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Drug traffickers survive under one premise: adapting to change. At the regional level, the agents of change emerge from the interaction between traffickers and the authorities, as well as among drug trafficking structures. The group that does not adapt does not survive. The result is a molotov cocktail of both planned and unanticipated consequences, in which the authorities can act as a stimulus if they are corrupt, or even if they do their job. These circumstances have reconstructed drug trafficking in Guatemala in the past five years, and led to the fracturing of some groups, the violent territorial conquest of new actors, and the displacement of traditional actors. The attack against nine policemen in Salcaja, Quetzaltenango on June 13 seemed like deja vu — something we had seen before. But it also seemed like something more serious: a possible sign that the Zetas were making an incursion into western Guatemala after securing the Franja Transversal de Norte route — the bridge between Honduras and Mexico — and contesting the eastern part of the country. This article was translated from Plaza Publica. See original article here. The case involved the murder of eight police in a police substation and the kidnapping of a police deputy-inspector, Julio Cesar Garcia Crotez, of whom only three fingers and a piece of his uniform have been found. The authorities revealed to the press that Garcia was suspected of participating in a robbery of the gang that presumably carried out the attack and the kidnapping. At the same time, a police source unofficially revealed that the massacre was vengeance for the robbery of a cocaine shipment, and that while the robbery did not involve all the victims, the gunmen had killed everyone in order to leave no witnesses. On July 14, the authorities captured seven men and two women in La Democracia, Huehuetenango, who were suspected of the murders, but did not identify them as members of a particular criminal structure. Later, on July 16, a tenth suspect was captured in Chimaltenango. This time, the authorities linked him to an offshoot of the Gulf Cartel that is beleived to be active in Huehuetenango. But until the arrests, the police had suspected the Sinaloa Cartel and had given assurences that the Zetas had not perpetrated the massacre for three reasons: The first is that Quetzaltenango and Huehuetenango are territories of influence of Sinaloa Cartel associates and the killers used escape routes and even weapons that the group often uses. The type of weapons used is also a very weak indicator — all criminal groups are able to obtain all kinds of firearms. Proof of this is that now the police are blaming the Gulf Cartel, not the Sinaloa. Therefore one cannot automatically attribute something that happens in Quetzaltenango or Huehuetenango to the Sinaloa Cartel. In addition, some authorities seem to have forgotten that drug trafficking is like plasticine — it has as many forms as hands, intentions, and events can shape it into, and one of the consequences of this is that more than one group can operate within the same province, even if it is not in the long term. They have been familiar with the northwestern border of the country since they arrived in Guatemala in the mids, when they were still part of the Gulf Cartel. Later, during the first week of March, , police captured two Mexican and eight Guatemalan Zetas that had stolen weapons from the National Civil Police PNC in Alta Verapaz and that knew how to move easily through five provinces to escape the authorities: Quiche, Huehuetenango, Solola, Totonicapan, and Suchitepequez. In April , the Zetas gunned down five anti-narcotics police investigators in Amatitlan, supposedly in revenge for the robbery of a cocaine shipment, according to the MP. When two guards were taking Gomez from one floor to another, he encountered the Zetas in the lobby in front of the elevator, and he shook each of their hands before continuing on his way to the next floor. Their motive was revenge against the property owner because he supposedly still trafficked drugs with the Gulf Cartel, according to a source in the MP. Ten days after the massacre, they kidnapped and dismembered auxiliary prosecutor Allan Stowlinsky in Coban, Alta Verapaz, after the police and the MP intercepted a Zetas cocaine shipment in Raxruha, Alta Verapaz. On September 26, last year, residents of the town of Santo Domingo Sinlaj, in Barillas, Huehuetenango meters from the border with Mexico , reported that the Zetas had threatened them with death when they refused to join the organization. There are other drug trafficking groups capable of killings like the Salcaja murders. In fact, some authorities have revealed that those detained between July 14 and 16 are linked to the Gulf Cartel. However, the attorney general Claudia Paz y Paz said the MP suspsects that those detained for the attack in Salcaja, Quetzaltenango, are also linked to the murder of seven people in San Pedro Necta, Huehuetenango, in December , which the Zetas are suspected of committing. Among the victims, who were burnt to ashes, was a prosecutor from Chiquimula, Yolanda Olivares. In terms of drug trafficking