Buying blow Derna

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Buying blow Derna

New eyewitness testimonies gathered by Amnesty International indicate that the Egyptian air force failed to take the necessary precautions in carrying out an attack which killed seven civilians in a residential neighbourhood in the Libyan city of Derna on 16 February. The incident is one in a string of horrific acts — some of which amount to war crimes — in recent weeks that show how civilians are increasingly bearing the brunt of reprisal attacks as violence in Libya escalates. In the latest incident on 20 February, according to the Libyan authorities 42 people were killed, including civilians, in bombings targeting military and civilian targets in the eastern city of Qubbah. A group calling itself Barqa Province of the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks in retaliation for the Egyptian airstrikes. When perpetrated as part of a systematic and widespread attack against a civilian population, murder is a crime against humanity. The Egyptian military carried out airstrikes using F fighters on the eastern port city in retaliation for the highly-publicized murder of 21 mostly Egyptian Christian Copts by a group calling itself the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State. The murder, which is a war crime, prompted the UN-recognized government of Libya and Egypt to seek the lifting of an embargo on the supply and transfer of arms to Libyan forces. According to eyewitnesses, Egyptian fighter jets carried out airstrikes on several locations in and around Derna between am and am on 16 February. Of these, only the al-Jabal company is located near a civilian-populated area. Apartment buildings located near al-Jabal company sustained minor partial damage. Residents told Amnesty International that most of the windows in their houses were shattered and doors were blown-off as a result of the explosion. The last strike however, which took place at around am, targeted a civilian area in Sheiha al-Gharbiya. One missile struck a four-storey house belonging to the al-Kharshoufi family, killing a mother and her three children aged between three and eight, and injuring their father and another child. A second missile hit a street in between civilian houses, causing three other deaths. Following this attack, Amnesty International interviewed eyewitnesses from the area and medical workers at a hospital that treated the wounded. According to the director of Derna Hospital, 17 people sustained injuries from shrapnel, debris or burns as a result of the explosions. The director confirmed to Amnesty International that there were no fighters amongst those injured and dead brought to the hospital. The full extent of the damage is still not known, but eyewitnesses told Amnesty International that about 10 houses were destroyed and a further 30 houses sustained shattered windows and other minor damage in the blast as a result of which some were rendered uninhabitable. Approximately 20 private cars were also damaged in the attack. The organization could not determine whether a legitimate military target was located nearby. Three area residents who witnessed the attacks all said that they did not see any fighters or military activity in the immediate vicinity. The Chief of Staff of the Libyan army denied any civilian casualties and said that fighters had been killed in the attacks on 16 February. According to a statement by Saqr al-Jeroushi, the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Air Force, one of the airstrikes was directed at the house of the Al-Zini family, which had an anti-aircraft gun mounted on its roof. Saqr al-Jeroushi said that the airstrike was carried out by a Libyan aircraft, and confirmed not knowing if any civilians were in the house. All residents interviewed by Amnesty International confirmed seeing only airplanes, which appeared to be F fighter jets, and that no Libyan aircraft took part in the attack. Eyewitnesses interviewed by Amnesty International denied seeing any anti-aircraft weapons mounted on rooftops in the area. One resident of Derna told Amnesty International that he received reports about the death of approximately seven fighters, but that they were not killed in the Sheiha al-Gharibya strike. Armed groups never bring their dead to the hospital, they usually bury them right away. In a televised statement during a visit to the Air Force troops who carried out the Derna airstrikes, Egyptian President Abdelfattah Elsisi denied that any civilian objects had been targeted. The objectives were studied with precision, the reconnaissance of the targets was carried out with precision. The gathering of data and information, including on those who were inside, and on the locations was done with precision. To sustain his claims, President Elsisi also recalled an operation against terrorist suspects, which was cancelled due to the presence of women and children amongst them. Eyewitness testimonies One resident who witnessed the airstrikes in Sheiha al-Gharbiya on the morning of 16 February told Amnesty International:. I heard the sound of airplanes and I immediately knew that they were Egyptian because of the news of the killing of the Copts. I heard them flying above the city. Then I heard the sound of explosions coming from the Dahar al-Ahmar mountain, located only two or three