Buy weed Ettadhamen

__________________________

📍 Verified store!

📍 Guarantees! Quality! Reviews!

__________________________

▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼

▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲

Buy weed Ettadhamen

Build your search with words and phrases. Use any combination to refine your search. Hi there! Share Alamy images with your team and customers. All images. Live news. Search by image. Search for images Search for stock images, vectors and videos. Search with an image file or link to find similar images. All Creative Editorial. All Ultimate Vital Uncut Foundation. All Archive greater than 20 years old. Strong farmers wall Stock Photos and Images 18 See strong farmers wall stock video clips. Strong farmers wall Stock Photos and Images. County Durham, UK. Thursday 1st March UK Weather. As the severe weather continues with blizzard conditions in many areas there are no snow days off for farmers, or their livestock. Lying in the shelter of a drystone wall these sheep try to avoid being completely buried as strong winds begin to affect Northern England. A wall of art signed by customers at Fat Bud's, a small Bangkok dispensary focused on buying and selling cannabis grown by local farmers in Thailand. Since the Thai Government decriminalised the sale and possession of marijuana on June 9, , dry cannabis flowers have begun to be sold in dispensaries and on the street throughout Bangkok. A sudden boom in the marijuana business coupled with its swift legalisation comes without a strong framework for legislative regulation, resulting in an uncertain economic forecast for the weed industry in Thailand. With the support of Thai doctors, some pol. July 27, , Bangkok, Thailand: A wall of art signed by customers at Fat Bud's, a small Bangkok dispensary focused on buying and selling cannabis grown by local farmers in Thailand. With the. A teenager stands front of a wall on which a drawing of man wearing gas mask is graffitied in a tough neighborhood of the popular city of Ettadhamen, which is one of the most populated cities in the capital Tunis. The neighborhood's youth played a central role in the revolution which overthrew President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Since then, the situation has worsened: precariousness, poverty, increase in cost of living, un. Dry stone wall construction. Repairs between old and new sections. A farmer carrying a sheep. A teenager makes the victory sign V sign as he poses for pictures in front of a wall on which a drawing of man wearing gas mask is graffitied in a tough neighborhood of the popular city of Ettadhamen, which is one of the most populated cities in the capital Tunis. Since then, the situation has worsened: pr. Dry stone walls. The finished Foundation Level to carry the rest of the dry stone wall. Download Confirmation Please complete the form below. The information provided will be included in your download confirmation. Download Cancel. Forgotten your password? Filter by agency collections. No agencies were found for this search. Filter Cancel. Search builder Build your search with words and phrases. Exact phrase. At least one of these words. Without these words. Refine Cancel.

Strong farmers wall Stock Photos and Images

Buy weed Ettadhamen

Tunisia is struggling with insecurity, social tensions, and ideological divisions three years after President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted during a popular uprising. But the country is making progress on the path to democracy. To solidify gains and ensure that a successful Tunisian experiment reverberates across the Arab world, socioeconomic struggles that fuel protests and radicalism must be confronted. The economy is key. The incoming interim government needs to generate the means necessary to finance the budget and provide targeted investments to the most restive and marginalized regions of the country. Social exclusion and economic disenfranchisement of the communities in the interior and border regions is breeding social unrest, criminality, and angry radicals. Security sector reform should be expedited. The professionalization of the Ministry of Interior, internal security services, and the justice sector is necessary to gain the trust of citizens and stem the deterioration of law and order. These organizations must be more accountable and legitimate. Outside support is needed. The United States and its European allies with a direct interest in Tunisia can encourage reforms in the security and economic sectors. The year was marred by two dramatic political assassinations, a suicide blast, and multiple deadly confrontations between Salafi militants and security services. The spike in insecurity aroused public indignation, poisoned the political climate, and polarized society. Political parties, the media, and civil society organizations seemed stuck in a vicious pattern of mutual recriminations, manipulation, and distrust. Politicians set the month of January as the deadline to finalize a new constitution and select an independent election commission. The move paved the way for the resignation on January 9 of the government led by the moderate Islamist party Ennahda and its replacement by a caretaker cabinet led by Mehdi Jomaa, an independent technocrat and former minister of industry. Months of difficult backroom bargaining between the leaders of the two major political parties in Tunisia appear to be paying off. Seventy-three-year-old Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of Ennahda, and eighty-seven-year-old Beji Caid Essebsi, a former prime minister and head of the secular party Nidaa Tounes, are credited with working