behavior, no country shows a pattern. One cannot speak of the Mexicanization of Guatemala, the way that a few years ago one could not speak of the Colombianization of Mexico. No country plagued by drug trafficking becomes an identical copy of another, because the behavior of drug trafficking depends on the interaction between the drug traffickers, the reactions of the authorities and the geographical context, more than on any predetermined pattern, says Rosada. These factors mark the differences in the behaviour of drug traffickers between one country and the next. Guatemala is not Colombia, where Plan Colombia along with the capture of drug traffickers wanted for extradition and the destruction of coca laboratories contributed to alleviating the war between the cartels and the sustained period of narco-violence. Later the cartels transformed into small cells that left production in the hands of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. But neither is Guatemala Mexico, where the size of the cartels is much larger and their interaction with the authorities much more complex. Guatemala is a unique animal. But what is it? And why? What happens and what is decided in the United States and in Mexico in terms of drug trafficking resonates through Guatemala and the rest of Central America. The engine of change in Guatemala can be divided into two. One on side are events that the United States unleashed in Mexico and Guatemala, and on the other side is the attention paid to requests made by the Public Ministry during the administrations of Amilcar Velazquez and Claudia Paz y Paz. It is during the current administration, under Otto Perez Molina, that Walter Overdick, an important Zetas associate, was captured. In contract, no important Gulf Cartel allies, such as members of the Mendoza group have been captured. The capacity of the drug traffickers for violence continues, as they continue bringing in contraband arms through the blind passes of the Guatemalan border, as a Woodrow Wilson Center report lays out. One of the triggers for the reconstruction of drug trafficking in the region came from the United States in , with the arrest of Osiel Cardenas Guillen, leader of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico, his extradition in , and the resulting infighting within the cartel. Cardenas ran a vertical organization, a narco-dictatorship. A dictatorship is the most vulnerable structure, according to German political scientist Hannah Arendt, because it is managed by violence and not by legitimacy. Cardenas was more feared than respected. Given that he believed he was infallible, he never prepared anyone to succeed him, and he surrounded himself with a security team made up of Mexican ex-military men known as the Zetas. Internal divisions resulted in the Zetas definitively separating from the Gulf Cartel in January At the same time, the Zetas had used their three years of relative independence to fortify alliances in Guatemala and open their own routes between Honduras and Mexico. The blind pass of Ingenieros, to the north of Ixcan, en Quiche, which connects with Chiapas, became one of their routes for bringing drugs up to Mexico. The location was just a few kilometers from the farm where Guatemalan authorities found a Zetas arsenal in March There were very few associates of that cartel who resisted the Zetas conquest, and who had the capacity to keep on trafficking. Overdick also permitted the Zetas to get a foothold in Peten, where he had various properties. This allowed them to harass the Mendoza family, one of the few remaining bastions of the weakening Gulf Cartel in Guatemala — which meant the Zetas immediately considered the Mendoza their enemies. The Zetas had learned something from experience: that it was helpful to ally with family-based drug trafficking groups, which had stronger ties to communities where they had lived for generations like the Cardenas family in Tamaulipas. Although it was on a smaller scale, Overdick and his strong presence in Alta Verapaz offered them this in Guatemala. By , when Osiel was about to fall, the Lorenzana family were trafficking drugs in Guatemala that were sent by the remains of the Cali Cartel and then passed on to the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, according to the US Department of Justice, and were part of the transport network of Otto Herrera in Central America. But by , the Lorenzanas would make a decision that would change their history for forever. But Juancho was also stealing drugs from other traffickers in Guatemala and Honduras, and his robberies had created enemies for the Lorenzanas. They knew the execution would occur with or without their consent. They knew to choose their battles, and they recognized that this was not the time for a violent war with the Zetas. It was a matter of honor among criminals. If the Zetas killed without permission on Lorenzana territory, they would have to respond. They knew they should wait, take their time, and then decide if they would make a strategic alliance with the Zetas, or if they would begin a war against them like the conflict seen in Mexico. Juancho had stolen a Zetas shipment in Honduras, and he had killed two of their