Buying ganja Al Hudaydah

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Buying ganja Al Hudaydah

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Buying ganja Al Hudaydah

The ongoing war in Yemen has either destroyed these markets or forced their closure. This would militarize the borderlands in perpetuity. Crucially, despite recurring conflict within Yemen, the warring domestic parties by and large took care to avoid clashing in the vicinity of these markets, given their value to the economy. The principal confrontation pitted the Iran-backed Ansar Allah rebel group, commonly known as the Houthis, against a Saudi-led Arab military coalition. Both sides quickly came to view the borderlands as a strategic asset and took to building up their military presence there. In and of itself, this development had negative repercussions on trade. Yet worse was to come. The economic downturn accelerated. Finally, outright clashes transformed the borderlands into battle zones. This led to the shuttering of the border markets and sundered long-standing cross-border economic and social links. Prospects for a significant amelioration of the current dismal state of affairs are bleak. Saudi Arabia and its allies have proven unable to dislodge the Houthis from most borderlands. As a result, even if the warring parties reach a peace deal, it is likely that they will divide the borderlands between them. Traders and stall owners seem to have realized as much. Some have gravitated toward smuggling, others have reconstituted smaller versions of the markets in inland Yemen, and yet others have set up shop along the more remote northeastern parts of the border. Though the markets, which took shape in Yemen over the second half of the twentieth century, catered mostly to Yemeni consumers, they suited Saudi interests in several ways: visas were not required of visitors who restricted themselves to the border areas, sundry items were brought together in a single location, and rates were tax-free. Significantly, the markets helped to sustain remote and somewhat marginalized Yemeni communities and enhanced relations between tribes on either side of the border. The markets began as small-scale affairs that operated only on certain days of the week. Nonspecialized stalls were the norm, but products and services were geared toward the needs of border communities. For example, many stalls sold foodstuffs, building materials, and agricultural products. Some also provided financial services, including money transfers via the hawala system a monetary transaction structure based on the honor system. For the most part, the markets emerged near border crossings. Even those located farther inland arose along highways or roads that led to a border crossing. Residential settlements, initially quite small, arrayed themselves around the markets. This phenomenon was apparent across all four border governorates, whose combined length is 1, kilometers about 1, miles. However, the northwestern governorates of Saada and Hajjah played host to larger markets than northcentral al-Jawf and northeastern Hadramout, owing to more cross-border traffic and a larger local population on both the Yemeni and Saudi Arabian sides of the border. In Saada, the markets sprang up around the Aleb crossing. In Hajjah, they were clustered around the Harad crossing. And in al-Jawf, it was in the vicinity of the Khadra crossing that the markets took shape. In the borderlands of Hadramout, where the most widespread economic activity was the raising of livestock, the markets were few and far between despite the presence of the Wadiah crossing. Many of the areas where the markets took root are named for the tribes that predominate there, a convention that has some precedence in the original demarcation of the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Most of these tribes are further subdivided into branches. For example, the border districts of Saada are home to the Suidan, Qurei, and Salah branches of the Waela tribe, with the Jabara and Husainia branches straddling the border itself. Because of geographic and demographic connections with the Saudi border communities, many members of Yemeni tribes near the border have both Saudi and Yemeni nationalities. For decades, several of these tribes had taken pride in the fact that they tilled agricultural land and did not have to resort to doing business at the border, an activity they associated with the marginalized and the poor, particularly those who had failed to make a living among their native inland communities and had come to the borderlands out of desperation. The success of the border markets counteracted this long-held stigma. The tribes began to involve themselves in the markets and benefited accordingly. This was especially true of the farmers among them, who would now sell their crops and buy their necessities at the same location. An additional factor that contributed to the growth of the markets was the improved security situation on the border in the first decade of this century. Throughout the s, skirmishes had occasionally broken out between Saudi and Yemeni military forces over contested border areas. In , however, a new demarcation of the border, one considerably more precise than its predecessor in , came to pass. The resulting stability and the ease with which the border was traversed by locals on either side enabled the border markets to become supply-and-distribution points for goods that were brought to Yemen from Saudi Arabia or vice versa, thereby boosting both their revenue and their economic significance. At the markets, many commercial