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Buying cocaine online in Tacuarembo

This article presents the results of an exploratory study aimed to analyze the contexts in which the use of Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and counter-intuitive routes is prioritized, based on the experience of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. This study constitutes a precedent for future research on the role of South American Southern Cone ports in cocaine trafficking. We can identify at least four emerging lines of research: 1. Cocaine trafficking from landlocked countries; 2. The link between Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and new markets; and 4. Other Non-Traditional Ports of cocaine departure, which are not containerized. Nevertheless, an especially important part of this scheme appears to have been neglected: ports and their role in drug trafficking. Even though some scholars have started working on this topic, specifically cocaine ports of entry Antonelli a ; Antonelli b ; Roks et al. Since South America is the region of the world where the vast majority of coca bush is cultivated and cocaine is produced, and Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, in that order, almost have the monopoly of that production, Footnote 1 it is important to understand how criminal organizations manage to supply the cocaine demand from abroad. In this regard, the production is still growing while crop eradication has been reduced in the last two years. At the same time, supply as well as the demand from the Global North have grown not only in Europe but also in new markets such as China, Australia, and New Zealand as well as in South America. Moreover, Europe has become a more tempting market not only because of the price of cocaine in that territory but also because it opens the door to the Middle East and Asia Mcdermott et al. In this context, studying cocaine trafficking from South American ports and maritime routes is becoming increasingly necessary. In this article, we work from the understanding that criminal organizations use certain Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and counter-intuitive routes as we will define below to reduce risks and maximize profitability Zaitch The latter present diverse manifestations of organized crime but have been inadequately studied Zaitch In recent years, these transit countries have gained importance in maritime cocaine trafficking and, because they are not considered critical source countries by the law enforcement institutions and Customs departments of entry ports, criminal organizations take advantage of the weaker control that exists in their ports. We believe that understanding how criminal organizations use Non-Traditional ports and counter-intuitive routes allows us to explore little-known aspects of cocaine trafficking from South America. As a result, criminal organizations re-export cocaine from the Southern Cone countries, taking advantage of their reputations regarding drug trafficking, as we will explain below. As Mcdermott et al. The main research question explored in this article is: What facilitating factors and incentives lead criminal organizations to use counter-intuitive routes and Non-Traditional ports such as Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo? Our analysis contributes to the discussion of the drug trafficking phenomenon by incorporating the perspective of the Global South. This article is divided into four parts. First, we outline the research notes. Second, we establish the importance of ports for criminal organizations, and define what we understand as counter-intuitive routes and Non-Traditional ports. Third, we identify the context of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo, analyzing geographical, infrastructure, and socio-political factors. Fourth, we analyze facilitating factors and incentives generated by the ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo. Finally, we draw some conclusions. This article presents some of the findings of a broader and ongoing qualitative research project focused on the evolution of criminal organizations in South America. A review of the specialized literature showed the scarcity of information on organized crime in the ports of the Southern Cone, and therefore, the need for smaller-scale research that is useful for investigating under-studied issues Swedberg Hence, the nature of this study is exploratory. That they have a more important role in cocaine trafficking to Europe and to the so-called new markets particularly to Asia and Oceania ; 2. Container contamination is the most common method used to transport cocaine particularly to Europe and new markets CIMCON ; and, 3. Their geographic proximity with two of the main cocaine producers, Peru and Bolivia, and the most important transit country, Brazil. In this research, two techniques were used to gather information: a bibliographic review and in-depth interviews. The literature review was carried out with a double purpose, methodological and thematic. This implied a permanent review of the literature. Through searches in different databases, we identified and selected books and scientific articles, official reports from international organizations, and official documents produced by the countries studied. The information gathered was systematized in a thematic bibliographic file and consolidated in bibliographic cards. These files were systematically reviewed and supplemented during the research process. In-depth interviews were conducted with 10 key informants. Among them were academics, officials of Customs, members of Federal Forces, and officials or former officials of Security institutions, selected based on the knowledge and experience they could provide