Buying cocaine online in Turkiye
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Buying cocaine online in Turkiye
Disclaimer: The material in this print-out relates to the law as it applies in the state of Victoria. It is intended as a general guide only. Readers should not act on the basis of any material in this print-out without getting legal advice about their own particular situations. Victoria Legal Aid disclaims any liability howsoever caused to any person in respect of any action taken in reliance on the contents of the publication. We help Victorians with their legal problems and represent those who need it most. Find legal answers, chat with us online, or call us. You can speak to us in English or ask for an interpreter. You can also find more legal information at www. It is against the law to use, possess, cultivate or traffic a drug of dependence, including marijuana, heroin, amphetamines, cocaine, LSD and ecstasy. The penalties for using and possessing small quantities of illegal drugs are treated less seriously than for trafficking and cultivating drugs. Importing or exporting drugs is an offence under Commonwealth law. Possession is one of the most common drug offences. Possession means having a drug on you or in a house or property you occupy. This includes cannabis growing anywhere on the premises. You can be charged with possession if drugs are found in a car you own or you are driving. If you are caught with a small quantity of cannabis or heroin and it is your first offence , you will usually get a warning caution instead of being charged with the offence. The police informant makes this decision. You will have to agree to have drug counselling and to attend a drug treatment centre. If you do not go along as agreed, you may be charged by police later. For the police to prove a charge of possession in court, you must have known that the drug was there and have intended to possess it. Read How we can help before being interviewed by police. The penalties are much higher for trafficking an illegal drug. They depend on the quantity you have and how old you are. Cultivation is the offence of growing narcotic plants. These are cannabis, opium or cocoa plants. The maximum penalty depends on whether you are found guilty of trafficking as well. These are indictable offences. If you are charged with cultivation, read how we can help before being interviewed by police. Whether you are guilty depends on the exact facts and circumstances of your case. The magistrate will look at this in the courtroom. If the police charged you with possession of cannabis, they may also charge you with use of cannabis. Use includes smoking, inhaling fumes, injecting or swallowing an illegal drug. The police can charge you if they saw you using or trying to use cannabis. They can also charge you if they did not see you using but you told them you used it. It is still an offence to possess a quantity over 50 grams and under grams. It is more serious to have over 50 grams but not necessarily considered a traffickable quantity. If you have been charged with possessing more than grams of cannabis or more, the police may have also charged you with trafficking cannabis. If you have been changed with trafficking cannabis, speak with a lawyer. If you have a future court date, you may be eligible to get help to prepare before you go to court. You can request help online. The prosecution must have evidence that an offence occurred. For the offence of possession of cannabis, the police have to prove all of the following:. Getting diversion means your case is treated differently. It is normally for less serious cases. You must agree to certain conditions, such as doing the Cautious with Cannabis program. You do not get a criminal record. To get diversion you must admit that you broke the law. This includes everything in the statement of alleged facts. Tell the magistrate that you know you broke the law but you would like diversion. If the police have not recommended diversion for you, you can ask to adjourn put off the case. If you agree that you broke the law, you should tell the court that you are pleading guilty. During the court hearing, the prosecutor will read out the statement of alleged facts. The magistrate will find you guilty and give you a penalty. If you plead guilty the magistrate treats this as a sign that you are co-operating and may give you a less severe penalty. For more information visit our page Going to court β pleading guilty. If you believe that you did not break the law, or you disagree with what is in the statement of alleged facts, you must tell the prosecutor before your court date that you plan to plead not guilty. They will hold a summary case conference with you before your case is heard in court. If you still want to plead not guilty after the conference, tell the magistrate. The magistrate will adjourn put off your case for another day. You will come back to court for a contested hearing. When you come back the magistrate listens to evidence from you and the police before making a decision. You should have a defence. Saying that you did not know you were breaking the law is not a good enough defence. If you are pleading not guilty, get