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Official websites use. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author s and the copyright owner s are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. Introduction: The normalized implementation of the centralized volume-based procurement policy for pharmaceuticals is a concerted push for supply-side structural reform of the pharmaceutical industry in China. The impact of the centralized drug procurement policy on pharmaceutical companies' transition from imitation to innovation is investigated to test whether a positive effect occurs in the innovation landscape of the pharmaceutical market. Methods: The double difference method and a series of robustness tests were used based on data from a sample of listed pharmaceutical companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares between and Results: The study found that the centralized drug procurement policy significantly contributed to the increased intensity of innovation input in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. In terms of regional and firm nature heterogeneity, it was found that firms in the seven provinces belonging to the three economic regions had a better increase in innovation input intensity than other regions. Firms of state-owned nature had a better increase in innovation input intensity than private companies. Discussion: Further research found that the effect of centralized drug procurement policy on the improvement of innovation quality of listed pharmaceutical companies was evident. The innovation development of Chinese pharmaceutical companies no longer focused on the accumulation of innovation quantity. The centralized drug procurement system results from a game and compromises between many stakeholders. It has effectively reduced the burden of drugs on the public and the cost of drug distribution since its introduction. Internationally, the Group Purchasing Organizations GPOs in the United States have attracted many medical institutions to join the system, enhancing negotiating power of GPOs, giving it the upper hand in price negotiations with pharmaceutical suppliers Burns, In New Zealand, multiple suppliers are invited to increase competition between themselves on the price of certain drugs, causing suppliers to voluntarily lower their prices. In China, the drug procurement system has roughly gone through three stages: independent procurement by hospitals, bidding and procurement by some provinces, and alliance and national centralized Volume-Based Procurement the three stages are not completely fixed and clear, but may have some nuances or variations. It plays an essential role in many aspects. In , the China Medical Security Bureau was set up to coordinate the implementation of the policy of state-organized centralized Volume-Based drug procurement and has carried out successively seven drug procurement exercises between and The prices of the selected drugs have dropped significantly, saving over RMB 50 billion in pharmaceutical costs each year. However, it is not enough to consider only drug price and distribution costs in promoting centralized drug procurement. So it is essential to regulate the order of competition in centralized drug procurement, protect the interests of enterprises, maintain the healthy development of the industry, and achieve a win-win situation for multiple stakeholders. Pharmaceutical companies, as the source of vitality in the pharmaceutical market, are the source of the supply chain of centralized Volume-Based procurement, are significant stakeholders in the supply-side reform of the pharmaceutical market guided by the centralized Volume-Based procurement policy. This study has important practical and theoretical significance: in terms of practical significance, the starting point of the centralized drug procurement policy was to encourage innovation among enterprises, prompting pharmaceutical companies to realize that innovation is the lifeline and to move from generic drugs to innovative drugs, improved new drugs, and high-quality generics. However, it is also a reality that the share prices of the pharmaceutical sector plummeted during the implementation of the policy, with several pharmaceutical companies losing market share overnight and causing dramatic upheaval in the industry. Is there an increase in investment in innovation to achieve generic transformation? What are the mechanisms of impact? Is there heterogeneity of property rights among the selected pharmaceutical companies? Is there regional heterogeneity in the innovation transformation of selected pharmaceutical enterprises? Suppose there is an increase in innovation investment. The study of these questions will integrate more stakeholder needs for the institutional design of the collection policy and provide experience for pharmaceutical companies to choose their innovation strategies. From a theoretical perspective, the existing literature has mainly explored the impact of centralized Volume-Based procurement policies on the risk of drug shortages, supply stability, the actual operation of the platform, hospitals, and patients, as well as the impact on drug prices and procurement volumes, and the selection of varieties. This paper empirically investigates the relationship between the centralized volume-based drug procurement policy and the innovation of pharmaceutical companies from the perspectives of the company nature, the regional economic level and company innovation strategies. This paper enriches the research related to the transformation of pharmaceutical enterprises and the change in the pharmaceutical industry. Domestic and international studies have repeatedly been published on centralized drug procurement policies and corporate innovation. In terms of corporate operating profits, Mo and Zhou et al. Fei found through empirical research that the negative impact of centralized Volume-Based procurement policies on corporate profits began to emerge gradually. Triulzi showed that recognizing the differentiation of drug values in tendering policies and implementing pricing policies that reward value-added drug development can encourage pharmaceutical manufacturers to innovate production processes and quality levels Triulzi et al,. Hongfei observed