transactions, especially bulk purchases, were made using Saudi rather than Yemeni currency, in part because the trade balance favored state-subsidized, and therefore cheaper, products from Saudi Arabia. And when Yemen was hit by an oil shortage in , border merchants imported fuel from the Saudi Arabian border markets and sold it to fellow Yemenis. When it came to the entry of Yemeni nationals into its territory, Saudi Arabia had long pursued a dual policy. Yemeni border inhabitants were allowed to enter and exit Saudi Arabia with few restrictions, even if all they possessed was Yemeni nationality. As such, merchants from the interior found it very difficult to conduct border transactions, let alone cross into Saudi Arabia, and generally obtained Saudi goods by buying them from Yemeni border residents who sold them at a profit. One product sold at all the markets that proved especially popular with Saudi buyers was qat, a plant whose leaves function as a mild stimulant when chewed. Since qat is prohibited in Saudi Arabia, where it is classified as a drug, most Saudis who made their way to markets across the border to buy it would end up spending several hours or even a couple of days on the Yemeni side in order to consume their supply before heading home. The plant was sold to Saudi consumers at a higher price, which increased profit. Qat tourism led to the construction of locandat , which are a sort of combination of rest stop, restaurant, and hotel. At a locanda , visitors could chew qat and dine at their leisure and even had the option of spending the night. This suited Saudi traders as well as Yemeni expatriates who lived in Saudi Arabia. All this activity generated popular confidence in the notion of working in border areas that until then had a reputation among inland Yemenis as far-flung and periodically unstable. Indeed, the transformation of the borderlands from a remote region, parts of which were contested, to one that was both peaceful and economically dynamic spurred migration from inland areas of border governorates and even from inland governorates. And with the business conducted at such markets increasing not only in volume but in variety, laborers began flocking to the area in search of menial work. Given the then-thriving economy, wages there were higher. As a result, the markets of Harad, for example, a district located in Hajjah Governorate, came to include stall owners, operators, and laborers from the southwestern cities of Taiz, Hudaydah, and Amran, many of whom took up residence in the area and sent for their families. Whereas in , the population of Hajjah Governorate stood at 1,,, by it had jumped to around 1,, In the first decade of this century, many markets that had previously operated only on specific days of the week took to opening every day. For example, both the Souq al-Thalouth of Harad and the Souq al-Khamis of Munbeh were initially open for business on one day of the week, the former on Tuesdays and the latter on Thursdays. Bit by bit, however, they began to open on additional days, until they turned into daily markets that operated around the clock. Moreover, their stalls, previously flimsy shanties, were now fashioned out of clay bricks. Both transformations—operating more frequently and making use of sturdier construction material—occurred in other markets as well. In , an on-again, off-again conflict between the Houthis and the Yemeni state morphed into a full-blown and continuous civil war, one that drew in regional powers. The consequences for the borderland economy were catastrophic. The war dealt the border markets a fatal blow, destroying several and forcing others to close permanently, and tore apart the cross-border social fabric of the borderlands. With the war grinding on, there is little to chance to halt, let alone reverse, such developments. Yet even an end to the hostilities is unlikely to restore the status quo ante. This would serve to militarize the borderlands in perpetuity and prevent the resumption of both cross-border trade and social relations. In , a sixth round of fighting in as many years between the Yemeni military and the Houthis ended with the latter taking control of large parts of Saada Governorate, including areas along the border. Yet by the end of , the Houthis were in control of all border areas in Saada as well as most of those in Hajjah and al-Jawf. Thousands of people were displaced, and many markets—especially the remaining weekly ones, which saw less traffic than their daily counterparts—suffered as a result of people avoiding travel to border areas. For example, the group imposed on merchants the khums , a religious tithe, in line with their theological beliefs. As a result, trade in agricultural produce experienced a precipitous decline. According to Saudi foreign trade statistics, imports from Yemen dropped by around 50 percent between and In alone, imports decreased by 75 percent compared to Throughout all these developments, Saudi Arabia maintained a flexible policy toward Yemen, one that saw it strike deals with both the Yemeni state and the Houthis. Saudi officials provided the Yemeni army with air support in , but also reached understandings with the Houthis, particularly as the latter cemented their control over border areas. Saudi-Houthi deals tended to take the form of an informally concluded quid pro quo: in return for the Houthis helping the Saudi state maintain security along the border, Saudi Arabia would allow much-needed fuel to enter Houthi-controlled border areas. In , however, the Houthis launched yet another rebellion against the weakened Yemeni state. Saudi Arabia viewed