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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Jordan serves as a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Although tighter border controls introduced during the COVID pandemic initially reduced cross-border human trafficking, the country's ongoing economic challenges have made people more susceptible to trafficking. Among the most vulnerable populations are those from Syria, Egypt, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. The garment industry commonly exploits workers from Southeast Asia and East Africa, while children in refugee camps are at risk of being recruited for illicit activities or by militias. Organ trafficking, with kidneys being the most sought-after organs, has also emerged as a significant issue in recent years. The profits generated from human trafficking are often laundered through legitimate business ventures such as real estate. The Kafala system, which legally binds migrant workers to their employers, is highly criticized for increasing the risk of abuse and exploitation. Jordan primarily serves as a point of origin and destination for human smuggling. The Kafala system has also been blamed for driving the human smuggling market, with many foreign workers, primarily Bengalis and Egyptians, living in Jordan. The deterioration of the security situation in Syria has led to the proliferation of human smuggling networks across the border from Jordan, which are effectively monopolized by tribal groups. Smuggling activity across the Jordanian-Syrian border has increased since the government changed its rules of military engagement along the border in The EU remains a common destination for irregular migrants from Jordan, and smugglers exploit social media to lure people seeking to migrate to Europe, providing them with fake identification papers and smuggling them through transit countries into the continent. Incidents of extortion and protection racketeering in Jordan appear to be spreading, especially in the impoverished areas of east Amman and Zarqa, with authorities regularly reporting crackdowns on the groups responsible for these crimes. Jordan's illegal arms trade is relatively small compared to that of its neighbouring countries. The decrease in weapons smuggling across Jordan's borders can be attributed to the overall reduction of instability in the region over the past few years, including the collapse of the Islamic State and the recapture of southern Syria by government forces. However, there has recently been an increase in arms smuggling activity between Jordan and Israel, particularly in the north-west region along their shared border. Cross-border arms trafficking networks in Jordan operate covertly, using the many desert routes controlled by groups with tribal and nomadic backgrounds. Such groups typically conduct two-way trafficking of arms through the country's deserts and over the border, and some have links to terrorist organizations and regime forces in neighbouring countries. The illicit influx of arms from Syria tends to overlap with drug trafficking networks. Moreover, the normalization of arms possession within Jordan has led to high domestic demand for weapons, with the remaining arms typically destined for buyers in the Palestinian territories. Around half of the total profits from foreign criminal actors that supply arms and ammunition benefit local Jordanian tribes and other groups, with the rest going to the suppliers. Jordan's position as a regional trade hub has made it an attractive destination for criminals to trade counterfeit goods, with the port of Aqaba serving as a gateway for such products. Jordanian authorities have identified several fake websites and social media pages that are being used by criminals to defraud people by selling them counterfeit and fake gold and other precious jewellery. The country has also been identified as a source country for fraudulent food products in the region. Illicit market for excisable goods is mainly limited to tobacco products. This is a significant market in Jordan, with criminal groups involved in distributing counterfeit variants which pose increased health risks to consumers. The absence of other markets is largely due to the country's low customs taxes, which offer little incentive for criminal groups to flood the black market with a variety of excisable goods. Jordan's market for flora crimes is relatively small. The forests of Jerash and Ajloun are among the most frequently targeted areas due to their high concentration of trees. Wildfires are often set to destroy parts of the forest, to facilitate illegal logging. Several plant species, such as tulips, daffodils, lupins and cyclamens are illegally collected for medicinal purposes; their survival is now under threat. Jordan serves as a transit and, to a lesser extent, source country for the illicit trade in wildlife, largely due to its geostrategic location between the Gulf, Africa and Europe. Longstanding conflicts in neighbouring countries like Syria and the Gaza Strip have significantly impacted natural habitats and created a market for smuggling wildlife species into Jordan. Illegal hunting has led to the rapid decline of several species, including roe deer, fallow deer and Arabian oryx, as well as the placement of the turtle dove on the red list of threatened species. The smuggling of rare falcons has also been a persistent issue, with many smuggled through the Omari crossing into Saudi Arabia. There have also been reports of online wildlife trading. Even though the smuggling of natural resources is not a prevalent market in the country, there has been an increase in fuel smuggling across the border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia in recent years due to the