that purchasing by the Chinese government organization led to marked price reductions in the labeled medicines, but the price distribution was too diffuse and the price ratios were not reasonable, requiring further and effective price regulation means Long et al. In terms of drug quality, In the gradual implementation of a drug-centralized purchasing policy in China, Chao became concerned about the quality of labeled generic drugs and had difficulty in ensuring clinical effectiveness and safety Zhang et al. The rate of reduction is calculated on the basis of the highest effective declared price of the corresponding specification in the Catalogue of Purchased Varieties. He considered it could eliminate worries and invest more resources in innovative research and developing new drugs Hu, Wang and Jiao analyzed the motivation of enterprises to innovate and found that assessing whether to win a bid solely based on price would reduce the motivation of enterprises. Richard, based on the failed case of drug procurement in Kenya, it is concluded that a bidding process based primarily on price carries significant risks to the economy and society and is ultimately detrimental to the innovative development of companies and the reduction of distribution costs Tren et al. Yang and Li et al. Zhang et al. Regarding industrial concentration and supplier competition, Lu analyzed pilot vs non-pilot cities for centralized Volume-Based drug procurement with a double difference method, found that the medical institutions in the pilot cities met fine their commitments to agree on the amount of drug use, giving the providers the confidence to lower the price in exchange for their sales Lu et al. Huang and Tao Huang and Tao combine the theory of industrial concentration with the practice of centralized national drug procurement. The concentration of talent and capital will improve the innovation ability of pharmaceutical companies Huang and Tao, Gabriel and Rifat argued that procurement organizations need to consider the reputation of drug suppliers and drug quality and avoid relying exclusively on a single drug supplier, thereby reducing the incentive for that drug supplier to innovate Seidman and Atun, Marcel suggests that sourcing from multiple competitively priced suppliers, rather than only from the supplier offering the lowest price, encourages more suppliers to remain in the market Marcel et al. This approach helps to keep prices down over time, reducing the likelihood of stock-outs and allowing companies time and space to innovate. Based on the above theoretical analysis, it can be concluded that the in-depth promotion of centralized volume-based purchasing of drugs in China has caused an increase in the intensity of innovation investment in pharmaceutical companies. By influencing their internal management, drug profits, production processes, technology, capital pooling, market share, competitors, drug quality, and many other aspects. Therefore, this paper proposes the hypothesis:. The centralized volume-based procurement policy for drugs organized by the State promotes the selected pharmaceutical companies to increase the intensity of their investment in innovation. The advancement of a policy across the country impacts different firms. Scholars such as Yi and Wang argue that enterprises have internal and external heterogeneity. Enterprise heterogeneity is the basis for a better understanding and appreciation of enterprise behavior Yi et al. The existence of different property rights of listed companies may lead to differences in corporate discourse, sensitivity, and responsiveness to policy formulation. There are significant differences in the economic level, the degree of marketization, and policy implementation power between regions. Based on this, this paper examines in depth the different effects of centralized Volume-Based procurement policy on innovation inputs from both property rights and regional perspectives. Property rights are an inherent attribute of listed companies and significantly impact their business activities. According to Wang and Zhu, a significant proportion of managers of state-owned enterprises have political experience, and management will follow policies closely out of concern for future political performance Wang et al. Chen Hong et al. In contrast, state-owned enterprises may have more difficulty acquiring advanced technologies from developed countries due to changes in the political environment Chen et al. According to Wen and Feng, state-owned enterprises have non-competitive managers due to diversified business objectives Wen and Feng, In terms of non-economic factors of corporate governance, institutional investors have a limited voice and cannot effectively exert innovative effects. The author argues that the centralized Volume-Based procurement policy for state-organized medicines is a robust measure organized and implemented by the government to promote supply-side structural reform. The measurement weight of economic factors will be considered less. In addition, from the perspective of political performance, it is a prominent political standpoint to meet the supply-side reform of the pharmaceutical industry and promote innovation in the industry by firming up the political direction in the industry change. On the other hand, privately listed companies will react with a certain lag to industry changes due to information asymmetry. In summary, this paper proposes the following hypothesis. The centralized volume-based procurement policy for drugs has promoted state-owned enterprises to increase investment in innovation more effectively than private enterprises. The ability of pharmaceutical companies to innovate is closely linked to the state of the local economy. Generally speaking, the more economically developed a region is, the more institutional investors there are, the better the entrepreneurial and innovative atmosphere, and the more support it receives. For example, the high number of universities and research institutes belonging to the three major economic zones can provide more excellent local talents. The cities belonging to the three major economic zones are well built and provide convenient transportation routes and postal services. Drug procurement policies promote the