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Sign in to listen to groundbreaking journalism. This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article. The street prices of illegal drugs — particularly methamphetamine hydrochloride shabu and cocaine — are now more expensive. As of Thursday morning, October 27, the total number of persons killed has already reached 4, Out of this number, 1, are drug personalities killed in police operations, while 3, are victims of extrajudicial or vigilante-style killings. The street price of shabu is determined by the place of transaction, according to PDEA. But while shabu and cocaine prices continue to rise, the street prices of marijuana and ecstasy remain static. Limiting the drug supply through prohibition, according to JC Punongbayan in a Rappler piece, however, is the traditional way of battling illegal drugs. READ: War on drugs? Other countries focus on demand, not supply. Curiously, the rising cost of drugs seems to apply only to shabu and cocaine, the preference of the poor. A dent in the supply, not the demand, is also being made by the intensified war on drugs. What would be the best measure of success in this war against drugs? Please abide by Rappler's commenting guidelines. There are no comments yet. Add your comment to start the conversation. Why is it important to subscribe? Learn more. How much do illegal drugs now cost in the Philippines? Upgrade to listen Powered by Speechify. A gram of shabu now costs P1, to P25, per gram, while cocaine is pegged at P5, to P7,, according to data from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Add a comment. Post Comment Cancel. Sort by Newest comments Oldest comments. Summarize this article with AI. How does this make you feel? Download the Rappler App! Related Topics. Jodesz Gavilan is a writer and researcher for Rappler and its investigative arm, Newsbreak. More from Jodesz Gavilan. Logged in as Toggle account details My account. Log out. Close video.
Authorities also revealed that the Philippines had become a trans-shipment point for other dangerous drugs such as heroin and cocaine. The PDEA reported the.
Cotabato buy cocaine
Collusion or Collision? The War on Drugs in the Philippines. La guerra contra las drogas en Filipinas. A guerra contra as drogas nas Filipinas. Este es el caso de Filipinas, donde una guerra indiscriminada y violenta contra las drogas no ha cumplido sus promesas. Abstract: The spiral of State-led violence against the illegal drug trade in Southeast Asia neither ended nor disrupted this shadow economy and its complex links to state and non-state actors as well as to the newly emerging violent extremism. The evidence in fact shows that the violent response to the problem has only fuelled more economic, political, and security concerns. This is the case in the Philippines where an indiscriminate and violent war on drugs has not lived up to its promises. Yet why is there continued public support for the anti-drug war despite its failures, particularly from among those who are often victimized by its violence? This paper takes an economic sociology approach to the problem of illegal drugs and turns the spotlight on the threats to embedded social networks posed by this deadly enterprise. Keywords: Philippines drug war, illicit drug trade, populism, embedded social networks, violent extremism, violent conflict, economic sociology. Before long, the war on drugs turned brutal and relentless, and the body count soared soon after it was launched. By the official body count had reached close to five thousand people within the country, and mostly in the national capital region ncr. In contrast, reports from human rights groups showed more than seven thousand suspects or about 35 persons a day have been killed in what Amnesty International described as the extra-judicial killing ejk of persons suspected of being producers, traders, pushers, and users of narcotics. Worse, the unofficial body count from media showed even higher figures, that were closer to twelve to fifteen thousand. While the facts and statistics are contested and confusing, one important aspect of the war is not. The campaign has elicited wide public support within the country and from Filipinos living abroad. Polls and media reports indicate that support was widespread among different classes in Philippine society. Also, like other anti-drug wars, the impunity to kill turned the campaign into a war against human rights and international humanitarian law as well. These findings lead us to an important puzzle: why is there continuing public support for a war on drugs that has failed to deliver on its promises, and among people who are most affected by its violence? There are at least two ways to address this conundrum: one way is to look at the manner in which the war was launched, assess its many weaknesses, and examine the hidden benefits and incentives that the Philippine government gets from pursuing a failed campaign. Another way is to analyse the contingent structures and social networks at the community level where support for the war on drugs and other illicit economies is rife, examine their rationale and incentives, and assess the distribution of power among and between these networks and the State. This study focuses on the latter, and the reason is straightforward —it was clear from the outset that broad public support for the war on drugs was crucial and necessary for the State to continue its strategy regardless of what its performance was—. The research challenge was to explain how that support came about at the local level where it wields the most relevance and impact. This study is important because it sheds light on the hidden forces and dynamics at the community level that determine the effectiveness and the level of support for the anti-drug war. It is also relevant because we need to disentangle the rhetoric from the real objectives of the anti-drug war in relation to the communities that are affected by it. Finally, the study is a timely contribution to the development of strategies and plans that can curb the potential resurgence of this illegal and deadly enterprise. The study employs an economic sociology approach that looks at how the illicit drug economy is embedded in social networks that allow entrepreneurs in this illicit economy to generate huge profits, but at the same time constrains their choices due to existing social norms and controls that they need to reciprocate and uphold. In many instances, exchange arrangements in any market, including the market for illicit drugs, is affected by norms of reciprocity among producers, traders, and consumers, and the need to redistribute incomes and profits away from the centre and towards the peripheries. Granovetter , pp. Portes , p. For example, some of the crucial social networks that are often neglected in the study of economic informality in the Philippines are the families and clans and the role they play in mediating transactions within the informal economies of Muslim Mindanao. Another important social network are the tricycle operators and drivers associations toda that proliferate in the many enclaves of Metro-Manila and function as closely knit groups engaged in retail logistics and who possess their own set of rules and sanctions. The study examines the institutional systems and dynamics that underlie other social structures bound by tribal, ethnic, and political identities. More importantly, the study examines the rival economies that thrive alongside the illegal drug economy, determining which of these contribute to growth and are