men, according to the same Mexican and Honduran intelligence sources. On March 25, , the Zetas responded. It was not simple revenge. The Zetas showed what would happen if anyone killed or robbed any of them which is what might have happened with the Salcaja case. It was a lesson that the historian Thucydides proclaimed in ancient Greece: the emperor, or whoever aspired to be emperor, should always respond to attacks to show that he is not an easy target. In this way, the Zetas raised their profile in Guatemala and also took the pulse of other rival groups. On November 30, they interrupted a horse race organized by allies of the Sinaloa Cartel in the town of Agua Zarca, in Huehuetenango. The shootout left 17 dead, including people from both groups. This would be the signature of the Zetas in the following years, and they would become one of the principal factors behind the instability in drug trafficking in Guatemala — more even than the police. Guatemalan authorities, including the MP and the Ministry of the Interior, and the United States with their orders of capture and extradition, dealt the Lorenzanas a serious blow. In the list of people eligible for extradition to the United States, there were people from all the criminal groups. But in Guatemala, operations concentrated on allies of the Sinaloa Cartel. An ex-official with the Drug Enforcement Administration DEA , Michael Braun, said that in Colombia the strategy was to attack one cartel at a time, and maybe that was the strategy also used in Guatemala. Regardless, whatever the intention was, the results ended up favoring the Zetas. By , the government of Alvaro Colom boasted of having captured at least a hundred Zetas, although two-thirds were Guatemalan many, replaceable , and the majority were mid and low-level members. Between and , the Interior Ministry signaled in an interview with a Spanish media outlet that the army was the source of leaks that alerted traffickers. But the police in Zacapa were also untrustworthy, according to a police investigator who worked the case. With the Lorenzanas busy trying to keep a low profile without neglecting their business, the mid-level commanders and junior narcos assumed they had the green light to try and improve their positions. Between and , the arrest warrants and extradition orders from the United States and the arrests made in Guatemala by the MP and the PNC started molding drug trafficking in Guatemala like plasticine. In theory, these arrests should have taken down the whole structure. In practice, it did not. What factor saved it? Another factor is corruption. Sources in the PNC say that Chamale directed all his drug trafficking operations from prison, which is an example of when interaction between drug traffickers and certain authorities favors the trafficker. The groups in the west led by Chamale continued to operate, perhaps even with a higher level of influencee due to their geographic proximity to their Mexican counterparts. At the same time, the Lorenzanas were exposed to other factors, the biggest of which was the Zetas. In , the arrests of the Lorenzanas cleared the path for the Zetas to force an alliance. Thus the moment arrived for the Lorenzanas to make the decision they had put off since , when they gave the Zetas permission to kill Juancho. With more drugs moving overland, there were more routes to fight over and more violence on both sies of the border. It is not that there was more drug production for the narcos, but rather a greater volume of drugs was passing across the Honduras-Guatemala border that previously would have been transported by air from South America to Guatemala, meaning there were more drugs being transported overland that were vulnerable to robberies. The arrests and the extraditions, in Guatemala and Mexico, and the expansion of the Zetas allied with local drug trafficking groups started to change the face of drug trafficking in the country. In , they entered through Huehuetenango, but they made Alta Verapaz their base of operations. By , they had dominated the corridor between Honduras and Mexico, starting with Izabal, following the Franja Transversal del Norte, passing through Alta Verapaz — its bridge to Quiche —, but they also moved toward Peten in the north, and toward the capital and the Pacific coast to the south, according to the MP. In it was clear that the Zetas had found the path and access to arms in military storehouses. In March and April, the authorities found numerous weapons, thousands of bullets, and at least a thousand grenades in Ixcan, Quiche, and Amatitlan. In Amatitlan, the authorities found a rifle that belonged to a set purchased for the police during the government of Oscar Berger , said Carlos Menocal, who was the Ministry of the Interior for President Colom from onwards. Between and , the Zetas fortified their extension towards the eastern part of the country with the same aggression they had employed in Mexico. The expansion occurred after the arrests — when the Lorenzanas were at their weakest and were keeping a low profile. They continued trafficking, but by now they did not have the power to maintain a monopoly over what went on in Zacapa. Their control over drug robbers on the border