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On August 2, , Vanda Felbab-Brown submitted a statement for the record for the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the human rights consequences of the war on drugs in the Philippines. Read her full statement below. However, as an independent think tank, the Brookings Institution does not take institutional positions on any issue. Resulting in egregious and large-scale violations of human rights, it amounts to state-sanctioned murder. It is also counterproductive for countering the threats and harms that the illegal drug trade and use pose to society — exacerbating both problems while profoundly shredding the social fabric and rule of law in the Philippines. The United States and the international community must condemn and sanction the government of the Philippines for its conduct of the war on drugs. With his explicit calls for police to kill drug users and dealers 2 and the vigilante purges Duterte ordered of neighborhoods, 3 almost people accused of drug dealing or drug use were killed in the Philippines in the first year of his government — about one third by police in anti-drug operations. A Reuters investigation revealed that police officers were killing some 97 percent of drug suspects during police raids, 6 an extraordinarily high number and one that many times surpasses accountable police practices. That is hardly surprising, as police officers are not paid any cash rewards for merely arresting suspects. Both police officers and members of neighborhood councils are afraid not to participate in the killing policies, fearing that if they fail to comply they will be put on the kill lists themselves. Similarly, there is widespread suspicion among human rights groups and monitors, 7 reported in regularly in the international press, that the police back and encourage the other extrajudicial killings — with police officers paying assassins or posing as vigilante groups. And yet, far from being an exemplar of public safety and crime-free city, Davao remains the murder capital of the Philippines. In addition to the killings, mass incarceration of alleged drug users is also under way in the Philippines. Many do so out of fear of being killed otherwise. Smart policies for addressing drug retail markets look very different than the violence and state-sponsored crime President Duterte has thrust upon the Philippines. Rather than state-sanctioned extrajudicial killings and mass incarceration, policing retail markets should have several objectives: The first, and most important, is to make drug retail markets as non-violent as possible. Worse yet, the police and extrajudicial killings hide other murders, as neighbors and neighborhood committees put on the list of drug suspects their rivals and people whose land or property they want to steal; thus, anyone can be killed by anyone and then labeled a pusher. The unaccountable en masse prosecution of anyone accused of drug trade involvement or drug use also serves as a mechanism to squash political pluralism and eliminate political opposition. Those who dare challenge President Duterte and his reprehensible policies are accused of drug trafficking charges and arrested themselves. The most prominent case is that of Senator Leila de Lima. But it includes many other lower-level politicians. Without disclosing credible evidence or convening a fair trial, President Duterte has ordered the arrest of scores of politicians accused of drug-trade links; three such accused mayors have died during police arrests, often with many other individuals dying in the shoot-outs. Another crucial goal of drug policy should be to enhance public health and limit the spread of diseases linked to drug use. In prisons, users will not get adequate treatment for either their addiction or their communicable disease. That is the reason why other countries that initially adopted similar draconian wars on drugs such as Thailand in 16 and Vietnam in the same decade 17 eventually tried to backpedal from them, despite the initial popularity of such policies with publics in East Asia. Even though throughout East Asia, tough drug policies toward drug use and the illegal drug trade remain government default policies and often receive widespread support, countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam, and even Myanmar have gradually begun to experiment with or are exploring HARM reduction approaches, such as safe needle exchange programs and methadone maintenance, as the ineffective and counterproductive nature and human rights costs of the harsh war on drugs campaign become evident. Along with Afghanistan, the Philippine HIV infection rate is the highest in Asia, increasing 50 percent between and Further, as Central America has painfully learned in its struggles against street gangs, mass incarceration policies turn prisons into recruiting grounds for organized crime. Given persisting jihadi terrorism in the Philippines, mass imprisonment of low-level dealers and drug traffickers which mix them with terrorists in prisons can result in the establishment of dangerous alliances between terrorists and criminals, as has happened in Indonesia. The mass killings and imprisonment in the Philippines will not dry up demand for drugs: the many people who will end up in overcrowded prisons and poorly-designed treatment centers as is already happening will likely remain addicted to drugs, or become addicts. There is always drug smuggling into prisons and many prisons are major drug distribution and consumption spots. Even when those who surrendered are placed into so-called treatment centers, instead of outright prisons, large problems remain. Many who surrendered do not necessarily have a drug abuse problem as they surrendered preemptively to avoid being killed if they for whatever reason ended up on the watch list. Those who do have a drug addiction problem mostly do not receive adequate care. In China itself, many so-called treatment centers often amounted to de facto prisons or force-labor detention centers, with highly questionable methods of treatment and very high relapse rates. As long as there is demand, supply and retailing will persist, simply taking another form. The dealers and traffickers who will remain on the streets will only be