increase in fuel prices. Benefitting from lower prices in Saudi Arabia, Jordanian organized crime groups collaborate with their Saudi counterparts in border areas to smuggle fuel into Jordan. Heroin entering the country is primarily destined for the Gulf region, and border guards and police have noticed an increase in heroin seizures in recent years. Just as with the heroin trade, cocaine has a minimal presence in Jordan. This is largely due to its high cost, with drug users in the country opting for cheaper alternatives. However, there have been occasional attempts to smuggle cocaine via air. Cannabis resin is the most widely consumed drug in Jordan. Most resin entering the country originates in Lebanon and is smuggled into Jordan through Syria and Iraq. In recent years, more resin arriving via these two countries has been intercepted, particularly during the winter months when smugglers take advantage of poor weather conditions to traffic drugs and other goods across the border using four-wheel drive vehicles, pack animals or on foot. In addition, Captagon, a synthetic drug primarily produced in Syria, has become much more prevalent in Jordan. While the country had long been primarily a transit zone for the drug on its way to the Gulf, the expanding regional market has led to growing domestic use. Alongside Captagon, there is a small domestic market for a synthetic form of cannabis called Joker, which contains herbs of unknown origin and is often mixed with toxic compounds. Nevertheless, Jordan primarily serves as a transit country for Joker to reach the Gulf region. In Jordan, cyber-dependent crimes are not as prevalent as other forms of organized crime facilitated through the internet, such as phishing attacks. Cybercriminals often aim to disrupt networks, steal data and exploit infrastructure to launch further attacks. Reports have particularly shown a growing number of instances of malware attacks, which give criminals remote access to devices and disclose information. Other common forms of cyber-dependent crimes in Jordan include the use of spyware and ransomware attempts. Financial crimes are becoming a more significant concern in Jordan, particularly through scams and hacking. The government has reported the emergence of unlicensed companies claiming to operate on worldwide stock exchanges and investments. Criminals have also created fake social media pages that promote so-called royal generosity to defraud citizens and hack their personal and bank data. Additionally, phishing emails have been sent to random people, falsely claiming that their information and devices have been hacked, and demanding payment in exchange for not publishing the data. There have also been allegations that members of the political elite have embezzled public funds and transferred millions of dollars to offshore companies. Criminal networks in Jordan are prevalent and operate in the country's border provinces near Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria. While spread across the country, these networks are mostly concentrated in the refugee camps, and have typically received long-term support from tribal networks involved in organized crime. Criminal networks in Jordan have been expanding their activities. For example, they smuggle and resell Saudi currency in the south of the country, where they profit from the difference in exchange rates. In addition, the country's criminal networks have turned to the black market for organs, exploiting vulnerable young people with monetary incentives, and selling their organs in the Gulf region. The interaction of foreign criminal groups with local actors is also closely linked, with ties often based on cross-border familial and tribal ties. There have also been reports of corruption among border employees who facilitate criminal activities. Hezbollah, for example, allegedly facilitates illicit shipments of drugs, weapons and other goods by bribing officials on both side of the Jordanian-Syrian border. Similarly, senior members of criminal tribal networks are believed to have purchased allegiances from members of local communities. Notably, the cultural concept of 'wasta', which involves favouritism and emphasizes the importance of building relationships, makes the Jordanian private sector particularly susceptible to corruption. For instance, investors with good wasta can expedite procedures, gain exclusive access to services and information, and even influence legislation to their advantage. Jordanian society has a long tradition of Bedouin groups operating around tribal loyalties, with a few reaching into Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. These groups can be classified as mafia-style groups. However, their activities have little consequence for Jordanian society at large due to this historical precedent. In comparison to its neighbours, Jordan is generally considered a politically stable country. It has various government agencies dedicated to combating organized crime and defending against international threats, such as the anti-narcotics department and the anti-trafficking unit. The April political crisis and subsequent sedition trial, has further heightened concerns about the country's security and stability. In addition, high taxes and low salaries have led to a loss of trust of people in the government. Nevertheless, Jordan's democratic process remains independent and protected from interference by criminal organizations. Despite the existence of laws criminalizing corruption in Jordan, it remains a significant issue, with frequent involvement and often impunity of high-ranking officials and companies. The government has taken some measures to address corruption, the effectiveness of which has been limited. Nepotism and lack of accountability remain