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Pyongyang is economically crippled, and after the Pong Su incident, the world is keeping a close eye on North Korea's activities. Japan, a major target market.

Buy coke online in Pyongyang

Shimomura was a member of the Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest yakuza crime family in Japan. When one of his superiors asked him if he wanted to make a pile of fast money, he naturally said yes. It was May 14, , and Shimomura was living in the city of Nagoya. Thirty-two years old and skinny, with expressive eyes, he took pride in his appearance, often wearing a suit and mirror-shined loafers. But he was a minor figure in the organization: a collector of debts, a performer of odd jobs. The superior assured him that the scheme was low risk, and instructed him to attend a meeting that evening at a bar in Nagoya. Shimomura, who has since left the Yamaguchi-gumi, asked to be referred to only by his surname. When Shimomura showed up, he found three other gangsters, none of whom he knew. Like many yakuza, he is of Korean descent, and two of the others were also Korean-Japanese; for a while, they spoke in Korean. The superior finally arrived, and the five men moved into a private room. Each volunteer was given a plain white credit card. There was no chip on the card, no numbers, no name—just a magnetic strip. They could not use a regular bank A. The gangsters should each withdraw a hundred thousand yen at a time about nine hundred dollars but make no more than nineteen transactions per machine. If anybody made twenty withdrawals from a single A. Withdrawals could start at 5 a. The volunteers were told to choose the Japanese language when prompted—an indication, Shimomura realized, that the cards were foreign. After making nineteen withdrawals, they should wait an hour before visiting another 7-Eleven. They could keep ten per cent of the cash. The rest would go to the bosses. Finally, each volunteer was told to memorize a PIN. On Sunday morning, Shimomura rose early, and dressed in jeans, sunglasses, a baseball cap, and an old T-shirt. He walked to a 7-Eleven, where he bought a rice ball and a Coke, to settle himself. He inserted the card into the A. After making the first withdrawal, Shimomura printed a receipt. Around 8 a. Shimomura took his ten per cent—about thirty-five hundred dollars—and stashed it in a drawer in his apartment. Later, he discovered that one of the other gangsters had absconded with the money and the card. The superior told Shimomura that he would retain five per cent of what his volunteers brought in and send the rest of the cash to his bosses. When Shimomura handed over his money, he sensed that the superior had enlisted many others. He was right. As the newspapers soon reported, more than sixteen million dollars was withdrawn from roughly seventeen hundred 7-Eleven A. The newspapers surmised that 7-Elevens had been targeted because they were the only convenience stores in Japan whose cash terminals all accepted foreign cards. Soon after the raids, the withdrawal limit for many A. Shimomura deduced that he had been at the bottom of the food chain in the scam. The real money-makers were much higher up. What he did not know, until an interview with this magazine last year, was the identity of the villains at the top of the chain. Shortly after the A. In satellite images of East Asia at night, lights blare almost everywhere, except in one inky patch between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, and between the thirty-eighth and the forty-third parallels: North Korea. Only Pyongyang, the capital, emits a recognizably modern glow. The dark country is one of the last nominally Communist nations in the world—a Stalinist personality cult centered on Kim Jong Un , the peevish, ruthless scion of the dynasty that has ruled North Korea since , after the peninsula was divided. The D. Its borders are closed and its people sequestered. Foreigners find it profoundly difficult to understand what is happening inside North Korea, but it is even harder for ordinary North Korean citizens to learn about the outside world. A tiny fraction of one per cent of North Koreans has access to the Internet. At first glance, the situation is perverse, even comical—like Jamaica winning an Olympic gold in bobsledding—but the cyber threat from North Korea is real and growing. Like many countries, including the United States, North Korea has equipped its military with offensive and intelligence-gathering cyber weapons. North Korea, moreover, is the only nation in the world whose government is known to conduct nakedly criminal hacking for monetary gain. Units of its military-intelligence division, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, are trained specifically for this purpose. As a result, even seasoned observers sometimes disagree when attributing individual attacks to North