upgrading of the pharmaceutical industry, which requires more financial and intellectual support for pharmaceutical companies. Therefore regional heterogeneity is worth studying. They concluded that the three economic regions attach more importance to intangible assets and have more advanced management concepts for intangible assets. Guo found differences and trends in the agglomeration and regional agglomeration effects of the three economic zones based on the analysis of urban and regional agglomeration effects Guo, For example, It can be seen that the inclusion of administrative regions belonging to the three major economic zones in one group, and other administrative regions in another group has a certain scientific and reference value. The centralized volume-based procurement policy for drugs has promoted pharmaceutical companies in the three major economic zones to increase their investment in innovation more effectively than those in the non-three major economic zones. The first batch of selected results of centralized Volume-Based drug procurement in the alliance regions was also announced in September of that year. Based on the availability of data, the period — was selected for analysis in this paper, using the time of publication of the notification as the node. For the sample companies, the corresponding exclusions were made according to the following criteria:. Due to its possible delisting at any time, this paper does not do research on such companies. If it is difficult to obtain the operating data of that listed company, then it is impossible to conduct the next step of the study, so it can only be excluded. This study is an empirical study that requires data on operating income, profit, and sales revenue of each company. Therefore, we can only exclude it. Listed pharmaceutical companies selected in the first to sixth batches of drug procurement in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares are used as the experimental group. Other listed pharmaceutical companies not selected are used as the control group. Treat variables Treat is a grouping variable with values of 0 and 1 distinguish between the experimental and control groups, with the experimental group taking a value of 1 and the control group taking a value of 0. The year was taken as the first year of implementation of the drug procurement policy In fact, was the first year of implementation, but considering that it was carried out at the end of the year, it was difficult to influence the market quickly, so this study positions as the first year. The time variable was used to distinguish the time before and after the implementation of the drug procurement policy, with the year after the implementation of the policy taking the value of 1 and the year before the implementation of the policy taking the value of 0. Considering that there are significant differences in the innovation culture and strength of different pharmaceutical companies, and there are also apparent differences in the same pharmaceutical company in different years, this paper refers to Marianne and Zhou and others to construct a two-way fixed effects benchmark model Marianne and Sendhil, ; Zhou and Chen, In addition, the quality of innovation output Newdrug and quantity of innovation output Patent will be used as explanatory variables in subsequent studies. Meanwhile, control variables were set according to previous studies, which were shrhfd5, ibd, yb, size, tobinq, businessyear, sa, executives. The specific variable names, variable codes, measurements, and data sources for this study are shown in Table 1. Table 2 presents the results of descriptive statistics for the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the selected variables and independent sample t-tests for the selected and non-selected pharmaceutical enterprises. It can be seen that the selected pharmaceutical enterprise sample shows better characteristics than the non-selected pharmaceutical enterprises in terms of innovation input intensity, quality of innovation output, and quantity of innovation output. Preliminary indications are that the research in this paper has some significance. Note: N is the number of samples. Table 3 reports the results of the baseline regressions for hypothesis H1, where columns Burns, , Vitry, , and Kaur et al. In addition to the core explanatory variables, the estimation results of the control variables from column Maniadakis et al. Secondly, the coefficient for the situation where the chairman and the general manager are concurrently appointed is significantly negative, indicating that the separation of the chairman and the general manager of the selected pharmaceutical companies can better maintain the effectiveness and independence of board supervision, enhance the role of the board of directors, focus on long-term interests and respond to policy changes on time. Since implementing a centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy is a continuous dynamic adjustment process, it is necessary to consider further the dynamic effect of centralized Volume-Based drug procurement on the innovation development of pharmaceutical enterprises in China. This section draws on the method of Beck et al. Thorsten et al. Table 4 shows the results of parallel trend tests and regressions of the dynamic effects of the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy on the innovation input intensity of pharmaceutical enterprises. A parallel trend test of the impact of centralized drug procurement policy on the intensity of innovation investment of listed pharmaceutical companies. Whether using graphs, regressions, or descriptive statistics, it needs to be shown that the experimental and control groups must be comparable before a shock or policy occurs. This is because the performance of the control group is assumed to be the counterfactual of the experimental group. It can be visually reflected that the coefficients of the double interaction terms coeff , coeff, coeff before the implementation of the pooling policy in are not significant, indicating that the trend of change in the treatment and control groups before the implementation of the pooling policy is the same and there is no significant difference. The coefficient of the double interaction term in after