legal advice before the contested hearing. See Going to court β pleading not guilty. You may have a defence if:. If this is where police found the substance, you will have to prove to the magistrate that it was not yours. You can ask the magistrate to adjourn to put off your case if you have a good reason. For example, to ask police about diversion or get a lawyer. If you have not adjourned your case before and you are on summons, you may be able to get an adjournment without going into the courtroom. When you arrive at court, go to the counter and tell the staff you want an adjournment. If you are also found guilty of using cannabis, the magistrate could fine you up to five penalty units. This is on top of the fines for the possession charge. If you are found guilty of cannabis possession the magistrate may give you a fine. This depends on the amount of cannabis you pleaded guilty to possessing. If you pleaded guilty to possessing up to 50 grams of cannabis the magistrate could fine you up to five penalty units. If the police also charged you with using cannabis, and the magistrate found you guilty, the magistrate could fine you up to five penalty units. This is on top of the penalty units for the possession charge. You should tell the magistrate about your income and things you have to pay for, and whether you support a family. If you get a fine you can pay it straight away at court. If you do not pay the fine straight away, Fines Victoria will send you a Court fine collection statement. This will tell you how much you owe and when the fine is due. You can ask Fines Victoria for a payment plan if you cannot afford to pay the fine in one payment. If you do not pay the fine when it is due, Fines Victoria may increase the fine. The court can issue a warrant for your arrest. If you were charged with possession of cannabis, the magistrate can also put you on an undertaking to behave well for a certain amount of time. If you were charged with possessing other illegal drugs, such as heroin, cocaine or ecstasy you can be fined up to 30 penalty units. You could also be sent to jail for up to one year. You may need to convince the court that you did not possess the drug to sell, particularly if caught with a large quantity of the drug. If charged with possessing a large quantity of an illegal drug you may have to make the court believe that you did not possess the drug in order to sell traffic the drug. If the police took the cannabis, the prosecutor will apply to the court for a forfeiture order. This means that the police will not give the cannabis back to you. The court and the police can see your criminal record. Sometimes they can let other people know what is in your criminal record. A criminal record, especially with convictions, may make it harder for you to get some jobs or get visas to some countries. See Possible outcomes for traffic offences for more information about penalties and other outcomes. If you do not agree with the decision you can appeal to the County Court. You have 28 days to do this. Get legal advice before you decide. You could get a higher penalty. Courts recognise that people who are addicted to illegal drugs need help and support to overcome this. Updated 1 November Skip to main content. Drug possession It is against the law to use, possess, cultivate or traffic a drug of dependence, including marijuana, heroin, amphetamines, cocaine, LSD and ecstasy. On this page Drugs of dependence Possession of an illegal drug Drug trafficking Cultivation Going to court for possession of cannabis What are my options at court? What are the penalties if I am found guilty? Court support services Other support. It is against the law to use, possess, cultivate or traffic a drug of dependence. There are long lists of the kinds of drugs that are prohibited by law. Possession of an illegal drug Possession is one of the most common drug offences. Police caution If you are caught with a small quantity of cannabis or heroin and it is your first offence , you will usually get a warning caution instead of being charged with the offence. Drug trafficking You could be charged with trafficking drug of dependence if you are caught: with a large quantity of the drug preparing such as dividing the drugs into smaller packages or manufacturing a drug selling the drug buying drugs for a friend. Penalty for trafficking The penalties are much higher for trafficking an illegal drug. Cultivation Cultivation is the offence of growing narcotic plants. Going to court for possession of cannabis Cannabis is a drug of dependence and these drugs are illegal. Quantities of cannabis are defined as: small quantity β up to 50 grams traffickable quantity β grams or over, or 10 plants commercial quantity β 25 kilograms or over, or plants large commercial quantity β kilograms or more, or plants Whether you are guilty depends on the exact facts and circumstances of your case. Use of cannabis If the police charged you with possession of cannabis, they may also charge you with use of cannabis. Trafficking cannabis If you have been charged with possessing more than grams of cannabis or more, the police may have also charged you with trafficking cannabis. Help before court If you have a