kilometres behind our neighbourhood. They were firing at each other. I then left to go to pray al-Fajr at the mosque. While praying, I could hear the sound of loud, violent explosions in the city. I could feel the mosque shake, and I then heard that they had hit the compound of al-Jabal company twice. I got back home; it was about For 40 minutes things seemed to have quietened down, there was no sound of planes. We thought that the strikes had stopped. I was home with my children, who got up because of the sound of explosions and were very scared. Then, suddenly, I heard the planes come back. They were flying above the university, which is located just in front of my house. I thought that they would be attacking the mountain area again. Then I saw a massive explosion. I saw a lot of smoke, women were screaming. The planes had hit a house located only metres from where I was standing. We tried to rush to help the injured, but the airplane continued to fly above us, and we got scared that there would be another strike. I think that about 15 houses were completely damaged because of the explosion, but many more were affected, just like my house. Around 30 cars were also damaged. Some were completely destroyed, others had their windows broken. It was a very powerful explosion. The Fs dropped two missiles. Amnesty International spoke to a family member of Osama Younis Ishtewi, a year-old man who was killed in the strike, who insisted that no fighters were present in the house:. When he graduated, he got a scholarship to continue his studies in Turkey, but because of the crisis in Libya, the embassy stopped paying for his fees, and he had to come back home. He had returned only on 2 February. He had no relation to the fighting whatsoever. It was a raid. It happened around am. No one in Derna was sleeping because of the sound of airplanes. There were four or five of them. Osama was filming the planes from the rooftop of our house. Suddenly, there was a massive noise. A missile hit the area between our house and that of our neighbours. Osama was killed with shrapnel. When we found the body, we saw that his head was severed. The whole house collapsed. We are all civilians, there were children and women in the house. I have three children, a girl aged five and a boy aged three. My youngest one is only 20 days old. There was no one firing from the rooftops, it is a lie. He described the attack:. I was inside the house, but ran out after I heard the explosion to help my father. All of those that were killed or injured were my neighbours. They were women and children amongst them. No one is known to have military activities. When the airstrikes started at am I heard the sound of anti-aircraft guns, but they were coming from afar, from at least two kilometres. I would have heard if the sound was coming from our area. Her sister-in-law was injured and admitted to hospital for treatment. On 28 December , two medical doctors were killed during an airstrike on a field hospital in Ben Jawad treating Libya Dawn fighters. On 2 December , an airstrike on the main food warehouse in the city of Zuwara located near the Tunisian border killed eight civilians injured approximately 25 others. The organization has also gathered photographic evidence showing remnants of PTAB 2. In December , armed clashes erupted in the area after Libya Dawn fighters, allied to the Tripoli government, launched an attack on the oil terminals at al-Sidr and Ras Lanuf. According to eyewitnesses, on at least three occasions since 18 December , Operation Dignity forces have dropped cluster bombs on the town of Ben Jawad while fighting Libya Dawn. Cluster bombs are banned under international law and unexploded cluster sub-munitions pose the same indiscriminate threat to civilians as anti-personnel mines. Amnesty International calls on the Egyptian military and all warring parties in Libya to take all feasible precautions to spare civilians and to ensure that their forces do not carry out direct attacks on civilians or attacks which are indiscriminate or disproportionate. Precautions also include giving effective advance warning of attacks which may endanger the civilian population, cancelling or suspending an attack if it becomes clear that it is likely to cause excessive civilian casualties or damage, and choosing means and methods of attack that minimize the risk to civilians and civilian objects. The presence of fighters in residential areas does not absolve warring parties from their obligation to minimize harm to civilians. All forces should also avoid deploying or locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas. All states including Egypt should ensure that the UN arms embargo on Libya is fully implemented and support setting up an independent Commission of Inquiry, or a similar mechanism, to investigate serious abuses and violations of international human rights and violations of humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict. Measures must also be foreseen to ensure that the findings and recommendations of such an investigation are acted on. Recommendations Amnesty International calls on the Egyptian military and all warring parties in Libya to take all feasible precautions to spare civilians and to ensure that their forces do not carry out direct attacks on civilians or attacks which are indiscriminate or disproportionate.