out the broad framework that led to the deal between Islamists and about half of the opposition parties. This is a potentially landmark accord between bitter enemies—the Islamists and secularists. Essebsi and the moderates in the secular camp recognized that Islamism is a social and political reality and that the alternative to dialogue and compromise is political chaos and social unrest. Ghannouchi and other moderate Islamists realized that Ennahda would be better off if the process of democratic transition were rapidly completed and power left to an interim independent government. But Tunisia is not out of the woods yet. Several challenges lie ahead. The failure to improve the economy and reduce social and economic marginalization has deepened the chasm between the youth and state institutions. To deal with the problem of radical Salafism, the Tunisian government has to undertake security sector reform and address the socioeconomic conditions that drive people toward extremist positions. The Ennahda-led government came up short on both counts. Its strategy toward radical Salafists was contradictory and inconsistent. This led to a fractured Islamist movement and made political compromise with the opposition very difficult. The new government will also face pressure to confront radical Salafists. Firmness will be necessary to weed out the most dangerous extremists. But a purely security-based approach will risk further radicalization and confrontation with state institutions. The challenge now for Mehdi Jomaa and his security cabinet is how to restore state authority without falling into the traps of overreaction, abuse of human rights, and indiscriminate repression. Pragmatism and compromise have served Tunisia well. But if the current government is to succeed in restoring security, achieving political stability, and steering the country toward democratic consolidation, it also needs urgent help from its international partners. The formation of a coalition government led by Ennahda and two secular parties in gave reason for hope that Tunisian politics might be transcending decades of poisonous acrimony between Islamists and secularists. The Islamist movement in Tunisia became politicized in the mids and then institutionalized in under the banner of the Islamic Trend Movement. When Ben Ali, a former army general and interior minister, took over power from a senile Bourguiba and promised to open up the political system to more competition and democracy, Islamists—a mass movement by —sought legal recognition under the name Ennahda renaissance. Despite allegations of fraud, the Islamists, running on independent lists, managed to score the second-highest number of votes 17 percent after the ruling party. In some big cities their share reached 25 to 30 percent. Ben Ali, like Bourguiba, portrayed Islamists as dangerous reactionaries who manipulated religious symbols to exploit the gullibility of the poor, uneducated, and misinformed. Islamism was caricatured in the media as a foreign import and a great menace to the national essence. Islamist thoughts and conceptions were products of the local consciousness and have always manifested themselves, either independently or in combination with others, but state propaganda denied this. Both presidents scoffed at the notion that there are in fact different shades of Islamism. Reformist Islamism of the kind advocated by Ennahda was seen as an oxymoron; in the eyes of the regimes, there were only doctrinaire Islamist reactionaries and violent extremists, no reformist middle ground. Islamism was maligned as a repugnant ideology that was unfit for political life and that deserved to be confined to obscurity. But fear of Islamism among some self-defining secularists soon resurged. The tension over freedom versus regulation or ideology versus pragmatism has deeply shaped the nature of politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Each camp fears that its individual ways of life dress codes, dietary habits like alcohol consumption, and so on might be jeopardized in the absence of absolute constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and religious rights. In these debates, the principles of political rights figure less prominently. The old, deeply engrained battle lines over the role of religion in the public space and the conception of freedom and values quickly resurfaced after the brief post-revolution respite as secularists and Islamists argued over the meanings and limits of those principles. The modernist camp, as non-Islamists like to refer to themselves, wanted freedom of speech and expression to be completely liberalized except the manifestations that they believed infringed on their individual ways of life or promoted the Islamization of society. Many elites were, for example, shocked when, at the end of , female students demanded their right to wear the face veil on the campus of Manouba University. Such an act was seen as the beginning of a deliberate campaign to destroy the progressive values of modern Tunisia. The eruption of several controversies over the extent of freedom of expression heightened the mistrust among Islamists and secularists and intensified the culture wars that continue to hamper the democratic transition. Some members of Ennahda have, for instance, pushed unsuccessfully to criminalize blasphemy. Others resorted to the judiciary to punish behavior they deemed as constituting an offense against religion. Several artists were also targeted for offending public morality. To mollify fears, both camps tried to negotiate a legal framework that provided adequate guarantees for civil liberties, human rights, and religious freedoms. Unfortunately, a