implementation is marginally insignificant. The coefficients of the double interaction terms in subsequent years coeff, coeff are significantly different from zero, indicating that the selected pharmaceutical enterprises in the treatment group have a greater intensity of innovation input than the non-selected pharmaceutical enterprises in the control group. Therefore, the DID model used in this study satisfies the parallel trend assumption and the effect of policy implementation has some persistence. While 3 years after the implementation of the pooling policy, the line of marginal effects rapidly slopes to the upper right, with increasing positive dynamic effects, indicating that the collective harvesting policy has caused a significant positive shock impact on the innovation input intensity of the selected pharmaceutical enterprises. A PSM-DID test of the impact of centralized drug procurement policy on the intensity of innovation investment of listed pharmaceutical companies. To alleviate the problem of sample selection bias, this section refers to the practice of Sun and Ge. Further, it applies the propensity score matching-dual difference PSM-DID method PSM nearest neighbor matching is the process of finding one or more individuals in the control group for each individual in the experimental group to match with. The reason is that if we choose , the final matching sample is smaller and the estimated variance is larger. If we choose or or others, the similarity between the third and fourth control group individuals matched with the experimental group individuals decreases, and thus the estimation bias increases. Selecting the control variable in the same innovation input intensity benchmark regression as the matching variable and setting the caliper to 0. Propensity scores were obtained before and after matching Sun and Ge, It can be seen that there is a specific selection bias between the sample treatment group and the control group before matching, and after matching, the sample treatment group is the same as the control group, as shown in Figures 2 , 3. Next, hypothesis H1 was re-estimated for the sample after eliminating the selection bias, and the results are shown in column Burns, of Table 5. The results of the robustness test are consistent with the previous section. To exclude the effects of endogeneity of policy shocks and individual firm heterogeneity on the study findings, this section conducts a placebo test repeated times concerning Ningbo et al. Ning et al. The horizontal and vertical coordinates of the dots in the figure indicate the coefficients and p -values of the policy dummy variables in the random combination case, and the curves show the kernel density distribution of the estimated coefficients, with the horizontal dashed line being the significance level of 0. As shown, the p -values for the random sample are generally above 0. The previous regression results suggest that the centralized drug procurement policy significantly increases the intensity of innovation investment by the selected pharmaceutical companies. However, it is still unknown how the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy affects innovation in pharmaceutical firms in the context of regional and firm property rights. The above analysis has verified the impact of the harvesting policy on selected listed pharmaceutical companies at an industry-wide level. However, as China is a developing country with uneven regional development, the effect of policy implementation is often heterogeneous at the regional level. In terms of spatial distribution, the three economic zones are are located in northern China, southern China and eastern China, which can drive the development of each region and of course attract the investment of resources from each region. Other regions have a weaker economic base and fewer enterprises than the three economic zones, but they are rich in resources and have great potential for development. It indicates that the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy has a better effect on promoting the intensity of innovation investment of pharmaceutical enterprises in the three major economic zones than in the non-three major economic zones. The impact of heterogeneity on the intensity of innovation investment in listed pharmaceutical companies. For the pharmaceutical industry, introducing national policies has a significant impact on enterprises, such as the promotion of GMP and GSP, medical insurance, and the primary drug catalog. This centralized Volume-Based drug procurement is no exception. Although private pharmaceutical companies can voluntarily make strategic adjustments according to their own development goals, combined with the current situation of the company, and freely control the pace of development, it is easy to seize market opportunities in the market. Secondly, state-owned enterprises have easy access to information on the future direction of policies and the strength of their promotion. Columns Kaur et al. At the same time, the private sector is insignificant, and the centralized procurement policy to promote innovation investment intensity is better at the level of state-owned pharmaceutical enterprises. The previous section found that the centralized drug procurement policy significantly promoted the selected pharmaceutical companies to increase their investment in innovation. The increase in innovation investment by the selected pharmaceutical companies may be due to the increase in profits from the increased market share of the selected products. Also, it may be due to the increase in innovation investment by reducing the relative sales costs. The views of scholars and experts differ on the above points, but they remain in qualitative research and less in empirical evidence. The impact of internal corporate mechanisms is not yet known, so the sample chosen for this paper is of some relevance. From the perspective of the sales expense ratio, enterprises save money by reducing the sales expense ratio to encourage corporate innovation, increase investment and improve the level of corporate innovation and innovation capacity. In addition, from the perspective of business profits, high profits promote enterprises to have more strength to carry out innovation work, improve