Damascus where can I buy cocaine

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Damascus where can I buy cocaine

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. The human-trafficking market in Syria continues to be pervasive, with the country being ranked among the worst in the world for human trafficking. Syria remains a major source and destination country for forced labour, sexual exploitation and domestic servitude targeting both local and foreign victims, these being women, children and men. While Syrians are being trafficked to neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, people from different nationalities mostly Iraq and the Philippines are trafficked into Syria, either to be exploited there or to be trafficked to another destination. Syrian children continue to be exploited by both state and non-state actors, forcing them to participate as combatants, human shields, suicide bombers or executioners, despite the introduction of new legislation intended to deter child trafficking through stricter legal consequences. The market is extremely lucrative. While profits from sexual exploitation are primarily generated from local demand, profits from organ trade are generated from foreign demand, with online platforms increasingly used to advertise and facilitate the trade of organs. Although human trafficking occurs across the country, Deir ez-Zor and Al Qaim remain major trafficking hubs. In addition to state-embedded actors, Syrian smugglers also cooperate with foreign counterparts in neighbouring countries to transport both asylum seekers and refugees. In recent years, there have also been reports of a migration flow of Lebanese, Asian and African migrants being smuggled into Syria, although this takes place to a lesser extent. Moreover, the deteriorating financial situation, the discrimination against Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and the repatriation of Syrian refugees have led some of them to pay smugglers to be smuggled back into Syria, with Syrians irregularly re-entering from Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan and Lebanon. Extortion and protection racketeering in Syria are generally interconnected with geopolitical developments. The most commonly known form of racketeering occurs through the misuse of zakat, normally a charitable donation that is considered a religious obligation in Islam but exploited by militias via the so-called zakat tax. Almost all highway trade and transportation in the country are also subject to regular extortion. The illicit-arms market in Syria is one of the largest markets worldwide, with arms prices considerably increasing over the years. This market is reportedly led by both domestic and foreign actors who are aligned with the Syrian regime. There has also been a surge in Iranian-made weapons and missiles trafficked into Syria via illegal crossings in Iraq, and which are allegedly destined for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Iran-backed militias present in the country. Furthermore, a large number of weapons smuggled into Syria for the armed opposition have ended up in the hands of militia groups or in the black market. A share of the illicit arms reaching Syria are re-trafficked into neighbouring Lebanon due to higher demand and profitability. There is also a significant demand for small arms from civilians for protection purposes due to the ongoing conflict and consequent instability in Syria. Purchasing small arms continues to be relatively easy with the use of both online channels and open-air bazaars, which have increased unlicensed arms possession in the country. Transnational trade of counterfeit goods, for which Syria is both a source and destination, is prevalent in the country. The issue is especially pertinent in northern Syria, where fraudulent goods reportedly enter the region with legal documents and licit trade infrastructure. Goods commonly counterfeited include household products such as laundry detergents, cleaning supplies and dishwashing soap, as well as expired or counterfeit food items, which are also produced in the country. Similarly, the illicit trade in excise goods is commonplace in Syria, especially tobacco products. Although illicit cigarette flows into and out of the country have presumably changed direction at various points in time, depending on market dynamics, in recent years Syria has been characterized as a destination country for tobacco products smuggled from Lebanon, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. These smuggling activities are reported to be facilitated by the foreign forces present in the country as well as state-embedded actors. This criminal market is a significant source of revenue for smuggling networks along borders and a significant source of bribes for government officials and armed groups who control said borders and checkpoints. Some actors involved in the continuing conflict in the country have allegedly been relying on financing generated by the illicit trade in tobacco products, among other goods. The illicit flora trade continues to be negligible to non-existent in Syria, although there is some information circulating on the smuggling of charcoal from Somalia into Syria. Conversely, Syria continues to be a relatively small transit and source