series of miscalculations and shock events have reinforced the rift between secularists and Islamists. Once it ascended to power after winning elections in October , Ennahda was handed the opportunity to put into practice its theoretical commitment to democracy. But its lack of experience in governance, internal divisions, and ambivalence about the relationship between state and religion complicated its efforts to reassure its non-Islamist adversaries. The party wanted religion to be free from the control of the state but at the same time insisted that the state must engage and organize religion. This emphasis on the centrality of religion to the polity allowed Ennahda to defend to its supporters its commitment to a civil state that is democratic but not divorced from religion. In governance, however, this desire to legislate based on religious references and values created tension. In interviews, several Ennahda parliamentarians conceded that they have made errors but insist that the party has governed in coalition with two secular parties Ettakatol and the Congress for the Republic and has a track record of seeking compromise and consensus on social and political issues. The party opposed attempts by some of its members to criminalize blasphemy and constitutionalize sharia, they have asserted, and partially yielded on its preference for a parliamentary system of government. Ennahda has been making concessions to help break the stalemate. Making any further concessions is seen as committing political suicide. In interviews in August, several Ennahda parliamentarians evinced a genuine fear that the country would return to the old oppressive order. Many were convinced that secularists were determined to crush them. The instances of violence were timed to coincide with important political benchmarks. On February 2, , secular opposition politician Chokri Belaid was assassinated, just when talks to broaden the ruling coalition were at an advanced stage and a controversial law to ban former regime politicians was gaining momentum in the Constituent Assembly. The country was celebrating its 56th independence day and its politicians were on the cusp of clearing the final hurdles for a landmark constitutional deal. Various forces have been blamed for the violence. President Moncef Marzouki, a secular centrist and a longtime defender of human rights, publicly blamed counterrevolutionary forces inside and outside the country for fomenting chaos and manipulating Salafi-jihadi groups. Whether purely coincidental or not, the violence raises concerns that saboteurs are determined to derail the last democratic transition under way in the Arab world. Before the compromise deal of December 14, , to dissolve the Ennahda-led government and form a caretaker government led by Mehdi Jomaa, the desire to roll back the Islamists seemed for some secular politicians to supersede fears of a descent into political chaos or a return to the old authoritarian order. Despite their small numbers, the most radical seemed ascendant and exhibited a disturbing instinctive recourse to undemocratic impulses. This authoritarian reflex manifested itself in a compulsive reliance on anti-Islamist elements in the security forces and the old powers of the pre-revolutionary state. In an editorial in Le Monde , a group of Tunisian academics and civil society actors warned that the dangerous game that the political elite were playing risked crushing the revolution. They stoke the crisis, then rush in with a radical solution that advances their own interests. But the maximalist demands of a hardline but vocal minority ended up creating divisions within the secular opposition. Systematic opposition to pragmatic efforts led by the most powerful unions and business groups to resolve the political crisis gave the impression that some elements in the secular camp were consumed more by their singular focus on Islamism as a mortal enemy than on the success of the national dialogue. The Islamists, too, were split. The ideological struggle between Islamists and Salafists has been an organic part of the Tunisian Islamist debates for decades. For reformist Islamists, Salafists have always posed a theoretical and ideological challenge as well as a hindrance to their political project. The rupture between the two currents played out openly in doctrinal, ethical, and political battles that Rached Ghannouchi led against the Salafists from his exile in England. Islamists long assumed that their reformist Islamist ideology presented a solution to the malaise that Tunisia endured under Ben Ali. As agents of political and ideological socialization, Ennahda believed initiation to Islamism passed naturally through their movement. Ennahda hoped that its attempts at rationalizing its value-norm system and assigning a pragmatic function to Islamist thought in politics would appeal in an increasingly differentiated social setting. While this was largely true, in its efforts to build an ideological construct that is pragmatic and capable of speaking to large swathes of society, the movement lost ground in the most neglected areas of the country. That effort created a disconnect between the party and the poor communities it claimed to represent. The party lost some of its monopoly on religious social activism as it scrambled to survive both the ruthless onslaught of state repression under Ben Ali and the concomitant rise of new forms of religiosity and ideological production. In addition to this, the confines imposed by exile forced the party to concede terrain to other emerging brands of religious populism that benefited from deepening social malaise and a gaping ideological