on regional trends and selected ports. Key informants were selected by purposive sampling and the strategy implemented was snowballing. From the first two interviews, a network of contacts was generated that made it possible to contact informants who were difficult to reach. The data collected was transcribed after each interview and coded thematically. In the first instance, deductive coding was carried out based on the research question. Then inductive or open coding was carried out to establish more specific themes and others that emerged from the interviews. In relation to ethical issues in the interview process, an effort was made from the first contact with the interviewees to inform them of the nature of the research. To guarantee the confidentiality of the interviews and protect the identity of the informants, a reference was assigned. The present research has some limits that need to be considered. Because of the Covid pandemic, on-site field work in the selected ports was impossible to carry out. A second limitation was that government authorities have invoked security reasons in order not to share updated relevant information regarding the modus operandi of criminal organizations despite our official requests. Finally, a third limitation was pointed out by key informants who agreed that there is a lack of well collected official data in the three countries. These latter limitations have already been addressed in other publications, both for the study of organized crime in general Hobbs and Antonopoulos ; Vander Beken and Drefruytier ; von Lampe and for the study of ports in particular Sergi a. As we will argue in the conclusions, this work opens several research lines that will require further work in the future. It is estimated that the total volume of maritime trade in was Footnote 3. Ports are fundamental for the economic and commercial growth of countries, as they enable international trade exchange. Due to its border as well as commercial nature Sergi a , b , c , they are the main spaces for the exchange of goods Antonelli a , and inevitably act as an interface between illegality and legality Roks et al. The ports are complex spaces. They are a gateway both for the entry and departure of illicit drugs Sergi a :2 , and criminal organizations operate and expand their business using advantages produced by port vulnerabilities Lantsman ; Madsen ; Moiseienko et al. The vulnerabilities of the port itself are not the only important factor; the spatial context in which they are inserted is also key Madsen In the case of the ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo the geographical space that connects them with the production centers is also relevant. Criminal activities in the ports can be promoted by an enabling environment Antonelli b that provides a privileged context for criminal organizations to obtain economic benefits and exercise power Madsen That makes ports more prone to a certain degree of criminal governance Arias ; Arias ; Lessing ; Sergi and Storti where the state and non-state actors interacting in these spaces generate a network of social behaviors Antonelli a ; Madsen ; Sergi and Storti through formal and informal links that favor the establishment of organized crime. Criminal organizations should be considered rational actors, as Zaitch , p. Failures in ports control are incentives for cocaine trafficking from South America to consumer markets abroad. Both Police and Customs surveillance and control have failed to be effective, particularly when drugs can be hidden within or alongside legitimate maritime traffic, such as fishing vessels or cargo ships Bueger and Edmunds Nevertheless, control does not always guarantee the triumph of state forces. As Sergi c : p. Nevertheless, the choice of ports and routes is not random but rather responds to the opportunities that criminal organizations see in them since they are rational actors. In this article, we argue that the routes used by criminal organizations serve a rational choice where greater criminal mobility Morselli and Royer reflects greater selectivity and a high level of thinking and planning, as well as allowing for greater economic returns. These are counter-intuitive routes from the government perspective, which escape traditional logic and do not respond exclusively to the lowest cost-most profit dynamic. Rather, they benefit from the inconveniences of routes that are not very accessible, whether due to natural, political, or economic factors, which, although they may imply a higher economic cost, provide greater security, avoiding police and customs controls. In other words, these are routes that involve fewer risks, thus improving their positioning compared to more traditional ones. They are not the closest geographically, the shortest in terms of time, nor necessarily the cheapest routes. Such counter-intuitive routes refer to land, air, river, or even sea routes that do not make apparent geographical or economic sense and therefore, allow criminal organizations to re-export drugs while maintaining low risk, as we will see below. Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure are understood as those ports that are not located in coca bush producing countries, as well as those that have been identified as clear transit areas. On the contrary, they are located in countries where the government does not recognize transnational drug trafficking as a real problem. Also, these ports are not being highlighted by the international community as cocaine departure ports so when a ship leaves the departure port, there are no alarms ringing in the ports of arrival, according to a Colombian officer we interviewed. McDermott et al. As Sergi points out c , p. In sum, risk is the most important variable considered by criminal organizations. On the contrary, Brazil has gained importance and Uruguay appears to be a new departure space, even though the route seems counter-intuitive at a glance. In short, we need to bear in mind, on the one hand, that criminal organizations use more than one route and departing port and, on the other, that counter-intuitive routes may be an ace up their sleeves especially in times of crisis. Criminal organizations have a portfolio from where to choose, so they use the most convenient route and port for a particular moment, always considering the cost-benefit equation in terms of risk. In the following section, we will analyze the context in which Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo are located and explain why they have become very good options for criminal organizations smuggling cocaine overseas. In recent years, cocaine trafficking in South America has been changing. Colombia has played an important role in this change; according to a Peruvian academic, this is mainly due to the impact that anti-drug policies have had on South American countries. As a result, the countries of the Southern Cone appear to be playing a more important role in drug trafficking. To understand why the organizations use the ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo to re-export cocaine, it is necessary to consider: first, the spatial context and the infrastructure the port has; and second, the socio-political context of the countries in which these ports are located. The geographic space in which these countries are located provides criminal organizations with the conditions for extensive internal and cross-border mobility. This favors the use of routes that may appear to be longer and more expensive but ensure a low-risk, high-return scenario. The three ports we studied are located in different countries and, although they share some characteristics, have some significant differences. All three ports are the most important door to the sea for their countries and move a considerably large volume of trade, as shown in Table 1. It moves more than 1,, TEU a year. San Antonio is 6th, moving more than 1,, TEU a year and Montevideo is 10th with , a year. Further, the routes and frequencies of the shipments departing Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo, according to key informants, show a regular connection between these ports and the container ports identified as cocaine ports of entry Antwerp, Rotterdam, Algeciras, Valencia, Barcelona, Le Havre, and Hamburg, according to a Colombian officer. It makes it easier for them to use the containers because the freight is practically free. They do not even have to invest in the vessel, because the means of transport is a normal commercial line, the container issue, well they have to pay those who do the contamination, but it is minimal what they pay and coordinate with port coordinators so that they go out and that's it. In addition, these departing ports have a consolidated transport infrastructure network. The Global Competitiveness Report World Economic Forum that evaluates connectivity to the global maritime network and efficiency to port services places Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina in that order as the most competitive economies in the region with high scores in port infrastructure. Therefore, they are ports of high attraction for criminal organizations. As Zaitch : p. For Idler , this is conducive to a low-risk, high-opportunity environment and these border areas constitute strategic corridors for criminal organizations and drug trafficking. A Uruguayan officer confirms this dynamic also when it comes to criminal organizations:. In the border cities with Brazil, there is a lot of trouble. They are small, they are people who enter and leave through dry borders that nobody controls. Little is known, but they have the power to control the territory and do whatever they want. According to official information, there are more than irregular passages over each border. It is important to highlight that corruption is quite normalized in Argentina and seems to penetrate society and government equally. According to Transparency International , Argentina is ranked 78th from places , while Uruguay and Chile, where corruption exists but is still not generalized, are placed 25th and 21st, respectively. Hence, for these three countries of the region, perception of corruption has always been close to world average. According to an academic and former officer, Chile and Uruguay are starting to see the penetration of corruption at the lowest political levels, while in Argentina it has long existed. There must be a significant level of corruption in the institutions that are allowing drugs to enter from Peru, either through the border with Peru, the border with Bolivia or, in some cases, the border with Argentina, which are like the three areas where the borders are very porous and there is no capacity for concentration. This statement reminds us that limits between corruption and State control capacities are very diffused. In the case of Argentina, as mentioned, corruption is normalized, as we can infer from the words of a foreign trade specialist when talking about Customs, implying that if corruption exists when it comes to a licit business, it should be much more important when analyzing illicit economies. On the other hand, levels of violence in the three countries have remained low compared to what happens in the rest of the region. According to the same report, violence related to organized crime in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay is not as widespread as in Mexico. However, no higher levels of violence have been identified in the port areas. Understanding how the ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo have become spaces that generate incentives for criminal organizations is a research exercise that implies a holistic approach, which allows us to explore the different dimensions of the phenomenon. The ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo have been characterized throughout history as key places for the exchange of goods and links between cultures and people. These ports are spaces that have a place in the heterogeneous, multicultural, and multiethnic history of South America. This leads to the issue of the indissoluble relationship between physical space and space-society; that is, understanding space as socially constructed Massey ; Lefebvre This idea has a key role in studying cocaine trafficking from these three ports. Space is not a given condition, it is a factor of transformation, a cultural and ideological instance integrated by diverse actors Santos This geographic space ranges from production areas to the land, river, air, and even sea routes leading to the ports Labrousse As a result, these are opportunities and facilitating factors Von Lampe and not because of the existence of a deep link between criminal organizations and the constructed space, as would be the case for mafia-type organizations. In the Southern Cone, criminal organizations, unlike their Colombian and Mexican counterparts, are not exclusively dedicated to drug trafficking. On the contrary, the logistics built around illegal products allow them to develop different activities and transport different goods, as demonstrated by smuggling. Geographic characteristics can be a facilitator and even an incentive for criminal organizations. It is a highly complex environment, placed between the Atacama Desert, the driest desert in the world, and the Andean high plateau. However, these geographical difficulties become opportunities for criminal organizations due to the scarce police control and the porosity of the border, which allows access without major difficulties through more than illegal land crossings that are impossible to control Troncoso , Counter-intuitive routes allow cocaine to enter Chile and then be re-exported. Bolivian cocaine enters by land via Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Oruro, to cross the border to Chilean cities. Cocaine from Peru is also transported by land, entering Chile mainly through the city of Arica. In addition, there is evidence of the use of maritime routes from the Peruvian port of El Callao. As a Chilean customs officer describes, the cocaine enters Chile through Arica and Iquique in the North. However, criminal organizations are not only using land crosses; they are also exploiting the sea as an entry point by using even semi-submergibles. Once in Chilean territory, the cocaine is transported by land along the Pan-American Highway, traveling km Footnote 4 to the port of San Antonio. Uruguay was for a long time insignificant in terms of international drug trafficking, according to a Uruguayan officer. Nevertheless, recently, it seems to be emerging as a new route for the cocaine that comes specially from Bolivia, sometimes through Paraguay and even Brazil, and Montevideo is becoming a Non-Traditional Port used to export cocaine UNODC Montevideo is a distribution center for cocaine destined for Europe, smuggled from the Paraguay and Parana rivers and other land routes. According to key informants, even private properties connecting Bolivia and Argentina are used to take trucks with already contaminated cargo that can enter Argentina illegally. Another option to move the cocaine to the ports in the South Atlantic Ocean is to use the waterway Footnote 5 linking Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay. Controlling the cargo during that journey is almost impossible and criminal organizations are aware of this. Finally, small flights have been detected in two modalities: doing a roundtrip or going down in clandestine landing strips more than have been detected recently in different provinces, not always placed as close to the border as one may think Santiago del Estero, Santa Fe, and even Buenos Aires are some examples Klipphan As a result of recent operations, Argentina has been added again to the map of cocaine routes as a transit country UNODC According to an Argentinean officer, recently a double dynamic has emerged that seems to show the growing importance of Uruguay—and probably of Argentina, too—in the international drug market: on the one hand, we have seen the entry of small planes and, on the other hand, the role of the waterway that connects two cocaine hot spots Bolivia and Paraguay , which is the perfect corridor. The waterway starts in Bolivia, passes through Paraguay both Mediterranean countries have a right to use it to access the sea , and travels for hundreds of kilometers in Argentinean territory until it passes through the Buenos Aires port and ends in Montevideo. In that context, an official claims:. So, basically, what I see in Argentina at the moment is that, necessarily, it has to be affected by these expanding markets This has a double impact: it has an impact on international cocaine trafficking to Europe, but also on the supply of local consumer markets. The three ports we studied are located at a great distance from the producing countries, which implies high mobility. Complex geography, porous borders, and state limitations in terms of control and corruption act as incentives and make cocaine trafficking possible through their countries. The long journey that involves using counter-intuitive routes and Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure involves higher costs for the criminal organizations but provides greater security for cocaine shipments, due to the high flow of containers and the weaknesses of the port system. The