future court date, you may be eligible to get help to prepare before you go to court. What does the prosecution have to prove? For the offence of possession of cannabis, the police have to prove all of the following: the offence occurred at a certain time and place you are the offender you had a substance in your possession the substance was an illegal drug. What are my options at court? Admit to the charges and ask for diversion Getting diversion means your case is treated differently. Plead guilty If you agree that you broke the law, you should tell the court that you are pleading guilty. Plead not guilty If you believe that you did not break the law, or you disagree with what is in the statement of alleged facts, you must tell the prosecutor before your court date that you plan to plead not guilty. Possible defences You may have a defence if: the substance was not cannabis the substance was not in your possession. Fines The magistrate can give you a fine. This depends on the amount of cannabis you had. You can get: up to five penalty units for up to 50g of cannabis up to 30 penalty units or up to a year in jail for over 50 g but under g. Other penalties If you were charged with possession of cannabis, the magistrate can also put you on an undertaking to behave well for a certain amount of time. What else might happen if I am found guilty? Forfeiture If the police took the cannabis, the prosecutor will apply to the court for a forfeiture order. Criminal record What happens in court goes into your criminal record. This includes: the finding of guilt a conviction, if there is one penalties. Court support services Courts recognise that people who are addicted to illegal drugs need help and support to overcome this. Other support For more information, support and referrals, visit: Help at court Other support for going to court Other support for fines and infringements. I need legal information about. Back to top.
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Buying cocaine online in Turkiye
You have full access to this open access article. Drug cryptomarkets are a significant development in the recent history of illicit drug markets. Dealers and buyers can now finalize transactions with people they have never met, who could be located anywhere across the globe. What factors shape the geography of international drug trafficking via these cryptomarkets? In our current study, we test the determinants of drug trafficking through cryptomarkets by using a mix of social network analysis and a new dataset composed of self-reported transactions. We also observed that trafficking on cryptomarkets is more likely to occur between countries that are geographically close. In summary, our study highlights the need to consider both online and offline factors in research on cryptomarkets. In the past, individuals who sought illicit drugs had to meet dealers in person to finalize transactions. Cryptomarkets, however, heralded a shift in this convention. These anonymous online markets, accessible exclusively via the darknet Aldridge, , enabled the purchase of both illicit drugs and other commodities, licit or not, without requiring personal contact with transaction partners. As a result, drug dealers could extend their businesses, dealing with people unknown to them and receiving anonymous cryptocurrency payments Ouellet et al. Ordinarily, illicit drugs traverse multiple international borders before reaching their final consumers. Cryptomarkets, on the contrary, provide the means to streamline supply chains by sourcing directly from drug-producing countries, bypassing intermediaries. This model has the potential to boost the global reach of drug traffickers and heighten their profits. This pattern extends to buyers and revenue as well. Only a handful of transactions occur directly between producer countries, such as Afghanistan for heroin and Colombia for cocaine, and destination or consumer countries Kruithof et al. Furthermore, cryptomarkets represent only a small fraction of the overall illicit drug market Kruithof et al. Despite some understanding of the geographic dispersion of cryptomarkets, the driving forces behind international trafficking on these platforms remain unclear. And more broadly, what shapes the geography of international drug trafficking via cryptomarkets? This article will attempt to answer these questions through social network analysis techniques and a new dataset of self-reported cryptomarket transactions. In the following sections, we will delve into relevant literature, formulate and test hypotheses assessing the relative influence of offline and online factors on drug trafficking via cryptomarkets. We will then introduce our novel crowdsourcing methodology and proceed to discuss the results. Our findings imply that countries involved in drug trafficking are not randomly connected; local factors indeed affect the movement of drugs from one country to another via cryptomarkets. Ross Ulbricht inaugurated the first such market in , driven by a libertarian ethos. He envisaged these cryptomarkets as open platforms for vendors to list their products and services Barratt, Buyers could browse these listings, select their preferred product, and