void. As a result, a new generation of disaffected Tunisians grew up with little exposure to Ennahda. Some of the most desperate and insecure found in Salafism and its social structures a refuge from social and moral dislocations. Salafism is a Sunni intellectual tradition that offers a particularistic understanding of theology, not a homogenous force. Salafists preach the same doctrines; all Salafi currents have as objectives the imposition of sharia law, the elimination of impious behavior, and the establishment of an Islamic state in Tunisia. But their strategies are tailored to specific individual needs and circumstances. Depending on the local and international context, Salafism can take different forms, ranging from peaceful proselytizing and political quietism to violent moral policing and armed struggle. Under Ben Ali, Salafism was practiced by a minority, and it had two primary currents: apolitical Salafiya Ilmiya and a jihadist, political strand. Salafiya Ilmiya Scientific or Scripturalist Salafism was undergirded by a literalist understanding of Islam and was closely associated with Saudi scholars. It was nonviolent and nonconfrontational toward the regime. Salafists were fond of reminding their followers that it took the Prophet Muhammad thirteen years of patient proselytizing and strategic engagement to weaken pagan rule and invade the political realm. The apolitical orientation of this Salafi tendency shielded it from the wrath of the security services. Its small number of preachers and limited places of learning were not harassed as long as they avoided inciting political controversies, sedition, and violence. These Salafists in a way got a boost in organizing grassroots operations from the same state authorities that harshly repressed political Islamists. Under Ben Ali, a small number of disaffected Tunisians converted to this type of Salafism. They congregated with like-minded religious soul mates in discussion groups halaqat ilm , designated cafes, and mosques in areas where discontent was widespread and focalized, such as the popular suburbs of the capital Ettadhamen and Intilaka , the neglected center-west Sidi Bouzid , and cities like Bizerte, Menzel Bourguiba, Rades, and Ezzahra. Gradually, this closed mindset based on linked fate led to the formation of small, radical cliques intent on aggressively and at times violently challenging the status quo. This jihadist current is rejected by apolitical Salafists and the Islamist camp. Virtual spaces became mediums through which initiation into violent extremism took place. Radical preachers and jihadi recruiters urged Muslims to defend their beliefs and values by joining the battlefields where Islam was under siege. After the September 11, , terrorist attacks and the U. Because of the repressive state apparatus, violent jihad was mainly carried out abroad, namely in Iraq. Another group of Salafists does not fit neatly into either the apolitical or the jihadist current. Most were young, self-taught, and influenced by satellite television channels. Across the board, most Salafi recruits followed a similar pattern. They were between sixteen and thirty years old, came from the same socially disadvantaged neighborhoods, had a low level of education, and possessed weak religious grounding. After stints in jail, some stumbled into Salafism as a new conduit for self-affirmation and as an outlet from social marginality. Salafism did not just emerge with the revolutionary ferment, though before the January revolution the majority of Salafists avoided politics and treaded carefully in their actions. After the stunning overthrow of Ben Ali, they saw an opportunity to shed their caution and push to implement the law of God. Even Salafi jihadists attempted to enter the political fray, renouncing the use of force and forbidding jihadi violence in the new Tunisia. Salafists undertook a fast and furious drive to reshape the Tunisian religious and social landscape after hundreds of Salafists were released from prison and several prominent sheikhs returned to Tunisia from their sanctuaries in Western Europe. Their spiritual awakening manifested itself in greater religiosity distinct dress codes and rituals and in the adoption of a strict black-and-white discourse the good versus the bad, licit versus illicit, and so on. The Salafi jihadists employed a two-track strategy in the new political context, broadening their support base in poor urban neighborhoods through social activism and the propagation of Salafi ideology while at the same time aggressively recruiting disaffected Tunisians into international jihadi squads fighting in Algeria, Syria, and Mali. At home, they promised not to wage violence against the state because it had shed authoritarianism and ceased repressing religion. Their effort was widespread. They set up shop in several Tunisian mosques, forcefully pushing out imams and religious figures imposed by the former regime. Out of 5, mosques, as many as 1, fell under the control of radical Salafists. In their zeal to prevent vice and promote virtue, these Salafi vigilantes attacked art shows, desecrated mausoleums, and burned liquor stores. In some neighborhoods where they were dominant, they pressured residents to conform to a strict Salafi code of conduct. In others, they formed morality squads to enforce codes of moral strictures, especially dress codes and the separation of men and women. In poor urban zones marked by social malaise, isolation, and high unemployment, they positioned themselves as agents of order and purveyors of transparent justice. They also volunteered to resolve interpersonal disputes and other civic issues. During disturbances, they