Libya Mounting evidence of war crimes in the wake of Egypts airstrikes

Buying blow Derna

Six years after the uprising that brought an end to the Gaddafi regime, Libya is experiencing continuing political division and widespread insecurity which in turn has contributed to societal tensions and an array of economic challenges. The civil war that erupted in summer has resulted in significant loss of life and displaced over , Libyans inside the country, further straining public services but also fraying social cohesion. The presence of an estimated , foreign nationals -including refugees and migrants seeking to travel to Europe by sea- is another challenge and has also fed societal tensions. Conflict in different parts of the country has resulted in serious abuses and violations of international law, with indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, summary executions, torture and deliberate destruction of property reported since Libya currently has three entities claiming to be governments - only one of which is recognised by the UN - and competing institutions divided between east and west. In these circumstances, the ability of the central government to continue providing essential services and ensure a safety net for the population has been greatly undermined. As a result, expectations of local government actors have grown. Compared to other formal and informal governance actors, municipal councils are viewed favourably by Libyans. With the House of Representatives mandate now expired and the UN-backed Government of National Accord not yet fully recognized, municipal councils are the only governing bodies to hold electoral legitimacy. Due to their proximity to the population and also the fact that most have stayed out of the national political crisis, municipal councils are seen as key to guaranteeing basic needs at a local level. Building on this, municipalities can play an important role not only in service delivery and localised economic recovery, but also fostering conflict resolution and improving societal cohesion. Very few truly national actors exist. Instead most derive their legitimacy from local dynamics - whether rooted in city, region or tribe - including those who have a nominal national role. Many believe municipal councils should be further empowered as a way of ensuring a measure of nation-wide popular legitimacy eroded in other elected bodies like the House of Representatives which emerged from a June ballot. Given the increasing fragmentation, however, there is a risk of such an approach going too far and contributing to a further undermining of the already fragile national dynamic. A balance must be struck between developing local governance and restoring a sense of the national across Libya, with one complementing the other. Since summer , a political power struggle has ruptured Libya between competing governments, based either in Tripoli or the east of the country. The Presidential Council is supposed to act collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces but from its inception internal rivalries and tensions have rendered it hamstrung and ineffective. The names of the three regions - Tripolitania in the northwest, Cyrenaica in the northeast and Fezzan in the south - which historically comprised Libya still resonate among Libyans today. The nomenclature is most often used by movements seeking autonomy for the east and south in particular. There remain distinct regional sentiments rooted in particular historical experiences during the colonial period and the Gaddafi era. Such regional dimensions have contributed to often very different social, political and military trajectories during and since the uprising. In western cities and towns that played key roles in the uprising against Gaddafi - such as Misrata, Zintan and Zawiya - the experience produced robust local structures that knitted together civilian councils, tribal elders and armed groups. In communities that had either supported the Gaddafi regime or refused to join the fight, similar structures also emerged, often as a means of defence against anti-Gaddafi factions. Animus between these simmered in the years after the uprising and sometimes spilled over into violence. The civil war that began in , however, brought new alliances between cities, towns and communities but also fractures within. Three years later, many cities and towns in western Libya are riven with internal tensions that often reflect aspects of the national conflict. Due to proximity to the Tunisian border, several towns in western Libya have been blighted by smuggling networks. Apart from the highly lucrative trade of fuel smuggling, some coastal towns have become hubs for human traffickers sending migrants to Europe by sea. The uprising against Gaddafi began after anti-regime protests in Benghazi tipped into armed rebellion there and in other towns in eastern Libya including Baida, Tobruk and Derna. The NATO-led intervention authorised by a UN resolution in March shielded the region from any further military threat by the regime. As a result, while eastern cities and towns galvanised in support of the uprising, they were not subjected to months of siege like Misrata or threat like other towns in western Libya, which resulted