this development as a threat, with the Iran-backed Houthis increasingly assuming the role of a state within a state. This set the stage for the Saudi-led military intervention in March This made life unbearable for many inhabitants and led to a mass exodus. Many scaled back their operations drastically, others moved elsewhere, and yet others closed down permanently. In the districts of Harad, al-Dhahir, and Midi, the war obliterated the border markets, causing people to flee. Escaping the raging war, most of them fled to various areas of the Yemeni interior. Today, all that remains in the border area is a shell of the long-abandoned original Thalouth, as well as ruined residential dwellings. Midi fared even worse. In , the area became an epicenter of military confrontation, and when the Houthis withdrew later that same year, they left behind thousands of land mines. Even markets on the Saudi side of the border suffered. The authorities undertook this measure ostensibly to protect the people of the borderlands from the Houthis, who were firing missiles into Saudi territory. However, the more strategic goal was to distance the largely Shia inhabitants of these areas from the Houthis, who now controlled the Yemeni side of the border, and thereby prevent any possible collusion. Following the evacuation and resettlement, many markets in these Saudi border areas closed. If nature abhors a vacuum, the warring parties were only too happy to fill it. The collapse and closure of the border markets on the Yemeni side prompted the Saudi military and the Houthis to swoop in and compete for control over the former economic hubs. However, it is notable that neither side seems keen on resuscitating them. The Houthis have captured fewer former border markets, but have nonetheless managed to recruit disaffected or unemployed non-Zaydis from these areas into their ranks and train them elsewhere. The Saudi military generally assigns the task of recruitment to its Yemeni allies. The recruits earn a small monthly salary, but are provided with little to no military training before finding themselves thrust into battle. The Houthis have had less success in taking over former markets and using them to their advantage. However, they have managed to recruit people to fight alongside them, often in or near markets that the Saudi government has since turned into military camps. This is particularly true of Yemenis deported from Saudi Arabia because of their illegal status. Upon their return to Yemen, the Houthis offer them the chance to exact revenge by taking up arms against Saudi Arabia—and to do so while earning a much-needed salary. The demise of the border markets did not just cripple a distinct economic system that tied together the Yemeni interior and the Yemeni-Saudi borderlands. It complicated and in some cases cut off social links between people on either side of the border. The markets, after all, had cemented familial and social relations between borderland inhabitants from the two countries. Many stalls and shops in the Yemeni markets were jointly owned by Yemenis and Saudis of the same extended family, thereby allowing them to maintain and even strengthen a bond that an international border might have otherwise weakened or severed. Additionally, it was common for members of such extended families, as well as for Yemenis who lived and worked in Saudi Arabia, to undertake cross-border visits. The most affected are Yemenis from the northwestern parts of the country who live and work in southeastern Saudi Arabia, which is adjacent to their areas of origin. As for the markets themselves, following their shuttering, some resurfaced elsewhere. In , as Saudi-backed government forces closed in on Hairan, battles with the Houthis took place near Baddah Beni Hassan and brought economic activity to a standstill. Other merchants moved even farther afield. Some traders made their way to northeastern regions of the Yemeni-Saudi border. Slowly, they began to change the economic landscape there. Before the war, there were no large markets in the vicinity of the Wadiah border crossing in Hadramout Governorate. A handful of restaurants and shops providing basic services to motorists were all one could find in the area. Indeed, fruit and vegetables previously exported overseas via the Harad port are now routed through Wadiah. All this economic activity has contributed to the emergence of residential settlements close to the border crossing. Merchants who have chosen to remain in northwestern border areas have precious few means of making a living. With legal economic activity providing scant profit, many have resorted to smuggling. Some of the villagers-turned-smugglers have demonstrated resourcefulness in other ways. For example, several have gone so far as to train donkeys to do the smuggling for them. Laden with wares, these donkeys make their way unaccompanied to points within Saudi Arabia, where they are corralled by Saudi smugglers and relieved of their burden. Smuggling is not a new development. Traditionally, two types of items were smuggled across the Yemeni-Saudi border. The first was goods that were legal in Saudi Arabia and Yemen but subject to relatively high customs duties. This included foodstuffs, construction materials, and home appliances. The second was made up of products prohibited on either side of the border, such as drugs, or only on the Saudi side, such as qatand weapons. The demise of the border markets has translated into even more such activity. As ever, the most widely smuggled products are hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin, as well as cannabis and