Buying blow Al Hudaydah

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Buying blow Al Hudaydah

The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June — posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman — sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. Throughout the year, relations between the STC and Saudi Arabia were tense, and increasingly focused on the governorate of Hadramawt. At the same time, Saudi leaders relayed messages to the STC that any build-up of its armed forces in Hadramawt would trigger a direct Saudi military response. The STC then responded politically — reordering its governing body and issuing a national charter in May. Following the announcements, the STC held its sixth national assembly in Mukalla on May 21, accompanied by a show of military force as military vehicles patrolled the streets. Tensions increased over the summer as Saudi, US, and British diplomats signaled they felt that the STC was beginning to act as a state within a state. Later that month, Al-Zubaidi traveled to the UK to press the argument that since a de facto Houthi state exists in the north, a revived southern one would be a natural complement. He had a chance to relay this message to the British government via a meeting with the British minister of state for the Middle East, Tariq Ahmad. The October 7 Hamas attacks in Israel set in motion a chain of events that turned the Yemeni political scene upside down. The Israeli military campaign against Gaza, and the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in purported solidarity with the Palestinians, effectively brought the Saudi-Houthi peace talks to a standstill, returned the Houthis to pariah status in the West, and allowed the STC to cast itself as a responsible member of the anti-Houthi coalition. Seizing the opportunity to present the STC as a useful force against the Houthis, Al-Zubaidi appeared in January at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he publicly criticized the harassment of Red Sea shipping, saying it had put a question mark over the nascent peace process in Yemen and hurt the economy. In an interview , Al-Zubaidi advised the US-British coalition to consider a ground operation against the Houthis — essentially reviving the war — that government forces could lead if the US would provide the arms, training, and intelligence. Throughout , Houthi forces boosted their presence along key frontlines in Taiz and Marib governorates but without major confrontation. There were occasional incidents on the Saudi border in which Saudi-led coalition forces were killed — five Bahrainis died in September in what may have been hardliners within the Houthi leadership expressing opposition to the terms of a seemingly imminent Saudi-Houthi peace. But Saudi media for the most part kept quiet about such incidents in order to keep peace talks on track. The major development on the security front during , however, was the revival of Al-Qaeda in Yemen as a functioning, relevant force. This is partly due to the rising influence of Iran-based Egyptian operative Saif al-Adel , who is poised to become the official successor to Ayman al-Zawahiri as the overall emir of Al-Qaeda. On the ground, Al-Qaeda in Yemen has been far more effective. In May, the group carried out two drone attacks against the Shabwa Defense forces, the first time it had used such weapons. Al-Qaeda may have received large sums of money in exchange for the August release of the director of the UN Office of Security and Safety in Aden, Akam Sofyol , who was kidnapped in along with four Yemenis. Batarfi has spoken publicly about the need for financial support, asking southern tribes to help. With Emirati funding they opened their own airport in Al-Mokha , which allows them to receive weapons directly. Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi appeared to sideline the latter when he announced a planned government reshuffle in September, in an apparent effort to reorder internal power dynamics ahead of a deal with Saudi Arabia and to respond to rising street protests over economic conditions. The internationally recognized government flirted with bankruptcy for much of the year, as public sector revenues dried up and promised aid was postponed, exacerbating ongoing economic deterioration. The fiscal crisis began in October , following the expiration of a UN-sanctioned truce. Through its bilateral negotiations with Saudi Arabia, the Houthis secured the easing of inspections and other restrictions on goods imported through the ports of Hudaydah. Having done so, they began to block overland trade of imported goods, threatening traders that they must now direct their shipments through Houthi-controlled ports. On August 6, they formalized the arrangement by announcing additional taxes on all goods brought overland from government-controlled areas. This was compounded by a further Houthi ban on domestically produced cooking gas, produced in government-held territory at the Safer facility in Marib. By the end of the year, the central bank was no longer able to hold foreign currency auctions to support the value of the rial and finance the import of basic commodities, including foodstuffs. Absent the rejuvenation of revenue streams or massive, sustained external financial support, economic conditions will likely deteriorate further. The shortage of electricity services in the south reached crisis proportions during Although Yemenis living in Houthi-run territories are subject to many deprivations, a lack