with Honduras and, to the south, with El Salvador, was further weakened. So the Zetas seized the moment. In Mexico, their modus operandi consisted of taking territory and then monopolizing criminal activity in the area. That is to say, they take control of a zone not just to engage in criminal activity, but also so that they can charge a tax on anyone who wants to pass through or engage in criminal activity in their territory — a kind of criminal tax. Thus they have agreements with migrant smugglers and human traffickers, among other criminal groups. The killings included attacks against some landowners in the eastern part of the country who the police linked to drug trafficking , some small-time drug dealers, and shipment thieves in the area. Among these cases, one that stands out is that of Jairo Orellana, who, according to civilian intelligence sources, the Zetas tried to execute for failing to pay the tax. The Zetas gunmen killed his seven bodyguards in front of a clinic building in Zone 15 of Guatemala City in an attack in November from which Orellana is beleived to have escaped unharmed. By , the Zetas were already operating in the southern and western parts of Guatemala. By last December, they had received two shipments on a farm in Escuintla. The person who sent them from Zacapa is believed to be Marta Julia Lorenzana, according to unofficial information. This marked a dividing line in the history of the family, who for years had trafficked exclusively for the Sinaloa Cartel. For the Zetas, in contrast, the incursion into the southern coast was not unusual. Some of the Mexican Zetas detained in had identification documents that marked them as residents of municipalities along the southern coast, according to the MP who investigated whether the documents were forged or whether they had been legally issued based on false identities. It is believed that once they were in Escuintla in , the Zetas used another transporter to move the shipments to Mexico. Hall Institute and year-old son of Marta Julia Lorenzana, was detained last June in San Marcos with a shipment destined for the Sinaloa Cartel when a military source says his mother has been linked to the Zetas since December although the US Treasury Department only links her to the Sinaloa Cartel. Guatemalan authorities determined that the 15 kilos of cocaine that were seized from Lemus Lorenzana were marked with a horseshoe, a characteristic symbol of the Sinaloa Cartel. The fact that it was a small shipment could indicate that it was meant as a demonstration, to prove the efficiency of a new route or sender before risking a larger shipment — a test that that the adolescent evidently failed, either through inexperience or because somebody informed on him. One former government official suspects that the the fracturing of the power of the Lorenzanas left some members and allies of the family free to negotiate with people unrelated to the Sinaloa Cartel. If some members of the Lorenzana family are trafficking with one group, and other members trafficking with another, the potential for conflict is even higher. If this is indeed the case, friction and an increase in violence in the western part of the country is only a matter of time. Until then, drug trafficking will remain subject to the hands that will write — both within and outside the law — its next chapter. It was translated and reprinted with permission. Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a weekly digest of the latest organized crime news and stay up-to-date on major events, trends, and criminal dynamics from across the region. Donate today to empower research and analysis about organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, from the ground up. Skip to content. The Dividing Line The engine of change in Guatemala can be divided into two. Battles Postponed By , when Osiel was about to fall, the Lorenzana family were trafficking drugs in Guatemala that were sent by the remains of the Cali Cartel and then passed on to the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, according to the US Department of Justice, and were part of the transport network of Otto Herrera in Central America. Capture of the Lorenzanas Guatemalan authorities, including the MP and the Ministry of the Interior, and the United States with their orders of capture and extradition, dealt the Lorenzanas a serious blow. Alliances and the Conquest of Routes In , the arrests of the Lorenzanas cleared the path for the Zetas to force an alliance. Stay Informed With InSight Crime Subscribe to our newsletter to receive a weekly digest of the latest organized crime news and stay up-to-date on major events, trends, and criminal dynamics from across the region.
