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Download the PDF. Photo by Alaa Al-Marjani, Reuters. Future large-scale combat operations in urban areas will be similar to the operation to liberate Mosul from the Islamic State. Four key aspects of the battle foreshadow the most likely future of urban warfare for the U. Army: corps-sized formations conducting multi-domain operations as a coalition force in dense urban environments DUEs. In conjunction with the four key aspects noted above, analysis of the battle for Mosul further reveals five observations that should guide the operational approach to the next urban fight: 1 it is impossible to isolate a modern city, 2 difficulty increases with depth and duration, 3 attackers lose the initiative once they enter the city, 4 dense urban terrain enhances sustainment, and 5 operational reach is proportional to population support. The U. Departing from the brigade-centric operations of the past decade, the Army will require division and corps headquarters to conduct more tactical action in close combat operations. Army did participate in LSCO by supporting the continuum of activities described in FM for a coalition corps of more than one hundred thousand soldiers. Figure 1 depicts how dense urban terrain and the characteristics of its associated population come together to form DUEs. Figure 1. Urban terrain is both universal and unique in warfare. Historically, societies, cities, and warfare evolved together. Coupling global urbanization with historical realities, U. Every type of terrain has its favorable and unfavorable characteristics, but a city is the only severely restricted terrain with the population and infrastructure to both sustain and shield a large army. A town may have thousands of people and hundreds of concrete structures packed along narrow roads, but small urban areas are easily overrun or isolated and have only small surpluses or stocks to sustain military operations. Simply put, size matters. Some urban areas are just not rich or large enough to be attractive military objectives. As Mosul illustrates, cities can serve as both the ends and the means for a military strategy while the operational ways in DUEs remain offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Several intuitive operational lessons leap out from media accounts of the battle. First, Mosul demonstrates that DUEs can be advantageous to either the attacker, the defender, or both, depending on who recognizes and best exploits the city through their operational approach and tactics. Photo by Staff Sgt. Alex Manne, U. Moving beyond media reports, a serious study of the battle reveals five counterintuitive or surprising operational lessons that should shape and inform future LSCO in DUEs:. The remainder of this article discusses these lessons and ways commanders can incorporate them into future campaign designs. Each subsection begins with a description of the phenomenon as observed in Mosul. Next, historical observations are provided to support the argument. Lesson 1: It is impossible to isolate a modern city. Scale, mobility, and the ubiquitous cyber domain preclude tactical isolation. Additionally, ubiquitous communications technology and media coverage make isolation equally daunting—if not impossible. Even though a modern military can jam all communications, how would the United States strategically prevent journalism or word-of-mouth information sharing? One hundred thousand soldiers encircled—but did not isolate—IS in Mosul. Buildings and rubble limited observation and cross-country movement and created irregular lines of contact. Siege, blockade, and relief therefrom have been tenets of warfare throughout history. In modern LSCO, siege and blockades are less successful at the operational level of war as ground combat has integrated other joint and government efforts. In World War II, the Soviet army sustained their forces in Stalingrad for three months using riverine operations; later, the German army used a meager air bridge to sustain trapped forces in the same city for almost as long. Enlarge the figure. In , Russian mechanized divisions chose not to isolate Grozny, a sq km city of three hundred thousand people. Russian columns successfully penetrated the city but failed to decisively destroy the defending Chechen fighters due to the difficulty of employing mechanized weapons systems across the DUE and failing to plan for the depth and duration of the Chechen defense. Have realistic expectations for encirclement missions in DUEs. Encircling a large city will consume a large amount of combat power; recent urban battles demonstrate that complete isolation requires a unified JIIM effort and is harder than ever to achieve. If the enemy is the objective, then allowing the defender a LOC from their city gives the attacker the option to fight field battles near the LOC instead of inside the DUE. As each assault becomes more difficult, tactical commanders will demand more fires to reduce or destroy strongpoints regardless of collateral damage. Commanders may be able to accept tactical and even operational encirclement if they are confident that they have enough depth to resist until relieved. Defending forces who plan for encirclement can stock critical supplies, prepare the terrain, and use infiltration to smuggle supplies, personnel, and information