of electricity is not one of them — the system is mostly privatized, meaning that while electricity is expensive, at Yemeni rials YR per kilowatt hour, it is at least available to those who can afford it in most urban areas. In Aden, things could not be more different. With the approach of summer, with its intense heat and humidity, life becomes almost unbearable for millions of people as rolling blackouts become longer and longer. Even in late October, residents of Aden were getting only two hours of electricity a day due to a shortage of fuel for power plants. The government uses this money — which usually comes from Saudi Arabia — to buy diesel, which is then given away for free to traders, who produce electricity from private generators and sell it back to the government for cut-price distribution. It consists of eight battalions led by Salafi commander Bashir al-Madrabi and started to deploy from Saudi Arabia to southern governorates in September Its members were reconstituted from some units of the Al-Yemen Al-Saeed brigades. The airport was shuttered in and had been converted into a military base by Emirati forces. A month prior, a well-known female broadcaster was arrested with two female colleagues for violating the mahram law. On February 12, a Houthi-run court upholds a five-year sentence for a female model and actress on allegations of violating public morality and carrying drugs. The funds come as public revenues are plummeting due to the halt in hydrocarbon exports and falling customs revenues, following Houthi attacks on southern ports and pressure on importers to source goods via Hudaydah. The Houthis advance and take strategic areas overlooking Harib district, including Jabal Buwara. Dozens of families are displaced due to the fighting. The law, first drafted in September , was reportedly pushed through by religious hardliners who refused to wait for a feasibility study. Following the demonstrations, Houthi authorities bring in a new security director for Al-Mashanah district in the Old City of Ibb. Hundreds of items are also removed from an embargo list. On April 8, the Blue Nile is the first ship to forgo the inspection process. No agreement is signed, but both sides signal a willingness to move forward with a deal. Several days prior, Riyadh summoned the PLC to brief them on the deal, to which they are not a formal party. Among those released by the Houthis are the son and brother of PLC member Tareq Saleh, the brother of former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a son and three relatives of former vice president Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and four journalists previously sentenced to death. Following the swap, one of the journalists accuses the head of the Houthi National Committee for Prisoner Affairs, Abdelqader al-Murtada, of torture. In response, units of the UAE-backed, Southern Transitional Council STC -affiliated Shabwa Defense forces deploy on roads linking Shabwa to the crossing, giving them a strategic position from which to potentially cut off supplies or reinforcements. This is a major blow to government revenues, as Safer is under government control. The first shipment of imported gas arrives in Hudaydah on July 6. Following the raid, Houthi authorities appoint loyalist Ali al-Hadi as head of the chamber, who has no background with the CCI or experience in commercial private sector activity. Among those traveling to Mecca are several Houthi leaders, including Yahya al-Razemi. Despite the objection, the government later approves the establishment of a joint telecommunications company with NX Group. Security services arrest more than 20 suspects, claiming many have ties to Al-Qaeda, and the group responds by threatening local authorities in Taiz. Officials insist that the decision is driven by a lack of funding and not political or security considerations, citing warnings made as early as January The decision is met with harsh criticism in the following months, with protests erupting across government-held territories. The operation has relative success in securing sites around the Omayran Valley. Details of the incident are murky and Giants Brigades-affiliated media deny it altogether, insisting the forces were simply following up on security issues. Throughout the summer, cities across the country experience major blackouts, with electricity available for only a few hours a day in some governorates. Despite government attempts to import fuel through the port of Aden, widespread protests break out. The provision of electricity remains unstable, with warnings of a complete electrical grid shutdown repeated again in late October. Prime Minister Saeed denies the allegations. The operation takes nearly a month and involves transferring the oil to the Yemen , a replacement ship under Houthi control. The Saudi government subsequently announces it is preparing a roadmap for peace in Yemen. Replicas of Iranian missiles and drones are displayed during the event alongside thousands of soldiers, and an F-5 fighter jet flies overhead for the first time during the war. Viral videos emerge of Houthis damaging cars and beating people waving the republican flag, and dozens of people, including women, are held in prolonged detention. In the following days, Israeli forces initiate a military campaign in the Gaza Strip, sparking outcry from both the Yemeni government and the Houthis. The group subsequently claims four separate attacks targeting the Israeli port of Eilat. Over 41, people are impacted by the