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Constantine: Three people arrested for using a barber shop to prepare and sell cocaine

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Previous editions of Platypus magazine have examined the impact of organised crime in Russia and South Africa. His paper puts into context the importance of the work of law enforcement agencies in protecting the quality of life which we have come to enjoy in countries like the USA and Australia. It is important to demonstrate why the threat posed by international drug syndicates is so ominous, and why the United States needs cooperative law enforcement programs in Colombia and Mexico to successfully counter the scourge of drugs inside the USA. Our law enforcement efforts must be compatible with the challenge posed by the syndicates, we must be able to attack the command and control functions of the international syndicates which are directing the organised drug trafficking activities in this country. But these organised crime leaders are far more dangerous, far more influential and have a greater impact on our day-to-day lives than did their domestic predecessors. While organised crime in the United States during the s through the s affected certain aspects of American life, its influence pales in comparison to the violence, corruption, and power that today's drug syndicates wield. These individuals, from their headquarters locations, undeniably influence the choices that too many Americans make about where to live, when to venture out of their homes, or where they send their children to school. Organised crime in the United States was addressed over time, but only after Americans recognised the dangers that organised crime posed to our way of life. But it did not happen overnight. American organised crime was exposed to the light of day systematically, stripping away the pretence that mob leaders were anonymous businessmen. The Appalachian raid of forced law enforcement to acknowledge that these organised syndicates did indeed exist. As a result, strong measures were taken to go after the top leadership, a strategy used effectively throughout our national campaign against the mob. During the s, Attorney-General Bobby Kennedy was unequivocal in his approach to ending the reign of organised crime in America, and consistent law enforcement policies were enacted which resulted in real gains. Today, traditional organised crime, as we knew it in the United States, has been eviscerated, a fragment of what it once was. At the height of its power, organised crime in this nation was consolidated in the hands of few major families whose key players live in this nation, and were within reach of our criminal justice system. All decisions made by organised crime were made within the United States. Orders were carried out on US soil. While it was not easy to build cases against the mob leaders, law enforcement knew that once a good case was made against a boss, he could be located within the US, arrested, and sent to jail. That is not the case with today's organised criminal groups. They are strong, sophisticated, and destructive organisations operating on a global scale. In places like Cali, Colombia, and Guadalajara, Mexico, even operational decisions are made, such as where to ship cocaine, which cars their workers in the United States should rent, which apartments should be leased, which markings should be on each cocaine package, which contract murders should be ordered, which officials should be bribed, and how much. They are shadowy figures who send thousands of workers into the United States who answer to them via daily faxes, cellular phone, or pagers. These syndicate bosses have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment, and weapons in quantities which rival the capabilities of some legitimate governments. Whereas previous organised crime leaders were millionaires, the Cali drug traffickers and their counterparts from Mexico are billionaires. Their communications are encrypted and they intimidate, murder or corrupt public officials and law enforcement officers. These sophisticated criminal groups cannot thrive unless law enforcement officials have been paid bribes, and witnesses fear for their lives. It is frustrating for all of us in law enforcement that the leaders of these criminal organisations, although well known and indicted repeatedly, have not been located, arrested, or prosecuted. The international drug syndicates operating in Mexico and those in Colombia are interconnected. During the late s the Cali group assumed greater and greater power as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel self-destructed. Where the Medellin cartel was brash and publicly violent in their activities, the criminals, who ran their organisation from Cali, laboured behind the pretence of legitimacy, by posing as businessmen carrying out their professional obligations. Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates composed what was, until then, the most powerful international organised crime group in history. They employed aircraft to ferry drugs to Mexico, from where they were smuggled into the United States, and then return to Colombia with the money from US drug sales. Using landing areas in Mexico, they were able to evade US law enforcement officials and make important alliances with transportation and distribution experts in Mexico. With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali leadership by the brave men and women in the Colombian National Police during and , all of the top leadership of the Cali syndicate are either in jail, or dead. The fine work done by General Serrano and other CNP officers is a testament to the commitment and dedication of Colombia's law enforcement officials in the face of great personal danger, and a government whose leadership is riddled with drug corruption. Since the Cali leaders' imprisonment, on sentences that in no way matched the severity of their crimes, traffickers from Mexico took on greater prominence. The alliance between the Colombian traffickers and the organisations from Mexico benefited for both sides. Traditionally, the