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Aggrieved youth increasingly express their anger through fiery protests, street violence, and in some cases violent extremism. In response to this ongoing social unrest and terrorism, the Tunisian government has developed hardline security policies, whose effects often exacerbate social tensions, political violence, and militancy. Tunisian coastal elites fear and misunderstand the bitter resentment in the border communities, making it harder to secure the country from continuing terrorist threats. The violent extremist groups based in these communities feed on a deep well of disillusionment with the democratic transition and prey on the growing sense of emasculation, disempowerment, and helplessness among Tunisian youth. Studies show that the lure of violent extremist groups, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State, has more to do with the promise of empowerment and restored dignity than with ideology or religious conviction. The Tunisian revolution greatly disrupted the security landscape, initially marked by political disorientation andregional upheaval. The postrevolutionary period provided disparate Salafi groups with a sudden opportunity to sow the seeds of another revolutionary movement in the soil of poor neighborhoods and allowed them to take advantage of the widespread disillusionment among the youth, particularly in the border regions. Salafists of every stripe came to the fore, but it was the so-called Salafi jihadists who most took advantage of the political transition. Powered by the release of hundreds of Salafists from prison and the return of several prominent sheikhs to Tunisia from their sanctuaries in Western Europe, they began spreading their roots in the poor and marginalized areas where state authority was lacking. One of the challenges that faced the Salafists was how to transform the heterogeneous Salafi-jihadi networks into a fixed structure with a central authority and identified leadership. Abu Ayadh prioritized central control over the growth of Salafi jihadism, fearing counterproductive actions might hurt the movement. The rise of this violence reached its culmination in September when raging mobs set fire to the U. The tougher approach prompted the Salafi jihadists to shift their focus away from aggressive, sometimes violent, proselytizing to directly challenging state authority and attacking its key institutions. By doing so, the Salafi jihadists hoped to weaken the credibility of the state security forces by proving to disgruntled Tunisians that their government was unable to stop the Salafi-jihadi attacks. This attrition strategy escalated in , with a vicious cycle of provocation, retaliation, and repression. In the midst of this escalating war between the state and AST, small and violent militant groups connected to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM were upping the ante in the western regions bordering Algeria. They did this especially in the most disenfranchised neighborhoods and regions of the country. The defeat of AST accelerated the fragmentation of the Tunisian militant landscape. Under the assault of state forces, AST ceased to exist by late This left behind an ideological void and a large, disgruntled constituency, whose members either went dormant, operated underground by integrating smuggling networks and building social linkages in Ben Guerdane close to the border with Libya, or joined the Syrian or Libyan theaters of war. The failure of this political strategy led to a dramatic shift in approach that embraced hitting civilian as well as military targets. In alone, three major attacks in Tunisia were claimed by the Islamic State—at the Bardo National Museum in the capital of Tunis twenty-two deaths , a beach resort at Sousse thirty-eight deaths , and on a Tunisian presidential guard bus in downtown Tunis twelve deaths. And in March , dozens of Islamic State—trained sleeper cells staged a dramatic assault on Tunisian security forces in Ben Guerdane. The Tunisian security forces successfully repelled this attempt to seize Ben Guerdane and to inflame a rebellious populace into open revolt. Such an evolution requires the Tunisian government to adopt a new approach that is not limited to law enforcement and military actions. The key is to analyze the risks of militancy in the political, social, and economic context in which they occur. In Tunisia, socioeconomic triggers alienation, discrimination, and stigmatization and regional asymmetries are important predictors of youth violence and radicalization, particularly in the border regions. President Beji Caid Essebsi likes to dismiss violent militancy as something induced by alien fanatic barbarism. Government actions that ignore the social, economic, and regional underpinnings of militancy will influence the trajectories of terrorism in Tunisia. T he rare sociological studies conducted on militancy in Tunisia show that the young Tunisians most sympathetic to AST hailed from the poorest neighborhoods and were the least religiously observant. Radical ideologies might be influenced by regional context and geopolitical