in the relatively cohesive local structures outlined earlier. While the east did not witness conflicts between cities and towns, it did experience tensions between hardline Islamists many of whom had been jailed or tortured by the Gaddafi regime in the revolutionary camp and security personnel who had defected. Post-Gaddafi eastern Libya has also been marked by movements seeking some measure of regional autonomy ranging from decentralisation and federalism to a full-blown independent state. The separatist current has gained further traction in recent years. The push to establish rival institutions including a parallel Central Bank and National Oil Corporation in eastern Libya since late was in part driven by this sentiment. Much of the south joined the uprising in its final stages and the region was largely spared sustained fighting that year. As elsewhere in Libya, since local dynamics have also been shaped by the national power struggle, with different factions aligning themselves with one camp or the other. Smuggling networks are particularly entrenched in southern Libya where porous borders benefit transnational traffickers. Long-standing grievances over citizenship and other rights for the Tebu and Tuareg populations also fuel tensions as does an overall sense that the south is more marginalised and neglected than any other region. The role of local government since , opportunities and challenges. Since , an array of local actors - from armed groups to civilian councils, tribal elders and other notables - have helped fill the vacuum left by a weak central state, often helping to provide security and assist with conflict management. But this highly localised dynamic has been double-edged, helping contain but also often driving conflict and insecurity. It has also undermined the role and legitimacy of state institutions already struggling with limited capacities and it has disrupted efforts to implement national programmes. In the absence of an effective, unified and inclusive state, the balance of power between different layers of government has tilted towards the local. Given the high levels of support among the general population for greater decentralisation, the question of how far devolution to the local should go is a pertinent one. The current network of municipal councils springs from what emerged that year, with democratically elected councils later replacing the ad hoc bodies of , along with the reinvented shaabiyat administrative districts of the Gaddafi era. Libyans were generally enthusiastic about these local representatives after , seeing in the councils the possibility of future decentralisation. The highly centralised Gaddafi regime in a country the size of Libya meant that citizens had to travel long distances to Tripoli for basic matters of bureaucracy like signatures and stamps. Continuing frustrations over this and other aspects of the centralised state have prompted some Libyans to examine the Estonian experience of e-governance to see if the model could be replicated in Libya in future. Estonia was the first country to successfully introduce a legally-binding e-voting system into its election process and most government services — apart from marriage and buying property — can be done online there. Due to the nature of the Libyan state as a rentier state almost entirely reliant on oil revenue, the municipal councils depend on the Central Bank of Libya for financing of local initiatives. This has led some to call for a local tax that would enable districts to launch development projects according to their specific needs without requiring approval - or funding - from central government. While the product of one of the few decisions made by the transitional authorities that had lasting impact, the newly formed network of municipal councils suffered from a dearth of experienced personnel with the operational and managerial capacities to adequately deal with the challenges of post-Gaddafi Libya. This, in turn, affected service delivery. With the rise of Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya, the nascent local government system has faced other threats and challenges. As his self-styled Libyan National Army LNA expanded its control over most of eastern Libya, it sought to interfere with the workings of municipal councils in order to consolidate its power base. In other towns tribal elders asked Naduri to install a military figure to run the municipality instead of the existing local council. It was unclear whether such requests were voluntary or the result of pressure or coercion. Gajiji had been to fore when it came to pushing for the empowering of municipal councils to shore up popular legitimacy. In some cases, including Benghazi, a civilian mayor was later re-instated but the trend of militarisation continues, particularly in eastern Libya. Other attempts to change or undermine the fledgling local government system came in early when Abdullah al-Thinni, the former prime minister who - despite being no longer recognised by the UN - clung to his title and base in Baida, eastern Libya, announced he wanted the legislation changed. He created a committee which he said would draft amendments to the local government law. The bid to change the law was interpreted as