place an order. Transactions were conducted in bitcoin, and all connections were protected by the darknet, ensuring the anonymity of all parties Martin et al. Given the intensely competitive nature of cryptomarkets, vendors are required to disclose substantial information as part of their business. With few discernible differences between vendors selling similar products like cocaine EMCDDA, , they share information regarding their location, experience, and the quality of their products and services. Conversely, buyers on cryptomarkets have minimal incentives to reveal personal information as it would compromise their anonymity. For the first time, drug buyers could order any drug of their choice whenever they wished Barratt et al. This suggested a shift in the international illicit drug trafficking network, bridging the gap between buyers and producers. However, the first analysis of a cryptomarket by Christin challenged this theory. He found that the most active countries distributing illicit drugs on cryptomarkets, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany, were more commonly known as consumer or transit countries rather than producers UNODC, Consistently, these countries, along with Australia and other European nations, have been reported as the principal origins of all illicit drugs sold on cryptomarkets Demant et al. Thus, drug traffickers typically import illicit drugs in bulk before redistributing them to buyers via cryptomarkets. In the case of international transactions, buyers usually prefer vendors from the same continent. Demant et al. Risk factors potentially explain this behavior. For example, vendors in countries with stringent border law enforcement like Finland, Australia, the United States, and Canada are often reluctant to ship internationally Kruithof et al. However, the origin of the drugs could also affect their online sales. Over the past decade, several studies have investigated international drug trafficking, its structure, and the various factors shaping offline trafficking routes. For instance, Boivin a determined that drug trafficking typically follows specific routes and countries usually have a limited number of trading partners. Meanwhile, Chandra et al. This reflects the multifaceted nature of illicit drug markets and their ability to adapt to internal and external shocks. Utilizing various network techniques, Giommoni et al. Interestingly, the risk of interception and arrest did not deter traffickers from exporting illicit drugs. Our understanding of the factors influencing international drug trafficking via cryptomarkets remains limited. This methodology can highlight active countries within the cryptomarket ecosystem but provides little insight into why some countries export to or import from others. However, his analysis, conducted seven years ago, focused solely on geographic distance and neglected other influential factors. The unanswered questions include whether countries with more advanced communication and information infrastructures are more likely to engage in international drug trafficking on cryptomarkets, or whether the level of cryptomarket law enforcement deters international trading. In general, what online factors, besides geographic distance, impact the formation of drug trafficking routes on cryptomarkets? These queries remain largely unaddressed and require further empirical exploration. In this study, we aim to examine the factors influencing drug trafficking via cryptomarkets. This constitutes the first investigation into how both online and offline elements shape drug trafficking routes via these cryptomarkets. From previous research, we formulate the following hypotheses:. Cryptomarkets do not operate in isolation. They require specific technological infrastructures Martin, Furthermore, they need resources to acquire the knowledge needed to operate efficiently on cryptomarkets. While some countries have these resources readily available, others do not. We hypothesize that countries with a more developed digital infrastructure β an online factor β are more likely to innovate in their drug trafficking and form drug trafficking connections with other nations. A country with a significant role in offline trafficking might have strong economic incentives to join cryptomarkets but might struggle to access them if high-speed connections and cryptocurrencies are scarce. Conversely, countries with highly developed technological infrastructures might easily participate in drug trafficking via cryptomarkets, even with a minimal economic return. Previous studies have demonstrated the positive impact of internet penetration on innovation development Xiong et al. We anticipate the same for online drug trafficking. Hypothesis 2\[H2\]: The farther two countries are from each other, the less likely they are to trade drugs on cryptomarkets. Distance augments transportation costs and the risk of interception and arrest. Although cryptomarkets primarily operate online, geographic distance β an offline factor β also affects them for similar reasons. Norbutas , p. Hypothesis 3\[H3\]: Sharing a common language increases the likelihood that two countries will trade drugs via cryptomarkets. Language β an