forces of economic development versus those that spur economic decline and social disorder. The research methodology was guided by similar studies conducted by those who have explored the intersection between social networks and shadow economies, using qualitative research methods that have been used in other studies such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and trialogues. The authors also interviewed key respondents and made use of transcripts from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews conducted in the case study areas, as well as secondary data from media and community reports. Descriptive quantitative data was also secured through an analysis of back-end information of drug-related violent incidents contained in an eight-year panel dataset on violent conflict, particularly drug-related violence, in the Bangsamoro region of Muslim Mindanao. The authors are grateful to International Alert Philippines for allowing the use of this panel data. Finally, the study employed multi-level case studies of the social networks that underlie the shadow economies in illegal drugs and others within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao barrm and the towns of Marawi in Lanao del Sur, and Datu Saudi Ampatuan in Maguindanao. The literature on illicit drugs, social networks, and violent conflict. The thesis is that the illegality of the drug economy induces the creation of spaces outside state control that will become perpetual sources of criminal violence and rebellion Cornell, , p. For example, in Mindanao, the trade in illicit drugs is often linked or accompanied by the manufacture and trade in illegal weapons, kidnap-for-ransom, and smuggling. Bayart et al. However, the appeal to state building objectives does not resonate equally in all areas of the Philippines, and has the weakest traction in the case study areas selected for this study, where people hardly pay any taxes, where local communities are the most conflict-ridden across the country, and where the domestic centre of the illicit drug trade operates. State building agendas certainly lack traction in those places where tribal, ethnic, and religious identities have constantly fought the State to respect their desire for autonomy and self-determination, and at one point, even secession. There is also an impasse when the legitimacy and credibility of local authority is built along the non-payment of taxes and the existence of rival holders of the means of coercion Lara, , pp. In fact, the operations of some local government units in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao barmm are replicas of the criminalized states that Reno and Bayart spoke about. A more recent report on violent conflict indicated as well how former rebels were now being supplanted by violent extremists who provide protection to drug lords Conflict Alert, , p. The second approach interrogates the war on drugs through a prism of fear and anxiety and how these feelings are marshalled to mobilize wide popular support for a highly punitive war on drugs. The thesis of penal populism has been used to describe the constant negotiation between the distinct yet interrelated politics of anxiety and hope Curato, , pp. The argument is that the war on drugs shapes and is shaped by the fears over loss of life and property that local citizens feel, and that this anxiety in turn constricts the space of political discourse by invoking the tough language of war against drugs and criminality, while hope broadens the scope of what electoral politics can achieve through alternative methods that depart from the classic machine politics of Philippine elections. The thesis looks well and good, except for one important thing that is absent in this approach, i. In short, it is unclear how perceptions of anxiety and hope evolved, who their proponents are, and who stands to benefit directly from the punitive actions that are taken against drug pushers and users. The effect is dangerously close to what the approach claims to avoid in the first place, i. There is a third approach that looks at the illicit drug economy in the Philippines, and in other countries where anti-drug wars have been initiated, as nested in communities where various social networks and arrangements exist. These networks can become stronger or weaker or expand and constrict depending upon the motivations and strategies of various actors engaged in the many informal, unregulated, and secondary economies that are prevalent in poor and conflict affected areas. The approach uses the social embeddedness framework in economic sociology noted earlier that highlights the role of traditional and embedded social networks in the assessment and management of risk. Meanwhile, the conflict scholar William Reno , p. In this approach, the mechanisms for social monitoring and control, punitive sanctions, and repressive violence are contingent upon the balance of power between the illicit drug networks, the State, and rival social networks in other shadow economies. This paper specifically examines the social networks embedded in other shadow economy activities that may have been affected or threatened by the deadly and illicit drug economy, particularly the impact of law enforcement campaigns, lockdowns, and the militarization of communities that the narcotics syndicates brought upon themselves and their operations, and the push back from rival networks that have been affected by these operations. Meanwhile, closer to the Bangsamoro region, studies have shown how the illicit drugs economy endangered the social networks in the cross-border and barter trade. Though most social networks are local in nature, those in the illegal drugs enterprise are structured for cross-country if not cross-continental reach. However, like the two earlier approaches outlined in this literature review, there are pitfalls to using a social network approach especially when similar studies have often painted social networks in the informal, unregulated, or underground economies as sites of criminality and destabilization that do not contribute to growth but, instead, entrench poverty, inequality, and greed Meagher, , pp. There is also a tendency, very similar to what happened when the social capital framework reasserted itself in the s and s, to treat social networks as the new panacea for understanding many aspects of the formal and informal economy. Indeed, without linking social networks to the role of the State, or even to external political economy influences, the war on drugs may be treated as a simple problem of conflicts between social networks or the outcome of dysfunctional cultural systems. It is important to begin by explaining the role of the illicit drug economy in reshaping economic informality in the Philippines and the important social networks that played a role in their evolution. This is also the rationale for assessing social networks embedded in other shadow economies that may have been affected or threatened by the illicit drug economy. Robust public support despite meagre results. Many observers have argued that the robust support for the war on drugs was made possible by a combination of clever narratives that Duterte deployed during the election campaign, and soon after he gained power, that trumped his opponents. To be sure, the war against drugs did not spared neither the central state nor the local government units where drugs proliferate, as more than five hundred government employees were arrested, including locally elected officials in the first year alone. However, the big drug lords operating