Korea. Nevertheless, in , a United Nations panel of experts on sanctions against North Korea issued a report estimating that the country had raised two billion dollars through cybercrime. According to the U. The cybercrime spree has also been a cheap and effective way of circumventing the harsh sanctions that have long been imposed on the country. In February, John C. The first was a hack of Sony Pictures. Sony pressed ahead. That November, Sony employees reported that their computers had been hacked, by a group calling itself Guardians of Peace. For a few days, Sony Pictures operated without an electronic network, and in subsequent weeks the hackers leaked embarrassing—and, in some cases, damaging—e-mails, salaries, medical records, movies, and screenplays belonging to the company and its employees. The F. If the attack on Sony had a cartoonish quality, the second major North Korean attack was like a caper. Accounts linked to the Lazarus Group sent e-mails to an array of targets at Bangladesh Bank and other financial institutions in Dhaka. The messages contained a link to malware that, if clicked, granted the North Koreans access to internal computer systems. Like many national banks in developing countries, Bangladesh Bank holds a foreign-currency account with the Federal Reserve bank in New York. On February 4, , the Federal Reserve received instructions from Bangladesh Bank to make dozens of payments, totalling nearly a billion dollars, to various accounts, including one in Sri Lanka and four in the Philippines. The requests were made via the swift network—a global conduit for money transfers, based near Brussels. In their fraudulent messages to the Federal Reserve, the Lazarus members had incorporated many details from genuine, previously executed SWIFT transfers, so that it would not be obvious their own requests were bogus. To further cover their tracks, the hackers had installed a network update that blocked SWIFT messages from being read at Bangladesh Bank—a piece of legerdemain that later impressed security experts. The Federal Reserve granted the first five payment requests, a total of a hundred and one million dollars. The next thirty payments, which amounted to eight hundred and fifty million dollars, stalled only because of a stroke of luck. This alert was tripped because an unrelated business, Jupiter Seaways Shipping, in Athens, was on a sanctions-evasion watch list for its activities relating to Iran. After this and another small irregularity were detected, freeze requests were placed on the recipient accounts. By that time, some eighty-one million dollars had been transferred into a different account. Most of this money was then withdrawn, converted into cash as Philippine pesos, and exchanged for casino chips. At the time, gambling establishments in the Philippines were exempt from anti-money-laundering regulations. A ransomware scheme known as Wannacry 2. The hackers encrypted computer after computer, then demanded payment, in bitcoin, to unfreeze the systems. North Koreans tailored some ransomware code and then propagated it from one device to the next by appropriating a dangerous piece of American code, known as EternalBlue, that a criminal group calling itself the Shadow Brokers had stolen from the N. After Hutchins realized that he had upended the hack, Wired reported , he went upstairs to tell his family. His mother, a nurse, was chopping onions. The North Korean regime has long been considered a fundamentally criminal enterprise. Joseph Bermudez, Jr. Since the birth of the D. In the seventies, North Korean diplomats who were posted abroad often trafficked narcotics. Treasury redesigned its hundred-dollar bill with extra security features. Then he witnessed the Bangladesh heist—a striking leap in sophistication. Priscilla Moriuchi, the Harvard analyst, told me that, in retrospect, the D. It connects criminal organizations and smugglers with one another. We discussed the Japanese A. Shimomura may not have known his ultimate boss, but the yakuza had been smuggling illegal products out of North Korea for decades. So, if cyber scammers in Pyongyang needed boots on the ground to withdraw cash in Nagoya, they could make a request, and it would soon be answered. Moriuchi also noted that, although the North Korean hackers were technically accomplished, their more important attribute was a felonious savoir-faire. In the Bangladesh Bank case, the robbers waited seventeen months after their first reconnaissance in Dhaka before they pulled off the heist. They had determined the ideal weekend and holiday to strike; they had planned how to move cash quickly out of recipient banks; and they had chosen institutions that had particularly lax know-your-customer protocols. Once they executed the theft, they used local contractors in the Philippines to launder their pesos, effectively hiding the money trail. Their success was predicated on knowing not only how