problematic. On the other hand, Jordan has made significant strides in developing control and electronic payment systems, with the government publishing its budget online for transparency purposes. However, access to information in Jordan is generally limited, and citizens often rely on personal connections, known as wasta, to access public services, thus increasing vulnerability to organized crime. Jordan has developed positive security relationships with its neighbours, including recent improvements with Syria. The country heavily depends on foreign assistance and aid, and has ratified international treaties that enable it to respond effectively to organized crime. Jordan has established extradition regulations that govern inter-state relations and its national extradition procedures. Moreover, Jordan cooperates with international counterparts, including the US and Indonesia, especially on security issues. Regarding its national laws and policies, in recent years, Jordan has made significant efforts to address a range of criminal activities, such as human trafficking, arms smuggling and drug trafficking. These efforts include creating new units, launching national strategies and implementing action plans to combat these crimes. Jordan has also taken steps to amend existing laws to make them more effective in combating these crimes, such as imposing harsher punishments for those charged with human trafficking and drug trafficking offences. However, the effectiveness of these laws and the enforcement of existing laws remain a concern, as demonstrated by the high number of unlicensed firearms seized in recent years. There are also ongoing discussions regarding proposed amendments to the cybercrime law, which could potentially violate fundamental rights such as privacy and free speech. Civilian courts in Jordan are generally viewed as transparent and procedurally sound, but their inefficiency has led to a significant backlog of cases, and authorities do not always follow court orders. Tribalism also plays a significant role in judicial proceedings. In recent years, Jordan has taken further steps to improve its judicial and prison systems, including a focus on rehabilitation over punishment, providing prisoners with various services and using electronic bracelets as an alternative to detention. However, progress in these areas has been slow, and reports of torture in prisons — particularly of political dissidents — have emerged. Overcrowding is also a significant issue in prisons, which have many administrative and judicial detainees. There are several specialized units that are responsible for combating various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, drug trafficking and trade in counterfeit goods, and carrying out criminal investigations in Jordan. Even though law enforcement is considered reliable by the Jordanian people, in practice, its efforts to combat organized crime are not up to international standards. The porous nature of Jordan's borders, especially in its eastern provinces, makes maintaining territorial integrity challenging, with the open deserts providing hotbeds for traffickers and terrorist groups. Jordan struggles to adequately control its borders, given the close kinship links between Jordanian tribes and those on the other side of the borders in neighbouring countries. The Jordanian government has focused on strengthening its grip on the periphery, particularly along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, but challenges remain, such as tensions in the West Bank and smuggling along the Saudi border. Jordan has been grappling with challenges in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, resulting in its inclusion in the FATF's grey list in To address these shortcomings, the country enacted anti-money laundering frameworks, such as the know-your-customer programme, which has helped to identify financial networks involved in money laundering. However, the conflict in Syria continues to fuel an informal black market outside the Jordanian government's purview, creating opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit the ongoing instability, including the extensive smuggling of Saudi currency, which is suspected to be linked to drug money from Syria. The informal sector constitutes a significant proportion of the Jordanian economy as a result of high taxes, leading to increased taxation pressure on formal sector businesses. Jordan has taken measures to monitor financial institutions and ensure compliance with regulations to curb illicit activities. Recent efforts to reduce customs duties on imported goods are aimed at reducing smuggling and tax evasion. However, challenges such as a budget deficit, trade account deficit, public debt and high rate of youth unemployment persist. The victim and witness protection schemes in Jordan are not effectively enforced, and have several shortcomings, including a lack of evidence gathering, interpretation issues and perpetrators who are beyond the reach of the police. Insufficient resources also hinder the identification and care of victims. Despite efforts to combat human trafficking, victims are still treated poorly, and are subject to arrest, imprisonment and deportation for acts committed as a direct result of being subjected to trafficking. Although drug use and possession are criminalized in Jordan, people who admit to using drugs and seek treatment are exempt from penalties. Jordan does provide shelters for victims of organized crime and witnesses with high confidentiality. However, there are still gaps that need to be addressed, including the lack of a follow-up and reintegration programme for victims and conflicting laws that make it difficult to identify victims of human trafficking. Jordan has various