returns are so high, and the borders closed by pandemic, drug dependents are willing to pay anything. So, the cost is ultimately borne by the customer. Although San Antonio is the largest transfer port of Chile, it has significant vulnerabilities. I think it is a huge problem and to put it in context because here there is a certain fight between customs and the police. In addition, controls are deficient. The port of Buenos Aires is located in the capital city. Even though it is still the property of the State, its use was privatized during the s. There are several private terminals inside. In the port, two different State forces co-exist. First, there is Customs, which according to a foreign trade expert has the power inside the port; and, second, there is Prefectura Naval, a Security Force whose role is to impose order in the port and that relies on a court order to act on suspected drug trafficking cases. In the case of Buenos Aires, even when most of the seizure containers were contaminated at origin, it is important to highlight the role of the rip-off method. Due to cost and time, most goods undergo Customs clearance where they originated before traveling by land to the port, meaning that the customs process is effectively completed before the export even arrives at the port of departure. Once in the port area, it must wait for the ship in a fiscal deposit controlled by Customs. The problem is that nobody controls the cargo between the moment the seals are placed and the moment when the container is put into the ship. So, as the foreign trade specialist pointed out, there are a lot of possibilities and probably temptations during the journey of the container. Another weakness of the port is related to the existence of treaties that give Paraguay and Bolivia the possibility to be in the port of Buenos Aires in transit, which means that Prefectura cannot intervene. In fact, the last cocaine cargo discovered in Antwerp and Hamburg coming from Buenos Aires April had been there in transit from Paraguay. According to a foreign trade specialist, depending on the cargo, when it comes to bulk shipments, they may have to use a transship in Buenos Aires from the barges to the containers. The same problem arises in Montevideo since Argentina and Uruguay share the waterway and the treaties allowing Bolivia and Paraguay to access the sea. Also, recent seizures in Europe have shown that the transit is affecting both ports equally. The dynamics of Buenos Aires and Montevideo seem to be remarkably similar. At the end of , the Uruguayan Customs together with the Navy, seized 4. In the port of Montevideo, as happens in San Antonio and Buenos Aires, Prefectura Naval that depends on the Uruguayan Navy is in charge of law enforcement Ewig : while Customs is responsible for seizures of illegal goods, such as psychoactive substances prohibited in the country. In the case of Uruguay, as Ewig claims : , Customs is tasked with reducing demand and controlling the supply of drugs, as well as addressing money laundering. This mission differs from that of customs in Argentina and Chile. You also must consider that the use of the port of Montevideo has grown a lot, due to a cost issue. Then you have a large space where the cargo, until it is loaded on the overseas vessels, you have a huge space of time to adulterate that cargo, which is also an interesting issue. As a result, it seems important to emphasize that the bigger the volume moved in the port, the more difficult it is to control. Besides, if trade is the goal and overseas drug trafficking is not even considered as a problem, controls may be seen as a hindrance to commerce. Paradoxically, the volume of container movement reported by the ports studied may generate a more diffuse control by state institutions despite the centrality of these spaces. From Montevideo, the containers go to West Africa e. Once again, the idea of Montevideo replacing some of the shipments that used to depart from Brazil seems perfectly accurate. One of the main problems identified by key informants is the lack of control at the ports and, in the three cases, the fact that there are overlapping jurisdictions where there is no cooperation or coordination specially between Customs and the Security forces. In sum, in the three ports we detected important weaknesses regarding the control of cargo and shipments, together with a clear lack of political will regarding drug trafficking to overseas ports. Further, the fact that the three ports are concentrated in commodities exports, makes the contamination easier for criminal actors, whether they are criminal organizations or brokers working independently. The scanners cannot detect it because they coat it with aluminum or other material that prevents it from being detected. The three ports seem to share an apparent calmness behind which hides ignorance of the real situation. But what happens on our coasts is gigantic. In short, the porosity of land borders has its correlation in the ports, understood as the last border limit before the sea. In this sense, the weakness and inefficiency of state controls is becoming increasingly clear, opening a world of possibilities for criminal organizations based on maritime trade. This reinforces the idea that the use of counter-intuitive routes and Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure is a rational choice for criminal organizations that aim to expand their profits. Another element to consider as part of the context in which ports are being used to smuggle cocaine is that the three countries currently do not have a reputation related to drug trafficking. They are not producers nor are they marked as countries used for transit by the authorities of the countries of cocaine entrance. On the contrary, especially in the case of Chile, key informants have mentioned the country reputation they strive to maintain as an incentive for criminal organizations to use their ports. And these transitions are known by criminal organizations. Cocaine re-export is a way to launder the cargo and disguise the origin of the drugs. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, are countries with clean reputations that do not activate the alarm system in entry countries when a ship departs. In this regard, it is necessary to highlight that all the key informants emphasized that the seized shipments resulted from a leakage of information. Its location on the Pacific Ocean seems to force the departure of cocaine from Chile since the other options are Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, all of them marked as countries to be monitored at the ports of entrance. On the contrary, on the Atlantic Ocean, the obvious choice will be Brazil, but Argentina and Uruguay are increasingly being viewed as alternatives for the departures, especially southern Brazil, as an Argentinean officer pointed out. This is likely because, firstly, Chile has a better international reputation due to its role in international commerce but also because of the perception of low corruption there, as mentioned. Second, as described, it is a door to the Pacific corridor that connects South America with some of the new cocaine markets such as China, Australia, and New Zealand. On the contrary, the frequency in the use of Buenos Aires and Montevideo seems to be more related to the way control is managed in Brazil. Nevertheless, the incentive for criminal organizations exists and it is being used. As Mcdemott et al. In sum, country reputations can be used to re-export cocaine in a safer way, reducing the risk to the cargo and increasing profits for criminal organizations. According to a Brazilian officer, Non-Traditional ports and counter-intuitive routes are strategic choices used by criminal organizations to ensure higher profits. The research shows that the Global South responds to the illicit drug demand imposed from the Global North. The pressure generated by the consumer markets, especially those located in the United States and Europe, leads to an increase in coca bush cultivation and cocaine production capable of flooding the region. Consequently, non-producing countries have suffered the impact of these changes, with their ports beginning to be used to supply mainly the most profitable markets. In this sense, Europe takes a central role considering that its geography allows the passage to new markets, where cocaine attracts extraordinary values. Simultaneously, increased controls in Colombia, Peru, and Brazil in the last three to five years have led to a shift of drug trafficking routes southward. The main findings of this research are that the context in which the use of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo is prioritized is marked by the geographical, infrastructure, and socio-political factors that emanate from the countries in which the ports analyzed are located. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay present important vulnerabilities that can be transformed into opportunities for criminal organizations. Further, we showed that criminal organizations prioritize the Ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo, and the counter-intuitive routes that lead to them, because they are spaces that generate incentives linked mainly to: 1. The porosity of borders; 2. Lack of control at the ports; and 3. The research shows that key actors, like Security Forces, have a profound lack of knowledge about what goes on inside the port facilities. The study of the ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo reveals that there is no recognition by state authorities of drug trafficking as a problem, beyond the discursive. These ports remain off the radar of the authorities at ports of cocaine entry. In these ports, it is clear that criminal organizations favor low risk over logistical costs, geographic distance and even the time it takes them to move the cargo. Likewise, the rational calculation that leads criminal organizations to opt for these ports of cocaine departure low-risk, high return is evident, as these routes improve their profits significantly. The maximization of benefits is given not only by the low risk involved in the use of Non-traditional Ports of cocaine departure but also because its use generates a diversion of the attention of the authorities of the traditional ports, from which greater volumes of cocaine can then be moved. From the work carried out, it is possible to discern the emergence of at least four new lines of research: 1. Cocaine trafficking from landlocked countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay; 2. The link between Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and new markets such as China, New Zealand, and Australia; and 4. Also, since the lack of control seems to attract more crime and too much control displaces crime Eski , Sergi and Storti , Sergi c , it is necessary to work on what strategies can be used to prevent drug trafficking effectively. The trends we described in this article existed before the Covid crises, but they have deepened since the end of Unfortunately, cocaine trafficking is expected to rise even more due to the growing demand from traditional The United States and Europe and new markets Oceania and Asia. At the same time, criminal organizations may become more sophisticated through access to greater economic resources and a better logistical capacity. Nevertheless, considering that, according to UNODC , the cultivation of coca bush in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia is larger than , ha, it does not seem relevant to add what appears to be very small productions seizures in different countries were from around 20 ha. UNODC has published data presented by countries until only, even when the latest publication was A traditional saying denoting the dominance of the city of Buenos Aires in the national imagination and reality. 