country for fauna crimes, with illicit bird trade and poaching pervasive in the country. There are wildlife breeding centres in Aleppo and Damascus, from which exotic animals are smuggled out of Syria to elsewhere in the Middle East. Syria continues to be a destination country for oil smuggled from Lebanon and Iran. Moreover, in north-west Syria, there has been a recent influx of smuggled oil from areas controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces SDF , due to the growing price differences between the two regions. The illicit oil and fuel economy has tremendous reach within all sectors of Syrian society, making it one of the most profitable illicit markets, with most of the functioning oil infrastructure and foreign imports in the hands of either non-state armed groups or smugglers. There are also reports of those connected to high-ranking Syrian officials being involved in the illicit trade of oil. The smuggling modus operandi is reportedly very diverse and can take place by van, bicycle, donkey, car, motorcycle or Syrian Army trucks. Diesel is also manufactured in the country by criminal groups to be sold in the local market as well as in neighbouring countries, including Turkey. Moreover, there have been reports of gold being smuggled into neighbouring Lebanon. Although drug trafficking has been on the rise in Syria in recent years, heroin and cocaine markets in the country continue to be less pervasive due to the high cost of and limited demand for these drugs. In this respect, the country is primarily a transit country for heroin and cocaine trafficked in the region, especially towards the Gulf states. Hezbollah is involved in both heroin and cocaine smuggling in Syria. The port cities of Tartous and Latakia as well as the city of Qamishli in north-eastern Syria are major drug-trafficking hubs. The illicit cannabis trade is widespread in Syria, and occurs in government-controlled, opposition-controlled and SDF-controlled areas. Although some cannabis is known to enter Syria from Turkey and Lebanon, cannabis is widely cultivated in the country. Synthetic drugs, specifically Captagon, are prevalent in the country, with Syria emerging as the global epicentre of Captagon production, which has been exacerbated following the civil war. Easy access to components enables synthetic-drug production to flourish, and Captagon production in particular has been increasing in recent years. Captagon consumption has become normalized in Syria, but local demand continues to be limited with the country mainly serving as a source country for predominantly Gulf countries. Synthetic drugs are smuggled out of Syria to neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as to Europe. Recent reports suggest a strong financial reliance on Captagon production and trafficking by the country. Even though cyber-dependent crimes are not common among the general population, these crimes are perpetrated with political intentions. There are notorious networks that reportedly have direct ties with the government and non-state armed militias carrying out numerous cyber-dependent crimes, including using malware, spamming and denial-of-service attacks to target media groups, NGOs, businesses and state bodies. Cyber-dependent crimes are mostly carried out to suppress dissent rather than generate economic profit. Instead, the limited activity targets diaspora and other Arabic-language communities outside the country. Although it is difficult to paint an accurate picture of the magnitude of financial crime in Syria, it is seemingly pervasive, especially in terms of tax evasion and the embezzlement of funds. These have become sizeable issues causing extensive losses to the government. Furthermore, sanctions and policy-driven distortions in the financial and foreign exchange sectors have resulted in the emergence of a widespread illicit finance and foreign exchange sector that operates outside the purview of the government. Criminal actors in Syria encompass various entities, most notably state-embedded actors, criminal networks and foreign actors. Corruption, bribery and nepotism continue to be prevalent in the country. State-embedded actors, including the Ghaith Forces, the Tiger Forces, the Country Armor Forces and the National Defence Forces, continue to exert major control over criminal markets such as drug production and trafficking. State-embedded actors also provide criminal groups with weapons and security, providing them with protection from legal consequences and facilitating their transit through checkpoints. Foreign criminal actors are also heavily involved in the criminal landscape of the country, with most of the Syrian borders being controlled by a large variety of foreign actors such as Sunni Islamist militant groups, the Syrian National Army, the Russian Armed Forces, the SDF and Turkish militias loyal to Turkey, among others. Foreign criminal groups also cooperate extensively with local criminals. Various foreign proxy groups involved in the civil war also control border crossings and human-trafficking operations, and are also suspected of involvement in oil trafficking. The Syrian state is to a large extent embedded in the private sector, where organized crime is difficult to separate from the illicit activities orchestrated by the government. For