computers work but how people do. In most countries, hackers develop their skills by experimenting on computers at home when they are teen-agers. Marcus Hutchins, who dismantled Wannacry, was one such high-school recluse. Few families own computers, and the state jealously guards Internet access. The process by which North Korean hackers are spotted and trained appears to be similar to the way Olympians were once cultivated in the former Soviet bloc. Martyn Williams, a fellow at the Stimson Center think tank who studies North Korea, explained that, whereas conventional warfare requires the expensive and onerous development of weaponry, a hacking program needs only intelligent people. The most promising students are encouraged to use computers at schools. Those who excel at mathematics are placed at specialized high schools. The best students can travel abroad, to compete in such events as the International Mathematical Olympiad. Many winners of the Fields Medal, the celebrated prize in mathematics, placed highly in the contest when they were teen-agers. Students from North Korea often perform impressively at the I. It is also the only country to have been disqualified for suspected cheating: the D. At the I. Two colleges in Pyongyang, Kim Chaek University of Technology and Kim Il Sung University, vacuum up the most talented teen-agers from the specialized math and computer high schools and then teach them advanced code. These institutions often outperform American and Chinese colleges in the International Collegiate Programming Contest—a festival of unsurpassed and joyful nerdery. Huawei sponsored the finals. Contestants, Oncescu said, have gone on to do impressive coding work. He mentioned Nikolai Durov, a member of the championship-winning St. Petersburg State University teams of and , who subsequently co-founded the Russian social-media apps VK and Telegram. Oncescu added that the North Koreans had stayed in the same hotel as the other contestants in Porto. He said that, although the competitions tested coding fluency, the true test was of a more general problem-solving capability. It often came down to pure math. Students working in teams of three were asked to create code that provided a solution to an abstract puzzle, but only one team member at a time wrote the code. The coding challenges at the I. Unfortunately, while walking home, you dropped all of your papers into a puddle! Much of what you wrote is now unreadable; all you have left are some lists of moves played in the middle of various games. Is there some way you can reconstruct what happened in those games? Oncescu said that, to win the competition, you had to work fast, collaboratively, and creatively. The Korea University paper featured an analysis of how hackers were divided within these silos. Most of the criminal work is performed by the Reconnaissance General Bureau. According to the Korea University researchers, a section of the R. Moriuchi, the Harvard fellow, has spent years tracking the metadata of North Korean Internet users. At any moment, as few as a couple of hundred I. These foreign units were, in essence, both profit generators and training grounds. Recently, an American analyst showed me the digital footprint of a cell that, he ascertained, consisted of North Koreans working in the border town of Dandong, China. Communicating through the e-mail address bravemaster hotmail. Wanna add some features or customize the design of your existing system? Wanna improve your site to the next level? Hold my seasoned development skills! He had worked in a trading business owned by the D. Lee told me that he once visited a so-called hacker dorm in Dalian. The men there lived four to a room—sometimes six. A Chinese intermediary sold their products. Lee suggested that, though this coding work was mundane, the North Koreans he met rarely wanted to be promoted—because a promotion would mean returning to Pyongyang. This anecdotal evidence was buttressed by another defector, who runs a South Korea-based clandestine radio network whose broadcast signal penetrated North Korea. He told me that he was familiar with the D. An American investigator of sanction breaches, who works at a prominent N. Most likely, these operatives used foreign V. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, no financial institution in Russia or China has been targeted by North Korean hackers. Recently, I spoke to Simon Choi, a security-intelligence analyst who lives in Seoul. In , while performing mandatory military service, he learned about North Korea waging a cyberattack on the South Korean Army—an unsuccessful attempt by the Reconnaissance General Bureau to deploy malware in order to steal highly classified weapons secrets. Choi became fascinated with the threat posed by North Korean hackers. After completing his military service, Choi took a job in online security. He also began to organize a team of volunteers in South Korea, called the IssueMakers Lab, which pores over malware attributed to the North Koreans, in order to understand it better. The group now numbers ten people, and includes men and women. Although the members are amateurs, not spies, their assessments are considered to be rigorous and acute. In his day job, Choi trawls the dark Web, investigating drug deals and other crimes on behalf of law-enforcement agencies; after hours, he thinks about hackers in Pyongyang. Choi told me that about eleven hundred North Koreans have written malicious scripts. He showed me some malware code, written in , that had been designed to cover the tracks of a North Korean bank heist. The malware consisted of rows of seemingly random letters and numbers flowing down a page, in pairs. Choi could fluently and sensitively parse all this. Chinese and American coders were the best in the world, he said, but Russians and North Koreans were tied for second. Sometimes, he explained, coders embedded signatures or initials into their scripts. It was a form of tagging, or maybe even bragging. He had occasionally noticed the initials of former International Math Olympiad competitors in malware that he examined. Once, when examining code related to a spear-phishing attempt on I. Later, Ryu posted this tag on a hacking Web site, seemingly confirming the link. Choi was circumspect about attributing coding tags to real-life people: who could know for sure which person was behind which persona? The North Koreans could well have swapped identities. He felt confident, though, that he had never examined code written by a North Korean woman. I laughed when he told me this. How could he possibly know? North Korea, he said, remained a traditional, male-dominated society, and it was extremely unlikely that the Reconnaissance General Bureau would train women for such work. I wondered whether he had ever felt as if he understood these coders as people. The Internet, to abuse John Donne, makes one little room an everywhere. In November, , a programmer in Santiago, Chile, was recruited for a high-level position at a foreign firm. The programmer, who worked at Redbanc, a network that connects all the A. The position was lucrative and part time: the programmer could supplement his income without impinging on his work for Redbanc. The Redbanc programmer was directed to a private e-mail address for Stuart-Young. The courtship progressed to a video interview, in which Stuart-Young interviewed the programmer in Spanish. He did as instructed, but he never heard from Stuart-Young again. The Redbanc programmer has since resigned, and the company would not identify him. While the programmer and Stuart-Young were corresponding, a cybersecurity professional named Juan Roa Salinas started in a new role at Redbanc. There were unusual connections to Internet domain names that he would not have expected to see on the network. Among other clues, a Redbanc terminal had inexplicably looked up an I. Roa, judging that the threat was severe, recommended that Redbanc shut off its Internet for a week. An internal inquiry after the shutdown revealed that the company had indeed been in the middle of an attempted FASTCash breach. Such assaults normally take several months to execute. When I spoke to the real Stuart-Young recently, it was the first time he had heard of the Chile attack, and of his identity being stolen. By the time Roa noticed the intrusion, the hackers had not yet achieved this objective. The next stage of the operation would have been to gain control of the mainframe at Redbanc, and then to initiate the FASTCash attack itself, which would use malware to conceal fraudulent withdrawal requests made at A. Roa purged the hackers from the Redbanc network before they could overtake the mainframe. After the attempted raid, Redbanc did what many companies subjected to such threats do: it kept quiet and improved its security. The FASTCash attack at Redbanc became public only because Felipe Harboe, then a Chilean senator, heard about it at a meeting of security experts and decided to tweet the news. There had been other A. Many ransomware operations started like the one at Redbanc, relying on a single weak point of entry. In a single breach in , money was simultaneously withdrawn from A. Priscilla Moriuchi believes that in the past two years the aesthetic of North Korean cybercriminals has become subtler. A report published in March by the U. But the most reliable money-maker for North Korea has become the theft of cryptocurrency. Real-sounding people propose real-sounding schemes, then persuade a network user at a targeted company to download an infected document. If hackers can compromise a sufficiently senior figure, they can reach the wallet and steal its coins. Give them back to me. Robinson said that one of the most successful fake personas used by the Lazarus Group was Waliy Darwish—a man who supposedly worked