at the national and subnational level, including their police and military protectors were not as vulnerable. Many went into hiding and only a few were arrested or even prosecuted. Few attempts were made to disrupt the deadly links between the big drug lords operating within the country and their criminal co-conspirators at the regional and international levels. To date the number of people that have been killed would rival the number of persons executed in the past decade due to the mandatory death penalties for drug trafficking institutionalized across many countries in Southeast Asia and China. Indeed, the 3, people who were executed globally, half of which were in Asia, pales in comparison to the numbers of people killed in one anti-drug war after another in the region. Duterte was not averse to using coarse language to express his beliefs and to use violence openly and intensively in Davao City to rid the town of its drug scourge —a feat that sustained his strongman and populist politics over several electoral cycles in the city—. Just as he did in Davao, Duterte was initially able to generate support for the war on drugs from a broader public weary about their children being addicted or their communities becoming centres of narcotic production and trade, and sites of crime and violence that accompanied the drug trade. Repeated surveys confirmed this perception of improved security. However, the outcomes have been found wanting when it comes to countering and ending the illegal drug trade. Some media organizations have lent credence to reports that the drug menace has indeed become weaker, an observation that is not borne out by the facts. The failure to adequately address the supply side is evidenced by the underground market for illicit drugs that continues to provide affordable prices that enable the poor to use, buy, and sell crystal meth or shabu , cocaine, marijuana, ecstasy and other drugs. In the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime unodc acknowledged the significant decline in seizures of selected drugs and precursor chemicals such as crystalline methamphetamine in the Philippines since the beginning of the Duterte administration in However, the agency also reported opposite results for illegal drugs other than crystal meth, exposing the spike in seizures of liquid methamphetamine, ecstasy pills, and cocaine table 1. Table 1. Seizures of selected drugs and precursor chemicals in the Philippines, dainap ; unodc arq and previous years for the Philippines; Official communication with dob , February Despite the heightened law enforcement measures however, the seizure of large-scale illicit methamphetamine manufacturing facilities, as well as trafficking involved with several hundred kilos of the drug, has been continuously reported in recent years. In , the government reported that a thousand kilograms kg of shabu worth PhP 6. Authorities also revealed that the Philippines had become a trans-shipment point for other dangerous drugs such as heroin and cocaine. The pdea reported the entry of a new regional crime gang called the Golden Triangle Syndicate that was behind the huge shipment that was believed to have come from Taiwan and China. Finally, the unodc noted how the country has been increasingly targeted for trafficking of cocaine by sea, and relatively large quantities of the drug have been seized in recent years. National authorities have also observed the increasing availability of liquid ecstasy in the country. The table below shows how the increasing volume of new drugs flooding the market is hidden in a study of trends in the use of selected drugs. Table 2. October The data shows a decrease in the use of selected drugs in the unodc table, such as crystal meth, benzodiazepine, cannabis, and inhalants in , but does not include the increase in the use and seizures of cocaine, ecstasy, and other drugs enumerated in table 1 that were registered from to table 2. The turn-around from periods of dramatic reduction in the production and trade of illicit drugs to sudden spikes in supply and a collapse in prices is not unheard of in the rest of Southeast Asia. Thailand is a good comparator. Despite the efforts by the Thaksin administration, drug consumption —especially methamphetamine— ultimately returned to an alarming level. The number of meth labs in Thailand, for instance, went from 2 labs between and to between and , and the Office of Narcotics Control Board of Thailand seized up to 1, kilos of crystal methamphetamine and 9, kilos of methamphetamine tablets in alone. When the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency was established in , the major criminal gangs in the northern and central part of the Philippines were those in control of the shadow economy in illicit drugs. This was the period when criminal and trafficking gangs, some of them located in the national prisons and correctional institutions, were busy consolidating and expanding production and trading networks for drugs and the hiring and deployment of mules for domestic and international routes. Informal settlements became the locus of drug use and trade because they were the also the centre of activity and the residence of out-ofschool youth and the other underemployed or seasonally-employed men and women who were the most numerous consumers of shabu and marijuana. Studies have shown how a large proportion of urban poor youth who were engaged in exhausting livelihoods and jobs with unusually long hours were compelled to use drugs such as shabu to cope and stay awake Fuertes-Knight, These tricycles are a regular feature in many urban areas and an intoxicating presence, due to their dirty fumes and the loud noise from their exhaust pipes. They careen back and forth into the small streets that snake into the armpits of Manila urban poor communities. Their drivers and operators are organized into associations called the toda , and they often traffic and control the ingress and egress of people and goods in urban poor colonies and enclaves in the metropolis. More importantly, they are a strategic social network that criminal gangs and drug syndicates have tried to control so as to achieve the smooth entry of illicit goods such as illicit drugs and weapons into these enclaves. They are certainly a strategic and reliable source of information and a useful logistic instrument for economic, political, or social activities. Because of its inherent power and broadbased constituency, this social network thrives best when it remains autonomous from criminal groups, local elite groups and middle-class organizations. They cannot be easily mobilized without a process of bargaining and social contracting with its leaders and members. They bring voters to the election booth and they are relied upon as emergency responders in times of natural or man-made calamities, from fires, typhoons, to gang wars. They could be mobilized for campaigns against illicit economies and can make life difficult for the criminal gangs that want to bring in illegal drugs into the local economy. Drug cartels will try their utmost to control the toda or broker financial arrangements with the association to acquire their services. The more intrepid and criminally inclined toda groups would use the opportunity to create a social network of drug-dependent youth that could be harnessed for criminal activities. In other cases, the toda groups would extract vulnerable youth away from the tiangge and create networks of support where jobs were located, credit was extended, and protection from law enforcers was secured. Most of the latter types