traffickers from Mexico have long been involved in smuggling marijuana, heroin, and cocaine into the United States, and had established solid distribution routes throughout the nation. Because the Cali syndicate was concerned about the security of their loads, they brokered a commercial deal with the traffickers from Mexico, to reduce their potential losses. This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from the Andean region to the Mexican organisations, who then assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine to the United States. Now, trafficking groups from Mexico are routinely paid for their services in multi-tonne quantities of cocaine, making them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right. About half of the cocaine entering the United States continues to come from Colombia through Mexico and across US border points of entry. Most of the cocaine enters the United States in privately-owned vehicles and commercial trucks. There is new evidence that indicates traffickers in Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen. In addition to the supply of cocaine entering the US, trafficking organisations from Mexico are responsible for producing and trafficking thousands of kilograms of methamphetamine. They have been major distributors of heroin and marijuana in the US since the s. Unfortunately, the violence that is an essential part of the Mexican organisations impacts innocent citizens who live in the United States. The traffickers' willingness to murder and intimidate witnesses and public officials has allowed these organisations to develop into the present day threat they are to the citizens of the United States and Mexico. Drug traffickers continue their brazen attacks against both US and Mexican law enforcement officials and their sources of information. During , a new trend involving armed attacks by Mexican traffickers on US law enforcement officers began to occur on a frequent basis. There have been many reports by US law enforcement officials of running gun battles between Mexican drug traffickers and US law enforcement officials stationed along the border. During a high speed chase, the Mexicans fired more than 15 rounds at the officers from semi-automatic pistols. The officers returned fire, but both trucks escaped into Mexico. On July 17, , Hector Salinas-Guerra, a primary witness in a McAllen, Texas trial of a major Mexican marijuana drug trafficking organisation, was kidnapped by members of this organisation at gunpoint from his place of business in McAllen, Texas. His tortured, badly decomposed body was found on July 22, in an open field in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico. Salinas was to testify in a trial that was scheduled to begin on July 21, Subsequently, on July 25, , a jury in McAllen, Texas reached a verdict of acquittal for the seven defendants in this case. This abduction and murder highlights the violent nature of drug trafficking along the US-Mexico border and the threats posed not only to US and Mexican law officials, but also to cooperating sources and witnesses. Violence within trafficking organisations escalated in , particularly in connection with the power struggle after the death of Amado Carrillo-Fuentes in July. Nearly 50 murders have occurred in Ciudad Juarez that are believed to be related to a power struggle between entities wishing to control the lucrative Juarez corridor, which had been controlled by the Carrillo-Fuentes organisation. When such violent acts such as these do not result in arrest, conviction and punishment, the impact on the law enforcement community and honest citizens is devastating. Few citizens are willing to cooperate when police comandantes, prosecutors, elected officials, and members of the free press are gunned down in broad daylight. Solving drug assassinations in Mexico will increase the opportunity for successful law enforcement. The corruption of public officials and law enforcement officials is critical to the power of organised crime. The criminal organisations based in Mexico have placed a major emphasis on the corruption of public officials and have demonstrated an ability to corrupt officials serving in high level positions in both law enforcement and the military. Drug-related corruption is probably the single greatest obstacle that law enforcement faces in its global battle against international drug trafficking. President Zedillo has called this the number one threat to Mexican National security and recently announced a national initiative to fight crime, violence, and corruption. Among the cases which demonstrate how far these crime lords will go to corrupt public officials is that of General Alfredo Navarro-Lara, who was arrested by Mexican authorities on March 17 for making bribes on behalf of the Arellano-Felix organisation. The December appointment of Jesus Carrola-Gutierrez as Chief of the Mexico City Judicial Police was cut short when his well known ties to drug traffickers and human rights violations became a public issue. To overcome the problem of widespread corruption in law enforcement, the Mexican Government replaced civilian authorities with military officers. Recent experience has shown that military officers, once exposed to the extraordinary opportunities for corruption, are equally susceptible as civilians. The Government of Mexico has made some progress by reconstituting its drug law enforcement infrastructure and has also made progress in several law enforcement cases. Unfortunately it has made very little progress in the apprehension of known syndicate leaders who dominate the drug trade in Mexico and control a substantial share of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine markets in the United States. There have been a number of procedural changes as the Mexican Government restructures its institutions charged with enforcing the drug laws. New personnel have been brought in to replace corrupt or ineffective officials. However, none of these changes has yet produced significant results. The ultimate test of any progress is measured by successfully apprehending the leadership and bringing them to justice. A