wanting legal cover for such moves. The prospects for amending the legislation are considered slim given the unstable political environment: it is unlikely to get the requisite approval from the House of Representatives and it could also prompt a public backlash given the relative popular goodwill towards the councils. Of these, 23 were reinventions of the former shaabiyat of the Gaddafi era. Throughout and , 85 municipal councils were elected under the supervision of the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections. In areas where elections were not held - for reasons including poor security - the councils that emerged in largely remained in place with some personnel changes. Some efforts were made in to expand the total number of municipalities to but due to the political instability then and since these increases have not been passed into law. Under Law 59, each municipality was to have a municipal council with its size depending on population and municipal administration known as the diwan. Municipalities were also to be divided into a number of wards or mahallat. Each mahalla has a mokhtar, or chair, who should be appointed based on merit by the governor - though the governorate system has yet to take shape - following proposal by the mayor. Mokhtars do not have executive authority but are part of the general municipal administration. Currently mokhtars are nominated by mayors and the ministry of local governance. Municipal councils are also supposed to establish a shura or consultative council comprised of local notables. The overall legal framework remains incomplete, however, and there is a lack of clarity regarding how responsibilities are - and should be - divided between the different levels of government, from executive to municipal council. Most services and functions remain under the aegis of executive bodies and branches of state agencies, particularly when it comes to local economic development. Municipalities have complained that they are not empowered enough to take the initiative in their respective areas, and that functions assigned to them under Law 59 often overlap with those of executive bodies. This legal vagueness has resulted in inefficiency and poor results due to lack of coordination between municipal and executive bodies. The ongoing national political crisis makes it unlikely that this institutional confusion will be resolved anytime soon. Some districts have been closely associated with anti-Gaddafi revolutionary sentiment since , such as Tajoura, Fashloum and Souq al-Jume. Others are perceived to be more sympathetic to the former regime, such as Hadba and Buslim. Relations between the various neighbourhoods can often depend on their respective positions during and tensions between armed groups from each area can often flare into violence. Their retreat also led to an exodus of Tripoli residents of Zintani origin, many of whom complained they were subject to threats and harassment. Controversies surrounding the appointed mayor Mehdi Harati - a former militia leader who also fought in Syria - later led to his removal. For some Tripolitanians, the perception remains that the council is too closely linked with certain armed groups. More recently tensions in the city have hinged on militia rivalry over territory and whether armed groups support or oppose the GNA. Tripoli is also home to a number of Benghazi residents displaced by the fighting in their city, some of whom have links to anti-Haftar forces which include designated groups like Ansar al-Sharia. This too has caused tensions. While some armed groups - particularly the Rada force - present themselves as policing the city, criminality has soared in recent years. Kidnapping for ransom is a particular problem. Hundreds of abductions have been reported this year. Local media regularly report cases of people being pulled from their cars or seized while walking on the street. Ransoms of up to , Libyan dinars are typically demanded. In a number of cases, those kidnapped have been killed by their captors if their families have been unable to raise the ransoms demanded. A number of children have died in this way. Tripolitanians also struggle with daily challenges including rising food prices, lengthy power outages and sometimes fuel shortages. But displacement as a result of the operation launched by Haftar in May ostensibly to root out extremist groups has changed the dynamics of the city. Thousands have been killed and many more forced from their homes. Benghazi residents make up the largest single cohort of displaced in Libya at present. Severe polarisation over three years of war has encouraged tribalism and the emergence of Haftar-aligned armed groups seeking vengeance. For now, prospects for reconciliation leading to a return of the displaced are slim. They have convened a parallel council in Tripoli which focuses on assisting IDPs from the city, using funds allocated by the government in the capital. Several critics of Haftar and his LNA have been detained. They now control the Awkaf religious affairs ministry offices there as well as most mosques in the city. Furthermore, the growth of tribalism has also made many uneasy. Bodies including the municipal council, educational institutions and hospitals have