Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionag…
Anthropic News我们最近判断,网络安全领域已出现一个拐点:AI 模型已经在网络安全行动中变得真正有用——既能被用于防御,也能被用于攻击。我们的系统性评估显示,相关网络能力在六个月内翻倍;与此同时,我们也在跟踪现实世界中的网络攻击,观察到恶意主体如何利用 AI 能力。虽然我们预期这些能力会持续发展,但令人注意的是它们以规模化、极快的速度演进。
2025 年 9 月中旬,我们发现了可疑活动;后续调查认定这是一项高度复杂的间谍行动。攻击者前所未有地大规模利用了 AI 的“能动性”( agentic )能力——把 AI 不仅当作顾问,而是用来直接执行网络攻击。
我们以高度置信评估,该威胁行为者为一支受中方国家支持的组织。攻击者将 Claude Code 工具操纵为尝试入侵大约三十个全球目标,并在少数案件中取得了成功。行动目标包括大型科技公司、金融机构、化工制造企业及政府机构。我们认为,这是首例有据可查的大规模网络攻击在几乎无需人工干预的情况下被执行的案例。
在检测到该活动后,我们立即发起调查以厘清其规模与性质。随后的十天中,我们持续绘制行动的严重性与全貌,识别并封禁相关账户,按适当方式通知受影响实体,并在收集到可行动情报时与相关部门协作。
这一行动对“能自主长期运行并在很少人工干预下完成复杂任务”的 AI“ agents ”时代的网络安全具有重大影响。此类 agents 在日常工作和提升生产力方面颇有价值,但落入不当之手时,会显著提高发动大规模网络攻击的可行性。
促成此次攻击的几个 AI 特性,是一年前尚不存在或仍处于雏形的:
- 智能化。模型的通用能力已提升到能遵循复杂指令并理解上下文,从而使得非常复杂的任务成为可能。其中若干高度成熟的专项技能——尤其是软件编码能力——很容易被用于网络攻击。
- 能动性( agency )。模型可以作为 agents 运行于循环中,自主采取行动、串联任务,并在仅需极少、间歇性人工输入的情况下做出决策。
- 工具接入。模型可访问广泛的软件工具(通常通过开源标准 Model Context Protocol ),它们现在能搜索网络、检索数据并执行过去仅由人工完成的诸多操作。在网络攻击场景中,这些工具可能包括密码破解器、网络扫描器及其他安全相关软件。
下面是攻击的不同阶段(每一阶段都依赖上述三项发展):
最初阶段,人为操作者选择目标(例如欲入侵的公司或政府机构),并构建了一个攻击框架——一个可在几乎无人干预下,自动化攻破选定目标的系统。该框架以 Claude Code 作为执行网络行动的自动化工具。
此时,攻击者必须说服经严格训练以避免有害行为的 Claude 参与攻击。他们通过“越狱”(jailbreak)绕过其防护——把攻击拆分为看似无害的小任务,让 Claude 在不被告知其恶意目的的情况下执行;并谎称 Claude 是一家正规网络安全公司的员工,正在进行防御测试。
第二阶段由 Claude Code 承担侦察职责:检查目标组织的系统与基础设施,定位最高价值的数据库。与人类黑客团队相比, Claude 完成这些侦察所需的时间少得多,随后向人为操作者汇报其发现摘要。
在接下来的阶段中, Claude 通过研究并编写自身的漏洞利用代码,识别并测试目标系统的安全弱点。借助该框架, Claude 能收集凭证(用户名和密码),进而获取更深层访问权限,随后以分类情报价值的方式提取大量私人数据。最高权限账号被识别、后门被植入、数据在极少人工监督下被外传。
在最终阶段,攻击者让 Claude 生成详尽的攻击文档——汇总被窃凭证与已分析系统的实用文件,便于该框架规划威胁行为者下一阶段的网络行动。
总体而言,威胁行为者使用 AI 完成了约 80–90% 的攻击工作,人类仅在若干关键决策点上介入(每次入侵行动大约 4–6 次关键决策)。AI 所完成的工作量,对于人类团队来说需耗费大量时间。AI 发出的请求达到每秒数千次——这是人类黑客根本无法匹敌的攻击速度。
不过, Claude 并非完美无缺。其偶有“幻觉”现象,会虚构凭证或宣称提取到事实上公开可得的信息。这仍然是实现完全自主化网络攻击的一大障碍。
网络安全方面的影响
发动复杂网络攻击的门槛已大幅降低,且我们预计这一趋势将继续。凭借合适的配置,威胁行为者现在可以让具备能动性的 AI 系统长时间运行,替代一整队经验丰富的黑客:它们能分析目标系统、生成利用代码,并以比任何人工操作更高效的方式扫描被窃取的大规模数据集。资源和经验较少的群体现在也可能发动此类大规模攻击。
这一事件比我们今年夏天报告的 “ vibe hacking ” 案例更具升级性:那类行动中人类仍频繁掌控整个流程,而此次尽管规模更大,人类介入却少得多。虽然我们只能直接目睹到对 Claude 的使用,但此案例很可能反映了前沿 AI 模型之间的一致行为模式,并展示了威胁行为者如何调整操作以利用当下最先进的 AI 能力。
那既然 AI 模型可能被滥用于如此规模的网络攻击,为什么还要继续研发并发布它们?答案在于:正是那些使 Claude 可被用于攻击的能力,同样使其在网络防御中不可或缺。当复杂网络攻击不可避免地发生时,我们的目标是让内置有强大防护措施的 Claude 协助网络安全专业人员检测、扰乱并为未来版本的攻击做准备。事实上,我们的 Threat Intelligence 团队在分析本次调查产生的大量数据时,大量使用了 Claude 。
网络安全已发生根本性变化。我们建议安全团队在以下领域尝试把 AI 应用于防御:安全运营中心自动化、威胁检测、漏洞评估与事件响应。我们也建议开发者继续在其 AI 平台上投入防护措施,以阻止对抗性滥用。上述技术无疑会被更多攻击者采用——这就使得行业间威胁情报共享、更好的检测手段和更强的安全控制变得更加重要。
我们将公开分享此案例,帮助业界、政府与更广泛的研究界强化各自的网络防御。我们会定期发布类似报告,并对发现的威胁保持透明。完整报告见原文链接。
We recently argued that an inflection point had been reached in cybersecurity: a point at which AI models had become genuinely useful for cybersecurity operations, both for good and for ill. This was based on systematic evaluations showing cyber capabilities doubling in six months; we’d also been tracking real-world cyberattacks, observing how malicious actors were using AI capabilities. While we predicted these capabilities would continue to evolve, what has stood out to us is how quickly they have done so at scale.
