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Bibliography
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Other Internet Resources
Pettit, Philip, 2003,
Republicanism ,
the first entry on republicanism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2003 Edition).
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Theories of domination are primarily attempts to understand the value
of justice, freedom, and equality by examining cases where they are
absent. Such theories seek to clarify and systematize our judgments
about what it is to be weak against uncontrolled strength, i.e., about
what it is to be vulnerable, degraded, and defenseless against
unrestrained power.
There is, of course, considerable disagreement about what
domination really is. Even so, theorists of domination tend to agree
about this much: domination is a kind of unconstrained, unjust
imbalance of power that enables agents or systems to control other
agents or the conditions of their actions. We can call this “the
basic idea” of domination. The basic idea has the following
components:
Much contemporary disagreement about domination involves competing
answers to three questions: (1) Who, or what, can dominate? (2) Is it
possible to dominate merely by having power with a certain
structure, or is domination an exercise or an abuse
of power? (3) Exercised or unexercised, what kind of power is
domination? The remainder of this entry will address each of these
questions in turn, then conclude with a survey of how the idea of
domination has been used in recent applied ethical theory. It will
become clear as we examine competing answers to these three questions
that different theorists have very different ideas of why, exactly, we
need a theory of domination. There may be wide agreement that we need
the idea of domination to make sense of unjust power relations, but
unjust power relations are wildly varied, and theorists of domination
disagree not only about which varieties most need to be understood,
but about how theorizing domination helps us to understand them.
Another word of qualification before proceeding: what follows is a
survey of work almost entirely from Anglophone political philosophers
and political theorists, broadly within the Analytic tradition. For
theories of domination from the Continental tradition, see the entry,
feminist perspectives on power .
The neorepublican tradition (i.e., the tradition of thinking about
domination associated primarily with the historical scholarship of
Quentin Skinner and the political theory of Philip Pettit) tends to
present domination as a relation between agents; only agents can
dominate or be dominated (Pettit 1997: 52), though the agent/agents
might be a group or collective. Domination by groups may not require
that they do so as a group agent (List & Pettit 2011:
19–41). The metaphysics of group agency usually require shared
beliefs or joint intentions among the members of the group; but,
dominating power may be grounded in group membership (white people in
Western racialized hierarchies, men in patriarchy) even if that group,
or some of its members, do not meet the metaphysical requirements for
group agency. At least for those who think unexercised power is
sufficient for domination, a man who rejects the patriarchy of his
society may still dominate women because of what he is in a position
to do—e.g., have his testimony in court taken more seriously
than a woman’s—even if he explicitly rejects and tries to
undermine patriarchal institutions.
A minority position in the literature sees domination fundamentally as
a relation between groups, where any domination between individuals is
parasitic on group membership. If this is true, the domination of one
individual by another counts as such only because one belongs to a
dominant group and the other belongs to a subordinate group
(Wartenberg 1990).
That agents alone can be dominated is rarely disputed; but can agents
alone dominate? What about non-agents like institutions or systems or
ideologies? Vaclav Havel’s (1991: 136–138) example of a
grocer in Soviet-era Czechoslovakia recurs in the literature as a
possible example of domination by a system, where particular agents
are merely conduits (Lovett 2010; Krause 2013; Blunt 2015). The grocer
posts slogans favorable to the regime in the window of his shop. By
posting the slogans, he both signals his cooperation with power and
extends its reach. Similarly, Sharon Krause (2013: 194) recalls her
mother’s insistence that she take smaller, more
“ladylike”, steps and overcome her natural stride. Perhaps
the ideology Krause’s mother both obeys and enforces is what
dominates, rather than any particular agent or agents (see also
Foucault 1975 [1977: 26–27]). Workers who have deeply imbibed
the values of capitalism might be another example (see Thompson 2013,
2018): e.g., someone who accepts whatever meaningless work is
available because their sense of self-worth depends on not being a
“slacker”. While it may be that the values of capitalism
are a social construct produced over time by agents for their own
benefit, if what motivates the worker is their own corrupted sense of
self-worth, it makes sense to think that they might be dominated by an
ideology rather than other agents.
The central question is whether we can understand possible examples of
domination by systems or ideologies as instances of domination
by agents through systems or ideologies. An
affirmative answer is more often assumed than argued for in the
literature, but Frank Lovett tries to motivate it with this
example:
Imagine a society in which the law of property recognizes the
possibility of ownership in human beings, but in which it just happens
that there are as yet no slaves. After some time, however, slaves are
imported, and the law duly supports their masters’ rights of
ownership. Later still, the masters repent, and manumit their slaves.
(2010: 48–49)
Lovett thinks we will agree that domination occurs only during the
period after slaves are imported and before their manumission: the
legal system that allowed property in slaves enabled
domination but did not dominate.
The proposed lesson of another thought experiment—this one from
Gwilym David Blunt (2015: 17–18)—is that domination without
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