prevention measures in place to prevent organized crime, and the authorities have maintained strong prevention efforts. For example, they distribute anti-trafficking brochures to all foreign migrant workers entering the country to raise awareness about trafficking crimes. Major efforts are also made to prevent forced early marriages among Syrian refugees, which put refugee women and girls at risk of abuse and exploitation. Additionally, work permits are issued to Syrian refugees to regularize their employment and protect them from exploitation in the workplace. Jordan has a wide range of society organizations, including cultural bodies, charities and research centres. The government plays an active role in maintaining its reputation to attract financial support and assistance, including humanitarian aid for refugees. Civil society organizations cooperate with international actors and remain prevalent in several cities. Although they operate non-confrontationally with authorities, they have produced tangible results, including laws supporting women's rights. Despite the existence of an active civil society environment, media freedom continues to be limited in the country. There have been reports indicating that the government imposes restrictions on individuals and organizations criticizing it. There is also political pressure on the media applied through threats of large fines and prison sentences, resulting in self-censorship in the coverage of sensitive issues. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Amman. Income group Upper middle income. Population 11,, Geography type Coastal. GINI Index Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 6. Human smuggling 5. Extortion and protection racketeering 4. Arms trafficking 6. Trade in counterfeit goods 5. Illicit trade in excisable goods 5. Flora crimes 3. Fauna crimes 3. Non-renewable resource crimes 2. Heroin trade 3. Cocaine trade 3. Cannabis trade 6. Synthetic drug trade 7. Cyber-dependent crimes 5. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 5. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 1. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 6. Foreign actors 4. Private sector actors 6. Political leadership and governance 5. Government transparency and accountability 4. International cooperation 8. National policies and laws 6. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 4. Law enforcement 6. Territorial integrity 6. Anti-money laundering 6. Economic regulatory capacity 4. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 6. Non-state actors 4. Analysis Download full profile english. People Jordan serves as a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. Trade Jordan's illegal arms trade is relatively small compared to that of its neighbouring countries. Environment Jordan's market for flora crimes is relatively small. Cyber Crimes In Jordan, cyber-dependent crimes are not as prevalent as other forms of organized crime facilitated through the internet, such as phishing attacks. Financial Crimes Financial crimes are becoming a more significant concern in Jordan, particularly through scams and hacking. Criminal Actors Criminal networks in Jordan are prevalent and operate in the country's border provinces near Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Leadership and governance In comparison to its neighbours, Jordan is generally considered a politically stable country. Criminal justice and security Civilian courts in Jordan are generally viewed as transparent and procedurally sound, but their inefficiency has led to a significant backlog of cases, and authorities do not always follow court orders. Economic and financial environment Jordan has been grappling with challenges in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, resulting in its inclusion in the FATF's grey list in Civil society and social protection The victim and witness protection schemes in Jordan are not effectively enforced, and have several shortcomings, including a lack of evidence gathering, interpretation issues and perpetrators who are beyond the reach of the police. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.
The Last Chapter in the Life of a Drug Addict
Buying Heroin Aqaba
Matthew Levitt , Lauren von Thaden. Share via:. This is despite peace treaties with both Jordan and Egypt and parallel efforts on the part of those countries to patrol their sides of the border. The study focuses on the borders Israel shares with Jordan and Egypt, where disruptions of smuggling operations increased during this period. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officials interviewed by the authors independently reported that it has, both in terms of an increase in known smuggling cases and in the complexity of smuggling operations and the dangers of addressing the challenge. The authors further believe it is reasonable to infer from the growth in detected smuggling activity that more smuggling is taking place, but this cannot be assumed with certainty. The guns and drugs that are flowing into Israel are creating societal problems and public safety issues. The influx of weapons is also a major counterterrorism concern. Smuggled weapons have been a contributing factor to the surge of violence that has plagued the West Bank and Israel. The brothers knowingly sold the weapons to members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and to criminals in southern Israel. Indeed, this increased arms smuggling 5 occurred against the backdrop of over a year and a half of violence that began with an day battle between Israeli forces and Hamas in May and continued through a string of terror attacks in the spring of that prompted a sweeping Israeli military campaign with nightly West Bank raids targeting terrorist operatives. Alongside