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The surprise election of reform candidate Bernardo Arevalo in Guatemala in August , and his struggle with elites who sought to block his January inauguration and the legal standing of his Semilla political party, \[1\] casts attention on the struggle of Guatemala as a transit country for illegal drugs and immigration, and the importance of its success as a stable prosperous democracy with healthy institutions, for both the U. It spans the Central American isthmus from Atlantic to Pacific, making it key for the transit of drugs and migrants to the U. Ortega regime in Nicaragua, the leftist populist Libre regime in Honduras, and the maverick authoritarian regime of Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. This work examines the security challenges confronting Guatemala, and the efforts of the current administration of Bernardo Arevalo to confront them. It shows that the government and its security forces, with the support of the United States and others, are making a valiant effort against a range of security threats but are severely challenged by the magnitude of the challenge, associated corruption, resource limitations, and divisions within the government itself. Due to its geographic position, Guatemala has long been a transit route for cocaine produced in Colombia, and later Venezuela, heading for the North American market. Once a source country for migrants, Guatemala has also become a transit country for large numbers of migrants from Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Ecuador and elsewhere, passing through the Darien Gap and the Central American isthmus toward the United States. The structure of narcotrafficking routes and the relationship between external and local groups in Guatemala has evolved considerably in recent years. From approximately , two dynamics upset that criminal equilibrium. The Mexican cartel Los Zetas, with significant military capabilities owing to the recruitment of Mexican Military special forces members into their ranks, \[10\] aligned with a disadvantaged Guatemalan smuggling group led by Horst Walther Overdick, \[11\] to move into the country to dominate high value drug smuggling routes there. In , the security forces of the Guatemalan administration of Otto Perez Molina, with significant help from the U. The result was an escalation of the violence, but also a fragmentation of Guatemalan smuggling groups. Eventually, the campaign by Mexican security forces against the Zetas in that country, coupled with resistance by well-entrenched Guatemalan groups such as the Huistas of Huehuetenango, pushed the Zetas out of Guatemala, \[13\] while Guatemalan President Perez Molino was jailed for corruption and association with narcotraffickers. With time, coca growing, and labs for processing it, have begun to appear in remote areas of the country such as Izabal and Alta Verapaz, \[17\] reflecting the relative absence of the state in those regions, and incentives for producing cocaine in Guatemala rather than smuggling it in, or purchasing it from Colombia. The relative fertile ground and appropriate growing conditions, particularly in mountainous areas such as San Marcos, help to produce coca leaves of relatively high alkaloid content, producing more product of higher value. In Guatemala, key smuggling routes continue to involve narcopistas in the Peten, \[19\] crossing the porous border with Honduras to the South, and smuggling overland into Mexico, both along well used routes close to the coast, and in the interior of the country. For Guatemala, the border region in the East with Belize has also become a problem, due to relative lack of state presence and road infrastructure in the sparsely populated area. The territorial dispute is currently before the International Court of Justice ICJ , \[23\] but the efforts to avoid clashes between the armed forces of both nations in the region has arguably contributed to a limitation in presence by the militaries of the two nations, which in turn facilitates the exploitation of the region by narcotraffickers and other smugglers. Taking advantage of limited state presence in parts of Guatemalan territory, augmented by the defunding of the Guatemalan military after the end of the Civil War, \[24\] the mountainous region of San Marcos, near the border with Mexico, became the primary site in the region for the growing of heroin poppies. With the expanded operations by the Guatemalan government against narcotraffickers, groups buying the heroin of San Marcos, and marijuana have reportedly decreased, resulting in a withering of production, although coca growing and labs for limited processing it have reportedly expanded. As a compliment to the drugs flowing through the region, Guatemala, like neighboring El Salvador and Honduras, have been beset by violent street gangs, \[29\] particularly Mara Salvatrucha MS \[30\] and Barrio 18 B The domination of the countryside outside Guatemala City by narcotraffickers and conservative elites has precluded MS and B from establishing a broader presence in the countryside. Moreover, the two principal gangs in Guatemala have generally respected the territory of each other, minimizing violence from turf battles between the two, \[34\] yet leaving citizens in the areas dominated by the gangs prejudiced by their extortion. From to , extortion in Guatemala more than doubled. Beyond drugs and gangs, Guatemala has increasingly become a transit country for migrants passing through the Central American isthmus toward the United States from Venezuela, Ecuador, Haiti, Cuba and other countries. Although Venezuelans have been the largest group passing through Guatemala, by contrast to South