those who can either violently oppose law enforcement and vigilante groups or bribe their way to the highest positions of power. By eliminating low-level, mostly non-violent dealers, Duterte is paradoxically and counterproductively setting up a situation where more organized and powerful drug traffickers and distribution will emerge. Inducing police to engage in de facto shoot-to-kill policies is enormously corrosive of law enforcement, not to mention the rule of law. There is a high chance that the policy will more than ever institutionalize top-level corruption, as only powerful drug traffickers will be able to bribe their way into upper-levels of the Philippine law enforcement system, and the government will stay in business. Moreover, corrupt top-level cops and government officials tasked with such witch-hunts will have the perfect opportunity to direct law enforcement against their drug business rivals as well as political enemies, and themselves become the top drug capos. Unaccountable police officers officially induced to engage in extrajudicial killings easily succumb to engaging in all kinds of criminality, being uniquely privileged to take over criminal markets. Those who should protect public safety and the rule of law themselves become criminals. The issue surfaced visibly and in a way that the government of the Philippines could not simply ignore in January when Philippine drug squad police officers kidnapped a South Korean businessman Jee Ick-joo and extorted his family for money. Jee was ultimately killed inside the police headquarters. President Duterte expressed outrage and for a month suspended the national police from participating in the war on drugs while some police purges took places. Rather than a serious effort to root out corruption, those purges served principally to tighten control over the police. Nor were other accountability and rule of law practices reinforced. Thus when after a month the national police were was asked to resume their role in the war on the drugs, the perverted system slid back into the same human rights violations and other highly detrimental processes and outcomes. The Philippines should adopt radically different approaches: The shoot-to-kill directives to police and calls for extrajudicial killings should stop immediately, as should dragnets against low-level pushers and users. If such orders are issued, prosecutions of any new extrajudicial killings and investigations of encounter killings must follow. In the short term, the existence of pervasive culpability may prevent the adoption of any policy that would seek to investigate and prosecute police and government officials and members of neighborhood councils who have been involved in the state-sanctioned slaughter. If political leadership in the Philippines changes, however, standing up a truth commission will be paramount. In the meantime, however, all existing arrested drug suspects need to be given fair trials or released. Law-enforcement and rule of law components of drug policy designs need to make reducing criminal violence and violent militancy among their highest objectives. The Philippines should build up real intelligence on the drug trafficking networks that President Duterte alleges exist in the Philippines and target their middle operational layers, rather than low-level dealers, as well as their corruption networks in the government and law enforcement. However, the latter must not be used to cover up eliminating rival politicians and independent political voices. To deal with addiction, the Philippines should adopt enlightened harm-reduction measures, including methadone maintenance, safe-needle exchange, and access to effective treatment. No doubt, these are difficult and elusive for methamphetamines, the drug of choice in the Philippines. Meth addiction is very difficult to treat and is associated with high morbidity levels. Instead of turning his country into a lawless Wild East, President Duterte should make the Philippines the center of collaborative East Asian research on how to develop effective public health approaches to methamphetamine addiction. It is imperative that the United States strongly and unequivocally condemns the war on drugs in the Philippines and deploys sanctions until state-sanctioned extrajudicial killings and other state-authorized rule of law violations are ended. In fact, a healthy U. However, the United States must recognize that drug use in the Philippines and East Asia more broadly constitute serious threats to society. Throughout the region, as well as in the Philippines, tough-on-drugs approaches, despite their ineffective outcomes and human rights violations, often remain popular. Fostering an honest and complete public discussion about the pros and cons of various drug policy approaches is a necessary element in creating public demand for accountability of drug policy in the Philippines. Equally important is to develop better public health approaches to dealing with methamphetamine addiction. It is devastating throughout East Asia as well as in the United States, though opiate abuse mortality rates now eclipse methamphetamine drug abuse problems. Meth addiction is very hard to treat and often results in severe morbidity. Yet harm reduction approaches have been predominately geared toward opiate and heroin addictions, with substitution treatments, such as methadone, not easily available for meth and other harm reduction approaches also not directly applicable. What has been happening in the Philippines is tragic and unconscionable. Foreign Policy. Southeast Asia. The human rights consequences of the war on drugs in the Philippines. Sections Sections. Contact Foreign Policy Media Office. Sign Up. Commentary Testimony The human rights consequences of the war on drugs in the Philippines. Vanda Felbab-Brown. Mindanao: Living in the peace of the dead. Will Rodrigo Duterte walk the talk? Joseph Chinyong Liow May 13, Shooting Up. Making Schools Work. Hanushek September 1, Clare Baldwin , Andrew R. Reuters , April 18, Reuters, April 18, More On. Sawhill, Kai Smith July 30, A hotspot anti-crime strategy in Mexico? Mexico A hotspot anti-crime strategy in Mexico? Vanda Felbab-Brown August 27,

The Philippine National Police: Finally Putting Limits to Police Use of Deadly Force?