the extensive collection of chemical materials to make explosives and hundreds of assembled explosive devices seized, authorities also found thousands of rounds of ammunition and weapons such as Ms, pistols, and shotguns. Of the terrorist attacks foiled by Israel security forces in in the West Bank or Jerusalem, were shooting attacks, underscoring the centrality of small arms smuggling to this spike in violence. The study then focuses in turn on smuggling attempts at the borders Israel shares with Jordan and Egypt, where authorities on both sides of the border report a significant increase in detected smuggling activity has taken place in the past two years. It is important to stress that the approximately two-year time duration means that their data sheds light on recent and what may only be short-term trends. The dataset draws from IDF and Israeli government press releases, news articles, and information gleaned from meetings with Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian government officials. The dataset is, by definition, not comprehensive because it is limited to information that is either publicly available in media reports or IDF press releases or that could be gleaned from documents shared with the authors and author interviews. Publicly available data does not uniformly report the details of each smuggling operation. For example, the types of detail provided in reports varies regarding the specific locations where smugglings take place, the identities of those involved, and even the quantities of contraband smuggled. Any quantity of drugs smuggled is especially difficult to quantify over time, as reports sometimes describe the amount of drugs seized by estimated cash value and other times by weight. Despite these constraints, the dataset tracks available information regarding event location, perpetrator identity, and smuggled items almost always weapons or drugs, but several cases involve money or gold. What Authorities Say Indeed, while the dataset is not an exhaustive list of each smuggling attempt during the March to April time period, the overall numbers in the dataset are nearly identical to those reported by Israeli authorities. Neither Jordanian nor Egyptian authorities provided overall figures to the authors. Israeli authorities confirmed to the authors the trendlines accurately reflect those observed by national counter-smuggling authorities. Where available, the authors provide these numbers for greater context. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian authorities all report significant increases in known cross-border smuggling between early and early The actual pace of known smuggling fluctuates from month to month, but authorities in these countries report that the overall trendlines point up during the past two years. See Figure 1. See Figure 2. Israeli forces embarked on a concerted anti-smuggling campaign in alongside efforts by Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts. According to the IDF, the number of identified, thwarted, or disrupted smuggling attempts along the Egyptian border increased from in to in See Figure 4. Others point to changed circumstances to explain what they see as an ongoing threat from cross-border smuggling, even as the number of known smuggling attempts began to drop in early Figure 1. Due to the lack of other opportunities, more people were drawn into the growing smuggling industry. Because of these circumstances, authorities expect cross-border smuggling to remain an ongoing challenge. Subsequent investigation revealed that the Jordanian lawmaker reportedly carried out a dozen earlier smuggling runs starting in early In each, he leveraged his diplomatic passport to smuggle illicit goods: namely guns, electronic cigarettes, gold, and birds. This incident stood out both for the number of weapons smuggled and the fact that a parliamentarian was used to drive them across an official border crossing at the Allenby Bridge into the West Bank. Most smuggling attempts from Jordan involve criminal smuggling networks that span the Israeli-Jordanian border using members of Bedouin tribes as runners to deliver illicit goods to and across the border, typically at isolated portions of the border far from official border crossings. Israeli and Jordanian officials report that the level of arms smuggling from Jordan into Israel and the West Bank has increased over the past two years, in terms of what is being detected. As already noted, more detected smuggling is likely indicative of more smuggling getting through, and this appears to have fueled instability and a surge in terrorist and other violent activity. Figure 3. As already noted, many smuggling plots on both sides of the border are not publicly reported. Weapons smuggling benefits both terrorist and organized criminal groups but is primarily driven by criminal smuggling networks that recruit members of Bedouin tribes to help facilitate their smuggling operations. According to Jordanian officials, cross-border smuggling incidents as of late were occurring about once or twice a week. And there are likely more still that we never find out about. The Jordanian border spans the geographic areas of responsibility of three IDF commands north, central, and south , requiring robust coordination within the Israeli military to address security concerns. While the Jordanian military is fairly well-deployed along its side of the border, the Israeli military is more sparsely deployed along large portions of the border since the terrorism threat is comparatively lower there than in other parts of the country. Cases along the Jordan-Israel border mostly involve weapons smuggling attempts conducted by West Bank Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs from Bedouin communities