America, where Venezuelan criminal groups such as Tren de Aragua have exploited and trafficked those migrants, \[40\] such Venezuelan gangs have not yet created a strong presence in Guatemala. Experts consulted for this work suggest that this is principally because Venezuelan migrants have not remained in Guatemala long enough, in large enough numbers, for Venezuelan gangs to establish themselves there. The population of Guatemalan prisons has tripled since Finally, in , the deliberate setting of fires to clear land, in dry conditions, \[46\] led to a rash of major forest fires in the northern departments of Jutiapa and Peten during more than two months, including damage to over square miles of the Maya Biosphere National Reserve, \[47\] obliging President Arevalo to declare a national emergency \[48\] and deploy the military to support the response. That deployment, including fighting the fires, evacuating local populations, and maintaining security, in support of the national emergency management authority CONRED, taxed the limited capability of the armed forces for responding to other missions. The response of the Guatemalan government reflects initiatives begun prior to the current Arevalo administration, as well as new direction by the Administration. In addressing national security challenges, the Guatemalan National Police has increased its size, and acquired additional equipment, including new motorcycles and 24 trucks acquired in December Beyond numbers, according to those interviewed for this work, the police have been challenged in addressing the fundamental problems of professionalization and corruption within its ranks, limiting their effectiveness. Across multiple prior administrations, changes in the direction of the police have arguably had a chaotic effect on the institution, \[51\] without making real progress. During the administration of Alejandro Giammattei, the government developed an elaborate strategy for police transformation. The police have also created special units to address the particular challenges of the country. FIAAT units, in recent years, have acquired their own helicopters for air mobility through donations from the U. Due to institutional differences between the police and the military that created tensions, undermined unity of command, and thus undercut operational effectiveness, the Alejandro Giammattei administration disbanded the IATFs in March Within the Interior Ministry, the government has also sought to address the problems of prison control and overcapacity. In recent years, recognizing the need to separate those detained without a trial, from those convicted of serious crimes, the government also created a Preventative Detention Center. The Guatemalan government has also sought to build new prisons, including a maximum security facility in Masagua, \[66\] although administrative and legal difficulties have slowed progress. With respect to the Guatemalan military, the priorities of the incoming Arevalo administration and Defense Minister General Henry Saenz Ramos have been first and foremost to ensure that the institution remains removed politics, and to combat corruption within the military ranks. With respect to the fight against corruption, the Arevalo Ministry of Defense has reportedly adopted a strict posture against corruption and wrongdoing within the ranks, including obliging the retirement of some officers who were strongly believed to be corrupt, but for whom proving such in a military tribunal or court of law would have been difficult. In April , it inaugurated a new school for training in human rights in the Headquarters of the Mariscal Zavala Brigade. Beyond these, the new administration is also working to make the military a more inclusive force. It currently has an unprecedented four female Coronels, including the head of the new human rights school. In terms of specific capabilities, the Guatemalan military continues to operate impressively within the constraints of very limited resources. With respect to control of the national airspace against incursions by narcoflights in areas such as Peten, the military has been constrained by a limited number of interceptor aircraft, including a Pilatus PC-7 and two aging U. As, none of which are currently in active service. Although prior government have sought to acquire new interceptor aircraft from Argentina and Brazil, the procurements have been filled with allegations of improprieties and ultimately have not advanced. Similarly for detecting incursions into its airspace, Guatemala relies on an older Spanish Indira radar system. Beyond interceptors, the transport and aircraft-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ISR capabilities of the Guatemalan armed forces are similarly constrained, with five Cessna fixed wing transports, a Pilatus PC received from the U. A complimentary factor that rotary wing readiness has been the contribution of Taiwan to the training of its pilots. Following the inauguration of President Arevalo, Colombia subsequently renewed its training. In the maritime domain, as noted previously, Guatemala struggles to cover its nautical mile exclusive economic zone against drug transits. Its key tool for maritime interception