In mid-September 2025, we detected suspicious activity that later investigation determined to be a highly sophisticated espionage campaign. The attackers used AI’s “agentic” capabilities to an unprecedented degree—using AI not just as an advisor, but to execute the cyberattacks themselves.
The threat actor—whom we assess with high confidence was a Chinese state-sponsored group—manipulated our Claude Code tool into attempting infiltration into roughly thirty global targets and succeeded in a small number of cases. The operation targeted large tech companies, financial institutions, chemical manufacturing companies, and government agencies. We believe this is the first documented case of a large-scale cyberattack executed without substantial human intervention.
Upon detecting this activity, we immediately launched an investigation to understand its scope and nature. Over the following ten days, as we mapped the severity and full extent of the operation, we banned accounts as they were identified, notified affected entities as appropriate, and coordinated with authorities as we gathered actionable intelligence.
This campaign has substantial implications for cybersecurity in the age of AI “agents”—systems that can be run autonomously for long periods of time and that complete complex tasks largely independent of human intervention. Agents are valuable for everyday work and productivity—but in the wrong hands, they can substantially increase the viability of large-scale cyberattacks.
These attacks are likely to only grow in their effectiveness. To keep pace with this rapidly-advancing threat, we’ve expanded our detection capabilities and developed better classifiers to flag malicious activity. We’re continually working on new methods of investigating and detecting large-scale, distributed attacks like this one.
In the meantime, we’re sharing this case publicly, to help those in industry, government, and the wider research community strengthen their own cyber defenses. We’ll continue to release reports like this regularly, and be transparent about the threats we find.
How the cyberattack worked
The attack relied on several features of AI models that did not exist, or were in much more nascent form, just a year ago:
- Intelligence. Models’ general levels of capability have increased to the point that they can follow complex instructions and understand context in ways that make very sophisticated tasks possible. Not only that, but several of their well-developed specific skills—in particular, software coding—lend themselves to being used in cyberattacks.