deployed their men to protect vital economic assets, public buildings, and private property. Jihadists stressed the contrast between their activism, charity work, and economic relations and the political polarization and partisan gridlock that rocked state institutions, hurt the economy, and created social unrest. They argued that their overlapping religious, social, and economic agendas fostered a sense of communal bonding that transcended petty squabbles and destructive political divides. The jihadists invested heavily in social activism, providing jobs, Islamic education, alms to the poor, and a simple justice system—a quite successful approach. The appeal of Salafi discourse and radical activism can be attributed to the disillusionment of a small but significant minority of Tunisian youth in the most marginalized communities with a democratic transition that has struggled to meet their aspirations for jobs and social justice. Most feel betrayed by the post-revolutionary political process, which they perceive as dominated by a coterie of old politicians intent on reproducing the same exclusionary economic policies of the old regime. Salafism offers them a way to further their political and social preferences through revolutionary methods. Salafi jihadism provides the promise for youths to acquire an authentic individual identity and new self-worth to respond to their social marginality and exclusion. It also provides an avenue for fame and adventure. Most of the converts to Salafism after the revolution embraced Salafi jihadism because of its revolutionary fervor and confrontational street tactics. Salafi jihadism became appealing in poor areas because it posited a dynamic, radical agenda that stood in stark contrast to the anemic agendas of the left and old-fashioned political Islam. It became almost a psychological phenomenon with its own constructed myths about how alienated Tunisians can conceive of their identities and gain acceptance in social settings where they express themselves and nurture their spirituality. To adherents, this market of significance with its own doctrines and practices provided an escape from social dislocations and the compromised Islam preached in state-controlled mosques. The media has depicted Salafi jihadism as a monolithic movement, but events on the ground show that the movement is fragmented. Even when they adopt Salafi social norms and lifestyles, some Salafi jihadists are resistant to joining organizational structures that they see as divisive and contradictory to Salafi teachings. The top spot in each group usually goes to battle-hardened veterans who fought in Afghanistan and other conflict areas. Former prisoners also hold leadership positions, as they are regarded as symbols of resistance and inspirational figures. Salafi jihadism has not yet been transformed into a coherent movement. In fact, the only serious attempt at institutional collective action came with the radical Salafi group Ansar al-Sharia, which the government labeled a terrorist organization in May Abu Iyadh, the head of the organization, captured in Libya in late December, has defended the path of formal structuration based on the necessities of the moment. He argues that Salafi jihadism has grown exponentially and needs to be structured and managed. Without formal organization and mobilizing structures, the connections between the jihadi sheikhs and followers are frayed, and this lack of central control over strategy and organization might lead to counterproductive actions that hurt the movement. Unplanned and untargeted violence has proven costly for the Salafi jihadists, for instance, shocking most Tunisians, alienating target constituencies, and inviting state repression. To broaden its base of followers, Ansar al-Sharia embedded itself into the social fabric of poor areas where state authority was absent by concentrating on charitable activities and the provision of law and security. Ansar al-Sharia aggressively marketed itself as a rational organization committed to promoting human capital. It targeted its recruitment effort at the third current of Salafists—the mainly young group that was neither apolitical nor jihadist. In several instances, Iyadh lambasted political and business elites for imposing on society an imported and failing economic model. To bring about social justice and economic fairness, he said in May that the financial system needed to be fundamentally changed. As if in campaign mode, Iyadh called for strengthening the role of workers through the establishment of Islamic unions and watchdog associations. He outlined new development opportunities through the introduction of different forms of tourism that are, according to him, morally superior to and more lucrative than current alternatives that pollute local cultures and damage communities. On the other side of the coin, some Salafists are completely opposed to any forms of institutionalization. They argue that it is not allowed under Salafi doctrine because it divides the community of believers and violates the sacred principle of tawhid the unity of God. There are also strategic reasons for opposition, as institutionalization makes Salafists easily identifiable targets for repression. When it came to power, Ennahda was confronted with the challenge of handling Salafi radicalism and violence. The revolutionary moment brought the ideological struggles between reformist Islamism and Salafism into the open. There were three contradictory views within the party over how to address the challenge of Salafism: engage with the Salafists, collaborate with the nonviolent adherents, or take a hardline stance against the radical wing of the