in the Pacific is its naval special forces, the FEN, \[78\] which operates from relatively small fast boats in the often-rough Pacific seas. The Navy does have minor facilities at Ocos and Champurico, closer to the border, but without large numbers of persons there or substantial capabilities there to support and resupply larger vessels. Nonetheless, the U. To extend the range and time on station of the FEN and its watercraft, the U. Coast Guard. It has deployed smaller boats previously provided by the U. In , Guatemala also opened a modest shipyard on its port on the Atlantic coast, \[84\] which it has used to build approximately 10 smaller watercraft in three sizes, known as Eduarinos. In , when those forces have been called upon to surge to increase control of the border, and fight fires in the Peten and Jutiapa, the Guatemalan military has supplemented their capabilities by temporarily attaching units from elsewhere with the needed specialized capabilities, although at the expense of a high operational tempo of those temporarily attached units, and their non-availability elsewhere in the country. With respect to vehicles for ground mobility, the Guatemalan military continues to operate up armored Jeep CJ-8s provided by the US, \[89\] although they have long been plagued with suspension and other issues that have adversely impacted their operational availability. As a compliment to equipment, as with the FIAAT in the police and the FEN in the Navy, since , the Guatemalan Armed Forces have an elite unit that combines their well respected military special forces, the Kabiles, with enhanced air and other mobility assets. The unit, the Special Battalion for Interdiction and Rescue BEIR , \[93\] is used in operations against high value narcotrafficking, and other difficult targets. Beyond new equipment, support facilities and training, the Arevalo government is currently writing a new National Security Strategy. President Arevalo himself, whose academic background prior to taking office, includes several books on Civil-Material relations in Guatemala, \[94\] has taken a particular interest in the Defense sector and defense policy. Indeed, as the U. The U. Bolstered by such support, the Armed Forces, and particularly the Guatemalan Navy, have reportedly made important strides in defense planning, increasing the rationality of defense acquisitions, understanding of lifecycle costs, and the ability of the military to justify budget requests for the acquisition of specific capabilities to Congress. General Medina chose not to accompany the President and Defense Minister in the march. In the context of a public dispute over whether or not it had been appropriate for uniformed senior officers to join the President in the activity, the underlying tensions apparently became too much, leading the President to dismiss General Medina and replace him with a Coronel, Hermalindo Choz. Arevalo has also had difficulty passing legislation to implement security and other policies. At the day mark of his administration, the President had not succeeded in passing any laws. The failure to do so was principally because his allies in the Semilla party had been blocked by conservative opponents who control electoral institutions, from having a legal identity in Congress, allowing them to occupy committee chairmanships and exercise other forms of procedural power. In April , he fired his Environment Minister Maria Jose Iturbide, over improper use of a government car by her daughter. The corrupting influence and societal stresses of transnational narcotics and immigrant flows through Guatemala, as well as the public insecurity fueled by street gangs and criminality, continue to erode the faith of Guatemalans in their democratic institutions. The selection of Bernardo Arevalo was an expression of Guatemalans frustration with the perceived inability of previous governments to address fundamental challenges of corruption, insecurity, inequality, and a lack of opportunity. The Arevalo regime currently enjoys the benefit of the doubt of the Guatemalan people as it struggles to address those challenges and restore the faith of Guatemalans in their government. Unfortunately, it confronts those hurdles with severely limited resources and little leverage in the legislature to acquire more resources and strengthen legal frameworks. The United States has provided substantial support to the new government in security and other matters, yet the U. It is a fight against considerable odds, yet one in which the costs of failure for Guatemala, the U. The views expressed herein are strictly his own. Guillermo Pacheco, and Diego Solis, among others, for their important inputs into this work. The Policy Spotlight. Introduction The surprise election of reform candidate Bernardo Arevalo in Guatemala in August , and his struggle with elites who sought to block his January inauguration and the legal standing of his Semilla political party, \[1\] casts attention on the struggle of Guatemala as a transit country for illegal drugs and immigration, and the importance of its success as a stable prosperous democracy with healthy institutions, for both the U.
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