grievances, but they are an expression of their local environs. This is especially true for the latest generation of Tunisian militants who were not around for the first wave of battles in Afghanistan in the s and were too young for the second round of major fights, which began after the September 11, , terrorist attacks in the United States and intensified with the U. They were born in the s, had a taste of repressive authoritarianism, and then stumbled into the politics of revolt that put an end to the repressive rule of Ben Ali. They were disappointed by the inability of the postrevolutionary government to deliver for them, and the revolutionary thrill quickly gave way to the embrace of Salafi jihadism as the primary vehicle of resistance. Today, the youth who become militant tend to be better educated than their average countrymen, but unemployed or underemployed. The failure of the democratic transition to improve the economic conditions for young Tunisians has led many to feel that the system is rigged against them. A World Bank report on removing hurdles to youth inclusion found that 68 percent of urban and 91 percent of rural youth have no trust in the political system. Coping with disappointing outcomes differs from one individual to the next. But the Tunisian experience shows that anger at the persistence of social exclusion and regional disparities, combined with exposure to radical Salafi preachers, are important factors in understanding youth radicalization. As frustration grows, some individuals become more prone to nihilism, as the high rates of suicide and self-immolation in the most impoverished neighborhoods and regions demonstrate. The challenge for Tunisian government officials is to understand this youth revolt. Viewing Islamic fundamentalism as the main driver of radicalism misdiagnoses the problem. Anytime there is a terrorist attack, the state cracks down on suspected radicals. Salafists complain of degrading treatment, unlawful raids, arbitrary arrests, and judicial harassment. Families of suspects and fighters who have returned home to Tunisia also complain of persecution and systematic police abuse. In the absence of a deradicalization program or a policy of social reinsertion, such a heavy-handed security approach is counterproductive. Tunisian prisons—notorious for overcrowding, poor sanitation, and torture—are becoming perfect settings for radicalization. This was brought into stark relief by the dramatic transformation of a twenty-five-year-old Tunisian from rapper to Islamic State fighter. Maurouane Douiri, known as Emino, was a womanizing singer who liked to post photographs of himself in front of a sports car with scantily clad women. In one year, he abandoned rap, changed his attire, and announced his allegiance to the Islamic State in a Facebook post in March The persistent stigmatization of impoverished communities and the trauma associated with aggressive and intrusive policing instill in young people profound feelings of humiliation by and bitterness toward state authority. The region has always been hounded by exclusion and deprivation. From colonial rule to the reign of Ben Ali, the southern periphery was marginalized and stigmatized as a zone of tribalism, dereliction, and unruliness. In both cases, the populations of the south were expressing discontent at the prevailing economic paradigm that has failed them. Aside from the few jobs in the army and local government that the state doled out as political patronage, the southern populations had to fend for themselves through work in the underground economy. Families in the border region with Libya eked out a precarious existence mostly through occasional day labor in informal cross-border trade and trafficking. The occasional border closures and expulsion of Tunisian workers from Libya opened the door for tribal cartels to develop lucrative cross-border services. The Twazin tribe of Ben Guerdane and their allies in the Nwayel tribes in Libya developed vast informal markets in currency trading, human trafficking, and smuggling of a range of subsidized Libyan goods from fuel to flour and sugar. The imposition of United Nations sanctions on Libya pushed people on both sides of the Tunisia-Libya border to rely on smuggling for their livelihoods. The Ben Ali regime had tolerated, if not encouraged, the growth of such illicit centers of commercialization as safety valves, relieving societal pressures that might have otherwise exploded into civil unrest or massive migration into the more developed eastern coastal cities. There were, however, two significant caveats to this informal agreement. The tribal cartels forswore engagement in drug and arms trafficking and committed to help the government protect the border from infiltration by drug and arms dealers. When the government broke the principles of the tacit agreement, the border region sank into civil unrest. The rioting and violence ceased only when the president canceled the tax and ordered the opening of the border crossing. The fall of the Ben Ali regime disrupted cross-border markets, trade networks, and standards of behavior. It also upset the traditional internal