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Manifestations of organised crime in the port of Genoa Policing and Society. Sergi A b The port-crime Interface: a report on organised crime and corruption in seaports. Sergi A c Playing Pac-Man in Portville: policing the dilution and fragmentation of drugs importations through major seaports. Eur J Criminol. Int J Law, Crime Justice Sergi, A. PORT workshop: a conceptual report and summary of activities. Revista IUS 13 44 Swedberg R Exploratory Research. In: C. Elman C, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, oo, 17 Transparency International Corruption perceptions index. Debates Latinoamericanos 14 29 , pp Troncoso V United Nations Publications, New York. United Nations publication, Vienna. United Nations publication, sales no. UNODC n. Vander Beken T, Drefruytier M Measure for measure methodological tools for assessing the risk of organised crime. In: van Duyne P et al eds Threats and phantoms of organised crime, corruption and terrorism; rhetoric and critical perspectives. Wolf Legal Publishers, pp Wolf Legal Publishers, pp 85 Von Lampe K Organized crime: analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal governance. Zaitch D Antonopoulo G Organised crime in Latin America: an introduction to the special issue trends in organized crime Download references. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. The manuscript is submitted only to Trends in Organized Crime. It is also an original piece, unpublished in each one of its parts. The authors declare that the data presented in the article are their own. We also have cited appropriately all the relevant literature we have found. Interviews were made off the record and due to the sensitivity of the topic, key informants asked to remain anonymous. We have consent to reproduce their words only if name and title remains confidential. We think it is not proper to publish the interviews since in many of them the informants talk about their positions and sensitive information that may compromise their jobs. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Reprints and permissions. Cocaine trafficking from non-traditional ports: examining the cases of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Trends Organ Crim 26 , — Download citation. Accepted : 26 November Published : 04 January Issue Date : September Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:. Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article. Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative. Trends in Organized Crime Aims and scope Submit manuscript. Download PDF. Abstract This article presents the results of an exploratory study aimed to analyze the contexts in which the use of Non-Traditional ports of cocaine departure and counter-intuitive routes is prioritized, based on the experience of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Use our pre-submission checklist Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript. Research notes This article presents some of the findings of a broader and ongoing qualitative research project focused on the evolution of criminal organizations in South America. Footnote 3 Ports are fundamental for the economic and commercial growth of countries, as they enable international trade exchange. Defining counter-intuitive routes and non-traditional ports of cocaine departure In this article, we argue that the routes used by criminal organizations serve a rational choice where greater criminal mobility Morselli and Royer reflects greater selectivity and a high level of thinking and planning, as well as allowing for greater economic returns. The world around the cocaine departure ports: the Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay context In recent years, cocaine trafficking in South America has been changing. Geographic and infrastructure factor The geographic space in which these countries are located provides criminal organizations with the conditions for extensive internal and cross-border mobility. Counter-intuitive routes and non-traditional ports of cocaine departure from the Southern Cone: Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo Understanding how the ports of Buenos Aires, San Antonio, and Montevideo have become spaces that generate incentives for criminal organizations is a research exercise that implies a holistic approach, which allows us to explore the different dimensions of the phenomenon. In that context, an official claims: So, basically, what I see in Argentina at the moment is that, necessarily, it has to be affected by these expanding markets Conclusion The research shows that the Global South responds to the illicit drug demand imposed from the Global North. TEU is a standard measuring unit, equivalent to a ft container. This distance is equivalent to the distance between Lisbon and Brussels. References Anguita Olmedo C Dynamics of organized crime in the European Union in the context of global insecurity. Wolf Legal Publishers, pp 85 Von Lampe K Organized crime: analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal governance. View author publications. Ethics declarations Ethical statements The manuscript is submitted only to Trends in Organized Crime. Rights and permissions Reprints and permissions. About this article. Copy to clipboard. Search Search by keyword or author Search. Navigation Find a journal Publish with us Track your research.

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