offline factor β can aid drug trafficking in two ways. Firstly, cultural affinity β such as speaking the same language β has been shown to reduce uncertainties by providing non-economic factors for buyers and sellers to trust each other. This principle applies to legal goods Prashantham et al. Thus, language diminishes uncertainties between the two parties of a deal Combes et al. Secondly, buyers and sellers must be able to read and write in the same language to understand the terms of a deal. For example, all other factors being equal, the USA is more likely to trade with the UK than with Brazil, given the larger English-speaking population in the former. The higher the level of enforcement in a country, the less appealing it becomes to cryptomarket participants, as this increases their punishment risk. Although various theories suggest this, evidence shows that the intensity of enforcement β an offline factor β does not impact the formation of trafficking routes Berlusconi et al. Effective law enforcement tactics might increase border inspections and disrupt the delivery of drugs purchased online. A cybercrime report by Chainalysis suggests that, except for Russia, cryptomarkets have indeed experienced some disruption, as their size and scope have not significantly increased since The data for this study were sourced from the crowd-sourcing project DrugRoutes, which we launched online on January 1, DrugRoutes was an online platform that gathered transaction data directly from individuals who had bought or sold drugs on cryptomarkets. The website, accessible via the clear web or the darknet, allowed users to anonymously share information regarding their latest cryptomarket transactions. The data gathered included the specific type of illicit drug involved, the quantity traded, the transaction amount, the transaction date, the countries of origin and destination, and confirmation of parcel receipt. To encourage participation, DrugRoutes openly shared the collected data, enabling cryptomarket users to identify the most popular routes. Consistent with previous studies Barratt et al. Every submission to the project underwent moderation by the authors to filter out potential spam. Submissions deemed too deviant from the prevalent cryptomarket prices per unit at the time were labeled as spam and excluded from the dataset. The research team cross-referenced the price per unit from multiple listings on several cryptomarkets and calculated an average. A transaction price from the same origin country that deviated more than one standard deviation from the mean was regarded as spam and removed from the dataset. We also removed multiple submissions made within seconds of each other as potential spam. While DrugRoutes was one of the few crowd-sourcing initiatives collecting information on illicit drug transactions for example, see Government of Canada, , it stands out as the only one incorporating successful delivery of illicit drugs. The research team advertised the crowd-sourcing platform on approximately darkweb platforms, and the consent form and contact information were readily available on the website. In total, we collected 1, submissions between and , all of which were confirmed to be authentic and genuine. Below, we present some descriptive statistics to demonstrate the nature and characteristics of the collected sample. Figure 1 highlights the top fifteen buyer countries, while Fig. Figure 2 complements Fig. Turkey, India, and Belgium concentrate most of their purchases internationally, while Russia, the USA, and Canada mainly fulfill their online drug demands domestically. Figure 3 broadens the scope of what we observed for the top buying countries, offering insight into the most prominent selling countries. Firstly, there are noteworthy differences between the two lists. Although the United States tops both rankings, several countries featured in Fig. Figure 4 can assist us in understanding the roles these countries play in international trafficking via cryptomarkets. This corroborates literature on offline drug trafficking that designates these countries as either producers Afghanistan and Colombia or transit points before drugs reach their final destinations UNODC, As this paper is exclusively concerned with international transactions, the subsequent analyses will omit data that pertain strictly to domestic trade. Table 1 presents the total number of international transactions recorded on DrugRoutes, differentiated by substance type. Cannabis is the most traded drug, accounting for over a quarter of transactions, followed by cocaine and LSD. This study views drug trafficking on cryptomarkets as a network of relationships between countries. This perspective aligns with previous literature analyzing drug trafficking across nations Aziani et al. We utilize data from DrugRoutes to identify relationships between countries. DrugRoutes solicited information from cryptomarket participants about their home country and the country with which they most recently transacted. Consequently, we establish a link from Germany to Spain if a participant based in Germany reports purchasing drugs from a dealer in Spain, or if a Spanish drug dealer declares having shipped