destruction caused by the storm, with thousands displaced and hundreds of homes and roads destroyed across multiple districts. The group suspends activities in Yemen, resuming work on November 7. Government officials blame the Houthis for the attack. At the same time, Houthi forces launch a major offensive along the Al-Kasara front northwest of Marib city, killing at least eight pro-government soldiers. US defense officials deny the claim. In the following weeks, the ship and its crew are held hostage as Houthi naval forces relocate the vessel several times. The ship is made into a major tourist attraction, with dozens of civilians posting trips to the deck on social media. An agreement is made with key private sector actors to act as intermediary parties for climate finance. Humanitarian and non-governmental organizations criticize the decision, arguing that up to 9. In the following days, dozens of major international shipping companies reroute in order to avoid passing through the Red Sea. This entity is distinct from the coalition led by the US and UK which will repeatedly strike Houthi targets in Yemen in The proposal will largely be based on direct Saudi-Houthi talks mediated by Oman. After further talks, including a well-publicized visit by a Houthi delegation led by Mohamed Abdelsalam to Riyadh, received with pomp and circumstance and a meeting with Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Salman, preparations began for the internationally recognized government and the Houthis to sign a roadmap for peace, which would include payment of public sector salaries for one year, organize a transitional power-sharing arrangement, and begin a two-year transitional period during which a political dialogue would settle the details of state structure and the final status of the south. This was to be followed by national elections. But the roadmap left the boundaries of such a political agreement open and did not stipulate building on what was agreed at the National Dialogue Conference NDC in , such as the adoption of decentralization or limiting the size of the active armed forces to The plan was, in effect, leading to no place in particular; a roadmap to nowhere. It was a formula for failure for three key reasons. Relinquishing the few, precious successes of the NDC invites unnecessary instability that could fracture the Yemeni state. The second is the short time frame. Yemen is so divided that bringing it back together will take time. Restructuring the state is now a prerequisite to national elections. While the Houthis have maintained and further centralized the simple state model that existed under the rule of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the model has fractured in the areas nominally under the control of the internationally recognized government. Local governments have assumed the competencies of the central government on an ad hoc basis, but also in the spirit of the NDC, which responded to the popular demands of greater local autonomy. The two-year transition period was also too short to implement the outcomes of the NDC. Now, with a fractured state and warring factions dominating the scene, carrying out another, more complex transition in two years is an impossible mission. These two challenges are amplified by a third divisive issue: the imbalance between the two sides of the conflict. While the Houthis enjoy a strong unified leadership and have control over central state institutions that were built over decades, the internationally recognized government has neither unity of leadership nor the institutional capacity to govern. Negotiations between these two sides, with such an imbalance in favor of the Houthis, make it impossible to reach a balanced and equitable power-sharing arrangement. The most likely scenario of peace negotiations under these circumstances is that the Houthis will offer no concessions, and negotiations will drag on for years, during which the internationally recognized government will slowly falter under the pressure of its own divisions. The Houthis will win at the negotiation table what they could not win on the battlefield: a total victory. The Houthis will become the dominant power in Yemen, but it is inconceivable that the South, Taiz, or Marib will agree to surrender to the harsh conditions of Houthi control. The Yemeni state will disintegrate into the respective fiefdoms of armed groups. Southern ambitions of restoring their state, or Houthi ambitions of having their own Zaidi, Taliban-style country are unrealistic, given that before Yemen was already teetering on the edge of state failure due to massive demographic pressure, lack of human capital, over-militarization, festering corruption, eroding regime legitimacy, and massive environmental challenges, including the worst water poverty in the world. Since then, these challenges have gotten worse, and are compounded by the conflict among the parties and their need to arm and prepare to fight each other. All indications lead to one conclusion. Yemen is on its way to Somaliazation, with the caveat that Somalia has already adjusted to its fragmentation. Yemen will be much worse than what Somalia is today. The Gaza war and conflict in the Red Sea may have changed that scary trajectory. In solidarity with the Palestinian people of Gaza, the Houthis have enforced a blockade on ships destined to or otherwise linked with Israel. This military action serves as a clear example that, in the absence of an inclusive peace and equitable and balanced political