in the Negev desert and their counterparts on the Jordanian side of the border, many of whom come from the same Bedouin tribes. What Is Smuggled, and Where? In some spots along the long and sparsely populated southern desert border, there is no security fence at all, just barbed wire. Here you can dig under, or simply cut a hole. Smuggling succeeds here because the border is too long to effectively patrol and the area is a sparsely populated wilderness. North of the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley is a rollercoaster of small hills running along the Jordan River marking the borderline between Israel and Jordan. The few smuggling attempts that did not occur within these aforementioned boundaries occurred south of the Dead Sea Map 1. As noted earlier, Jordanian MP al-Adwan allegedly attempted to smuggle three bags of weapons across the Allenby Bridge, including some handguns and about a dozen AR style assault rifles. On average, weapons busts along the Jordanian border include roughly 15 handguns and one or two assault rifles. Only after his arrest did authorities learn that starting in February , the Jordanian parliamentarian allegedly made a dozen smuggling runs moving a variety of contraband across the border. In April , Israeli police confiscated 63 handguns and arrested a Bedouin Israeli citizen suspected of smuggling weapons from Jordan. Earlier, in December , Israeli authorities arrested two Israeli Bedouin brothers and a Palestinian from the northern West Bank on charges of smuggling weapons and ammunition that was then sold to members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and criminals in southern Israel. The overwhelming majority of smuggled weapons coming in through Jordan are handguns, which account for about 90 percent of smuggled weapons seized at or near the Jordan-Israel border, according to the IDF. Not all reported smuggling cases fully document what weapons were seized at or near the Jordan-Israel border, but collating the data from those that do reveals over weapons were seized from March to April , including handguns and 90 assault rifles. Without providing details other than the total number of weapons seized per year, the IDF reported in May that were seized in , in , and in the first five months of not including weapons parts, which appear in about 50 percent of smuggling runs. The other 10 percent of guns smuggled across the Jordan-Israel border are M and AK style assault rifles and shotguns, officials report. Many of these are stolen from IDF armories or sold on the black market by IDF soldiers, 59 but some are also smuggled into the country from Jordan. In fact, one reason Israeli officials believe they have had more success thwarting arms smuggling from Jordan is an intelligence collection shift from drugs to guns. The precise location of each smuggling operation from Jordan is often unknown. Both government press releases and media reports identify where arrests take place, which is typically near the border, but not where the actual cross-border smuggling occurred. Rarely do smugglers cross the border themselves, instead preferring to come up to the border fence and either throw bags of weapons over the fence or leave them there for someone on the other side to pick up after cutting a hole in the fence. At some points, the space between the border and the fence can be as wide as meters. In July , Jordanian armed forces thwarted an attempt to smuggle 54 handguns, five shotguns, and ammunition from Syria. The sharp increase in prices appears to be a function of both the impact of counter-smuggling efforts, which have put some constraints on the supply of weapons and ammunition, and continuing high demand for weapons in Israel and the West Bank. In fact, demand is so high that guns are often smuggled across the border before buyers are lined up. As the February terrorism wave spread, applications for gun licenses by Israelis spiked by percent. In , 51 Israeli-Arabs were reportedly killed by organized criminal gangs in Galilee, the so-called Triangle bordering the northern West Bank and the Negev. You want a gun? You can buy a gun in an hour. You can buy a handgun. You can even buy a machine gun, an assault rifle. But demand is very high. So it is a very good business. Israeli organized criminal networks are another source of violence and instability in the West Bank. In , seven criminal gangs were active in Arab communities, and over Palestinians were killed by organized gangs. The influx of guns has factored in the sharp increase in terrorist activity in the West Bank. Smuggled weapons are flowing in from Jordan, but that is by no means the only source of black-market arms. In November , for example, thieves stole approximately 70, bullets and 70 grenades from an IDF base in the north of the country. Israeli forces confiscated 92 kg of heroin and cocaine and 28 kg of hashish from the vehicle. Bedouin smugglers in the Negev typically traffic marijuana and hashish grown in the Sinai Peninsula. In rare cases like this one, harder drugs such as cocaine and heroin have been smuggled as well. Here, drugs are the primary illicit commodity smuggled across the border. Israeli authorities said that, as of late , there were typically one to two smuggling attempts a day along this border. While some reports imply that the increase in drug smuggling is tied to terrorism, 96 evidence suggests otherwise. Iran, they assess, has not done so either. Israeli and Egyptian authorities point to increased identified, thwarted, or disrupted drug smuggling from Figure 4 , which is the result of several factors including long-term neglect by the Egyptian government and rampant unemployment. In , a tribal leader pointed to unemployment as the primary driver behind crime and