the tolerance of innovation risk, and thus obtain high-quality innovation results. So, it opted to enter biologics and innovative drugs to increase its bargaining power in the market. To test the above two mechanisms, this paper uses the stepwise regression method with the coefficient product Sobel test to test the mediating effect. The specific model is as follows. The regression results of model 2 and model 3 are presented in Table 7. To explore the reason, this paper uses the Sobel test for mediating effect and finds that the p -value is less than 0. It is not enough to consider only the relationship between inputs and outputs without considering corporate strategies in the context of centralized Volume-Based drug procurement. In the context of implementing the centralized Volume-Based procurement policy for drugs organized by the state, many large pharmaceutical companies whose ace products did not win the tender have put all their efforts into researching and developing innovative drugs. Their former negative innovation strategy has become more innovation-driven. Some companies are committed to an indirect innovation strategy through inter-company technology mergers or acquisitions to achieve product differentiation and diversification. Some Enterprises have pursued technological innovation strategies, focusing their vision on low price, high quality, and sufficient output of winning drugs, and vigorously developing new technologies and techniques for generic drugs. Therefore, the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy has dramatically influenced the choice of innovation strategies of enterprises based on their strength and the surrounding environment. According to Chen, the development strategies of pharmaceutical firms can be classified as autonomous, integrated, and joint innovation, and the quality of their innovation output often differs Chen, He found through a questionnaire that clear innovation strategies help to improve innovation performance, and false innovation strategies even weaken the positive impact of other suitable mechanisms on innovation performance He et al. According to Xu and others, the dynamic adaptation of firms to their environment inevitably creates a link between outcomes, evolution, and strategy, i. Then, Chinese-listed pharmaceutical companies participate in centralized drug procurement in the face of the integration and optimization of the national market by the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy. Will they choose to lay out high-end generic drugs and strictly control the quality and safety of their products concerning the consistency evaluation standards of generic drugs? Or will they accelerate the development of innovative drugs to improve national and international competitiveness? Or will they take improved new drugs as the main direction of attack, with equal emphasis on risks and expected returns? Alternatively, will they provide stable generics as the main focus, with an innovative expansion path, or seek corporate mergers, technology mergers, and project integration to improve innovation performance in a short period, all of which is unknown? Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed in this paper from an empirical perspective. The aforementioned theoretical analysis shows that as drug procurement policies are advanced, there will be significant differences in the innovation output of companies. The pharmaceutical industry is unique in that it attaches importance to protecting intellectual property rights and timely information, such as clinical filings, as required by law. We can differentiate and quantify the quality differences in the innovation output of pharmaceutical companies based on specific criteria to obtain the proper level of innovation and thus help address the question of how the national centralized drug procurement policy affects innovation output. However, the question of choosing appropriate output indicators to measure the quality of innovation output after centralized Volume-Based drug procurement is an urgent issue to be addressed. Yang and Wu took the number of invention patent applications by pharmaceutical companies as innovation output from the input-output activities of enterprises YANG, Wang and Zhu used the number of patents applied for and eventually granted by enterprises in the same year to measure the quantity of enterprise innovation. The number of other citations of individual patents applied for and eventually granted in the same year is a measure of enterprise innovation quality, which is somewhat innovative Wang et al. Du and Zhang argue that the number of patent applications needs to be verified and audited in detail, so the number of patent applications does not represent innovation output. The percentage of new product sales does not consider the knowledge achievements at the theoretical level; it is more reasonable to choose the logarithm of technology contract turnover as an indicator to measure regional innovation output Du and Zhang, According to Yin and Chen, innovation output can be decomposed into the innovation generation and innovation transformation stages for the technology-driven pharmaceutical industry, measured by the number of annual patent applications and primary business income, respectively Yin and Chen, Comparing the data of the last 3 years, Chen can find that the number of new drug clinical trials has increased year by year after the implementation of the collection policy: in , , and , the proportion of new drug clinical trials is New drug research and development is the highest productivity and innovation ability of pharmaceutical enterprises, and the increase in new drug clinical applications is of great significance. This paper shows the number of patents granted as an output indicator of innovation quantity. The number of new drug clinical applications as an output indicator of innovation quality. They are chosen to investigate whether the centralized Volume-Based procurement policy for drugs organized by the State has a significant impact on the innovation output of pharmaceutical enterprises, and a model is constructed as follows. Table 9 reports the results of the benchmark regressions, where columns Burns, and Kaur et al. Through the previous