the traditions of the people involved. Of all the proposed member states, only Croatia, Latvia and Ukraine have naval traditions of any kind, with Croatian and Latvian traditions being both mercantile with a limited degree of piracy, while Ukrainian naval tradition is limited to the riverine and coastal piracy of the Rus principalities and later cossacks. Ukraine, of course, can be considered the true inheritor of the Imperial Russian and Soviet naval traditions, retaining the shipyards of Mykolaiv as well as claiming the temporarily occupied naval base and infrastructure at Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula. Nevertheless, it is still primarily a land power and has lost all of its ships in the 2022 Russian invasion. Its amazing successes against the Russian navy come mostly from long range missile and drone strikes against Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels, proving once again Lord Nelson’s old adage that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”

With these facts in mind, it is important for the alliance to curb its expectations for its navies and focus on the possible. Land power must be prioritised and the logistical capacities described in point 1 are of paramount importance. The navies of the member states in the Adriatic and Baltic Seas will have to be small and suited for a role of policing the coasts. However, the problems of the Russian Federation and later Turkey will mean that a significant exception will have to be made for the Black Sea and that the alliance must have a naval presence there, in order to countermand Turkish naval might and power projection. 

While it is possible that these increased naval forces be part of the command structure of the member-states bordering the Black Sea (presently, the proposed member-states Romania and Ukraine), it might be a better solution for the alliance to establish a common Black Sea Fleet whose mission will be to pursue the interests of the Intermarium in that body of water. Towards this end, the shipbuilding capacities of the Black Sea coast must be developed even further and the logistic network proposed in point 1 must be in place to rapidly shift the alliance’s resources to the Black Sea theatre, both for regular operations and in emergencies. Of note is the presence of oil and natural gas deposits in the Black Sea which must be secured for the alliance and this will require a naval presence. In a world where US naval supremacy is projected to decrease and which could see a return of piracy on the high seas, it’s of vital importance that the Black Sea be safe and secure for the Intermarium. 

However, as the Intermarium expands into the post-Russian space, two more theatres of operation will open for the combined naval forces of the alliance which must be taken into account. 

The first and less important will be the Caspian Sea and river Volga. Representing a theoretical boundary of the Intermarium but also an important internal logistical throughway, the Volga will have to be protected by a riverine military presence. The alliance should also seek to have a naval presence in the Caspian Sea, the world’s largest lake, in order to directly countermand the presence of the Turkic states which surround it as well as to communicate with possible ally Iran, insofar as Iran decides to be a friend to the alliance. In the era of insecure international shipping lanes, all countries must look for ways to trade internationally while avoiding the increasingly perilous seas. 

However, the second and far more important, as well as more interesting theatre will be the Arctic Ocean. Regardless of whether after the dissolution of Russia the Kola Peninsula and Murmansk Oblast become independent states which are the integrated into the alliance or are annexed by the Republic of Finland, the port of Murmansk and also the port of Arhangelsk on the White Sea will become Intermarium ports, as the Three Seas Alliance finally reaches the Fourth Sea - the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean itself. This will present an unparalleled opportunity for the Intermarium. 

As has been mentioned previously in this article, it is likely that by the time the Intermarium reaches the Arctic Ocean, the US-led international order of the freedom of the seas will have likely been dead and buried and the world would have to a certain degree deglobalised. However, access to Murmansk, Arhangelsk and the White Sea will accord the alliance an opportunity to use developments in icebreaker technology in order to reestablish the Arctic trade routes. The modern Russian Federation has a substantial icebreaker fleet, which includes nuclear icebreakers. These can be seized with the dissolution of that state. Noting the shoddy quality of Russian-produced goods, these ships can nevertheless be refitted for use and even better designs produced, perhaps in conjunction with the Intermarium’s Scandinavian allies. This icebreaker fleet can then open the Arctic sea lanes, where due to the remoteness and extreme weather conditions, piracy is unlikely to present as great a challenge as in the more temperate waters. With the arctic sea lanes thus open, communication and economic contact can be reestablished with the Far East, in particular with such prospective allies as Japan, South Korea and India, as well as with the states on the North American continent, in whatever form they take after the US withdrawal from the world. Combined with the fact that every other power bloc on the planet is likely to struggle in the deglobalised world, this opportunity for trade and economic connection between Europe and East Asia will likely supercharge the economy of the Intermarium and make it the preeminent power on the Eurasian landmass, thus forever securing the sovereignty of its member states and successfully defusing the dangerous situation of the post-Russian space.  

The Destiny of the East

Men, rulers, states, nations, empires and even ambitious alliances have always been slaves to geography. The prospective Intermarium defines itself by the three littoral seas it borders, but its destiny is on the land, as a land power. The are of the world which I’ve called the post-Russian space in this essay is referred to as the pivot region by George Mackinder in The Geographical Pivot of History. Mackinder, writing in 1904, claimed that Russia is merely the tenant of this space which had hitherto been occupied by various steppe nomads who’ve menaced the coastal civilisations of the Eurasian landmass since time immemorial. Both historical and geographical reality dictates that there must always be a tenant of the pivot region. Towards the end of his essay, Mackinder expresses fear that China might eventually topple Russia and thus seize this pivot area, freshly bolstered by the invention of the railway and thus become a dangerous Asiatic influence projecting land power into the heart of Europe. Mackinder speaks charitably of the Russian empire and writing in 1904, he was oblivious to what cruel future had in store for the long-suffering lands of the Rus, from the Soviet nightmare of the Bolsheviks to the post-Soviet nightmare of Putinism, that there were Asiatic horrors which did not require the Chinese takeover of Russia. 

Nevertheless, his fears were far from unjustified and we have already witnessed the near complete Chinese economic vassalisation of Russia. Fortunately, the grave error that the government of the Russian Federation committed in its invasion of Ukraine has severely weakened it and this will likely lead to the dissolution of the state within the next few decades. However, this dissolution will likely be temporary and will soon give way to a new unifying force, for which the best candidates of the present powers are China and Turkey. Neither of those two powers can be trusted with the immense power accorded to the tenant of the pivot region. Therefore the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, the proposed Intermarium states must take the reins of history into their hands, occupying the post-Russian space, or at least its European part and becoming collectively the predominant land power on the Eurasian landmass, both securing their own existence for many centuries to come and also taking their place as the creators, rather than merely the objects of history. The forward looking Intermarium is the only feasible way to take over the great steppe and win the ultimate prize for the member-states, that of the supreme world power and at long last, freedom from eastern invasions.