movement. The first and dominant one is a centrist strategy that emphasized engagement and persuasion. Its proponents have contended that being hard-nosed on radical Salafists would be highly ineffective and would increase the likelihood of recruitment into violent extremist organizations. Ennahda saw this youth militancy as a passing phase. The new freedoms present a cathartic chance to release pent-up frustrations and anger. Once the youth realized the impracticality of their goals, they would temper their ardency. In a democratic Tunisia, he says, Salafists will be forced to initiate ideological revisions once their utopic experimentation hits a wall. Ghannouchi genuinely believes that in a free market of ideas, Salafists will see the wisdom of adopting a gradual and pragmatic approach to promoting Islamic values and morals. In one of his controversial remarks, he pleaded with young Salafists to adjust their tactics, proceed with caution, and most importantly appreciate how far they have come. If they overreached, he warned them, the freedoms they enjoy could be fleeting. As a cautionary tale, Ghannouchi used the Algerian tragedy of the s to show Salafists the dangers of moving too fast. Algerian Islamists misread the balance of power and tried to quickly dominate the political system, alarming secular parties, civil society organizations, and several intellectuals and media personalities. The Ennahda leader was trying to convince impatient Salafi preachers and leaders of Islamic associations to pick their battles carefully. Ghannouchi consistently denounced Salafi violence. In the dozen discussions Ghannouchi had with Salafists, he encouraged them to invest in peaceful social activism and follow the path of Jabhat al-Islah, the first Salafi experiment in politics. The recent jihadi returnees from Iraq and other theaters of conflict have not followed a similar trajectory. Veteran jihadists in the biggest and most notorious Salafi organization—Ansar al-Sharia—have, for example, refused to heed these calls. Complicating matters further for Ennahda is that the new Salafi parties that have renounced violence and are taking part in the political process have struggled to gain footing in traditional Salafi strongholds. For instance, Jabhat al-Islah, a party that was formed in , is unwaveringly committed to the application of sharia law, which offers the disenfranchised youth the promise of justice and equality for all under the law. The fact that the leadership of the new Salafi political parties is largely viewed as old and aloof made the case for participating in partisan politics all the more daunting. The preference was to dissuade radical Salafi factions from extremism and to possibly integrate them into Ennahda or other, already-existing Salafi parties. But in the end, Ghannouchi overestimated his ability to exercise moral influence on young Salafists and build a political consensus on how to deal with their challenge. Ghannouchi also misjudged the infectious influence that the jihadi returnees had on a new generation of Salafi activists who spent their culturally and ideologically formative years exposed to radical preaching from Saudi Arabia. The second strategy for dealing with the Salafi challenge is one of collaboration with nonviolent Salafists. The main proponents of this line are ultraconservative Islamist leaders who consider Ennahda and Salafists as part of the same Islamist family. It supports electoral and doctrinal alliances between Islamists and Salafists. While the spread of this new ideology did not fully supplant the established system of political Islam, a number of Islamists embraced Salafi beliefs and practices. He spent twenty years in captivity and has impeccable ideological credentials, earning him the respect of Salafists and the sympathy of political Islamists. He uses the threat of Salafi radicalization and violence to extract concessions from the state on the role of religion in society. Some within this camp would like to see the Salafization of Ennahda because this would unify the whole Islamist spectrum and marginalize those that advocate violence. The third strategy is the one preferred by the outgoing prime minister, Ali Laarayedh, who has advocated a hardline stance against radical Salafists. He has warned Ennahda that it needs to distance itself from Salafi groups. Laarayedh has argued that failure to stem the propagation of radical Salafism will threaten the political and electoral hegemony of his party, and might end up destroying the democratic transition. This confrontational strategy was in the minority in Ennahda, as many feared the return of the repressive state tactics of the past. After the security situation deteriorated, this position has become the official party policy. The government was initially reluctant to take on radical Salafists, and it had limited capacity to do so. Some criticized the engagement approach as a political ploy to appeal to Salafists to vote for Ennahda. Ennahda was forced to change strategy. Since then, more than 2, Salafis have been apprehended for direct or indirect involvement in violence. There is no generalizable solution to the Salafi challenge. Lumping all Salafist currents and young Tunisians who identify as jihadists into the basket of violent extremists and terrorists is a simplistic and dangerous approach. Branding a whole organization as a terrorist group might make good politics but not smart policy. There is a real danger that stigmatizing the tens of thousands of Ansar al-Sharia supporters as terrorists will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Isolated and under attack, the organization has nothing to lose now and might