drugs to Germany. Using this method, we identified a total of different transactions involving dyads across 42 pairs of countries. The network of drugs trafficked via cryptomarkets is characterized by two distinctive features. First, we only consider a connection if at least two submissions are reported for a pair of countries. For example, we dismissed the connection between Albania and Ireland since we have only one observation following this route. These connections are more likely to be random or sporadic links between countries and, therefore, are not included in our analysis. The final network is predicated on a total of exchanges between any two countries. Secondly, we do not differentiate between substances. For example, a connection between Spain and Germany for cannabis is regarded in the same way as a connection between France and Germany for cocaine. Given that we have only a few transactions for most substances, creating individual networks for each illicit drug type would result in very small networks. As a result, we opted to group all drug types together to avoid information loss. More crucially, we anticipate the independent variables to exert a similar effect on cryptomarket transactions, irrespective of the drug type. This study employs both nodal and relational attributes data to decipher the factors that influence the geographic arrangement of drug trafficking through cryptomarkets. On the other hand, relational attributes provide insights about the connections between any two countries within the network, like the distance between Spain and Germany. Table 2 presents all variables used in this analysis, detailing the source, reference period, the nature of the variable i. We utilized the Information and Communication Development ICT index as a country-level indicator of technological progress to verify our initial hypothesis. This empirically derived index comprises three weighted sub-indices infrastructure access, intensity, skills and facilitates cross-national comparisons ITU, Our decision to use this index was motivated by three factors. Third, several countries examined in this analysis neither collect nor report any data related to cybercrime. Exponential Random Graph Models ERGMs were employed to ascertain the factors influencing the geographic arrangement of drug trafficking through cryptomarkets. ERGMs comprise a category of statistical models applicable to relational data, evaluating the likelihood of a connection between two countries in the network based on the individual country attributes e. Besides the independent variables previously discussed, one of the models incorporates two controls to compensate for outdegree centralization and reciprocity. All network analyses were conducted utilizing the Statnet suite of packages for R Butts, ; Handcock et al. The model encompassing parameters for centralization and reciprocity employed Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation methods to approximate the maximum likelihood Hunter et al. The research was guided by two fundamental principles: 1 the process of data collection and analysis should not expose any party involved to potential harm, and 2 no personally identifying information would be collected or disclosed at any stage of the research. Although DrugRoutes was accessible on both the clear and dark web, we did not gather any sensitive data such as IP addresses or geolocation of submissions. Our objective was to illuminate the operations of cryptomarkets, not to furnish guidance on successful strategies for online drug trafficking. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the drug trafficking network through cryptomarkets, with Fig. This observation aligns well with prior studies indicating that offline drug trafficking has a low density and tends to concentrate along specific routes Boivin, , a ; Giommoni et al. Despite the sparse density, countries usually obtain illicit drugs from multiple sources, as on average, each country imports from more than two nations and conducts trade with nearly five countries. However, the number of connections is not evenly distributed, as demonstrated in Fig. While most countries export to one or a few countries, a handful export to numerous others. This suggests that, akin to offline drug trafficking, some countries play a central role in trafficking via cryptomarkets. Germany 20 , the Netherlands 20 , and the USA 15 stand out due to the number of outgoing ties with other countries. The distribution of incoming ties is more evenly spread than that of outgoing ties in-degree centralisation stands at 0. With seventeen incoming ties, the USA emerges as a clear outlier. This can be explained by both online and offline factors. Firstly, as noted earlier, the USA accounts for a significant majority of illicit drug transactions on cryptomarkets. Reciprocity offers further valuable insights into the network. This feature characterises drug trafficking via cryptomarkets, a phenomenon less common in offline drug markets. Offline trafficking generally follows a single direction - for instance, the UK imports from the Netherlands, but the Netherlands does not reciprocate. However, this dynamic occurs within