to prolong the defense. Lesson 2: On the offensive, difficulty increases with duration and depth. As a campaign advances, progress becomes more difficult for the attacker. The Battle for Mosul began on 16 October with an expectation that the fighting would take three months. Despite the declaration, fighting in isolated pockets—predicted to last three days—continued for another two weeks. At the beginning of the battle, coalition ground forces were 40 km from the al-Nuri Mosque. Within a week, the coalition halved that distance to 20 km. After two more weeks, distance reduced to 10 km with the trend continuing in a negative logarithmic curve. Figure 2 shows the distance from the al-Nuri Mosque to the coalition front line of troops over time. As the coalition fought deeper into Mosul, the rate of gains decelerated from kilometers per day at the outset to single-digit meters per day by the end of the operation. Figure 2. Rapid geographic progress in the opening attack often leads to false confidence. Planning during the German siege of Stalingrad suffered from the same phenomenon. Rapid progress in the first two weeks of the attack penetrated the Soviet suburban perimeter and threatened to destroy two corps. Marines fighting to liberate Seoul in had a similar experience. It took the Marines two days to reach the edge of Seoul, one hundred miles from Incheon. The next day, the Marines crossed the Han River and advanced four more miles, but as the terrain grew hillier and enemy resistance increased, the pace slowed to one mile per day for four days. Although the Marines successfully captured the city, they did not accomplish their secondary objective of trapping all North Korean units south of Seoul because planners did not account for the increase in difficulty as operations advanced. Allocate the greatest share of resources for the most difficult phases of the operation. This can be accomplished by rotating units away from the front, by generating a fresh unit in time for the final assault, or by preserving combat power by holding elite units in the reserve. The last option may seem counterintuitive, but it would allow the commander to develop the situation, then commit the reserve later when the enemy is weaker. Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service surgeon Lt. Hayder al-Sudani treats a girl at a processing station for internally displaced people 3 March near Mosul, Iraq. Lesson 3: Attackers lose the initiative as soon as they enter the city. Historically, the attacking commander has the operational initiative for the preponderance of a LSCO campaign. The strategic decision to initiate hostilities is usually associated with the ability to commit forces superior to the defending military. If defeated in the field, the defender may retreat to a large city to use its DUE to preserve force, extend operational reach, and gain the tactical initiative. Once the attacker invests a city, the siege continues until it culminates in a successful assault or the siege is defeated. In May , IS defeated the first coalition operation to liberate Mosul with a spoiling attack that seized Ramadi. In October , the Iraqi prime minister announced the operation to liberate Mosul. IS integrated obstacles and employed novel combinations of military hardware and civilian equipment to contest coalition land operations from multiple domains. IS retained the operational initiative by varying resistance by sector to control the tempo of the battle, massing fires to culminate specific coalition units, and adapting sustainment basing as the operation progressed. By December, the coalition culminated, and IS decided not to retrograde from Mosul. Instead, they allowed the encirclement of ten thousand personnel with a new goal to attrit so many Iraqi soldiers that the coalition would lose its will to continue the campaign. During the operational pause, the coalition consolidated gains, prepared to resume the offensive, and then successfully seized eastern Mosul. IS prevented the coalition from projecting force across the Tigris River, which forced the coalition to repeat the operational approach in western Mosul. DUE combat has defeated many excellent field armies. In , German Army Group B seized Stalingrad but at the cost of its operational armored capability, without which it was unable to counterattack or break out from Soviet Operation Uranus. Superior fires, mobility, and sustainment capabilities might have helped Russia retain the initiative in a field campaign. Attackers can retain the initiative by synchronizing operations to seize essential objectives. The IDF had permissive rules of engagement and sufficient time to develop each tactical strike and raid, and the Israeli army intentionally kept the siege frontage broad in order to spread PLO defensive forces across a wide array of tactical objectives. Maintain the initiative to avoid general combat along a linear front. At the tactical level of war, DUEs can equalize combat capabilities as two forces fight in close proximity, with limited line of sight, in a hardened area dense with civilian presence. There is a tendency in LSCO in a DUE for combat to settle into an impasse along a linear front, especially if strategic objectives limit the time available to prepare for the operation. Linear contiguous fronts may seem unavoidable in DUEs