preferred to remain quiet and avoid getting into confrontations with the toda groups that were intertwined with the illicit drug economy. Consequently, their peaceful coexistence provoked an image of a peaceful but dangerous informal economy. These were the years preceding the Duterte presidency when violent conflict in this illicit economy was down and a stable peace in a usually deadly enterprise existed across the country. However, the launch of a more vigorous and continued attack against illicit drugs by the Duterte government, plus the eruption of violent disputes between drug lords with separate connections to the central state brought them out into the open. The turf war exploded within the urban poor areas and also inside the prisons where rival groups engaged in a proxy war to advance or retard the criminal interests of the big drug lords, some of whom were killed in these wars. The intensification of the anti-drug campaign eventually led to the conscription of social networks affected by the illicit drug economy to support of the violent anti-drug campaigns launched by the Duterte government. A young man was gunned down early in the evening of December in a dense Muslim enclave in one of the bustling metropolises of the Philippines. His name was Ali. The basketball court is a common space for some 15, or more residents in this crowded 4. The land where the compound stood was purchased in the s through a grant from former Libyan strongman Moammer Khaddafy who had sponsored a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front mnlf. Ali received a fatal shot in the head that was witnessed by his young daughter along with everyone else in that stunned, crowded space. This enclave, after all, is known to be a major hotspot for the illicit drugs and weapons trade in the metropolis. Ali, however, was not an enemy, but an autonomous conscript in the war against drugs, and he was slain ostensibly because he was suspected of having had a role in the creation of the narco-list in the first place. Control over the leadership in the compound was historically marked by brutal contestations, with intense fights for the prime leadership roles of head of the compound and head of the toda. One can effectively control the economic, political, and social life of the compound if one is the leader of either of these two groups or both. Rents from the various enterprises and trades inside the community go through this leadership. It is literally, the eyes, the ears, and the pocket of the community. There are two factions within the mainly Sulu-based Tausug tribe that have been at war for years. During that period, the incumbent Chairperson of the compound was from the faction perceived by people as corrupt and brutal, while the head of the toda , on the other hand, was from the other faction who has strong links to the major families of the Maguindanaon tribe in the community and to civil society groups linked to development and peacebuilding projects that initiated smallscale projects in the compound. This latter group was becoming a strong contender for the leadership of the community and posed a threat to the interests of the incumbent power holder who had already lost two top henchmen in the drug war. The leadership at that time suspected the other group to be working with the police and the military, instrumentalizing the drug war to weaken them for a take-over. The killing of Ali unleashed a string of violence that culminated in a community shoot-out between the two warring groups. This time, a Maguindanaon leader took revenge for the death of Ali and held the community hostage, fighting the police and military who went in to intervene. This was the first time in the history of this community, and since the compound was established in , that they had experienced collective violence of this sort. The eruption of criminal and ethnic violence within the enclave was widely different from the collective violence that engaged their forebears. The compound had a history of collective resistance and was the fruit of the labour of the first leaders under the Islamic Directorate who were the anti-Marcos activists from Muslim Mindanao and who later fled back to the South or to the Middle East when Marcos declared martial law in There has been a change in leadership since the events of People say it has only been from that the tension and the volatility of the situation in their compound has finally stabilized. They say they can now feel government with welfare provisions reaching their compound as compared to before. It does not matter that they have lost a good part of their income without the auxiliary benefits of the illicit trade in their area; what matters, they say, is that they finally feel secure and unafraid. The leadership of the toda went to the Maguindanaon leader who was recently released from detention for his alleged involvement in the December violence. The Chairperson of the compound is a respected Sultan who was among the original signatories in the land title possessed by the Islamic Directorate for the parcel of land donated by Libya. There is relative peace in the compound and people remain strong supporters of Duterte. They perceive the events of as an opening to finally get their community out of the stigma of illegality, lawlessness, and violence. But when asked if they think this stability would be sustained, they respond with the kind of silence that can either represent hope for the future or the resignation that comes when political, economic, and identity-based interests are at stake, and nothing is for certain. Social networks and the illicit drug economy in Mindanao. The rapid increase in domestic demand for shabu , plus the corresponding increase in deaths, arrests, and seizure of confiscated narcotics from to pushed the illicit drug economy to undertake evasive moves by importing from abroad. In , the Philippines reported clandestine production of methamphetamine ten labs were detected in , though much of the drug supplies were now being imported from China, and with a growing amount imported from Mexico. Some of the methamphetamine was also sourced outside the subregion, including, in descending order, in Mexico, the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and India, although their role in supplying markets in East and South-East Asia remains limited. Since most of the crystal meth at this time was already being manufactured in Mindanao or imported from abroad, the brutal and deadly campaign being waged in the national metropolis and the other major cities of Luzon and the Visayas seemed clearly misdirected. Consequently, the move to rural areas that were beyond the easy scope of law enforcement made Mindanao an excellent expansion area for the production and storage of shabu inside the country. It also shifted the locus of social networks attached to the illicit drugs economy towards the families, clans, and criminal gangs that were already embedded in the informal economy in Mindanao. That is so because in Mindanao, these informal economies are legitimate sources of livelihoods and jobs, enabling poor and marginalized groups to cope in the midst of economic uncertainty and hardship. For example, studies of the illicit cross border trade across the Sulu Seas amplified the notion of a benign shadow state where public sector workers wore two hats, as enforcers on the one hand, and dealers on the other Quitoriano, ; Villanueva, They also revealed how the smuggling of various commodities often involved public school teachers who were simply involved in coping and survival