for a cryptocurrency company, based in Michigan, called Celas L. The Lazarus Group invented both Darwish and Celas. LinkedIn profiles and other pages related to the persona and to the company are still active. In the spring of , the Darwish-Celas mirage was convincing enough to bait employees of a cryptocurrency exchange in Hong Kong into downloading infected software. An investigation into this operation continues, and investigators believe that confirming the identity of the exchange might damage an ongoing inquiry. The coins, then worth around ninety-four million dollars, would now be worth more than half a billion dollars. The money-laundering patterns that typically follow such raids are dizzying. Elliptic has traced what happened to the coins from the Hong Kong-exchange hack. Robinson explained that all the stolen coins were forwarded to a wallet maintained by the hackers, then split into dozens of small amounts and sent, through different routes, to another exchange. A peel chain is designed to outwit automatic alerts, which search for the transit of a precise volume of cryptocurrency. The stolen coins were sent to two Chinese men, Tian Yinyin and Li Jiadong, who had opened accounts on other exchanges, including one in the U. They then cashed out the coins and transferred the money to Chinese banks. Treasury, several financial institutions in China offer accounts to North Koreans, or to front companies that have relationships with Pyongyang. They remain at large. In , the U. One exchange in Seoul, Bithumb, was successfully raided four times—a tremendous failure of security. Since the U. According to Jesse Spiro, of Chainalysis, fifteen cryptocurrency heists have been reported so far this year. It is too early to say how many will be attributed to North Korea. Spiro noted that the authorities were increasingly on the lookout for such schemes. But new obfuscation techniques have emerged. Professional money launderers offer such services as CoinJoin, which mixes stolen and non-stolen coins to confuse forensic analysts. If one compared the industry and the manpower that went into planning and executing the Bangladesh heist with the almost casual way in which digital tokens are often stolen, it would be evident why the North Koreans have come to favor such exchange heists. Spiro told me that private forensics firms and law-enforcement agencies were finally addressing the problem with the seriousness it deserved. Understanding how to track cryptocurrency is an increasingly important skill, not least because North Korean hackers, and members of many criminal gangs, accept ransomware payments in digital currency. Between and , according to Chainalysis , ransomware incidents rose by more than three hundred per cent. Even if other laundering techniques become well known and stolen coins could be readily flagged, the key to making such heists unprofitable is to stop thieves from cashing out. This is unlikely anytime soon, Spiro said, because of the lax practices of certain Chinese, Eastern European, and Southeast Asian exchanges. What good will such statements do? The U. At the time, some security experts doubted that North Korea was capable of such an attack. Something like the Sony hack—that was an attack on a company. Several government agencies—including the F. Griffith had travelled to Pyongyang in to give a speech at a cryptocurrency conference. The unsealed indictments are a boon to journalists and researchers, but the chances of any North Korean hacker being prosecuted successfully are vanishingly slim. There is, however, a growing recognition in America of the threat presented by cybercriminals. President Joe Biden has secured ten billion dollars for federal agencies dealing with the issue of cybercrime. A government adviser told me that one major remedy being considered is the establishment of new protocols that will allow agencies to work much more closely with private security companies, which often perform the best cybercrime forensic work. The national-security threat posed by North Korean hackers is less obvious than the one posed by Russian hackers, who have notoriously interfered in U. He told me that North Korea presented unique difficulties for law-enforcement agencies, not only because its criminal activity was mixed up with its intelligence-gathering capabilities but also because its gangsterism now interferes with crucial networks in other countries, such as health-care operations. They also seem like victims. Costin-Andrei Oncescu, the Oxford programmer, was saddened to think of brilliant young North Korean minds being wasted in schemes to rob banks and install ransomware. But it is almost impossible to learn the stories of people from the program. Ri Jong Yol was a mathematics prodigy. He was born into an academic family outside Pyongyang in By the time he entered first grade, at the age of seven, he had been studying daily with a private