- Agency. Models can act as agents—that is, they can run in loops where they take autonomous actions, chain together tasks, and make decisions with only minimal, occasional human input.
- Tools. Models have access to a wide array of software tools (often via the open standard Model Context Protocol). They can now search the web, retrieve data, and perform many other actions that were previously the sole domain of human operators. In the case of cyberattacks, the tools might include password crackers, network scanners, and other security-related software.
The diagram below shows the different phases of the attack, each of which required all three of the above developments:

In Phase 1, the human operators chose the relevant targets (for example, the company or government agency to be infiltrated). They then developed an attack framework—a system built to autonomously compromise a chosen target with little human involvement. This framework used Claude Code as an automated tool to carry out cyber operations.
At this point they had to convince Claude—which is extensively trained to avoid harmful behaviors—to engage in the attack. They did so by jailbreaking it, effectively tricking it to bypass its guardrails. They broke down their attacks into small, seemingly innocent tasks that Claude would execute without being provided the full context of their malicious purpose. They also told Claude that it was an employee of a legitimate cybersecurity firm, and was being used in defensive testing.
The attackers then initiated the second phase of the attack, which involved Claude Code inspecting the target organization’s systems and infrastructure and spotting the highest-value databases. Claude was able to perform this reconnaissance in a fraction of the time it would’ve taken a team of human hackers. It then reported back to the human operators with a summary of its findings.
In the next phases of the attack, Claude identified and tested security vulnerabilities in the target organizations’ systems by researching and writing its own exploit code. Having done so, the framework was able to use Claude to harvest credentials (usernames and passwords) that allowed it further access and then extract a large amount of private data, which it categorized according to its intelligence value. The highest-privilege accounts were identified, backdoors were created, and data were exfiltrated with minimal human supervision.
In a final phase, the attackers had Claude produce comprehensive documentation of the attack, creating helpful files of the stolen credentials and the systems analyzed, which would assist the framework in planning the next stage of the threat actor’s cyber operations.
Overall, the threat actor was able to use AI to perform 80-90% of the campaign, with human intervention required only sporadically (perhaps 4-6 critical decision points per hacking campaign). The sheer amount of work performed by the AI would have taken vast amounts of time for a human team. The AI made thousands of requests per second—an attack speed that would have been, for human hackers, simply impossible to match.
Claude didn’t always work perfectly. It occasionally hallucinated credentials or claimed to have extracted secret information that was in fact publicly-available. This remains an obstacle to fully autonomous cyberattacks.
Cybersecurity implications
The barriers to performing sophisticated cyberattacks have dropped substantially—and we predict that they’ll continue to do so. With the correct setup, threat actors can now use agentic AI systems for extended periods to do the work of entire teams of experienced hackers: analyzing target systems, producing exploit code, and scanning vast datasets of stolen information more efficiently than any human operator. Less experienced and resourced groups can now potentially perform large-scale attacks of this nature.
This attack is an escalation even on the “vibe hacking” findings we reported this summer: in those operations, humans were very much still in the loop, directing the operations. Here, human involvement was much less frequent, despite the larger scale of the attack. And although we only have visibility into Claude usage, this case study probably reflects consistent patterns of behavior across frontier AI models and demonstrates how threat actors are adapting their operations to exploit today’s most advanced AI capabilities.
This raises an important question: if AI models can be misused for cyberattacks at this scale, why continue to develop and release them? The answer is that the very abilities that allow Claude to be used in these attacks also make it crucial for cyber defense. When sophisticated cyberattacks attacks inevitably occur, our goal is for Claude—into which we’ve built strong safeguards—to assist cybersecurity professionals to detect, disrupt, and prepare for future versions of the attack. Indeed, our Threat Intelligence team used Claude extensively in analyzing the enormous amounts of data generated during this very investigation.
A fundamental change has occurred in cybersecurity. We advise security teams to experiment with applying AI for defense in areas like Security Operations Center automation, threat detection, vulnerability assessment, and incident response. We also advise developers to continue to invest in safeguards across their AI platforms, to prevent adversarial misuse. The techniques described above will doubtless be used by many more attackers—which makes industry threat sharing, improved detection methods, and stronger safety controls all the more critical.
Read the full report.
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