cryptomarkets, albeit on a small scale. Cryptomarkets can broaden geographic and informal networks by offering alternative paths to traditional routes. For example, even though illicit drugs usually move from the Netherlands to the UK, Dutch-based buyers might find a better deal in the UK. As most transactions involve cannabis, which is produced in almost every country, drug trafficking is less tied to a single direction and more open to reciprocal exchanges. Table 4 details the estimates and standard errors from ERGMs of drug trafficking via cryptomarkets. Model 1 includes all variables operationalising our four hypotheses. Most of these variables are significantly associated with the dependent variable, and their direction aligns with our predictions. The exceptions are the ICT index for exporter countries and common language. While the ICT index standard errors are relatively small and close to the significance threshold of 0. Model 2 is the final model, incorporating structural effects to manage the impact of exporters and mutual connections. Two reasons can account for this variance. First, cryptomarkets replace social proximity with a collection of deliberately crafted mechanisms aimed at fostering trust among participants Martin et al. The question of how a buyer can trust a seller on cryptomarkets arises β how can they ascertain the seller will not abscond with their money? Cryptomarkets have engineered mechanisms to identify reliable partners and mitigate deceitfulness, rendering social proximity unnecessary. Second, there are active cryptomarkets in various languages at any given time. Participants have access to online markets in any language, and they do not need to learn or use another language to buy drugs online. However, proficiency in English, or at least the ability to read and write in English, is a requirement for participating in certain cryptomarkets. Digital restrictions are as crucial as offline restrictions and account significantly for importing countries. To sell or buy drugs online, participants need access to a high-speed internet connection, the Tor browser or an alternative anonymous network like I2P, and the capability to set up an anonymous Bitcoin wallet Basheer, Usually, these are not enough; participants in cryptomarkets often need to take extra steps to increase their anonymity, such as setting up encrypted emails, encrypting all communications, and using a VPN Horton-Eddison et al. In some countries, these technologies are readily available, contributing to digital skills being more widespread among the population. However, this might not be the case in other countries that could potentially benefit from joining cryptomarkets. This disparity helps illuminate β albeit incompletely β why the UK has a more central role in drug cryptomarket trafficking than Colombia. In essence, the more equipped a country is to combat cybercrime, the fewer outgoing connections it has. This observation is contrary to much of the empirical research on drug law enforcement and some studies on policing cryptomarkets. Research on international drug trafficking drivers reveals that stringent law enforcement actions do not deter a country from establishing trafficking connections Aziani et al. Police successes, at best, are fleeting and diminish over time. There are a few reasons why a more advanced cybersecurity infrastructure might make drug trafficking via cryptomarkets less attractive. Individual police operations may yield limited success, but the overall cybersecurity infrastructure could deter people from exporting illicit drugs via cryptomarkets. This might seem counterintuitive, but it aligns with traditional drug trafficking. The mere existence of drug law enforcement influences drug markets. The second reason is more technical, relating to how we measure levels of enforcement. The GCI is a composite indicator accounting for different aspects of cybersecurity, such as organizational measures, capacity development, and cooperation. We posit that the GCI provides a more robust and comprehensive indicator of enforcement against cybercrime, including cryptomarkets. Both models also indicate that trafficking is likelier between geographically proximate countries. Geographic distance amplifies this risk and can discourage dealers from engaging in long-distance transactions. This implies that the number of countries with cryptomarket consumers is limited and that certain countries may have nearly saturated at least their regional market once they attain a certain size. The reciprocity variable, being positive and significant, suggests a tendency towards mutual ties in the network. This might indicate that cryptomarket participants are conscious of the relative safety of transactions on cryptomarkets. If drugs can be successfully transported in one direction, consumers might be more inclined to order drugs internationally in the opposite direction, particularly if less. This study presents compelling insights into the mechanics of drug trafficking within cryptomarkets. It challenges conventional notions of social proximity, demonstrating that shared language or traditional relationships are less relevant in these digital platforms. Instead, the