violent extremism in the Sinai. Egypt flooded tunnels under the popular Rafah crossing, collapsing the tunnels and the illicit economy they created. Between the two, smuggling pays far better and is the only growth industry in the area. Until then, there was no need for, and thus market for, dedicated smugglers, because anybody could smuggle items across the then-open km border with an easily-breached fence. The new fence includes sophisticated sensors and is 5 to 8 meters high, depending on the location. Due to the lack of economic opportunities in the region, some of these tribesmen, now better armed, are believed to have turned to smuggling once the Islamic State in Sinai was effectively defeated. The Egyptian-Israeli border runs for just over km, along which there are several hotspots where most of the cross-border smuggling takes place. Three of the most significant hotspots are along a km run of the border starting at the Nitzana border crossing border stone 26 and running south to Mount Harif border stone 49 and Mount Sagi border stone Smuggling also occurs further north, near the Kerem Shalom crossing at the point where the Israeli, Gaza, and Egypt borders meet, and closer to the city of Eilat and the Red Sea. The topography of the Egypt-Israel border area favors smuggling, with its many dry river beds wadis that complicate surveillance and reconnaissance efforts by military and police and block lines of sight. Large water pipes run under some of the roads and provide cover. Periodic bluffs overlooking the border provide natural lookout spots for smugglers. On the Egyptian side of the border, smugglers emerge from staging areas around Jebel Khali and other mountains and cross the flat plateau that leads to the border fence. On the Israeli side, they do much the same, exiting from staging areas around Mount Hanif and Mount Sagi. Many more drug-smuggling runs were not disrupted. Office on Drugs and Crime report on the global cocaine market, cocaine seizures in Israel increased dramatically from to Though much smaller in scale, there is also some limited smuggling from Israel into Egypt. This typically involves marijuana plant seeds first smuggled into Israel from the Netherlands onward into Egypt for cultivation there. The final product is later smuggled back into Israel for sale. As the pace of disruption rose, disrupting the flow of drugs in both directions across the border, smugglers developed more sophisticated and aggressive tactics to move their product. Countermeasures to evade counter-smuggling efforts include investing in surveillance and intelligence collection, fine-tuning smuggling tactics at the border and developing aggressive maneuvers for situations when military or police encounter smugglers. If needed, they will move on to another area or wait until security forces leave to patrol another area. The criminal networks running drugs across the Egypt-Israel border also invest significant sums of money to hire teams of couriers, drivers, lookouts, and scouts, as well as operations officers to oversee each smuggling operation. Smuggling operations officers seek financially unstable Bedouin in the Negev Desert area who have either completed their IDF service or still serve in the IDF, including as trackers in anti-smuggling efforts, to obtain advanced knowledge of Israeli patrols and other intelligence. While smugglers along the Jordanian border operate in small groups, one-way smugglers along the Egyptian border cope with increased patrols is to overwhelm them by sending groups of up to 30 people at a time. Large groups of well-armed smugglers can effectively keep such Egyptian forces at bay while they withdraw from the border fence and escape. A typical smuggling run takes just two to three minutes at the border fence, with smugglers converging from either side to send and receive goods. A long smuggling operation might run up to eight minutes, but they are intended to be quick to decrease the risk of disruption or capture. At the Egypt-Israel border, smugglers typically throw bags of drugs and other contraband over the security fence, which is five meters tall in most places but six to eight meters tall at smuggling hotspots along a 17 km stretch of the border. Smugglers operating on the Egypt-Israel border tend to be more violent in cases when they are engaged by authorities and have large quantities of drugs in their possession. In some cases, smugglers run off into the wilderness carrying the drugs and leave their vehicles behind. The cost of losing a car is the cost of business, as long as the drugs are not confiscated. Smugglers on the Egypt-Israel border are growing increasingly sophisticated and are known to operate quadcopter drones to collect intelligence and evade patrols. They have also been known to run chains or place other impediments across roads to disable military or police vehicles, which must stick to the roads. Smugglers about to be cornered and desperate to evade capture have been known to attempt to ram military and civilian vehicles with their SUVs. According to the World Drug Report, many countries, including Israel, reported overall growth in drug consumption and relapses since the start of the pandemic. While the majority of drugs consumed in Israel are smuggled into the country from abroad, domestic marijuana production is on the rise, with organized criminal groups growing the illegal crop in greenhouses in parts of the Negev desert classified as live firing zones. The plants were grown in trenches dug in a live fire zone with beige nets spread over them to make the area blend in with the desert. Aside from the public health threat posed by the flow of drugs into the country, Israeli officials are concerned about the increasingly aggressive and militant nature of