Deconstructing FT

One of the unexpected consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine has been the emergence of new arguments against the rejection of Chinese equipment. Unfortunately, these arguments are unknown outside of Ukraine.

Without factual support, the debate on the risks of using 'untrusted' equipment resembles scholastic debates about the number of Chinese devils that can fit on the tip of a needle. This FT's article gives us an example of this kind of reasoning, which is useless from a practical point of view and incompetent in a professional sense.

The article gives the impression of being quite unprofessional. The authors did not reflect the key facts that are well-known in the professional community. Instead, they offer us narratives promoted by one side of the U.S.-China conflict over Huawei.

"The UK, Denmark, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have banned Huawei from their 5G network build"

The EU has 27 members. Plus Britain, Norway, and the Balkan countries. That makes a total of almost 40 countries. Six out of a few dozen countries doesn't look very impressive, does it? And what about the other countries?

What is happening with the equipment of Chinese vendors in the European mobile networks can be judged by the report Strand Consult. Light is the share of Chinese equipment in 4G networks, and Dark in 5G networks. Doesn't look like a massive decisive rejection. How can that be? Very simple, but that's not what the FT will tell you.

The Portuguese government addresses the issue of risks associated with Chinese equipment using the relevant EU regulations. Unlike the U.S., these regulations are supposed to rely on facts, so the key documents are the so-called risk assessment reports. The document to which the publication refers mentions this report, but its contents are not known to us because it is classified.

The government agency decision that is available to us does not contain any assessment of the risks in question. All the details are in the classified report. Without knowing its contents, there is no reason to draw any conclusions. In the experience of other EU countries, these conclusions can be anything, literally opposite in content. That is why some countries find it appropriate to apply restrictions, while others do not.

"This year, Germany said it was reviewing the use of Chinese components in its 5G network and investigating whether a change in the law would be required"

This statement should be taken literally. The German government will re-evaluate the arguments and draw conclusions. It may well decide to continue the current policy again.

"Governments around the world have used the term "high risk vendor" to refer to Huawei when introducing curbs on the use of the company's equipment"

This statement is an inappropriate generalization at best. Outside the West and its closest allies like Japan and South Korea, there are few places where Chinese equipment is seen as a threat.

The reason for this is no secret to professionals. In five or six years of pursuing Huawei, the United States has not presented a single properly documented piece of evidence of its accusations of backdoors or illegal use of user information. As a study by the Center for Security and Emerging Technologies (Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service) shows, even within the U.S. itself, the ban on Huawei is largely decorative in nature.

The article says nothing about the reasons why most EU and NATO members refuse to follow the U.S. lead and ban Chinese equipment. One reason is that U.S. equipment also meets the high-risk criteria set forth in the EU guidelines. This equipment is fully compliant with subparagraph (a) of paragraf 5 in Portuguese government paper cited in FT's article. Subparagraphs (d) and (e) are not formally met but have more than sufficient justification.