Criminal Boys
Andrey PertsevHello, this is Andrey Pertsev - a correspondent for Meduza (Announced in Russia as a "foreign agent) who has been writing about Russian politics.
... The policy of any country does not exist in an empty place, and the state is a big machine and a complex mechanism in which everything affects everyone. And what a shock for many - including me - the current war has become, once again proving that we know our state and its authorities poorly. Perhaps today we can close another gap in this knowledge.
In early July, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, who has recently become barely whether not the main Kremlin "hawk", broke out with another post in his telegram channel, and explained why it is important that Russia is respected: "As in childhood, when your yard came to fight out neighbor ... if you hit first, then the chances of defending one's own become significantly higher.
The language of the streets, which has absorbed the “thieves” jargon, is regularly used by Russian politicians. For example, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, describing negotiations with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken at the end of December, suddenly started talking about "concepts" (boy said - boy did). Western audience hardly understood what it was about, but the “boss” understood well - Russian President Vladimir Putin once admitted that he was a bully in childhood, and himself remembered the rule “to hit first”, which “the street of Leningrad” taught him.
My letter today is about the "boys" from these streets. About how their subculture was formed, its basic laws. And also about why the “boys” are the key to understanding the current war and how it could end up.
And we will start this conversation with the history of St. Petersburg - with that part of it that is not written about in textbooks.
Criminal Boys
Petersburg at the beginning of the 20th century was considered the most criminal city, not even in Russia, but in all of Europe. Pickpockets were active in the markets and squares. Cab drivers suffered from horse thieves, wealthy merchants from safebreakers who cracked safes. Simpler thieves cleaned the apartments of "ordinary" townspeople.
It was a rather motley criminal fraternity, but something united it - professional thieves deliberately eschewed violence. They were driven solely by the mercenary interest, which consisted in stealing something valuable and hiding as soon as possible without too much noise.
But also in the city, groups were operating that looked at life differently - hooligans. As a rule, they consisted of youth and teenagers: homeless adolescent, children from the working-class urban outskirts who had nothing to do. Historian Vitaly Ryzhov writes hooligans committed crimes spontaneously, unmotivated - "out of mischief or drunk." They did not seek to avoid unnecessary noise, rather the opposite.
“Professional criminals considered any physical violence, especially murder, a deed low and dirty; killers were not respected and considered a lower caste. In a hooligan environment, on the contrary, beating or killing a person was considered a common and even honorable thing, and elegant ways of taking money were not welcomed” - so explains Ryzhov the difference between professional thieves and “amateur” hooligans.
Violence was primary for hooligans. For example, they often beat passers-by just like that, without the purpose of robbing them. Or they fought wall to wall - one working settlement against another - to find out who is stronger.
Researcher Tatyana Shchepanskaya believes that the roots of hooligan love for violence should be sought in mass village fights, which were common in the Russian Empire. Urban outskirts are often former villages and villages absorbed by a growing metropolis. In addition, the villagers who migrated to the city often settled on its outskirts. They brought the memory of village traditions with them.
The traditions of village fights were kept, of course, by men - fathers, older brothers. Anthropologist Dmitry Gromov and sociologist Svetlana Stevenson, in a scholarly work on Russian youth groups, write about two important attitudes of the village dweller, which "remained part of the collective social knowledge." Here they are: "know how to stand up for yourself" and "the main thing is to hit first."
It was important to grasp them - folk often fought in the villages - crowd against the crowd. Sometimes - for no reason: the parties just wanted to know which of them is stronger. However, not always - the reasons for the massacre were also found, albeit purely formal ones. Let's say the youth of one village could go against another "because of the girls." Or in the name of "protecting children", who were previously specially ordered to commit some kind of provocation.
The village fight was not only a way to let off steam, but also a meaningful village ritual. It had his own traditions - for example, the participants in the battles cheered each other up with songs. There was even a whole genre - a song for a fight. The guys sang: “Hey, flirt with a fight, we’ll start a fight: guilty comers, we’ll break their heads!” or “My white shirt is covered in blood. Count, my girl, all the wounds on the head!
Researcher Tatyana Shchepanskaya points out that the village fight also served several important social functions. Some of them are quite obvious - with the help of these battles, young people learned to fight back and defend their territory. But there is also an unobvious one - fights helped to "filter out" the most rabid fighters.
At the critical moment of the confrontation, the village girls separated the fighters: adequate guys listened to them, but the most desperate guys continued to fight, receiving injuries or even mortal blows. The crippled guy lost his attractiveness, and the girls bypassed him. In addition, a serious injury was a sign of aggression and cruelty of the one who received it - it was dangerous to marry such a person. Therefore, the most active participants in fights often stayed away from family life.
How hooligans met "thieves" - and Criminal “Boys” appeared
Before the revolution, St. Petersburg hooligans were in many ways the bearers of the folk culture of the Russian village. But they did not stop there - under the Soviet regime, hooligan traditions continued to develop. According to researchers, these traditions were finally formed already in the fifties of the XX century.