settlement, there will be no check on the militancy of the most extreme faction of the Houthi group, and no guarantee that marine traffic through Bab al-Mandab will not be disrupted again. Regional and international actors are now coming to accept the basic fact that only an inclusive peace in a unified Yemen can guarantee the long-term stability of the Red Sea. Recent military confrontations, culminating in Houthi attacks on international shipping, have sent ripples through the global economy, disrupting vital trade routes and raising concerns about energy security and supply chain resilience. The situation is still evolving, and its full economic impact is difficult to predict. The long-term effects will depend on how quickly the situation is resolved and what measures are taken to ensure the safety of shipping. International cooperation and diplomatic efforts are crucial to de-escalate the situation and prevent further economic harm. For Yemen, the Houthi attacks on international shipping could throttle its already fragile economic lifelines, pushing the war-torn nation toward catastrophic collapse. In the case of escalated conflict, port closures become a possibility, which would cause significant disruptions to shipments and trade, leading to losses and higher costs. Disruptions cripple trade flows, pushing basic necessities beyond the reach of millions. In the light of ongoing military confrontations, marine shipping and insurance costs for goods arriving at the ports of Hudaydah have been rising. Ultimately, these increased costs are likely to be passed on to consumers, further exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation. While the intended goal is to pressure the Houthis to cease their attacks and engage in peace talks, the economic consequences are multifaceted and potentially counterproductive. US sanctions will restrict financial transactions with the Houthis and individuals and entities associated with them. Aid organizations undertaking distribution in Houthi-controlled areas may face difficulties, potentially impacting millions in need. Businesses and individuals engaged in trade with Houthi-controlled areas could face legal and financial challenges. Disruptions to trade and aid could exacerbate food shortages and malnutrition, especially in Houthi-held areas. The existing economic divide between Houthi- and government-controlled areas may widen, hindering future reunification efforts. While sanctions may not significantly affect core Houthi funding, they add further strain on their ability to provide basic services. The Houthis may perceive the designation as an escalation, leading to increased attacks and further hindering economic activity. Heightened tensions with Iran could also impact regional trade and investment flows. The long-term impact on the Yemeni population, already facing immense hardship, remains a major concern. Existing challenges also pose continued risks. The suspension of oil exports since the Houthi military attacks on oil exporting port infrastructure in late will likely continue, shrinking government revenues and exacerbating the fiscal crisis. Disruptions to port activities and export limitations stifle economic activity, depriving Yemen of crucial revenue needed for basic services and reconstruction. The future remains precarious. Renewed violence or the complete collapse of the truce could erase fragile gains and worsen the crisis. However, sustained peace efforts, increased international aid, and economic reforms could unlock latent potential. Rebuilding infrastructure and essential services would create jobs and stimulate growth. Creating a stable environment could attract investment, boosting key sectors like agriculture. Sustained aid is crucial to address immediate needs and support long-term development. However, without a lasting peace agreement, economic recovery remains elusive. The current situation in Yemen presents both challenges and opportunities relating to water security, environmental sustainability, and climate resilience. In the coming year, these issues must be placed at the forefront of political discussions. Several areas require close attention to help integrate these considerations into future plans and policies. Shortages in freshwater resources are expected to escalate due to war, climate change, demand increase, and poor management. Cooperation among local authorities, UN bodies, and mediators might help mitigate conflicts and build trust between the opposing sides, especially in Taiz. Community-level experience in mediation and lessons from past resolution of water-related conflicts should be studied and replicated where possible. Ensuring a just transition on environmental and climate questions will help avoid disproportionate impacts on vulnerable regions and communities. Research by Columbia University on climate justice frameworks could be helpful for national strategies and discussions conducted by policymakers and international partners. Yemen also needs help accessing global funds earmarked for climate resilience projects. It must engage international financial institutions and solicit their support for the development and implementation of national adaptation plans. Such programs must be implemented through a climate justice lens that empowers marginalized groups and favors just transition policies. Traditional coping strategies and innovations from similar contexts should be investigated to ensure adaptation works on a local level. Lastly, the current conflict in