qat. Drugs and cannabis, which originate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iran, are shipped by sea to Yemen, where they are offloaded at secret points and then smuggled into Saudi Arabia, where demand is high. Before the conflict, many Saudis in the district of Jizan would enter Yemen through the Harad crossing in order to purchase qat. Today, those who still wish to obtain the stimulant must buy it from smugglers. Qatsmugglers now reap a significant profit by catering to Saudi customers. The smuggling of arms has also flourished. Many Saudis began to worry about militants or even criminal gangs infiltrating their country. Because strict gun laws apply in Saudi Arabia, they had to turn to smugglers from Yemen, where possession of arms is an integral part of the culture, especially in border areas. Smugglers in Saadah, whether veterans or novices, had only to turn to the Raqumarket, located in an inland area of the governorate, to purchase arms that they could then sell for a higher price across the border. Yet it is not just drugs or weapons that are smuggled from Yemen into Saudi Arabia. People smuggling has surged. With the onset of the conflict, many Yemenis who had had steady work at the border markets suddenly found themselves without jobs. Moreover, massive unemployment in war-torn Yemen as a whole has impelled Yemenis from inland governorates, many of whom previously had no ties to Saudi Arabia, to cross the border with the aid of hired smugglers. Most are Ethiopians who reach Yemen by sea, having set off from Somalia. They then head for cities or towns that are known as transit points. According to estimates by the International Organization for Migration, the number of African migrants entering Yemen in was 50, Smuggling, whether of goods or people, seems likely to continue for the time being. Even in the best-case scenario, one in which it becomes possible to resume economic activity in these borderlands, it is hardly certain that a sizable number of people would do so. Once bitten, twice shy, the Yemeni merchants and residents who made the border markets such a successful enterprise may well decide against returning and beginning anew. While continued conflict hardly augurs well for the border markets, ironically a peace agreement between the warring parties may serve as the nail in their coffin. The Saudi government seems to have given up on its initial goal of enabling the pro-Saudi Yemeni government to retake all of Yemen and has become resigned to the Houthis retaining control over northern parts of the country. One way to do this is to reactivate a dormant plan to build a border wall. Saudi Arabia began construction of that wall in , only to suspend the project at the request of the Yemeni government, which still controlled much of the country. In , Riyadh briefly considered resuming construction, but decided against such a move given continued opposition on the part of the Yemeni government. This would lessen the likelihood, for example, of Houthi-fired missiles striking populated areas in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, it would give Saudi border security forces the chance to neutralize would-be infiltrators, smugglers, and migrants well before they breach the border. The Houthis seem willing to accept the idea of a buffer zone on condition that Saudi Arabia recognize their de facto Sanaa-based government and end military support of the internationally recognized and pro-Saudi Yemeni government. This was made clear by the Houthis during their negotiations with the Saudis—which began in mid and remain ongoing—in Muscat, Oman. For one thing, Saudi military forces would almost certainly prevent the border markets from reestablishing themselves. In all probability, they would also clear out remaining communities around the buffer zone. Inhabitants of Yemeni borderland areas that fall outside the zone would fare little better, as the permanent closure of border crossings would take its toll on them. Although the borderlands have long since ceased to attract internal migration and are now hemorrhaging that portion of their population which moved to the region in recent years, many original inhabitants, such as farmers and livestock herders, have thus far remained despite all the hardships. With no prospect of cross-border trade and progressively fewer local buyers of their products, however, they may well move to other parts of Yemen. Peace through the establishment of a buffer zone would have consequences both far-reaching and long-lasting. All that is gone now. Yet it appears that a worse development is on the horizon: a permanent disfigurement of the landscape along with forced demographic change through a Saudi-Houthi joint project for a buffer zone. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the buffer zone would mark the definitive end of the border market era. The country is undergoing a process of cantonization, one driven by the political and military imperatives of Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the UAE is backing southern Yemeni separatists in their efforts to detach much of southern Yemen from the region controlled by the internationally recognized and pro-Saudi government. This paper draws on a mix of sources and methods. The primary sources include interviews with dozens of locals residing by Yemen-Saudi borders and local researchers. Due to coronavirus restrictions and security circumstances near the areas under study, most of the interviews were conducted via phone. The paper also utilizes secondary sources tackling Yemen-Saudi border issues.

Buying ganja Al Hudaydah