mechanisms to support their family needs and send their children to school. There are other social networks that grew out of other illicit economies that could be considered as survival or coping economies such as informal credit, unregulated transport vehicles, and secondary land markets. However, the illegal drug trade stood out from the rest. The enterprise requires relatively smaller amounts of capital yet it generates the biggest profits compared to other shadow economies. Drugs, like money, are also fungible —they can be sold or used as currency—. Drug lords can pay other criminal entrepreneurs with crystal meth or shabu and other drugs or turn their products into cold cash and hand over the funds to greedy politicians and corrupt government executives and some to the religious groups, to be used as payment for dowry, tuition fees, blood money and the like. Cash is also preferred by rebel groups and violent extremists who claim to adhere to the Islamic prohibition against haram evil goods yet secure more than enough funds from the illicit drug trade for their violent activities. This flexibility turned the illicit drug business into a more dynamic enterprise with a wider range of users —from states and clans to criminals, rebels, and violent extremists—. In and , International Alert Philippines came up with consecutive reports that explored the ties between the illicit drug economy and violent extremism. The report underscored the evolution of stronger ties between drug lords and rebel or extremist groups that allowed the capture of devolved authority by many politicians engaged in the production and trade of illicit narcotics. Another victim was a well-known Mayor who local people described as a kind and benevolent leader who had built his reputation through acts of charity and did not hesitate to rush to the aid of other municipalities within the most dangerous conflict corridor in mainland Mindanao. His social contract with local citizens was to provide investments in livelihoods, tourism, and infrastructure and to not collect taxes. Figure 1. In exchange he had full use of internal revenue allotments and public tolerance for his near-monopoly of the illegal drug business in the conflict-corridor. Figure 2. As aforementioned, local strongmen such as the two mayors mentioned above are also part of a wider web of kinship relations that included families and clans laying claims to the same economic resources. A politician or a government executive are also the representatives and gatekeepers for families and clans and are thus motivated to capture and monopolize power for their clans. Clan members became the first beneficiaries of the huge funds generated by the illegal drug trade and were also the last line of defence against any effort to disrupt their operations. In the story of the first slain mayor above, his entire municipal bureaucracies were staffed by clan members, men, women, and youth, who were involved in all stages of the production and sale of illegal drugs. There is no doubt as well that the continuous benefits that every member of the clan received, from the most basic protection and security of their households to the welfare goods such as education and health care, was paid for by the illicit drug business. This is an important consideration in determining why their clans and the other social networks that they are a part of cannot prevent themselves from having a love-hate relationship with the illegal drug economy. From illegal drugs, the clan diversified into illegal weapons and civil works projects. The same clan members were involved in the activities of the armed Moro fronts, including armed extremist groups. Neither did the reports indicate that both also clans collided over the issue of illicit drugs, and how the alliances that the former Mayor brokered with suspected terrorist groups in exchange for protection also brought with it the spectre of illicit drugs converging with the spectre of violent extremism. This confluence is revealed by the presence and influence of drug syndicates at various levels of the state in the extremely poor and disadvantaged communities of Central Mindanao where the production and processing of crystal meth is located. The junctions of the illegal drug trade in Mindanao are found in Marawi city in the north, Cotabato city in the south, and Zamboanga city in the western part of the barrm. These places were the scenes of many armed clashes between police and criminal gangs, between the military and the Moro rebels, and between warring clans. Tables 3 and 4 below indicate the proliferation of drug dens and drug groups that have been neutralized by the Philippines government and most of these are in Mindanao, particularly in the newly established barrm. Meanwhile, figure 3 below indicates that most of the barrm is riddled with clandestine laboratories and the concentration of illicit drug smuggling incidents was reported in the city of Zamboanga and the islands of Basilan and Sulu. Table 3. Table 4. Geographical distribution of neutralized local drug groups, pdea , Figure 3. Map of critical areas in Mindanao with recorded incidents from pdea Annual Report. In the past decade, major cocaine smuggling incidents were recorded in Davao City amounting to about 85 kilograms, as well as 69 kilograms of shabu in Zamboanga City. Clandestine laboratories were discovered and dismantled in the cities of Cotabato, Cagayan de Oro, and General Santos. The extent of operations from smuggling to production to trading and the coverage across Muslim Mindanao and beyond it is a clear sign of how this illicit economy is colluding with state authorities across the island. These were highlighted in the links between illegal drugs and extremist violence that exploded in the Islamic City of Marawi in Conflict Alert, While the national and international media laid their eyes on the battle by isis -linked militants against the Philippine government soldiers, a more subtle and almost hidden spread in drug-related incidents was happening in the province of Lanao del Sur, beginning in and spiking in or a year before the war in Marawi. The data also shows that though there was a clear decline in incident numbers after , the average number of incidents was still higher than those from figures 4 - 5. From , Marawi contributed the most to the number of drug-related incidents, a proportion that remains significant years later. Marawi City had the highest number of incidents from January to October at almost 30 incidents followed by the municipality of Wao figure 6. Figure 4. Number of illegal drug-related incidents, Lanao del Sur, to October International Alert Figure 5. Figure 6. From the data one can see how Marawi city with its many drug-related incidents is an important petri-dish for observing the interlinkages between state and society on the issue of illegal drugs. However, there is another puzzle that needs to be resoved, i. The answer lies in the convergence of clan institutions and the rule-systems that encompass the illegal drug trade. Everywhere else in the country the body-count from the war on drugs has been rising at a fast clip. This has not been the case in Lanao del Sur in general, and Marawi in particular, because clan rules about revenge killings and feuding can unleash a violent response that is greater in proportion to the human costs at the outset. In short, it is not as easy for criminal gangs or members of the police and military to wantonly kill a drug peddler in Muslim Mindanao, as they often do in Manila, without incurring a far bigger onslaught of