and external hierarchies of tribal power. The dominant tribal elites and smuggling cartels were rivaled by once-peripheral tribes and young adventurous actors. Taking advantage of the disorientation of the security services and disorganization of the border economy, the new actors expanded trading to previously prohibited goods such as alcohol and drugs. The introduction of violent extremists into the mix further muddles the black market landscape and makes it crucial to distinguish between innocuous informal networks of cross-border traders and entrepreneurs of organized crime and violence. This tendency to criminalize the shadow economy alienates the local populations and the economic actors the government needs to help manage the border. It also aggravates the social crisis brewing in the south. The March attack in Ben Guerdane increased border militarization to deter terrorism and stem the mushrooming smuggling trade. The government accelerated the building of a mile antiterror barrier along its border with Libya. To keep militants from entering Tunisia through Libya, the wall will be equipped with an electronic sensor system and fortified by observation towers and drones. This militarization of the border, however, is not likely to be very effective until the government becomes serious about tackling the root causes of insecurity in the south. The building of a wall will neither stop terrorism nor stem the flow of smuggling contraband into the country. Indeed, recent history suggests that closing off the southeastern border only encouraged the smuggling business. In the s, Ben Guerdane became a major smuggling hub precisely when the border with Libya was closed. Border militarization will affect only the most vulnerable people who are dependent on trade in contraband and who lack the means and networks to circumvent border checks. The most powerful and well-resourced smuggling rings use the main roads and benefit from the connivance of Tunisian border patrol agents and other security officials. Many Tunisian officials believe the threats are primarily external and hence require a primarily security - based response. As a result, the socioeconomic problems that fuel political discontent, social unrest, and violent extremism have so far received only lip service from the state. In , Essebsi successfully ran for president as the candidate most capable of restoring stability and security to Tunisia. It should not be surprising that blocking those interactions often leads to protests and rioting. Most southerners believe that the political system is controlled by the northeastern elite whose aim is to perpetuate their structural marginalization and exclusion. Instead of addressing the conditions of uneven regional development, the government is seen as impeding the only source of revenue available to border communities. The violence is therefore less about opposing state control of its frontiers and more about the lack of a viable alternative to illicit trade. For example, the governorate of Tataouine, which has become a flashpoint for protests against marginalization, has one of the highest numbers of unemployed graduates in the country 58 percent. This deficit stifles economic activity and social services delivery even in areas that have experienced significant industrialization. Worse, in a region choked by industrial pollution and unsafe working conditions, the lack of access to hospitals and healthcare speaks volumes about the degree of marginalization experienced by local communities. To the dismay of the poorest regions, the successive postrevolutionary governments proved incapable of correcting these deficiencies. In its two-year stint in power, Ennahda increased the public funds destined for the poorest regions by 30 percent. The result is that the amounts spent were less than their prerevolutionary levels. Conflicts between the central government, local representatives, and governorate authorities also slowed the pace of investments and capital expenditures. At the central level, a lack of organizational unity led to inconsistency and incoherence in designing and implementing development projects in the most marginalized regions. The lack of coordination between the Ministry of Regional Development and the Ministries of Industry, Finance, Economy, Employment, Agriculture and Environment, and Equipment fragmented economic policies and led to each ministry pursuing its own narrow interests and protecting its turf. In an unstable political environment, the governors appointed by the Islamist-led government faced dogged resistance from the local elite, unions, and regional administrations. The fact that most governors were associated with Ennahda and lacked administrative and economic experience generated more distrust and tension. Since his appointment in August , Prime Minister Youssef Chahed has been under pressure to reactivate and accelerate the implementation of suspended investment projects. Good intentions, however, are not sufficient. As with everything else in Morocco, projects that are ordained by the king move faster. Those that are not get bogged down in staggering bureaucracy, political