the Red Sea seems likely to harm the livelihoods of fishermen and the security of marine life. What environmental effects might there be if warfare escalates, or if a military ship or oil tanker is bombed? Monitoring and documenting the potential impacts of such scenarios will help raise awareness and provide timely data to concerned stakeholders. But these developments have far-reaching consequences, perhaps most notably threatening to derail the peace process between the group and Saudi Arabia. Domestically, the Houthis will attempt to capitalize on the popularity gained through their attacks in the Red Sea, which give credence to their slogan depicting America and Israel as their main enemies. The US-UK strikes have cast the group as national heroes being targeted for standing with the people of Gaza — a sensitive issue that strikes a chord worldwide, particularly in Arab and Muslim countries. But a decade of bombardment by the Saudi-led coalition has left few targets to hit. Hence, the recent strikes have so far had limited military effect on the Houthis, but bolster its claim to be a staunch defender of Palestine. Their newfound momentum has not only allowed the Houthis to circumvent the popular discontent that has been escalating over the last two years due to unpaid public sector salaries which had prompted the group to crack down on dissent ; it has seen their popularity surge to the extent that their critics now stand accused of being agents of the US and Israel. On the other side, the internationally recognized government is growing weaker by the day, as the economy and security sector collapse. This may push the Houthis to make the most of the opportunity to mobilize newly recruited fighters, establishing popular forces like those in Amran governorate and moving them to frontlines in Marib, Shabwa, the west coast, and Taiz. The group may push to take control of oil fields in the east; should it succeed, it could seek to expand further, especially if the Saudis maintain their current neutrality. Saudi Arabia is keen to end its war with the Houthis and strike a deal, even if that means sidelining its allies in the Yemeni government. However, such an arrangement would be threatened by direct Western intervention to remove the Houthis. This is currently unlikely, as the participation of local forces would cast them as agents of the US and Israel in the eyes of many Yemenis. The only development likely to change the current situation is an end to the Israeli offensive in Gaza. The key issue remains how far the US will go to deter the Houthis, weaken their power, and prevent their rearmament. This could also impact the terms and likelihood of a Houthi agreement with Riyadh. In regional and international calculations, it is impossible to discuss a settlement with the Houthis without taking the interests of its Iranian backers into consideration, despite the relative independence the group claims to enjoy in local decision-making. Unless the balance of power changes on the ground, Houthi control could expand beyond its current borders in Military gains could in turn lead the Houthis to change their approach towards Riyadh and the region. For them, conflict is a means of political survival, not simply a policy choice. Few observers of Yemeni politics could have imagined that the year would end in such a manner. It ended with the Houthis attacking Red Sea shipping and a US-led military escalation that changed the trajectory of the conflict and placed a question mark over any peace settlement. When he became president in , Joe Biden said ending the war in Yemen was a foreign policy priority, and removed the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group. Now, he approaches the end of his term by striking Houthi military targets and redesignating the Houthis as a terrorist organization. Both countries cooperated in the past to target Al-Qaeda in Yemen, but in recent years they have begun to rely more on regional powers for counterterrorism efforts, such as the UAE, and their political approach has tended to align with that of Saudi Arabia. The US and UK initially supported the Saudi-led war in Yemen but put pressure on Saudi and Emirati forces to halt their advance up the western coast in , following the outcry over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and concerns that an assault on Hudaydah city would escalate an already dire humanitarian crisis. Perhaps tired of bad press, the Saudis became determined to end their involvement in the Yemeni war and rebrand as a luxury tourist destination and investment hub. This required an end to Houthi missile attacks on Saudi targets. During , Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were close to striking a deal to end hostilities between them. Leaks showed that the Houthis were finding acceptance of most of their demands in return for vague security promises, while other Yemeni parties who had been supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE were sidelined. The Gaza war changed these political calculations. Before the attacks, the US and UK appeared relatively unconcerned about the Houthis as the de facto authority in north and west Yemen or the potential expansion of their territory following a deal with Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have their own mini-state in north Yemen with independent financial resources through a large taxation base, consisting of some 20 million people. Yet their unpopularity in areas under their control is rising as they rely