establishment of trust-based mechanisms and multilingual capacities are more integral to interactions in cryptomarkets. The study also underlines the unexpected effects of strong cybersecurity infrastructure. This finding could reshape our understanding of effective strategies to combat online drug trafficking. The risks and costs associated with longer shipping distances can deter dealers from international transactions, reflecting the influence of physical logistics on online trade. Overall, these findings suggest that cryptomarkets operate under different dynamics than traditional markets and need unique strategies for intervention and control. This paper provides key methodological advancements in studying online drug trading. By harnessing crowd-sourced data, we haveve managed to explore this field more deeply than ever before. While cryptomarkets tend to provide elusive details about buyer locations, our platform has proven successful in gathering and examining data on trafficking routes. As a result, we now have an unparalleled glimpse into the pathways of drug movement across international borders through the dark web. Yet, this innovative approach is not without its challenges. The data collection process led to an unrandomized sample, due to a self-selection bias among participants. With no concrete understanding of why some users shared information and others did not, our findings could potentially be skewed. However, such biases are common in research involving illicit activities like drug trading. To ensure the accuracy of our findings, we implemented stringent checks to remove spam, outliers, and infrequent connections between countries. Moving forward, fostering stronger relationships with participants in illicit drug markets is crucial for the success of crowd-sourcing platforms. 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Measuring the effects of operation bayonet on vendors migrating to dream market. Xiong, F. Internet penetration as national innovation capacity: Worldwide evidence on the impact of ICTs on innovation development. Information Technology for Development, 28 1 , 39β Download references. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. All authors contributed to the study conception and design. AB and DDH collected and cleaned and prepared the data. LG and GB performed all the analysis and wrote the first draft of the sections Introduction, The current study, Methodology and Results. AB and DDH drafted the literature review and conclusions. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. Correspondence to Luca Giommoni. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Table 5. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. Reprints and permissions. Online and offline determinants of drug trafficking across countries via cryptomarkets. Crime Law Soc Change 81 , 1β25 Download citation. Accepted : 21 June Published : 02 July Issue Date : January Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:. Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article. Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative. Download PDF. Abstract Drug cryptomarkets are a significant development in the recent history of illicit drug markets. A longitudinal analysis of the effects of Operation Onymous Article 29 October Personal use, social supply or redistribution? Use our pre-submission checklist Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript. The current study In this study, we aim to examine the factors influencing drug trafficking via cryptomarkets. Methodology Data The data for this study were sourced from the crowd-sourcing project DrugRoutes, which we launched online on January 1, Top 15 buyer countries. National and international transactions. Full size image. Top 15 seller countries. Table 1 International transactions per type of drugs in DrugRoutes Full size table. Table 2 Independent variables Full size table. Results Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the drug trafficking network through cryptomarkets, with Fig. Table 3 Network statistics Full size table. Trafficking network via cryptomarkets. Scatterplot between indegree and outdegree along with their distribution. Conclusions This study presents compelling insights into the mechanics of drug trafficking within cryptomarkets. Reference list Aebi, M. Article Google Scholar Barratt, M. Article Google Scholar Bichler, G. Google Scholar Boivin, R. Chapter Google Scholar Boivin, R. Article Google Scholar Caulkins, J. Article Google Scholar Chainalysis. Article Google Scholar Christin, N. Article Google Scholar Hunter, D. Article Google Scholar Kleemans, E. Google Scholar Kleiman, M. Article Google Scholar Ladegaard, I. Book Google Scholar Martin, J. Article Google Scholar Paoli, L. Article Google Scholar Pollack, H. Article Google Scholar Reuter, P. Article Google Scholar Robins, G. Article Google Scholar Sgrignoli, P. View author publications. Ethics declarations Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest. Goodness of fit diagnostics for Model 1. Goodness of fit diagnostics for Model 2. About this article. Cite this article Giommoni, L. Copy to clipboard. 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