engage in terrorism to disrupt the political transition. Moreover, repressing Ansar al-Sharia will not solve the problem of Salafi jihadism in Tunisia. There is a plethora of small Salafi groups that act independently of Ansar al-Sharia or use its name to commit acts of violence. The key is determining how to differentiate between violent Salafists who are the real enemies of the state and nonviolent radicals who just reject the status quo. Many young Salafists have a visceral distrust of politics, feel disconnected from their local communities, and hate Western foreign policy. They present a social problem that needs to be kept separate from the terrorism threat posed by violent extremists that preach, incite, and use violence that require a security and judicial response. Disillusionment in post-revolution states is a hardy perennial. After the initial euphoria fizzles out, depression quickly sets in. This is the plight that Tunisia faces. The public policies and the grand bargains required to jump-start the transitional process have been difficult to reach because of the absence of basic trust and reciprocity between much of the secular opposition and Ennahda. The Ennahda-led government struggled to manage the radical strand of Salafism, and it paid a heavy political price for its failure. In the end, the violence of a small minority of radical Salafists threatened the political fortunes of Ennahda and the very survival of the democratic transition. Tunisians have grown frustrated with lurching from one political crisis to the next. They are dismayed by the performance of Ennahda in power; the party has failed to contain the Salafi threat, reduce regional economic imbalances, and implement transitional justice. Tunisians are also frustrated with the secular opposition, whose political opportunism does not elicit much confidence. It has also sapped public trust in the political transition. Increasing numbers of Tunisians now declare that they would trade democracy for political stability and security. In some quarters, there is even nostalgia for strongman rule. Despite these major challenges and setbacks, Tunisia has managed to limp along. The country has a fairly homogeneous, well-educated population, its army does not have a history of military coups, and its political Islamists are accommodationists—all positive signs for the transition. Both Islamists and their secular opponents know that they lack enough leverage and power to make their adversaries comply with their demands. The pragmatists in the secular opposition realize that they cannot force the Islamists out of power through popular street actions or a military coup as happened in Egypt. Ennahda is also aware that the alternative to making concessions is political chaos and civil strife. The longer the political impasse persists, the greater the risk that a major terrorist attack or high-profile assassination will doom the talks and drive the country into the unknown. This would be a devastating outcome for Tunisia and the whole region. Fear of this lose-lose scenario is what has so far kept the disputants at the table, negotiating a road map to the completion of the protracted transitional period. The incoming interim government needs to take distinct steps to move the country forward, including addressing the social exclusion and economic disenfranchisement of some communities that is breeding social unrest, criminality, and angry radicals. Raising the means necessary to finance the budget and launching targeted investments in the most restive and marginalized regions of the country are both necessary. Urgent government attention is also needed to expedite security sector reform in order to make the actors and institutions tasked with protecting the state and its citizens more professional, accountable, and legitimate. A top priority is to reorganize the Ministry of Interior and establish democratic oversight over its budget and practices. The internal security services and the justice sector also need restructuring and reform. The professionalization of these organizations is necessary to gain the trust of citizens and stem the deterioration of law and order. The United States and its European allies with direct interest in Tunisia can encourage these reforms in the security and economic sectors. On the domestic political front, hammering out the details of the final deal had been excruciatingly difficult, but the accord struck between Islamists and the secular opposition at the end of was a victory for pragmatism over divisive ideology and politics. Such threats of prosecution could also be heard in street protests against Ennahda. Fear led many in Ennahda to sometimes perceive their critics in the opposition as either belonging to or being manipulated by the old regime. The reality is that some were, but an appreciable number were genuinely concerned about the potential Islamization of the country. By underestimating its impact, the party allowed it to fester for too long. Ennahda, as Ghannouchi acknowledged in an interview with the Swiss daily Le Temps , should probably have tried much harder to include more secular parties in its government coalition. This observation was buttressed by a Crisis Group report on Salafism and violence. But the abrupt conversion raised several doubts that the new converts were using the Salafi identity to carve out a role of themselves in the informal economy and the lucrative trafficking of drugs and alcohol in peri-urban zones. The party scored its highest in urban areas, however. Dialogue With Islamists. The radical Pan-Islamist Hizb al-Tahrir was also integrated into the political process.

Buy weed Ettadhamen