violence. Figure 7. Except if you were a leading member of a clan involved in illicit drugs and you totally opposed this illicit economy and were forced to use your authority and power to destroy this economy. This was the case in when then Marawi Mayor Omar Ali went on an all-out war against the illicit drug economy that pitted him against his close relatives, including his brother, son, and nephews. Ali had been under increasing pressure from the traditional and religious leaders to act against the drug lords, and being a devout Muslim, he had tried to find ways to deter the spread of harmful narcotics in the Mindanao State University msu main campus in Marawi City, but to no avail. The attack followed the ambush-killing of a policeman who was also a member of a powerful Muslim clan and who had opposed the drug lords. Ali saw that the opportunity was right to launch a violent campaign because he had secured an alliance born out of frustration and grief over the deadly impact of the illicit drug economy. In cases where fractures in a social network intensify, there are few opportunities for patching things up without a violent interlude, especially if what is at stake is a business that generates enormous profits for just one faction of the family or clan. There is no doubt that a turf war on illegal drugs can lead to inter and intra-clan feuding, including inter-generational wars between the Moro clans that can restructure alliances and bring about a new political settlement between subnational drug lords. Collusion had brought peace among drug lords as their turf wars ended and Mindanao, especially Lanao del Sur, became the production hub for crystal meth. Enormous resources are needed to undertake the sort of extremist violence that saw isis -affiliated groups lay siege and engage in positional warfare in Marawi for five months. Contagion theorists would like to explain this newfound capacity by looking at illicit aid flows from isis international to the Maute group. However, there is a secondary source that is easily verifiable and more reliable as a source of funding —the funds that come from the illegal drugs economy in Lanao del Sur and the rest of Mindanao—. The story of another local government executive in Marawi that followed the one that launched the war on drugs is illustrative, as his alleged involvement in both the illegal drug economy and the financing of the war in Marawi is the key narrative that points to the intimate relationship between collusion and collision in the war on drugs. First, this heinous act invited a politico-military response from a combined security task force that led to the war on drugs in Marawi just a year before the explosion of war in Marawi. The marriage of illegal drug money and violent extremism provoked the collision that saw a recasting of alliances and the birth of a new political settlement that allowed the operations of the illegal drug economy so long as its ties were severed from violent extremism. Two years later, the assassination of other drug lords with links to extremist violence continued apace the increase of drug buy-bust operations after martial law was lifted in Marawi. The old actors are now in prison and the government is still running after their allies. Meanwhile, the illegal drug economy lives on and a fragile peace now exists. Collusion and collision within social networks. These narratives cannot be ignored or dismissed because they hold so much truth about the marginalization, discrimination, and ruthlessness suffered by communities where social networks identified with illicit drug economies are nested. It is the reason why popular support for these violent campaigns has been described as some sort of push-back from disgruntled communities burdened by poverty and crime who now lauded the violent impunity of State and non-state actors in their communities, even if these turned them into collateral victims themselves. The autonomous and diverse actions embedded by tradition and practice among the urban and rural poor makes it clear that violent responses are not always an easy option for the poor and is neither their primary preference because of the costs they personally and physically incur. Curato , p. However, the actually —existing conditions in the urban poor areas of the metropolis indicates the opposite— people want punitive action against illicit drugs not because of an instinctive fear of violence, nor because they are seen as a dangerous other, but because they had far bigger interests and agendas that they wanted to secure and the illicit drug economy was standing in their way. Such was the experience of the youth organization in the metropolitan enclave that fought against a social network of tribal Tausug leaders who were perceived as conspirators of the drug lords. Meanwhile, in Marawi, profits from the drug trade were finding their way into the hands of violent extremists who local people condemned for the destruction of Marawi, plus, the consumption of illicit drugs was rising among the Moro youth and pulling them away from their religious and clan obligations. The approach leveraged the role of existing social networks and their corresponding institutional frameworks that structured their preferences and behaviours. We saw first-hand how family and clan institutions were the driving forces behind these informal and shadow economies and saw how their preferences were dissimilar to each other. Oftentimes they were allies but sometimes they were rivals. They alternately colluded or collided depending upon the contingent interests of each group. For example, there were no prior struggles against the clans in Lanao del Sur who were involved in the illicit drug economy despite the war on drugs unleashed by Duterte, but neither was there any appetite among the various Moro clans to shield the illicit drug economy or resist an anti-drugs campaign in the period before and following the eruption of extremist violence in Marawi after the so-called isis groups were found to have benefited from the profits generated in the shabu trade. A second conclusion that must be drawn is that the support for the war on drugs had less to do with individual preferences, latent fears, and the desire to instigate or prod the state to take punitive actions against the illicit drug economy, and more to do with the contingent situation and the positions taken by the social networks that people adhere to. Decisions were not arrived at individually but were mediated within these social networks. This explains why the production and trade in goods that are considered haram in Islam, such as drugs and narcotics, also involved social networks associated with Islamic systems and practices. The third important conclusion is that people tend to consider a wide range of choices and time-bound responses to risks such as the entry of illicit drugs, or alternately, the risk of losing power and opportunities due to a refusal to deal in illicit drugs. Preferences are transitional and dictated by circumstances. To be sure, there will be struggles within social networks that lead to members swinging towards simple exchanges that do not consider the reciprocal obligations embedded within the network. This was clearly the case when the armed groups led by Wahid Tundok of the milf exacted revenge for the death of a chief executive who was a hefty contributor to their agenda, even though he was also suspected of being involved in illicit drugs, and hence violating the Islamic admonition against illicit drugs. There will also be instances when choices will be purely determined