reconstitution of law enforcement institutions is under way in Mexico. This is a difficult and lengthy process that may take decades. Several programs have been initiated, but the institution-building process is still in its infancy. There are now some individuals and small organisations with whom we are able to interact on specific cases. We limit this exchange, however, to individual cases when we are sure the information would not put our agents or sources of information at risk. The Government of Mexico is attempting to build a reliable civilian law enforcement agency to replace the former anti-drug agency, INCD, which had been seriously corrupted at virtually every level. The DEA has provided assistance to the OCU in the development of personnel selection systems and has provided extensive narcotics enforcement training to the new OCU agents. The problems of establishing a corruption-free law enforcement infrastructure are not insurmountable. However, it is essential that it be established because of the enormous damage these criminal organisations based in Mexico are causing to US citizens. The only effective law enforcement strategy is to bring these criminals to justice and ensure they are punished in a manner commensurate with their vicious acts. At present that is not occurring and, as a result, citizens of both the United States and Mexico are suffering greatly. Despite the rise to power by the Mexican crime syndicates and their increasing control of the wholesale cocaine trade in the United States, Colombian traffickers still control the manufacture of the vast majority of cocaine in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually every kilogram of cocaine sold in US cities and towns. Traffickers from Colombia supply almost all of the cocaine to the Mexican crime syndicates referred to in this address. They move the cocaine from their clandestine laboratories in the jungles of southeast Colombia to Mexico through a variety of scenarios including: commercial maritime vessels, fast boat, containerised cargo, and private aircraft. The methods are as varied as one can imagine and traffickers frequently vary their routes and modus operandi to thwart interdiction efforts. Colombian transportation groups have honed their skills and tactics to the point that law enforcement has little chance of interdicting shipments of cocaine, unless intelligence is developed pinpointing specific shipments or methods. The cocaine they receive from the Colombian syndicates in payment for their transportation services is no longer sufficient to meet the demands of their expanding distribution outlets in the United States. This change in the manner in which business is conducted is also driven by the new trafficking groups in Colombia, who have chosen to return to the Caribbean to move their cocaine to the United States. Colombian drug organisations are the world's leading traffickers of cocaine, and have increasingly assumed a dominant role in opium poppy production. These organisations operate throughout the Caribbean corridor, as well as in Colombia, and extend their operations into the United States. After Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates in the Cali crime syndicate were brought to justice by Colombian authorities in , new groups from the North Valle del Cauca and splinter groups from Orejula's organisations began vying for control of the lucrative markets on the United States East Coast, previously dominated by Rodriguez-Orejuela. Many of these organisations began to re-activate traditional trafficking routes in the Caribbean to move their product to market. Colombia's counterdrug efforts are of critical importance to the United States. Colombian trafficking organisations produce hundreds of metric tons of cocaine HCl, some 6 tonnes of heroin, and over tonnes of marijuana each year. The bulk of these illicit drugs are destined for the United States. Colombian traffickers continue to control the supply of cocaine at its source and dominate the wholesale cocaine market in the eastern US and Europe. In recent years, Colombian drug traffickers have become increasingly involved in opium poppy cultivation and heroin production. Colombian traffickers also continue to be important foreign suppliers of marijuana to the United States and Europe. The Colombian trafficking organisations' presence and influence in the Caribbean are now overwhelming. DEA has identified four major organisations based on the North Coast of Colombia that have established command and control functions in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic and use the Caribbean Basin to funnel tonnes of cocaine to the US each year. The Colombian managers, who have been dispatched to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, operate command and control centres and are responsible for overseeing all aspects of cell operations. They direct networks of transporters that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution of cocaine destined for the United States. These Colombian groups have been re-establishing their ties with their Caribbean confederates, increasingly larger shipments transit the Caribbean. Seizures of to 2, kilos of cocaine are now common in and around Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. The exponential increase in the flow of cocaine and heroin through the region has brought a new wave of drug abuse and violence to the Caribbean. Approximately 70 per cent of all documented homicides in Puerto Rico are drug-related. Drug homicides in state have increased dramatically in the last decade. In , homicides in Puerto Rico numbered ; by , this figure had more than doubled. Today, these totals remain constant ie. The incarceration or death of the leaders of the Cali drug syndicate were the antecedents for the most significant change in the wholesale US cocaine trade in the last two decades. This change has become particularly evident over the last 12 months. Just a few years ago, Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela and his powerful Cali syndicate controlled as much as 80 per cent of the cocaine distributed in the US. He completely