instance, there are reports indicating the incorporation of private companies by the Syrian regime in an attempt to avoid Western sanctions. Tax evasion by large companies in the private sector is also pervasive in Syria. The Syrian state continues to not provide much room for mafia-style groups, but such groups with familial and kinship ties remain active in the country. State intelligence agencies observe the daily lives of citizens in efforts to root out dissent through targeted detentions, torture and executions. Corruption continues to be a systemic issue throughout the governmental apparatus, rendering the infiltration of state institutions by criminal organizations very possible. Although the government, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the transparency of the state budget and electronic payment systems are present in all regions and governorates, this has played no role in limiting corruption in the country. Syria has ratified the vast majority of relevant treaties pertaining to organized crime. However, while Syria does maintain formal ties to a number of countries, there is no meaningful substantive international collaboration or cooperation on issues related to transnational organized crime. Syrian government actors have taken advantage of attempts at collaboration to advance own political goals. Syria also fails to extradite war criminals, although extradition treaties are in place. Nonetheless, Syria has been improving its relationship with other Arab states, which may open the door for regional and international cooperation in fighting organized crime in the future. Syria has been also readmitted to the World Health Organization. However, the implementation of these legislations is severely lacking, with even pro-government forces engaged in certain criminal markets with impunity. Despite the existence of relevant judicial institutions mandated with fighting organized crime, the judicial system in Syria continues to be deeply corrupt, highly politicized and dependent on the state. The president is entitled to dismiss judges through presidential decrees, which further undermines the independence of the judicial system. As for the penitentiary system in Syria, prison conditions are reported to not meet the standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. Children are held in prison, where malnutrition and torture are rampant. Similarly, law enforcement continues to be widely corrupt and politicized, and organized-crime groups are embedded within the system. The Syrian military also carries out arbitrary arrests of citizens. There have been reports of clashes between the security service and criminal militias loyal to the government in several parts of the country. Moreover, the state security apparatus continues to lack the necessary capacity to effectively combat organized crime caused by the civil war. Syria continues to be a fragmented country, with a weak economy and weak governance structures. In effect, the country is divided into four administrative zones, with the government running the central, southern and coastal areas. The north-eastern provinces are managed by a Western-backed, Kurdish-led administration, the north-western Idlib province is dominated by jihadi factions and the northern borders and a swath of Syrian land is controlled by Turkey. Despite the existence of a regulatory framework and measures pertaining to money laundering, their implementation is severely undermined in practice, as the Syrian government applies such measures selectively. Furthermore, internationally imposed sanctions appear to indicate complicity from the Syrian central bank in a range of money-laundering schemes. Its effects range from soaring inflation, the devaluation of the Syrian pound and harsh shortages of fuel and electricity to increasing food insecurity and widespread poverty. Efforts made by the Syrian government to provide support to victims and witnesses of organized crime in the country are very limited. For instance, there are only two state rehabilitation centres for drug users in addition to a few private ones. Trafficking victims continue to be vulnerable and even reportedly punished for unlawful acts they were forced to commit, such as child soldiering or sex work. No protection services are provided to children who were recruited by armed groups. Rather, they are arrested and tortured by government officials. Courts continue to discriminate against women in particular, and perpetrators of sexual abuse can avoid punishment by marrying their victims. Women are afraid to report sexual abuse to the police for fear of further sexual abuse. The Syrian regulatory framework continues to lack witness protection programmes and judges may oblige witnesses to appear in court without protection. Crime prevention in Syria revolves around community awareness-raising programmes, often targeted at the youth. The Syrian regime has plans to establish crime-reporting centres. Community-based initiatives led by NGOs to promote civil-society awareness have also been launched, although they have been largely ineffective. Moreover, various crime-prevention programmes supported by international aid organizations have been mostly unsuccessful in reducing crime. The government has not only failed to make