Directive Nr. 21 — Case Barbarossa

Directive Nr. 21 — Case Barbarossa
— The text of the historic document, in three parts.
Part 3
B.) Air Force:
It will be the task of the Luftwaffe, so far as possible, to damage and destroy the effectiveness of the Russian air force, and to support the operations by the army at the points of main effort, that is to say in the sectors of the central army group and in the area where the southern army group will be making its main effort.
The Russian railways will either be destroyed, or, in the case of more important objectives close to hand (river crossings!) will be captured by the bold use of parachute and airborne troops.
In order that maximum forces may be available for operations against the enemy air force and for direct support of the army, the munitions industry will not be attacked while the major operation is in progress. Only after the conclusion of the mobile operations will such attacks, and in particular attacks against the industrial area of the Urals, be considered.
C.) Navy:
During the war with Soviet Russia, it will be the task of the Navy to protect the German coast line and to prevent any hostile naval force from breaking out of the Baltic. Since once Leningrad has been reached, the Russian Baltic fleet will have lost its last base and will thus be in a hopeless position, major naval operations are to be previously avoided.
After the destruction of the Russian fleet, it will be the responsibility of the Navy to make the Baltic fully available to carry sea traffic, including supplies by sea to the northern wing of the Army (Minesweeping!)
IV.
All orders to be issued by the Commanders in Chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicate that they are precautionary measures for the possibility that Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be assigned to the preparatory work at an early date is to be kept as small as possible; additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible and only to the extent required for the activity of each individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our preparations - the date of their execution has not even been fixed - there is danger that most serious political and military disadvantages may arise.
V.
I anticipate further conferences with the Commanders-in-Chief concerning their intentions as based on this directive. Reports on the progress made in the proposed preparations by all services of the armed forces will be forwarded to me through the Armed Forces High Command.
[Signed] A. Hitler
[initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.]
Distribution:
Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)—1. copyOb. d. M. (Skl.)—2. copyOb. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.)—3. copyOKW:WFSt.—4. copyAbt.—5-9. copy