heavily on oppression to impose their authority and follow a policy of divide and rule to maintain control of a complex society. The Gaza war could expand to new, surprising localities, or alarm in the Biden administration over the state of regional disintegration could finally spur the US to act to restore calm. But what is clear is that the role of the Houthis has changed, from a local Yemeni group to a regional player. This risks turning Yemen into an international battleground and postponing the possibility of a peace agreement that just a few months ago was seen as almost inevitable. Throughout this regional volatility and its domestic reverberations, southern Yemen has been a key element. These were met by escalatory moves from the Saudis and their local allies, with polarization peaking in Hadramawt during May and June. However, the regional and international community re-assessed its position toward southern Yemen during the last quarter of , following the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, one of the most important international maritime trade routes. Polarization will likely continue in Southern Yemen due to two opposing dynamics. On the one hand, it could become a ticking time bomb for the sponsors of any hasty peace agreement with the Houthis. Developments in the first quarter of favor the second dynamic, seeing the South receiving support as a geopolitical actor, rather than a political dilemma. But this will not prevent political polarization, given the series of threats that feed existing tensions. The first threat is the widespread economic collapse taking place amid the declining value of the Yemeni rial, the economic repercussions of the Houthi escalation in the Red Sea, and the severe financial hardship that the government has been facing following the suspension of oil exports in late As is usual during the hot summer months, southern governorates witnessed popular protests in This year, the protests began early as residents of Aden struggle with the almost total disruption of services even before the end of cooler winter months. This has put pressure on the STC leadership and may make it inclined to adopt an escalatory approach to assuage its disgruntled base. The persistence of this competition will likely lead to new rounds of political escalation. The last threat comes from the political and social consequences of returning to a peace process without improving the terms of the proposed settlement in a way that guarantees broader inclusiveness or a real balance of interests, and without providing meaningful guarantees on the southern issue. The Saudi-Houthi talks have been dangerously exclusive and may sow the seeds of further discord. With these ongoing challenges, the situation in southern Yemen appears increasingly fragile and volatile and could explode at any time. There are a number of variables that may emerge as a result of conflict dynamics that could reshape conditions in southern Yemen into a more consolidated and stable environment. This would slow the pace of economic decline in southern Yemen. Political support could be directed to help reduce polarization in the government camp. International actors could also seek to influence events through direct military support. If the various military forces affiliated with the government were to redirect their attention north toward confronting the Houthis, the risk of internal conflict in the south would be reduced. One is the formation of a unified intelligence service and a special security apparatus to combat terrorism, as well as the appointment of a new prime minister. If these moves become a part of a broader effort to build political consensus and restructure the state apparatus, it could enhance stability in southern Yemen in the coming period. Unlike the start of , Yemen entered in tumultuous circumstances in light of the stand-off between Western countries and the Houthis over the threat to Red Sea shipping. As a result, the Yemen war was no longer limited to the regional parties but had become an issue of global concern. Consequently, the world will witness more economic and political pressures as a result of the escalation in the Red Sea. After months of speculation, Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed was replaced by Foreign Minister Ahmed Awadh bin Mubarak in early February, in a move that appears to be technically unconstitutional since it was not accompanied by any cabinet reshuffle and was done without parliamentary approval. Bin Mubarak has been close to Saudi Arabia in the past, but he does not have a close relationship with Riyadh-backed Presidential Leadership Council chief Rashad al-Alimi. If there is a ground operation to confront the Houthis — a distant possibility for now — it will depend on these forces based on the Red Sea coast, instantly restoring depleted Emirati influence in Yemen. For now, Al-Alimi is able to benefit from these political and personal disputes to maintain his influence and hold the PLC together under his leadership, despite the fact that he is not backed by a major military force or a strong party like the rest of the PLC members. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. February 15, Reading time: Table of contents Show. Download as PDF. Abdulghani Al-Iryani. Sana'a Center Economic Unit. Musaed Aklan. Tawfeek Al-Ganad. Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen. Hussam Radman. Maged Al-Madhaji. Read also in Publications.

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