efforts to prevent certain organized criminal activities such as human trafficking and drug trafficking, but it also has either failed to acknowledge the existence of the market or boosted the reach and effects of such markets. Community-based initiatives, undertaken by civil-society organizations CSOs , promote awareness of civil society, which are assisted by the media to encourage state actors to combat crime. Nevertheless, CSOs are unable to provide the state with resources to fight crime, as their contributions are limited to civil-society activities. There are also a few organizations whose secondary domain is protecting women, particularly victims of sexual violence, but their role is limited and they face several challenges, the most serious being financial. CSOs are unable to exist without explicit permission and practical protection from regime or state institutions in the country. The Syrian media is owned and controlled by state actors, and investigative journalism is nearly non-existent. Journalists engage in self-censorship, especially on matters regarding the ruling family. Journalists are also under constant threat of abduction and death, and have often been subjected to intimidation. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Damascus. Gross domestic product GDP No data. Income group Low income. Population 21,, Geography type Coastal. GINI Index Criminal markets 6. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 8. Human smuggling 9. Extortion and protection racketeering 8. Arms trafficking 9. Trade in counterfeit goods 6. Illicit trade in excisable goods 6. Flora crimes 1. Fauna crimes 3. Non-renewable resource crimes 8. Heroin trade 3. Cocaine trade 2. Cannabis trade 7. Synthetic drug trade Cyber-dependent crimes 4. Financial crimes 8. Criminal actors 7. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 4. Criminal networks 9. State-embedded actors Foreign actors 8. Private sector actors 7. Political leadership and governance 2. Government transparency and accountability 1. International cooperation 3. National policies and laws 2. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 1. Law enforcement 2. Territorial integrity 1. Anti-money laundering 2. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 2. Prevention 2. Non-state actors 1. Analysis Download full profile english. People The human-trafficking market in Syria continues to be pervasive, with the country being ranked among the worst in the world for human trafficking. Trade The illicit-arms market in Syria is one of the largest markets worldwide, with arms prices considerably increasing over the years. Environment The illicit flora trade continues to be negligible to non-existent in Syria, although there is some information circulating on the smuggling of charcoal from Somalia into Syria. Drugs Although drug trafficking has been on the rise in Syria in recent years, heroin and cocaine markets in the country continue to be less pervasive due to the high cost of and limited demand for these drugs. Cyber Crimes Even though cyber-dependent crimes are not common among the general population, these crimes are perpetrated with political intentions. Financial Crimes Although it is difficult to paint an accurate picture of the magnitude of financial crime in Syria, it is seemingly pervasive, especially in terms of tax evasion and the embezzlement of funds. Criminal Actors Criminal actors in Syria encompass various entities, most notably state-embedded actors, criminal networks and foreign actors. Criminal justice and security Despite the existence of relevant judicial institutions mandated with fighting organized crime, the judicial system in Syria continues to be deeply corrupt, highly politicized and dependent on the state. Economic and financial environment Despite the existence of a regulatory framework and measures pertaining to money laundering, their implementation is severely undermined in practice, as the Syrian government applies such measures selectively. Civil society and social protection Efforts made by the Syrian government to provide support to victims and witnesses of organized crime in the country are very limited. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

A little-known drug brought billions to Syria’s coffers. Now it’s a bargaining chip

Damascus where can I buy cocaine

Captagon is a highly addictive amphetamine-like drug that has plagued the Middle East in recent years. Over the past year, the BBC has filmed with the Jordanian and Lebanese armies, observing their campaigns to stop Captagon being smuggled across the borders into their countries from Syria. In March, Britain, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on a list of people - including two cousins of President Assad - suspected of involvement in the Captagon trade. But the BBC's investigation, deep inside Syria's narco-state, has found evidence indicating the involvement of other senior Syrian officials in addition to those already included in that list. Syria's government has not responded to the BBC's request for comment. However, it has previously denied any involvement in the drugs trade. In July , in the city of Suweida in southern Syria, the headquarters of Raji Falhout, the leader of a regime-allied militia, was overrun by a rival group. They