by reciprocity obligations with little consideration of their wider implications. This was clearly the case in the metropolitan enclave where the influence of the drug syndicate was later subdued by the social network of progressive youth located in the toda that opposed the illicit drug trade despite the human costs that they incurred from that decision. This was also the case in Marawi, where clan and family members colluded or collided —one faction favoured the spread of an illicit drug economy that benefitted it, while another faction resisted and opposed the enterprise and sought rewards that were less profitable, yet more stable and peaceful—. Instead of collisions within the network, collective and coordinated decisions within social networks to return or shift to other less destructive and deadly informal economies has always been an option for families and clans, tricycle associations, or among rebel returnees. See for example the youth network in the metropolitan enclave that prodded its members to engage in the unlicensed and unregulated transport economy instead of dealing in drugs. Their leaders explained that there were other informal economies that the youth could get involved in and besides, lobbying and advocating for the organic law that can reduce the tangible and felt discriminatory and exclusionary attitudes towards the Moro youth outside Muslim Mindanao had its own rewards. At the national level, a pause was initiated after the first 18 months of the campaign to mitigate the treatment of suspected pushers and users in urban poor communities. At the local level, the case in Marawi and Lanao del Sur is evocative of this sensitivity and is clearly seen in the less repressive tactics and strategies that were employed in the war on drugs from the outset. The possibility of provoking a far more costly and deadlier counter-response from the Moro clans that could cripple local authority and unleash levels of violence that would be difficult to absorb demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the State can ignore clan rules and dynamics but only at its own peril. The fifth conclusion is that the State is as important as the social networks that influence or cooperate with them or even those that denounce and oppose them, in enabling shifts to other less deadlier economies. This will not seem counter-intuitive if one looks at the State as wearing two hats —one as an enforcer of formal rules and another as an arbiter of informal and unregulated economies that fills gaps in state provisioning—. Bargains are made regularly between legal and shadow authorities over the informal economies that will thrive in villages and enclaves. Those bargains can lead to shifts away from drugs towards other less contentious but illicit economies such as money laundering, illicit credit schemes, illegal gambling, or the smuggling of contraband, among many others. Sustaining and institutionalizing change, as in, forever getting rid of illicit drugs and narcotics, will require alliances and collective actions that can reel-in public authorities to support network objectives. Alternately, social networks can be made to understand and recognize the need for state autonomy from vested interests to protect its legitimacy and credibility. The sixth important conclusion is that social networks are ubiquitous, and it is not easy to assess which among the different identities that are reflected in these social networks should be leveraged or accentuated from time to time. When we say that people support decisions and make choices based on the social networks that they adhere to, we must be aware that adhesion is not permanent. In this paper alone, networks of families and clans, tribal groups, ulama and traditional leaders, youth organizations, trade and transport associations such as the toda , and even ideologically-bound rebel and extremist groups carried with them varying positions and choices that could have shaped the attitude and willingness to support or resist an ongoing war against drugs. This interplay between formal and informal institutions was an advantage, rather than a barrier in resolving problems. Finally, to answer the question of why there is such a wide public support for the War on Drugs from among those that are often victimized by its violence? This paper has revealed the powerful social networks at the local level in many urban areas, as well as those located in conflict-affected rural areas, that rejected or eschewed the huge profits and other benefits offered by the illicit drug economy and saw only the differential impact of those benefits on their networks. Some networks, such as those related to illicit weapons and kidnap-for-ransom profited from those advantages, but the vast majority of informal market activities clearly did not —such as the unregulated traffic in vehicles, boats, and motorcycles, the unregulated export of labour, informal credit markets, and even the secondary markets for land and cattle—. One such example is the cross-border trade in Tawi-Tawi, where networks of women traders and their smuggled products were imperilled by the drug lords who used the same routes, ports, and sometimes the same vessels to transport illicit drugs, the consequence was that women traders had to absorb the same level of suspicion as well as demands for bigger pay-offs. Some were clearly disadvantaged by the scrutiny, attention, interdiction, and repressive tactics that they had to endure resulting from the deadly outcomes in this illicit and underground activity. Some were indeed influenced by fear as well, but not because that fear invited punitive action by the State. Instead they feared that the illicit drug economy would equip a far bigger threat to their peace and security —the very real threat of violent extremism—. There is no doubt that the continuous benefits received by members of a clan involved in illegal drugs was paid for by the illicit drug business, from the most basic protection and security of their households to the welfare goods such as education and health care, This is an important consideration in determining why local people cannot prevent themselves from having a love-hate relationship with the illegal drug economy. It also explains, however, why collusion and collision within the illicit drug economy are two alternate realities that can recur when circumstances shift and when the balance of power and opportunity in economic informality shifts to favour one sector over the other. Economic sociology sensitized the study to the opportunities and risks at the local level that are informed and mediated through kinship ties, clan institutions, and control over local political office. Muslim political and religious leaders have also been adept at reinterpreting religious beliefs to accommodate the survival needs of communities below. Economic sociology has also been useful in interpreting the current dilemmas faced by economic informality in the case of illicit drugs in the Philippines and particularly in Muslim Mindanao. Bayart, J. The criminalization of the State in Africa. Oxford: James Curry. Cagoco-Guiam, R. A deadly cocktail? Illicit drugs, politics, and violent conflict in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. Schoofs Eds. Cooper, F. What is the concept of globalization good for? African Affairs , , Cornell, S. Narcotics and armed conflict: Interaction and implications. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30 3 , Curato, N. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 35 3 , Duffield, M. Post-modern conflict: warlords, post-adjustment states and private protection. Civil Wars 1. London: Frank Cass Publishers. Globalization, transborder trade, and war economies. Malone Eds. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Goodhand, J. Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in Afghanistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 5 2 , Granovetter, M. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. Swedberg Eds. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Hesselbein, G. Economic and political foundations of State making in Africa: an understanding of State reconstruction. Kaplan, R. The coming anarchy. Atlantic Monthly, 2 , Keen, D. Complex emergencies. Cambridge: Polity Press. Lara, F. Insurgents, clans, and States: political legitimacy and resurgent conflict in Muslim Mindanao, Philippines. The shadow economy and strongman rule in Mindanao. Hutchcroft Ed. Mandaluyong: Anvil Publishing. Inclusive peace in Muslim Mindanao: revisiting the dynamics of conflict and exclusion. London: International Alert. Robustness in data and methods: scoping the real economy of Mindanao. Out of the shadows: violent conflict and the real economy of Mindanao. MacGaffey, J. The real economy of Zaire: the contribution of smuggling and other unofficial activities to national wealth. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Meagher, K. Identity economics: social networks and the informal economy in Nigeria. Suffock: James Currey Ltd. Nohria, N. Is a network perspective a useful way of studying organizations? Eccles Eds. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Polanyi, K. The economy as instituted process. Boulder: Westview Press. Portes, A. Economic sociology: a systematic inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putzel, J. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Quitoriano, E. Unpublished manuscript. Reno, W. Warlord politics and African States. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Order and commerce in turbulent areas: 19 th century lessons, 21 st century practice. Third World Quarterly, 25 4 , Simangan, D. Journal of Genocide Research, 20 1 , pp. Thompson, M. Bloodied democracy: Duterte and the death of liberal reformism in the Philippines. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 3 , Villanueva, S. Cross-border illicit trade in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi: the coexistence of economic agendas and violent conflict. News and other reports. Cagayan de Oro shabu laboratory busted. Philippine Star. Most of those killed in war on drug not involved in drug. The Nation. Hunt on for 2 escaped drug pushers in Davao raid. Marawi police chief shot dead. Ex-mayor tagged as Maute financier. Maguindanao town mayor gunned down in Manila. The Economist. Acosta, J. Mayor Dimaukom a big loss to peace and development: lgu staff. Amnesty International uk. More than 7, killed in the Philippines in six months, as president encourages murder. Arguillas, C. Arugay, A. The Conversation. Bergonia, T. Top us think tank sees no gauge of success in ph drug war. Cabato, R. Thousands dead. Police accused of criminal acts. The Washington Post. Delizo, M. Over 6, killed in nearly 3 years of ph drug war: pnp. Elemia, C. Trillanes calls on Senate to defend De Lima, press freedom, right to life. Felipe, C. Fuertes-Knight, J. The Guardian. Gita, R. SunStar News. International Alert. Conflict alert Guns, drugs, and extremism. Conflict alert War and identity. Conflict alert data Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao \[comma separated value csv file\]. International Drug Policy Consortium. A civil society shadow report. Jannaral, J. Suspects in Maguindanao vice mayor murder known. The Manila Times. Kine, P. Human Rights Watch. Lema, K. Marquez, C. Average price of shabu in Metro now P3, per gram. Morales, N. Pardo, B. Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Annual report to Annual report Punongbayan, M. Busted Cotabato City laboratory could produce 3 kilos of shabu daily. Reyes, R. Rungsrithananon, N. Samson, O. Shabu price drops as competition among drug gangs intensifies - pnp. Business Mirror. Social Weather Stations. Stoicescu, C. Has the decade-old war on drugs in Asia succeeded? Al Jazeera. Talabong, R. Tomacruz, S. Tubeza, P. Tuyay, F. Chinese drug lord convicted. Manila Standard. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. June World drug report March Synthetic drugs in East and South-East Asia: trends and patterns of amphetamine-type stimulants and new psychoactive substances. Methamphetamine: retail and wholesale prices and purity levels, by drug, region and country or territory. Yap, D. Zonio, A. Narcs raid 1 st shabu lab found in GenSan. Para citar: Lara, F. Francisco J. Lara Jr. University of the Philippines and Senior. Nikki Philline C. Country Manager of International Alert Philippines. Received: 29 January Accepted: 25 May Robust public support despite meagre results Many observers have argued that the robust support for the war on drugs was made possible by a combination of clever narratives that Duterte deployed during the election campaign, and soon after he gained power, that trumped his opponents. Seizures of selected drugs and precursor chemicals in the Philippines, Trends in use of selected drugs in the Philippines, Number of neutralized drug dens in , some were discovered in Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Marawi City. Geographical distribution of neutralized local drug groups, Books and journal articles Bayart, J. News and other reports 10 May See also Stoicescu and Lasco and Duffield Reuters, 16 August See Arsenault. Al Jazeera , 22 May See also The Conversation 29 September Observers may argue that the Vice president Robredo is biased as a member of the legal opposition. However, she is not the only one that holds this view. See also unodc report, March Instead she presents evidence that Igbo rule systems have undergone important shifts that were imposed upon them during the colonial and post-colonial era. These findings were echoed by the Social Weather Stations sws a few weeks later Rappler , 21 December , 21 January See also Business Mirror , 29 July Name and date withheld. The spike in violent incidents in the second half of was clearly the result of the aggressive campaign launched by the government, rather than due to turf wars between drug lords. It holds an important economic and social function, especially in poor and lower middle-class communities. This is the second most popular public transportation in the Philippines next to jeepneys. See also unodc d, p. Participants included a member of the Marawi Sultanate League, a local government mayor, a provincial government executive, an ulama, and the chief executive of a Mindanao-based university. Names and date withheld. It is a subnational conflict monitoring system that tracks the incidence, causes, and human costs of violent conflict in the Philippines. It aims to shape policymaking, development strategies, and peace building approaches by providing relevant, robust, and reliable conflict data. The data is sourced from police reports, media reports, and community-level reports and presently contains more than 30 discrete incidents of violent conflict in the Bangsamoro region alone. Rappler 11 February reports that the Mayor was also linked to the Davao market blast and pointed to his links to the Maute-isis Group. The police spokesperson lauded the police chief for his courageous fight against drug syndicates in the city Rappler , 17 October
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