controlled every phase of the drug continuum, from manufacturing to distribution in cities and towns throughout the United States as varied as Chicago, Illinois and Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Mexican organised crime syndicates now control the distribution of cocaine in the western half and the Midwest of the United States. In the last year, the Colombians have franchised to criminals from the Dominican Republic the mid-level wholesale cocaine and heroin trade on the East Coast of the US. The Colombian groups remain, however, in control of the sources of supply. The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly entrenched as low-level cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger North-eastern cities, were uniquely placed to assume a far more significant role in this multi-billion-dollar business. Many new Colombian drug syndicates have sought to pull back from the Cali syndicate's tradition of ruling a monolithic organisation and exercising complete control of the drug continuum, from cultivation and production, to the wholesale marketing of both heroin and cocaine. Instead, many of these new groups have chosen to franchise a significant portion of their wholesale heroin and cocaine operations. This change in operations somewhat reduces profits for the syndicate leaders. It succeeds, however, in reducing their exposure to US law enforcement, their ultimate goal. Some cells specialise in a particular facet of the drug trade, such as cocaine transport, storage, wholesale distribution, or money laundering. Each cell, which may be comprised of 10 or more employees, operates with little or no knowledge about the membership in, or drug operations of, other cells. The head of each cell reports to a regional director who is responsible for the overall management of several cells. The regional director, in turn, reports directly to one of the drug lord's heads of a particular organisation or their designate based in Colombia. A rigid top-down command and control structure is characteristic of these groups. Trusted lieutenants of the organisation in the US have discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority rests with the leadership in Colombia. Upper echelon and management levels of these cells are frequently comprised of family members or long-time close associates who can be trusted by the Colombian drug lords to handle their day-to-day drug operations in the United States. They report back to Colombia via cell phone, fax and other sophisticated communications methods. Colombian drug traffickers continually employ a wide variety of counter-surveillance techniques and other tactics, such as staging fake drug transactions, using telephones they suspect are monitored, limited-time use of cloned cellular telephones frequently a week or less , limited-time use of pagers from 2 to 4 weeks , and the use of calling cards. Colombian organised crime groups continue to show an active interest in acquiring secure communications capabilities. Colombian organised crime groups in the US are focused on the wholesale cocaine market and are not involved in drug trafficking at the retail level. A diverse assortment of criminals from varying ethnic groups are responsible for most of the domestic street trade in cocaine and crack. In major US cities, organised groups of Cuban, Jamaican, and Mexican criminals, as well as African-American and Dominican gangs dominate the retail market. The Crips, Bloods, and Dominican gangs, and Jamaican posses, are responsible for much of the widespread cocaine and crack cocaine related violence. Adding significantly to the dangers faced by the anti-narcotic forces in Colombia is the protection being afforded to the farmers, who grow the coca and to the traffickers who process it into cocaine base and cocaine HCl, by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC and the National Liberation Army ELN. The FARC factions continue to raise funds through extortion, by providing security services to traffickers, and charging a fee for precursor chemicals and coca leaf, and cocaine HCl moving through their region. Some of these groups have assisted the drug traffickers by storing and transporting cocaine and marijuana within Colombia, and certain FARC units in Colombia may be engaged in localised opiate trafficking. CNP helicopters and planes used in drug eradication efforts continually receive ground fire when conducting counterdrug operations. Unfortunately, several CNP officers were killed while conducting anti-narcotic operations in guerrilla controlled territory. Guerrilla groups provide security for and aggressively defend coca and poppy fields and the processing laboratories, like the huge HCl conversion complex seized in January of The FARC, and other guerrilla groups, were originally founded and built on ideological beliefs, but profits from the multi-billion dollar drug trade have sparked the guerrillas' interest in selling their services to drug traffickers instead of pursuing ideology. To date, there is little to indicate the insurgent groups are trafficking in cocaine themselves, either by producing cocaine HCl and selling it to Mexican syndicates, or by establishing their own networks in the US. The Colombian National Police is a major law enforcement organisation with a long and honoured historical tradition of integrity. The CNP had some corruption problems in the s and early s, but took the needed steps to address that corruption and have moved on to aggressively attack the drug menace. Over the past two and one-half years, all of the top Cali drug lords have been either captured by the CNP, died, were killed, or have surrendered to Colombian authorities. These unprecedented drug law enforcement successes were the culmination of years of investigative efforts by the CNP, with active support from DEA. The CNP continues to pursue significant drug investigations as well as significant counterdrug operations against cocaine processing laboratories, transportation networks, and trafficker command and control elements. The fact that the CNP, and other members of Colombia's law enforcement community, were able