squabbling, and cost overruns. There is no doubt that Chahed has his work cut out for him. Bureaucratic hurdles and corruption also get in the way of business development. Rising security threats compound these difficulties by scaring away potential foreign direct investment. These staggering challenges are not confined to the southeastern border. The most striking aspect has been the lack of any real integrated action plans for the social and economic inclusion of border communities. This dearth of economic progress creates a seething cauldron of anger that increasingly expresses itself in protests, street violence, and violent extremism. The governorate, home to half a million people, has the worst socioeconomic indicators in the country. This sad state of affairs is due to a history of economic development skewed in favor of the northeastern littoral regions. The people of Kasserine attribute this economic asymmetry to a deliberate policy pursued by the political and economic eliteto punish their region for its recalcitrance. Kasserine and the other western regions have a long history of opposition to central authorities dating back to the colonial era. Ferocious resistance to French control came from the tribes in the west. After independence, these regions resented the dominance of the state apparatus by elites from the coastal areas. One significant moment in the story of the deliberate dispossession and oppression of the periphery by the northeastern coastal elite came in , when Lazhar Chraiti, a native of Gafsa in southwest Tunisia andcharismatic leader of the anti-French insurgency, was executed for plotting to assassinate Bourguiba. National critical infrastructure sectors were constructed essentially as enablers of economic growth in the capital and coastal regions of the east. Major investments in transport infrastructure were directed to connect the center-east with the greatest metropolitan area around grand Tunis, where high-value - added industries such as textile and tourism are concentrated. The coastal economic belt has become the lifeline of the Tunisian economy, contributing more than 85 percent to the GDP of the country. The western regions, meanwhile, were left to languish in a state of poverty and underdevelopment. The events of the Gafsa guerrilla attack by TunisianYoussefites those inspired by Salah Ben Youssef and Libyans supported by Qaddafi to destabilize the Bourguiba regime are still supported by many in the region as the only means of resisting state neglect and discrimination. Six years after the revolution, however, majorities of youth in these two marginalized regions remain excluded from jobs, health insurance, social security, and public facilities. So far, the same overcentralized economic model that marginalized and disempowered Tunisians for years after the revolution are still in force. Efforts to address regional disparities elicit suspicion and even hostility from actors invested in the status quo. The urban and coastal elite still exercise a substantial and disproportionate amount of influence in Tunisian economics and politics. This explains the constraints that hinder the implementation of the decentralization reforms stipulated in the constitution. Strengthening local and regional authorities threatens the existing political and economic fault lines in the country, so this prospect invites blockages rather than support from the political elite. For example, the Ministry of Interior, entrusted with overseeing the organization and implementation of decentralization, sets up administrative roadblocks to slow or dilute the reforms. The result is that the laws promulgating decentralization are still bogged down in political debates over redrawing municipal and regional lines and the transfer and assignment of competencies to municipalities and regional councils. Municipal and regional elections have also been postponed several times due to political disagreements, but are scheduled to take place on December 17, , as of this writing. This slow pace of change has exacerbated frustrations, driving a deeper wedge between the people of the periphery and their political leaders. Protests by the unemployed often denounce the centralized nature of the state and the unresponsive attitude of the local and regional administration. The wave of protests that gripped the western regions in early targeted local authorities who often seem dismissive and uncaring about the needs and demands of protesters. The governors and other local officials have frequently refused to even engage indialogue with protesters. To be sure, the majority of municipalities lack the financial capacities or a clear mandate to address the demands. They also lack the qualified human resources necessary to plan and design inclusive development strategies. Local economic development councils are understaffed and operate with insufficient resources to be able to develop any real integrated action plans for the social and economic inclusion of youth. With little money for social services and social welfare programs, local authorities run a handful of public assistance programs to contain social