theoretical analysis and result verification, we can find that the innovation strategy of the selected pharmaceutical enterprises has changed significantly after the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement, and their innovation output has certain characteristics of suppressing the quantity of innovation and focusing on the quality of innovation. Thus hypotheses H5 and H6 are rejected, and hypothesis H4 is accepted, i. Columns Vitry, and Mo, further demonstrate the robustness of the model by showing that the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy dummy variable remains significantly positive in terms of quality of innovation output and negative in terms of quantity of innovation output after the inclusion of control variables. The above regression results validate hypothesis H4 that the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy of the state organization significantly increases the importance of the quality of innovation and reduces the demand for quantity of innovation among the selected pharmaceutical companies. This paper applies two-way fixed effects double difference estimation to a quasi-natural experiment using the national drug centralized Volume-Based procurement policy. In the era of centralized Volume-Based drug procurement, poor-quality generic drugs are eliminated, generic drugs of good quality obtain general manufacturing profits, and innovative drugs can obtain higher pricing power. Although corporate innovation, especially the development of new drugs, is risky, the author holds a positive attitude towards the innovation of Chinese pharmaceutical companies in the coming years. Secondly, the centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy has a heterogeneous impact on listed companies of different business natures in China. It showed that listed companies of state-owned nature are more likely to obtain the right to information and are also more able to keep up with policy changes and show higher motivation. Private companies may have a lack of understanding of the policy in the early stage of the promotion of the collection policy, which leads them to lose a certain degree of motivation. Thirdly, centralized Volume-Based drug procurement policy has a heterogeneous regional effect on the innovation of listed pharmaceutical companies. The reasons for this are a large number of pharmaceutical companies, the large size of the companies, the high market share of the enterprises, the substantial capital, the large reserve of scientific researchers, a large number of scientific research institutions and research colleges, the high level of regional GDP, and the excellent innovation atmosphere belonging to the three economic zones. As innovation continues, innovation exchanges across the pharmaceutical industry will become more frequent, ultimately promoting the innovative progress of pharmaceutical companies nationwide. Fourthly, through mechanism testing, the author found that the selected enterprises save money by lowering their own sales expense ratio as a mediating way to increase innovation investment. This mediating effect accounts for 8. Operating profit is negatively significant, indicating that the promotion of centralized Volume-Based drug procurement breaks the original interest pattern and temporarily reduces the operating profit of enterprises. It also encourages enterprises to rely on their original capital or financing and increase innovation investment to improve profits. There is a large gap between the gold content of ordinary patents and new drug clinical applications for pharmaceutical companies. Based on the findings of the study, it is recommended that companies take a proactive approach to innovation. The rich financial and human resources of the three major economic zones can provide help for the development of enterprises. In addition, regional differences among pharmaceutical companies should be reduced, cross-regional cooperation among pharmaceutical companies should be encouraged and promoted, and technology and talent exchange should be enhanced. The government should pay more attention to private companies than state-owned and state-controlled enterprises, and help solve the difficulties they encounter when developing innovations. Of course, it is essential to improve the procurement process and strengthen the process supervision. In addition, for countries like China that rely on procurement platforms, this paper recommends promoting the standardization of procurement platforms and improving the procurement system. Prevent the risk of corporate default and ensure the quality and quantity of drug and medical device supply. This study has some limitations and several deficiencies. The study did not distinguish between business scope. Finally, Volume-Based drug procurement has been conducted several times. It is difficult to quantify whether there is an impact on the incentive to innovate when a listed company is selected the first time and then loses in the next procurement. I am grateful to my advisor, for guiding me well in identifying the favorable and unfavorable effects of current drug policies on pharmaceutical companies. We thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their support and constructive comments, which have significantly improved this article. The Foundations had no role in the study design, data collection, data analysis, and interpretation, writing of the manuscript, and the decision to publish. Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent from the participants was not required to participate in this study in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements. YG and QZ: study concept and design, and Obtained funding. YG: drafting of the manuscript. YG: statistical analysis. QZ: study supervision. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher. This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article. As a library, NLM provides access to scientific literature. Front Pharmacol. Find articles by Yang Gu. Find articles by Qian Zhuang. Received Mar 23; Accepted May 17; Collection date Open in a new tab. Min max mean S. Similar articles. Add to Collections. Create a new collection. Add to an existing collection. 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