these drug smuggling operations. In December , Israeli soldiers shot dead a suspect attempting to smuggle drugs from Egypt after smugglers fired at the soldiers as they arrived at the scene. When IDF forces arrived at the various smuggling scenes, the smugglers fired at them. In the nearby Israeli border community of Kadesh Barnea, farmers complained that chickens were killed in the crossfire when they shot at the vehicles of arriving Israeli forces. Conclusion In early June , Israeli forces thwarted a smuggling attempt in the middle of the night, and hours later, an Egyptian police officer crossed the border into Israel and shot and killed three Israeli soldiers. This case along with that of Jordanian Parliamentarian Imad al-Adwan attest to the increased need for cross-border security cooperation. The Jordanian foreign ministry released a statement noting it was following up on reports of the arrest with the relevant authorities. The reason all sides displayed such restraint in these cases is that the three countries work diligently to prevent terrorist and criminal activities across and along their shared borders. It should therefore not come as a surprise that while al-Adwan was detained in Israel, Jordanian authorities ran a parallel investigation and arrested several suspects believed to be involved in the smuggling. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian authorities all report a sharp rise in cross-border smuggling over the past couple of years. The downward slope in detected smuggling attempts since late see figure 1 suggests that counter-smuggling efforts may be having the intended impact; however, it is still too early to draw firm conclusions. Some of the counter-smuggling success is attributable to enhanced cooperation between Israeli military and security agencies and the completion of border defenses. Furthermore, Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officials all stressed to the authors the importance of their cross-border coordination and cooperation. Officials are increasingly willing to make such statements publicly. In the final analysis, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt all see counter-smuggling and border security as a shared interest and a security function they perform for their own benefit. Many of the circumstances that have contributed to the increase over the last two years in detected smuggling are highly likely to persist, from regional instability and the ready availability of guns to the massive profits criminals stand to make from narcotics sales. Commercial incentives mean that smugglers will likely become more violent and more creative, from digging tunnels under border fences to deploying drones to transport packages over them. Cooperation between the three countries will continue to be crucial. Treasury Department. He has written for CTC Sentinel since Substantive Notes \[a\] For every smuggling attempt identified, thwarted, or disrupted, an unknown number of others presumably get through without authorities ever learning about them. The authors believe the numbers detected by authorities is likely to be indicative of the true larger total. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian authorities also made this point in interviews with the authors. Significant caveats apply, however. It should also be noted that, all other things being equal, more thwarting and disruption of smuggling could be expected to lead to a reduction in smuggling attempts over time. In other words, a higher number of interdictions could theoretically be associated with a decreasing rather than increasing problem set, though this would likely occur over a longer period of time than that studied here. Indeed, while most officials interviewed for this study reported that increased disruption of smuggling attempts was taking place against the background of an increased trend in smuggling activity, one Israeli official expressed the opinion that what has changed at the Jordanian and Egyptian border is not the overall level of smuggling, but rather the number of smuggling attempts that are identified, thwarted, or disrupted. Determining why the rate of detected smuggling goes up or down is complex, is not a result of any one factor, and may elude simple explanation. It only includes data on assembled guns smuggled across the Jordanian border. It does not include weapons parts or grenades. The IDF compiled higher numbers of weapons seized in the past three years because they include smuggling attempts that were not made public, but they do not differentiate between types of weapons. The larger number of weapons seized at or near the border appears to reflect a broader category than just those seized in specifically counter-smuggling operations. Author Levitt interview, Israeli official, May Sometimes it quantifies the amount of drugs seized by weight, and sometimes by estimated worth in dollars or shekels. Some material was shared at these meetings, and more was provided in follow up communication via email, WhatsApp, and Zoom. Field research along the Israeli-Jordanian border was conducted in September Anything Goes! The red dots represent areas where there have been thwarted smugglings at or near the borders of Jordan and Egypt. The red pins show smuggling hot spots. IDF data relayed to the authors 95 While some reports imply that the increase in drug smuggling is tied to terrorism, 96 evidence suggests otherwise. The line shows the wider area where smugglings most frequently occur according to Israeli officials interviwed by the authors. CTC Dr.
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Guns, Drugs, and Smugglers: A Recent Heightened Challenge at Israel’s Borders with Jordan and Egypt
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