disorder among the alienated destitute. During the Ben Ali regime, social programs such as the National Solidarity Fund, the National Employment Fund, and the Tunisian Solidarity Bank were designed specifically to alleviate poverty and regional asymmetries. The program provided short-term jobs in road maintenance, sewer cleaning and installation, removal of wastewater, soil conservation, and forestry activities. But local authorities used the funds to consolidate their clientelistic networks and uphold their ability to exercise social control and political domination. This partisan and clientelistic system continued after the revolution. In the absence of a serious reflection on the limits of the economic model, the successive postrevolutionary governments resorted to the same old superficial approaches and palliative stop-gap solutions. For example, all Tunisian administrations have used the Chantiers system to build networks of support and to assuage rising social tensions. The turmoil in turn hampers desperately needed economic growth as well as the consolidation of democratic reforms. Additionally, the economic plight of the western border regions has worsened as a number of al-Qaeda-linked militants have taken hold in the rugged areas of Mount Chaambi and Semmama, near the Algerian border. The attacks on security forces by the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade and the pro—Islamic State group Jund al-Khilafah Soldiers of the Caliphate in al-Qayrawan, Tunisia, have been met with an intensification of airstrikes on the territories controlled by these groups as well as new deployments of weaponry and personnel. The stepping up of surveillance along the Algerian border has had negative social ramifications on people whose livelihoods depend on informal cross-border trade, much like along the Libyan border. This breeds bitterness among locals who believe that the government security measures come at the expense of their well-being. Many complain that they are caught in the crossfire between security forces and terrorist groups. For example, the uptick in social contestation has often coincided with the hardening of the counterterror measures ordered by Essebsi. The buildup to the violent unrest in January gained momentum precisely during the imposition of the state of emergency two months prior. As a result, both the government and the border regions are trapped in this vicious cycle of violence. Terrorism legitimizes hardline counterterrorism approaches, whose effects often result in more social tension and political violence. For example, the asphyxiation of the informal economy drives people who have no other options and who have historically relied on smuggling and contraband as sources of daily subsistence to the brink. The incentives to exit this conflict trap are lacking, because the threat of terrorism remains high and the political actors capable of making commitments to promote sustainable development goals and addressing the root causes that contribute to radicalization are not credible. The western border region is therefore doubly affected by the rise of militancy and the corresponding harsh counterterrorism measures. Terrorism exacerbates underdevelopment and inequality while heavy-handed antiterror approaches polarize communities and worsen growing youth disillusionment. The government should develop an initiative to validate their historical figures, symbols, and contributions to Tunisia in history textbooks, statutes, memorials, and exhibitions. The Tunisian authorities should also consider enacting positive discrimination policies that prioritize investment in social programs and public policy in the border regions. Such a program requires the development of an inclusive agricultural plan that seeks the technological modernization of the sector through innovative financial mechanisms that channel resources for vocational education and training and land reform. The improvement in the management of natural resources and the investment of a fair portion of the profits from local resources into local projects are also key to addressing the needs and demands of the people. The United States, the European Union, and other donor countries and agencies should condition foreign assistance on the enactment of anticorruption and transparency reforms. Aid that is not smartly programmed will reduce the incentives for the ruling coalition to adopt rule of law reforms and the adequate protection of civil liberties. To address the hardline security approach that is causing, not alleviating, the security threat in Tunisia, the United States and its allies should prod the Tunisian government to seriously commit to reforming the internal security apparatus and criminal justice sector as well as improving governance and empowering both the work of the National Authority for the Fight Against Corruption INLUCC and the Truth and Dignity Commission. Reducing corruption, restoring justice, and controlling police abuse will help relieve mounting social pressure in the border regions. The international community should also help the government design and finance rehabilitation and