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First published Wed May 5, 2004; substantive revision Mon Oct 1, 2012
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Can a government legitimately prohibit citizens from publishing or
viewing pornography, or would this be an unjustified violation of basic
freedoms?
This question lies at the heart of a debate that raises fundamental
issues about just when, and on what grounds, the state is justified in
using its coercive powers to limit the individual freedom .
Traditionally, liberals defended the freedom of consenting adults to
publish and consume pornography in private from moral and religious
conservatives who wanted pornography banned for its obscenity, its
corrupting impact on consumers and its corrosive effect on traditional
family and religious values . But, in more recent times, the
pornography debate has taken on a somewhat new and surprising
shape . Some feminists have found themselves allied with their
traditional conservative foes in calling on the state to regulate or
prohibit pornography-although the primary focus of feminist concern is
on the harm that pornography may cause to women (and children), rather
than the obscenity of its sexually explicit content . And some liberals
have joined pro-censorship feminists in suggesting that the harms that
violent and degrading pornography causes to women's social standing
and opportunities might be sufficiently serious to justify prohibiting
such pornography on liberal grounds . Many others, both liberals and
feminists, remain unconvinced . They are doubtful that pornography is a
significant cause of the oppression of women or that the “blunt and
treacherous” instrument of the law is the best solution to such harm
as pornography may cause . As we shall see, the debate over whether
pornography should be censored remains very much alive .
“I can't define pornography,” one judge once famously said, “but I
know it when I see it .” (Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v . Ohio
378 US 184 (1964) .) Can we do better?
The word “pornography” comes from the Greek for writing about
prostitutes . However, the etymology of the term is not much of a guide
to its current usage, since many of the things commonly called
“pornography” nowadays are neither literally written nor literally
about prostitutes .
Here is a first, simple definition . Pornography is any material
(either pictures or words) that is sexually explicit . This
definition of pornography may pick out different types of material in
different contexts, since what is viewed as sexually explicit can vary
from culture to culture and over time . “Sexually explicit” functions as
a kind of indexical term, picking out different features depending on
what has certain effects or breaks certain taboos in different contexts
and cultures . Displays of women's uncovered ankles count as sexually
explicit in some cultures, but not in most western cultures nowadays
(although they once did: the display of a female ankle in Victorian
times was regarded as most risqué) . There may be borderline
cases too: do displays of bared breasts still count as sexually
explicit in various contemporary western cultures? However, some
material seems clearly to count as sexually explicit in many contexts
today: in particular, audio, written or visual representations of
sexual acts (e .g ., sexual intercourse, oral sex) and exposed body parts
(e .g ., the vagina, anus and penis-especially the erect penis) .
Within the general class of sexually explicit material, there is
great variety in content . For example, some sexually explicit material
depicts women, and sometimes men, in postures of sexual display (e .g .,
Playboy centrefolds) . Some depicts non-violent sexual acts (both
homosexual and heterosexual) between adults who are portrayed as equal
and consenting participants . Other sexually explicit representations
depict acts of violent coercion: people being whipped, beaten, bound,
tortured, mutilated, raped and even killed . Some
sexually explicit material may be degrading, without necessarily being
overtly violent . This material depicts people (most often women) in
positions of servility and subordination in their sexual relations with
others, or engaged in sexual acts that many people would regard as
humiliating . Some sexually explicit material involves or depicts
children . Some portrays bestiality and necrophilia; and so on .
On the first definition of pornography as sexually explicit
material, all such material would count as pornography, insofar as it
is sexually explicit . But this simple definition is not quite right .
Anatomy textbooks for medical students are sexually explicit-they
depict exposed genitalia, for example-but are rarely, if ever, viewed
as pornography . Sexual explicitness may be a necessary condition for
material to count as pornographic, but it does not seem to be
sufficient . So something needs to be added to the simple definition .
What else might be required?