tutor, and had already mastered the entire elementary-school syllabus. In middle school, he entered and won a national mathematics competition, and he was selected to attend a high school for gifted children. Ri was a tall, gregarious, good-looking boy who liked playing volleyball and Ping-Pong. Unlike his teammates at the I. He saw foreign teen-agers accessing the Internet in their spare time and wondered if he might give it a try. He had never been online. In the end, Ri did not submit to temptation. He knew that he would be severely punished if he was caught. Ri won a silver medal at his first I. He won silver medals at both events. Ri remembers how happy he was seeing other contestants who returned year after year. After he returned from the I. He instantly knew what was about to happen: the state would harness his talent for numbers by giving him a job as a hacker, or as a functionary in the nuclear program. The prospect filled him with dread. Working in the most guarded sections of the military meant that you were cut off from society. He would have no freedom whatsoever. He also realized that if he were instructed to join such an agency he could not refuse. Ri knew that he could compete in the I. The North Korean mathletes were not heavily supervised at the competition, and Ri was on friendly terms with the teachers who accompanied the team. After winning another silver medal, Ri took his chance. He walked out of the dorm where he was staying and hailed a cab to the airport, where—with the help of a friendly airline worker—he found the address of the South Korean consulate. He took another taxi there and told a South Korean diplomat that he wished to defect. He then spent seventy days in Hong Kong, waiting nervously while the South Korean delegation negotiated his safe passage to Seoul. Ri is now twenty-three and goes by a South Korean name. He is studying mathematics at Seoul National University. He has not seen his parents since he defected. In a recent conversation, he told me that he had developed his escape plan without any outside help, but he may have been protecting his loved ones. In North Korea, the families of defectors often meet grim fates. Ri said that he had no regrets about leaving his native country. Since his escape, he has considered how his talent would have been squandered had he stayed in Pyongyang. In Seoul, he saw only possibilities. He told me, with excitement, that he was hoping to spend a year in the United States, on an exchange program. One of the first things that Ri did after he landed in South Korea in was go online. With the help of a mentor, he set up a Gmail account. The mentor then encouraged him to make his first Google search. He was momentarily at a loss. But now, with the world seemingly at his fingertips, he felt overwhelmed by choice. There was so much to know. An early printing of this story misstated the approximate latitude of the border between North and South Korea. An earlier version misstated the name of the think tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Save this story Save this story. Cartoon by Benjamin Schwartz. Copy link to cartoon Copy link to cartoon. Link copied. Cartoon by Barbara Smaller. Cartoon by Frank Cotham. Cartoon by Suerynn Lee. Cartoon by Lars Kenseth. Ed Caesar is a contributing staff writer to The New Yorker. The Political Scene. Among the Gaza Protest Voters. Will their tactics persuade her, or risk throwing the election to Trump? By Andrew Marantz. Letter from Pennsylvania. By Eyal Press. News Desk. The Pursuit of Gender Justice. For the first time, the International Criminal Court has concluded that an armed group specifically targeted women. By Jina Moore Ngarambe. Three months ago, the Vice-President was fighting for respect in Washington. Can she defy her doubters—and end the Trump era? By Evan Osnos. Is It Time to Torch the Constitution? By Louis Menand. The Lede. The A. Tammy Kim. A Reporter at Large. Four daughters in the royal family were kept drugged and imprisoned for almost two decades. A physician who tried to free them speaks out for the first time. By Heidi Blake. At first, scientists just wanted to figure out the best way to kill these pests. Then they decided that studying rat society could reveal the future of our own. By Elizabeth Kolbert. The Weekend Essay. The immensely popular crowdsourced recipe site has an aura of shambolic good will, something between a church cookbook and a fan-run Wiki. By Ruby Tandoh. Don Luigi Ciotti leads an anti-Mafia organization, and for decades he has run a secret operation that liberates women from the criminal underworld. Treating political violence as a contagion could help safeguard the future of American democracy. By Michael Luo. The Pain of Travelling While Palestinian. This year, I learned the difference between a traveller and a refugee. By Mosab Abu Toha.

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