Then - shortly after the death of Joseph Stalin - a general amnesty was announced in the country; More than a million people have been released from prison. These were not only and not so much "political" - the bulk were those convicted under ordinary criminal articles.
Once liberated, the former inmates began to actively spread thieves' "concepts" and jargon, and society actively absorbed all this. Sociologist Anton Oleinik explains that the rules of life in captivity were clear to the Soviet citizen and even familiar somewhere. “Both of these institutions are ‘total’ — in prison, as in Soviet society, there were no boundaries between private and public life,” he notes.
Often yesterday's prisoners settled on the outskirts, where criminalized boys and working youth were in charge. So these two cultures - prison and hooligan-village - met. And having met and united, they gave rise to a subculture of street boy gangs - “boys” appeared.
On the one hand, the "boys" became the successors of the village fist traditions. They divided people into "friends" and "strangers" on a territorial basis: "friends" were guys from the same yard, street or micro-district; "strangers" - all the rest. And a stranger is an enemy, he had to be defeated in battle.
On the other hand, the “boys” adopted the “concepts” and jargon of the “thieves”. Prison culture attracted adolescents and older youth in that it made it possible to realize social rebellion - both the state as a whole and the Soviet educational system in particular, which permeated schools, pioneer and Komsomol organizations, were its object. Anthropologist Vadim Lurie emphasizes: “In the existing totalitarian state, children, by virtue of their age, thieves, by virtue of their position and the role they played, had the opportunity to create their own cultures that were not subordinate to the official culture and resist it. They could be outcasts."
There were more and more "outcasts" - the groups grew and grew stronger. And not only at the expense of those who wanted to rebel against the Soviet state, but also at the expense of those who feared for their safety. Teenagers joined street gangs, among other things, in order to become for the “boys” someone “their own” and no longer be subjected to violence from their side. It was very beneficial for the groups themselves, because the more you are, the stronger you are. And the more voluminous your "cash desk" - all members of the group should chip in for a common cause, in the "common fund".
Sometimes only desire to join a group was not enough, it was necessary to go through initiation, including initiation by violence. For example, a newcomer was beaten, but he was obliged to endure and not complain. So the newly minted gang member found himself in an environment where violence was the main method of communication. Members of the street gangs whiled away their days, constantly resorting to it: beating strangers who wandered into their area; they themselves invaded “foreign” territory in order to properly fight; they beat up representatives of other youth subcultures (for example, fans of some musical genre) or those who did not know the concepts and could not stand up for themselves.
Experts of prison culture are aware that "concepts" forbid to use violence without reason. Such behavior is considered "lawlessness" and is punished for it - also, of course, with violence. Aggression must be legitimate, it needs a reason. The “boys” masterfully learned to invent these reasons, in which the culture of village fights (to protect some girls or children) was very useful again. But not only that - arguments like “he looked wrong” and “answered wrong” also gave the moral right to the first blow.
Thus, in the second half of the 20th century, violence turned into a special language of communication on city streets. The universality of this language is noted, for example, by researcher Tatyana Shchepanskaya. “Pain, tactile signals are clear to everyone,” she writes, so when the other party does not want to communicate, violence can force them. It will also help when the parties "do not have a common language (verbal or symbolic)".
To reinforce her thought, Shchepanskaya gives an example: fights often begin with the words “Not understand.” By this, the aggressor means that now the parties will try to understand each other differently, in an understandable language. That way they can not only resolve the conflict, but also unite - because "through complicity in violence, previously strangers unite and accept each other"
In addition, violence serves as a means of knowledge. Using it, a person will find out who is in front of him: the other “boy” is also ready to get into a fight, but the “goof” is not, so he can be beaten, humiliated and robbed. You can also learn through violence - if someone violates the norms of the community, they are “remembered” with a fist to him so that he remembers better and does not forget anymore. Finally, violence becomes an instrument of exile. The most notorious norm-breakers are severely beaten so that they can never return to the group.
When the "boys" got close to state - and how it affected Russian politics
The "boy" culture, which arose in defiance of the official one, eventually became closer to it. This process began back in the Soviet years: during the late Soviet era, teenage groups with a patriotic and even pro-state ideology suddenly began to appear.
One of them was studied by the sociologist Sergei Belanovsky, it was called "Communards". In the mid-eighties, it was founded by a former Soviet policeman who trained teenagers in combat for free. And so a youth group appeared (not very numerous, however, - 100-150 people), whimsically combining criminal “boys” and official rhetoric.
Belanovsky believes that the work of the former policeman with the yard guys would have been impossible without the approval, albeit tacit, of the authorities. It is likely that this was the case: unlike the vast majority of other Soviet "boy" groups, the Communards did not rebel against the state. For example, they insisted that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was fair and necessary.