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Following a surge of police killings during the war on drugs initiated by Philippine President Duterte directly after assuming office in July , the number of suspects killed returned to pre-Duterte levels in the last year of his presidency July to June This decline, which received little attention in media and research narratives, stabilized in the past 22 months under the new President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Certainly, it cannot be denied that post-Duterte, there is still a pressing need for reforms aimed at reducing the use of deadly force by the police. It also reveals that 60 police officers were killed and 92 wounded during this period. Among those killed, 25 were not killed in encounters but were ambushed, as were 20 of the wounded. This indicates that over the past two years, fatal deaths involving police intervention in the Philippines were fewer than in the United States approx. Conversely, the victimization rate of police officers in encounters was significantly higher compared to the United States : approximately one police officer died for every 7 civilian victims excluding those assassinated in the Philippines compared to one dead police officer per 18 civilian victims in the United States annually for the years and These data indicate that during the Marcos presidency, Philippine police killed fewer suspects in armed encounters relative to the population while facing a higher risk to their own lives compared to law enforcement officers in the United States. This suggests that during the past years there were some constraints on police use of deadly force in place, even amidst the ongoing enforcement of aggressive policing tactics in combating illegal drug production, trade and usage. A recent outlier was Davao City, the hometown of former President Duterte and governed by his son Sebastian since the elections. During the 21 months from July to March , a staggering suspects were killed by the police in Davao City, which is 30 percent of the suspects killed by the police nationwide during this period even though Davao City has only approx. The local rash of police use of deadly force even surpassed by far the number of such killings during the peaks of the national war on drugs from to Despite this, there were no public statements from either the local police chief, police higher-ups or the mayor on this issue. This changed on March 22, , during the turnover command ceremony of the police director. Surprisingly, following those few days, police violence abruptly ceased, and at least eight police officers implicated in the operations were relieved of their duties. He further stressed in his inaugural address that. We need officers who recognize that it is simply not enough to act decisively, relentlessly, and fast in the war against crime, but that there must also be accountability and transparency on our end, and most importantly, we will nurture police officers to whom a humane approach to law enforcement is a given. These developments are notable for several reasons: firstly, the higher echelons of the PNP responded swiftly and decisively, effectively addressing a rogue mayor, who openly asserted authority in local security governance. Secondly, the highest-ranking police official in the Philippines took the earliest opportunity to convey that the approach to anti-illegal drug enforcement should not be framed as warfare, indicating a departure from previous practices. The central question now is whether these visible shifts represent the initial phase in a genuine reform process or if it is merely a strategic move in a political game. The recent developments in Davao City reflect on the one hand ongoing efforts by the police to limit the influence of local politicians on law enforcement, making the PNP less susceptible to local political interference. On the other hand, the timing might suggest a link to a fundamental fallout between former President Rodrigo Duterte and his son, the mayor of Davao City, on one side, and Philippine President Marcos on the other. In late January, tensions over constitutional reforms proposed by the President, which were opposed by the Dutertes, escalated during a rally in Davao City. Given the politicization of the Philippine police, the swift backlash against the strongman stance of the Davao City mayor and the former president may be seen as partly a response to put the local executive in his place. Despite this, the notable decline in police use of lethal force in recent years indicates an effort to counter the patterns set during the early Duterte administration. This measure aimed to remove officers with connections to illegal drugs outside of standard procedures , resulting in the dismissal of 18 high-ranking police officers, including 3 Generals and 15 Colonels. They are a further signal towards a shift in policy, albeit one that will remain precarious. Despite the PNP rightfully asserting a significant reduction in crime levels in recent years, this achievement can easily be dismissed by populist politicians at all levels, who capitalize on projecting themselves as strong leaders. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether PNP directors at various levels would be able to withstand the public pressure that would inevitably mount if there was a reversal of the downward trend in crime. The Davao case underscores the substantial impact of local political authority in coercing the police towards unscrupulous practices and its most recent limits. Therefore, organizational improvement demands that not only local commanders but also top-ranking police officers are capable of resisting radical politicians and prioritize their allegiance to the laws of the Philippines above loyalty to any individual. He focuses on political violence in the Philippines and maritime conflicts in the South China Sea. A Political Game or a First Step to Less Violent Policing The central question now is whether these visible shifts represent the initial phase in a genuine reform process or if it is merely a strategic move in a political game. Bio Latest Posts. Peter Kreuzer. Latest posts by Peter Kreuzer see all. Peter Kreuzer Dr.

Davao buying Heroin