come under pressure to appoint certain tribesmen to senior positions. The city faces a massive reconstruction bill before new development projects are initiated. Several construction projects launched before the have not re-started since. Many of the ills that helped spark the uprising in Benghazi - youth unemployment and a general sense of marginalisation by the central authorities in Tripoli - remain today. Benghazi is home to key figures in the movement seeking autonomy for eastern Libya, some of whom are now openly separatist in their rhetoric. While polling has shown significant support for decentralisation in Benghazi and across the east, those who favour a separate state are few in number. The city suffered extensive infrastructural damage during , when it was besieged by regime forces for several months. Its population of some , has swollen over the past three years with the arrival of displaced - many of them of Misratan origin - from Benghazi, Tripoli and other areas. The latter, one of the biggest employers in the city, remains one of main state revenue sources outside the energy sector. Misratan militias - which grew out of the revolutionary brigades that emerged in - were central to the Libya Dawn alliance which took control of Tripoli in summer even though many Tripolitanians had long resented them, particularly after Misratan militiamen opened fire on protesters in the capital in , killing dozens. Armed groups from Misrata also dominated the Bunyan al Marsous alliance that drove Islamic State from its stronghold of Sirte, further east from Misrata, in Antipathy towards Misrata is common across Libya due to the role its political and armed factions are considered to play on a national level, with many accusing them of overreach. Misrata is also criticised for the displacement of the entire neighbouring town of Tawergha by Misratan armed groups in late They accused Tawerghans of carrying out abuses in support of Gaddafi during the uprising. Misrata held its first free elections in February , the first city to hold local elections after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The current municipal council was elected in May and elected its mayor the following month. Misrata is considered one of the most secure - and prosperous - cities in Libya, but it was rocked by an attack on its courthouse by Islamic State militants in October Tensions have also grown in the city over the presence of IDPs from Benghazi, some of whom are suspected of sympathising with extremists groups. Until that national crisis is resolved, little can be done to address the structural and legislative questions that have hampered the development of a truly effective layer of local governance. A clearer legal and constitutional framework is required in order to properly define the role and function of local government. In the meantime, the focus should be on building capacity in municipal councils to help them provide the best possible services in the current environment. Developing skills in the areas of planning, budgeting, financial management, post-conflict recovery, and decentralised development can help local institutions better provide public services but also initiate development according to the specificities of their areas. So far, seven Libyan cities - including Tripoli, Benghazi and Sirte - are involved in the project which focuses on public services. Other proposed projects include creating composting facilities in five Libyan municipalities, training youth leaders in counter-radicalisation and developing a university course in public administration. Municipal councils can be empowered through building their institutional capacity and making sure they are better resourced in the short term to enjoying a greater measure of autonomy in the long term. While this should complement - and be complemented by - efforts to restore the sense of the national and create a unified central government, failure to effectively decentralize could further weaken Libya as a nation state. Regional dimensions Northwest In western cities and towns that played key roles in the uprising against Gaddafi - such as Misrata, Zintan and Zawiya - the experience produced robust local structures that knitted together civilian councils, tribal elders and armed groups. Northeast The uprising against Gaddafi began after anti-regime protests in Benghazi tipped into armed rebellion there and in other towns in eastern Libya including Baida, Tobruk and Derna. South Much of the south joined the uprising in its final stages and the region was largely spared sustained fighting that year. The role of local government since , opportunities and challenges Since , an array of local actors - from armed groups to civilian councils, tribal elders and other notables - have helped fill the vacuum left by a weak central state, often helping to provide security and assist with conflict management. Civil registration Issuing of permits for businesses Public health and environment monitoring The overall legal framework remains incomplete, however, and there is a lack of clarity regarding how responsibilities are - and should be - divided between the different levels of government, from executive to municipal council. Back Search.

Buying blow Derna