reintegration programs for returning Tunisian fighters that are based on the social and cultural context that enabled violent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. Unfortunately, the response from the successive postrevolutionary governments has been misguided and failed to address the root causes that are inherently political and socioeconomic. By overreacting to the security threats through heavy-handed measures, the Tunisian government mistakenly relegates economic development and job creation to the back burner, further isolating the young people who live in the border regions. Tunisia faces the complex challenge of dealing with the return of hundreds of people who traveled to fight in conflicts in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The fear is that these returnees will destabilize the country by bolstering domestic extremist networks or committing lone-wolf terror attacks. For some Tunisians, such a prospect conjures up the specter of the decade-long armed insurgency against the Algerian government in the s, where the return of Algerian veterans from the s war in Afghanistan contributed to the violence. The need to adopt tough security measures can have its advantages, but it should not lead to grave violations of human rights. These police tactics are also the best recruiting tools for terrorist groups. Tunisian authorities need to adopt comprehensive strategies that not only improve intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities but also tackle the conditions that fueled radicalization if they are to successfully stop the threat of violent extremism. It was born as an informal settlement for rural migrants coming from the impoverished northwest of the country. Today, it is a dense, poor, and crowded area. The second armed revolt — was spearheaded by Khalifa Ibn Asker, who mobilized the tribes of Dhehibat in Tunisia and Jebel Nafusa in Libya before being violently suppressed by the French. The same noticeable differences apply to the officialpoverty rate The share of unemployment among graduates hovers at

Young People and Smuggling in The Kasserine Region of Tunisia

Buying Cannabis Ettadhamen

Build your search with words and phrases. Use any combination to refine your search. Hi there! Share Alamy images with your team and customers. All images. Live news. Search by image. Search for images Search for stock images, vectors and videos. Search with an image file or link to find similar images. All Creative Editorial. All Ultimate Vital Uncut Foundation. All Archive greater than 20 years old. Strong farmers wall Stock Photos and Images 18 See strong farmers wall stock video clips. Strong farmers wall Stock Photos and Images. County Durham, UK. Thursday 1st March UK Weather. As the severe weather continues with blizzard conditions in many areas there are no snow days off for farmers, or their livestock. Lying in the shelter of a drystone wall these sheep try to avoid being completely buried as strong winds begin to affect Northern England. A wall of art signed by customers at Fat Bud's, a small Bangkok dispensary focused on buying and selling cannabis grown by local farmers in Thailand. Since the Thai Government decriminalised the sale and possession of marijuana on June 9, , dry cannabis flowers have begun to be sold in dispensaries and on the street throughout Bangkok. A sudden boom in the marijuana business coupled with its swift legalisation comes without a strong framework for legislative regulation, resulting in an uncertain economic forecast for the weed industry in Thailand. With the support of Thai doctors, some pol. July 27, , Bangkok, Thailand: A wall of art signed by customers at Fat Bud's, a small Bangkok dispensary focused on buying and selling cannabis grown by local farmers in Thailand. With the. A teenager stands front of a wall on which a drawing of man wearing gas mask is graffitied in a tough neighborhood of the popular city of Ettadhamen, which is one of the most populated cities in the capital Tunis. The neighborhood's youth played a central role in the revolution which overthrew President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Since then, the situation has worsened: precariousness, poverty, increase in cost of living, un. Dry stone wall construction. Repairs between old and new sections. A farmer carrying a sheep. A teenager makes the victory sign V sign as he poses for pictures in front of a wall on which a drawing of man wearing gas mask is graffitied in a tough neighborhood of the popular city of Ettadhamen, which is one of the most populated cities in the capital Tunis. Since then, the situation has worsened: pr. Dry stone walls. The finished Foundation Level to carry the rest of the dry stone wall. Download Confirmation Please complete the form below. The information provided will be included in your download confirmation. Download Cancel. Forgotten your password? Filter by agency collections. No agencies were found for this search. Filter Cancel. Search builder Build your search with words and phrases. Exact phrase. At least one of these words. Without these words. Refine Cancel.

Buying Cannabis Ettadhamen