Here is a second definition . Pornography is sexually explicit
material (verbal or pictorial) that is primarily designed
to produce sexual arousal in viewers . This definition is better:
it deals with the problem of anatomy textbooks and the like . Indeed,
this definition is one that is frequently employed (or presupposed) in
discussions of pornography and censorship . (See e .g ., Williams 1981 .)
Of course, it is important to distinguish here between sexually
explicit material that is wholly or primarily
designed to produce sexual arousal (i .e ., whose only or overriding aim
is to produce sexual arousal) and material whose aim is to do this in
order to make some other artistic or political point . The film,
Last Tango in Paris arguably aims to arouse audiences, but
this is not its primary aim . It does so in order to make a broader
political point .
It is sometimes assumed that pornography, in this second sense, is
published and consumed by a small and marginalized minority . But, while
exact estimates of the size and profitability of the international
trade in pornography vary somewhat, it is generally agreed that the
pornography industry is a massive international enterprise, with a
multi-billion dollar annual turnover . In 2003, the pornography industry
(taken to include adult videos, magazines, Cable/Pay per view, Internet
and CD-Rom) is estimated to have grossed US$34 billion world-wide; and
in excess of $8 billion in the U .S . alone, greater than the combined
revenue of ABC, CBS, and NBC ($6 .2 . billion) . (See “Internet Filter
Review: Internet Pornography Statistics” in
Other Internet Resources .)
Pornography is much more widely consumed than
is sometimes supposed, and is a large and extremely profitable
international industry .
However, the term “pornography” is often used with an additional
normative force that the first and second definitions leave
out . When many people describe something (e .g ., a book such as
Tropic of Capricorn or a film such as Baise Moi )as
“pornographic”, they seem to be doing more than simply dispassionately
describing its sexually explicit content or the intentions of its
producers-indeed, in these debates, the intentions of producers are
sometimes treated as irrelevant to the work's status as pornography .
They seem to be saying, in addition, that it is bad -and
perhaps also that its badness is not redeemed by other artistic,
literary, or political merit the work may possess . (Consider, for
example, how people use the term “visual pornography” to condemn
certain sorts of art or television, often when the material is not even
sexually explicit) .
This suggests a third definition: pornography is sexually explicit
material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers that is
bad in a certain way . This definition of pornography makes it
analytically true that pornography is bad: by definition, material that
is not bad in the relevant way is not pornography . It might be that
all and only sexually explicit material is bad in a certain
way (e .g ., obscene): in which case, “pornography” will refer to all and
only the class of sexually explicit materials . But it might be that
only some sexually explicit material is objectionable (e .g .,
degrading to women), in which case only the bad subset of
sexually explicit material will count as pornography . And, of course,
it is possible that no sexually explicit material is bad in
the relevant way (e .g ., harmful to women), in which case we would have
an error theory about pornography: there would be no pornography, so
defined, merely harmless, sexually explicit “erotica” .
A number of approaches define pornography as sexually explicit
material that is bad—although they disagree as to the relevant source of its badness, and consequently about what material is pornographic . A particularly
dominant approach has been to define pornography in terms of
obscenity . (For critical discussions of this approach see
Schauer 1982, Feinberg 1987, MacKinnon 1987 .) The obscenity might be
taken to be intrinsic to the content of the material itself (for
example, that it depicts deviant sexual acts that are immoral in
themselves) or it may lie in contingent effects that the material has
(for example, that it tends to offend “reasonable” people, or to
deprave and corrupt viewers, or to erode traditional family and
religious values) . If all sexually explicit material is obscene by
whichever of these standards is chosen, then all sexually explicit
material will be pornography on this definition . This is the definition
of pornography that moral conservatives typically favour .
But the badness of pornography need not reside in obscenity .
Pornography might be defined, not as sexually explicit material that is
obscene, but as that sexually explicit material that harms
women . Thus many contemporary feminist definitions define
“pornography” as sexually explicit material that depicts women's
subordination in such a way as to endorse that subordination .