The group treated the yard punks favorably - it was believed that they were hooligans “from nothing to do”, and they just needed help. But the "enemies" were various informals, speculators and sex workers - that is, those who were actively persecuted by the Soviet state.
The goals that the "Communards" set for themselves were also far from rebellious. Among them, for example, are the following: to educate in oneself a physically developed personality, ready for work and defense; clean up own area, and in the future the city and the whole country from those who “prevent us from developing normally”; help troubled teenagers improve and prepare for military service.
Many statements of the modern Russian government almost literally repeat the theses of the Communards, and it is easy to notice. That is, the reasons why "boys’" principles penetrated the official level should be sought not only in the fact that at the end of the Yeltsin period, representatives of Russian organized crime groups gained access to politics. Politics and “boy-friendship” in Russia met earlier, and by the time Vladimir Putin came to power, they had already influenced each other for some time. The “street” experience of the youth of the Russian president simply organically fit into this process and accelerated it.
How organically, it became noticeable not immediately. Until the president became the sole head of the Russian elite, and the Kremlin still had many "towers", the criminal courtyard philosophy of the head of state was not so conspicuous - it was diluted with views on the life of other high-status politicians, far from the streets and teenage gangs. But after the head of state publicly showed, and more than once, that he was not ready to seriously listen even to the closest members of his entourage, the Kremlin courtyard, willy-nilly, had to accept the rules of the St. Petersburg gateways and begin to live by them. It was, in general, not difficult to do - criminal culture has long penetrated into many areas of Russian life, so its language and principles are well known to everyone, including the elite.
So. it is worth looking at the actions of the Russian leadership - extremely illogical from the point of view of diplomacy and outrageous from the point of view of morality - with "boy’s" eyes. This is practically inaccessible to a Western audience, but Russians can easily try on this approach - and find a lot of evidence that this is exactly how the Kremlin operates.
First, the "boy" does not seek to become successful in the usual frame of reference - he establishes his own order, his own hierarchy of values and his own criteria for success based on strength. Vladimir Putin and his entourage are also sure that Russia should have a privileged position in the world community, not because it is socially prosperous, technologically advanced, or even simply rich. The argument here is purely forceful - the country has nuclear weapons and a very large territory. Of course, with a certain persistence, well-being and development can be achieved by integrating into the global context on a common basis, but rattling weapons and building an alternative world order is much more convenient.
Secondly, the "boy" culture is very masculine, and one way to humiliate the enemy is to doubt his masculinity. Russian leaders are doing the same - we have heard many times how Putin and other representatives of the Russian authorities made fun of the "non-traditional values" of Western countries, and official propaganda frightened Russians with "geyropa".
Thirdly, groups are interested in growing up and getting stronger, and do not like "neutral" teenagers - with the help of violence they are encouraged to finally decide and become "their own" for hooligans. Then the attacks stop, and the "boys" are ready to defend the newcomer in case of a conflict with competitors. This is exactly how Russia behaves with the CIS countries - for example, reminding Kazakhstan that it is still better to be friends with Russia.
Fourth, street groups are constantly looking for victims in order to establish themselves in their might. These victims are often weak teenagers who are not members of any groups - this is how the "boys" insure themselves against a fight with the strong, which is still unknown how it will end. The current war with Ukraine and the conflict with Georgia in 2008 - both countries are not members of NATO - fit well into this logic. They also fit into the territorial logic of the formation of groups - the Russian authorities consider the countries of the former USSR to be their area of influence, and still tend to dictate their rules to them.
Fifth, a good street fight needs a purely formal pretext, and the Kremlin has several of them at once. We protect the children of Donbass and all our "under wardship" ones - the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine is allegedly oppressed, so they need to be released. And we are also defending our territory, because we are threatened by “strangers” – by the deployment of NATO military bases in Ukraine. These “strangers” do not want to understand the words, so it is time to explain our position to them in another language.
Even the Kremlin's PR support for the current war is inspired by "criminal boys". The slogan of the campaign is “We do not abandon our own”, and they explain that the main thing is to protect “our own”, and not to be truly right. Moreover, the “boy” is always right in any case and can prove it - if not with street jargon, then with his fists.
Knowing boys’ logic makes it easier to understand the actions of the Russian government, its basic philosophy. But it does not add optimism - a bully who starts a fight without any rational reasons and clear goals, albeit very selfish ones, will fight to the end.
However, the code of honor of the "criminal boys" is not clearly spelled out anywhere and can be interpreted broadly. When retreating, street gang members often pretend that they really succeeded, and some failures are due to the fact that the enemy crushed them with numbers or violated the rules of the fight.
Russian propaganda is already preparing the ground for such a retreat, claiming that the country is actually at war not with Ukraine, but with NATO, that is, a more serious and powerful adversary than Kyiv. To stop the fight for the sake of preserving the health and life of the "boy" is not a problem.
Andrey Pertsev (Андрей Перцев)
Editor: Anna Chesova (Анна Чесова)
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