found bags of what appeared to be Captagon pills prepared for distribution and a machine which could be used to press pills, as well as Mr Falhout's Syrian military ID card and an unlocked mobile phone. Gaining exclusive access to the phone, the BBC found a series of messages between Mr Falhout and a Lebanese contact he called 'Abu Hamza', in which they discussed the purchase of the pill-pressing machine. There is a chat on the mobile from August , in which Mr Falhout and Abu Hamza talked about moving the machinery from Lebanon to Syria. We have been told by local journalists that he is linked to Hezbollah, the Lebanese political party and militant group closely affiliated with the Syrian government. Hezbollah's fighters have played a key role in helping the Syrian government turn the tide in the civil war and are reported to have a presence throughout Syria. They have long been accused of involvement in drug trafficking, but have always denied it. Speaking to us from exile, a Syrian journalist from the Suweida area explained: 'Hezbollah is involved but is very careful not to have its members playing key roles in transporting and smuggling the merchandise. They have previously denied any role in the production and smuggling of Captagon. We were unable to reach Mr Falhout or Mr Faytrouni for comment. He said many of them had become drug dealers locally to supplement their incomes, and that this had become routine for them. We asked him to describe his unit's role in the local Captagon trade. We would receive the goods and co-ordinate with the Fourth Division to facilitate our movement. The Fourth Division is an elite Syrian army unit tasked with protecting the government from internal and external threats. Since it has been formally led by Maher al-Assad, the younger brother of President Assad. Maher al-Assad is subject to Western sanctions for carrying out brutal crackdowns on demonstrators during Syria's civil war and has also been linked with the alleged use of chemical weapons. He is also said to have overseen the transformation of the Fourth Division into a major economic player. We spoke to a former officer who had defected from the Syrian army. He told us: 'Because of the tough financial conditions which the officers and ranks are going through during the Syrian war, many members of the Fourth Division have resorted to smuggling. Syria's economy, crippled by sanctions and war, is now close to collapse. Analysts have told us it has become increasingly reliant on the lucrative little Captagon pill. The BBC has found further evidence of Assad family involvement in the business. In , a trial began in Lebanon against a notorious Lebanese-Syrian businessman called Hassan Daqqou, dubbed the 'King of Captagon' by the Lebanese press. He was found guilty of Captagon trafficking after a huge shipment of the drug was seized in Malaysia. The case was heard behind closed doors, but our team met with the judge who told us that most of the evidence came from the surveillance of phone communications between Daqqou and a number of drug smugglers. In the trial, Daqqou said he was collaborating with the Syrian army's Fourth Division to fight Captagon traffickers and presented a Fourth Division ID card as evidence. Daqqou told the BBC that he maintained his innocence and that no evidence was found by the court to involve him in a Captagon shipment. While Daqqou was found guilty of trafficking, the judge told the BBC that no evidence was found of Syrian officials' involvement in his Captagon business. But our investigation found something in the page court document that tells a different story - a series of screenshots of WhatsApp messages that Daqqou sent to someone he called 'The Boss'. Their phone number mostly consisted of the same digit repeated many times, making it a prized so-called 'golden number'. We called the number repeatedly but failed to get a response. In the WhatsApp messages, Daqqou discussed with The Boss the movement of 'goods' - which we believe to be Captagon - to a Syrian town called Saboora, where the Fourth Division has a large base, as well the renewal of security clearances. If The Boss really is Gen Bilal, the conversation suggests that one of Syria's most senior army officers is linked to the illegal Captagon trade, worth billions of dollars. Gen Bilal did not return our attempt to reach him for comment. In May, Syria was welcomed back into the Arab League and President Assad attended a meeting of the regional grouping for the first time in more than a decade. The question remains as to what extent the international community will seek to pressure the regime to give up Syria's addiction to Captagon. Skip to content. US Election. Syria: New Captagon drug trade link to top officials found. Captagon, dubbed 'the poor man's cocaine', is produced in huge quantities in Syria. Now the drug is being found in Europe, Africa and Asia. BBC and other. That was not the only time Hezbollah appeared in our investigation. BH TV. Malaysian authorities seized nearly m Captagon pills in Huge amphetamine haul seized at Jordan-Iraq border. Jordan's drug fight becomes deadly undeclared war. Jordan says it killed 27 drug smugglers from Syria. Hezbollah denies any role in global drugs trade. Syrian civil war. Drugs trade.

Damascus where can I buy cocaine