and willing to pursue operations against the drug underworld is a testament to their professionalism and dedication. The CNP's counterdrug successes have come at a high price. Last year at this time I was able to report to you that the seven leaders of the Cali drug syndicate were either dead or in jail. Unfortunately, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuelas and his associates, who comprised the most powerful international organised crime group in history initially received ridiculously short sentences for their crimes. In January , Gilberto was sentenced to 10 years and six months in prison on drug trafficking charges. As a result of Colombia's lenient sentencing laws, however, Gilberto may serve only five years. Miguel, originally sentenced to nine years, was later sentenced to 21 years on Colombian charges based on evidence supplied by the United States Government in the Tampa, Florida, evidence-sharing case. Miguel is expected to serve less than 13 years in prison. Even now, the Rodreguez-Orejuelas are able to partially run their businesses from prison cell blocks equipped with private quarters, telephones, indoor soccer facilities and a well stocked private kitchen, due to Colombia's lax prison system. As a consequence, even though they are in prison, they remain among the most powerful cocaine traffickers in the world. Their inability to control their operations fully is the major factor in the rise of independent Colombian trafficking groups. Last year, the Colombian National Police took control of four maximum security prisons from the Bureau of Prisons, in an effort to prevent traffickers from carrying out their operations from jail. In June , the CNP raided a dozen communications centers in Bogota and Cali that were being used by the jailed drug lords to manage operations. Nevertheless, the jailed drug lords remain able to continue to direct some aspects of their trafficking operations from prison, albeit with greater difficulty than before the CNP actions. As of October 1, , all Colombian-registered aircraft are subject to search and inspection by the CNP. The CNP systematically identifies all Colombian aircraft by utilising tamper-resistant stickers placed throughout the aircraft. Each sticker has a bar code that, when read, allows the CNP to check the sticker information with a database of all parts and serial numbers registered with that aircraft. The political environment in Colombia continues to hinder United States Government counterdrug efforts. Divergent antidrug agendas within the Colombian Government, a frail judicial system, widespread official corruption, and a weak national resolve to confront the drug problem continue to limit Colombia's ability to cooperate with the US Government in the counterdrug arena. Our continued counterdrug efforts and accomplishments in Colombia is a testament to the professionalism and dedication of DEA personnel in Colombia and their Colombian drug law enforcement counterparts. The CNP leadership has taken important steps in recent years to counter the effects of corruption on their organisation. Since the early s, the CNP has dismissed more than 14, police officers for corruption. The outstanding efforts of CNP notwithstanding, the dysfunctional Colombian justice system lacks the expertise and resources necessary to investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate most criminals. According to a former Justice Minister, only three per cent, and perhaps as few as one per cent, of all crimes in Colombia result in a conviction. The Rodriguez-Orejuelas and other jailed Cali drug lords continue to direct some aspects of their trafficking organisations from prison. In October , a Colombian judge dismissed murder charges against jailed Cali drug trafficker Ivan Urdinola. Although the judge's decision is under investigation by Colombian authorities, Urdinola may be released from prison in There is clause in Colombia's new extradition law which states that the law will not be applied retro-actively. This clause ensures that the Cali drug lords, and other Colombian drug traffickers, who are already in jail will not face extradition for crimes committed prior to the date that the new law took effect in late December Furthermore, DEA is very concerned that the non-retro-activity provision of the extradition amendment will be applied to non-Colombian nationals. If the Colombian courts rule that the amendment covers foreign fugitives, Colombia will become a haven for international criminals. Colombia's lenient sentencing codes remain intact. For example, Cali drug lord Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela may serve less than five years in prison. His brother, Miguel, is expected to serve less than 13 years in prison. We can and should continue to fully identify and build cases against the leaders of the new criminal groups from Colombia as well as the resurgent splinter groups of the old Cali syndicate. These criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors. At least at this point, we are not seeing major shipments of 10 to 20 tonnes of cocaine sent at one time, but rather a steady flow of to kg per shipment through the Caribbean. A number of initiatives hold promise for success:. Our Country Team's Flow Reduction Strategy will complement the air bridge interdiction program by focusing USG resources on those cocaine transportation and production organisations located south and east of Colombia's Andes Mountains. Indirect support and staffing also are provided by the Defense Attache Office and the State Department. The special unit program, funded under the Andean Initiative, will make it possible to convert existing partially vetted units of the CNP into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will work closely with DEA to conduct drug investigations. The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners in other countries, to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime which bring misery to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or extradited to the United States to face American justice,.

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