(See Longino 1980, MacKinnon 1987 .) This definition of pornography
leaves it open in principle that there might be sexually explicit
material that is not pornography: sexually explicit material that does
not subordinate women will count as harmless “erotica” .
Of course, women may not be the only people harmed by the production
or consumption of certain sorts of sexually explicit material . The
consumption of sexually explicit material has often been thought to be
harmful to its (mostly male) consumers: for example, by corrupting
their morals or by making them less likely to have loving,
long-term sexual relationships . Many people strongly object to
“child pornography”: that subset of sexually explicit material that
involves depictions of actual children engaged in sexual activity . This class of sexually explicit material is
widely regarded as objectionable because it involves the actual sexual
exploitation of children, together with a permanent record of that
abuse which may further harm their interests .
I have discussed how, on this third approach to defining
“pornography” as sexually explicit material that is bad or harmful in a
certain way, there are three possibilities: “pornography” might name
all , some or even no sexually explicit
material, depending on what (if any) class of sexually explicit
material is in fact bad in the relevant way . But it is worth noting
that there is an interesting fourth possibility . It is possible that
some non -sexually explicit material might also turn
out to be bad in the relevant way . It might be that some non-sexually
explicit material is obscene in the relevant sense (e .g ., Andres
Serrano's famously controversial artwork entitled “Piss Christ”, which
displays a plastic crucifix in urine with cow's blood) . Or it might
turn out that non-sexually explicit advertising that depicts women in
positions of sexual servility in such a way as to endorse that
subordination is also bad in the relevant way . (As many
philosophers might be inclined to put the point, the sexually explicit
materials that subordinate women via their depiction of women as
subordinate may turn out not to form a natural kind .) In this case,
there are two options . “Pornography” might be taken to name only the
sexually explicit subset of material that is bad in
the relevant sense (e .g ., that depicts women as men's sexual
subordinates in such a way as to endorse their subordination); or
“pornography” might be taken to refer to all the material that
is bad in that way, whether that material is sexually explicit or not .
The former option would clearly stick more closely to the everyday
conception of pornography as involving the sexually explicit . But it
might be that this ordinary conception, on reflection, turns out not to
capture what is of moral and political interest and importance . There
may thus be a theoretical reason to conceive of pornography more
broadly than simply sexually explicit material that is bad in a certain
way, or perhaps simply to invent a new term that captures the
theoretically interesting kind . Some feminists seem inclined to this
broader approach, suggesting that material that explicitly depicts
women in postures of sexual submission, servility or display in such a
way as to endorse it counts as pornography (See Longino 1980 and
MacKinnon 1984) . This may include some non-sexually explicit material
that would not ordinarily be thought of as pornography: for example,
photographs in artwork, advertising or fashion spreads that depict
women bound, chained or bruised in such a way as to glamorise these
things .
The term “pornography” is used in all of these different ways in
everyday discourse and debate, as well as in philosophical discussions:
sometimes it is used to mean merely material which is sexually
explicit; sometimes it is used to mean material which is sexually
explicit and objectionable in some particular way; and so on . (For further discussion, see Rea 2001 .)
It seems to me that we do not need to choose between these different
definitions, for all of them capture something of the term's everyday
use . What matters crucially is that we know which definition is being
used in a particular case . For the fact that “pornography” has
different senses can have two very unfortunate consequences if these
differences are not clearly noted and kept in mind: it can make it seem
that there is disagreement when there is not; and it can obscure the
real nature of the disagreement when there is .
Here is one topical example of how this might happen . Some feminists
object to pornography on the grounds that it harms women . Other
feminists claim that pornography may not always be harmful to women,
and may even sometimes be beneficial . It seems that there is genuine
disagreement here . But is there? Not necessarily . For the two sides
might mean different things by “pornography” . Suppose that feminists
who object to pornography are defining “pornography” as sexually
explicit material that subordi
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