as attackers maneuver to encircle and sever exterior lines of communication, while defenders establish positions to secure interior lines. Lesson 4: Dense urban terrain enhances sustainment. Cities both complement and supplement military sustainment. There is a myth that urban terrain favors the defender—that logic does not apply to any other type of terrain and should not be accepted about DUEs. Uniquely, DUEs are the only severely restricted terrain that offers complements and substitutes to enhance sustainment. Even then, IS paid and coerced civilians to harvest the city for all classes of supply to sustain a robust defense for four more months. Soldiers occupied buildings instead of tents, and sustainment infrastructure moved into the city and was distributed to smaller and more numerous tactical support areas only a few blocks from the front lines. Combat power was allocated to restoring essential services in newly liberated neighborhoods, while hospitals served as a substitute for external refugee camps. Defenders are able to benefit from DUEs over a longer period of time before combat degrades sustainment opportunities. Mosul, Beirut, and Grozny fit the pattern for LSCO in a DUE where defenders employ intact terrain to sustain a delay operation, causing attackers to employ massed firepower in an attempt to attrit the defenders, increase tempo, and regain the initiative. As a result, attackers usually seize damaged terrain that is less valuable to their operational efforts than it was to its previous defenders. The Germans, however, did not—or could not—use the same infrastructure when they were later besieged. Defenders usually have an internal mobility advantage in DUEs due to road infrastructure, but attackers do not gain an equal advantage as they seize terrain because the fighting often degrades the trafficability of captured roads. Integrate DUEs sustainment assets into the operational approach. All terrain confers military advantages and disadvantages, but DUEs are unique in their ability to sustain combat power. In their operation in Beirut, the Israeli army appreciated this fact and carefully avoided combat in areas that could offer military value later in the operation. Sustainers should also anticipate that DUEs tend to disaggregate forces more than other terrain and may require a different distribution plan. Photo by Pfc. Anthony Zendejas IV, U. Lesson 5: Operational reach is proportional to population support. Local people can concretely assist, or hinder, the employment of combat power. In , IS seized Mosul and large portions of Iraq using a small military force enabled by population support. Sympathetic individuals, Baath-affiliated groups, and captured government facilities provided information, sustainment, and even combat power to allow the IS attack to seize and then consolidate gains further and faster than anyone anticipated. Intelligence came from civilian human and open-source intelligence analysis. Civilians dug communications tunnels and trenches, drove bulldozers to build berms, and served as mobile protection platforms to deter coalition strikes. Civilian households distributed all classes of supply to small units and provided medical support, and civilian labor manufactured weapons including precision UAS-IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs, and suicide vest IEDs from commercial off-the-shelf components. On the opposite side, the same civilian population did comparatively little to enhance coalition operations. Once liberated by the legitimate government, civilians escaped to safety and the coalition expended resources and combat power to secure and sustain the civilians: soldiers distributed supplies, provided medical care, and constructed shelters, adding to a net reduction in coalition operational reach. Historically, DUE defenders extract physical support from urban populations, while the task of rebuilding the city and restoring its society falls to the attacker. Irregular militaries go to great lengths to maintain control of this captive labor market because they rely on civilian population support to provide combat forces with additional capabilities and operational reach. Invest resources to mobilize and extract concrete support from the population. In a friendly country—perhaps, the defense of a NATO partner—an operational approach could contract civilian labor, recruit local volunteers as human intelligence sources along LOCs to enhance rear area security, and augment humanitarian assistance for displaced people. Active population participation may prove decisive by improving cohesion, legitimacy, and the likelihood of sustaining the defense long enough for strategic relief. Militaries that choose not to incorporate population support into their operational design leave locals idle and risk their adversary discovering a way to harness the latent population support. Instead of adjusting operational approaches to a city, commanders should incorporate elements of that city into their operational approach with the goal of retaining the initiative and extending operational reach while preserving combat power late into the decisive phase of the battle. Commanders can tailor the degree of isolation required, fight for select objectives to control the tempo and location of ground combat, and avoid the high attrition and material cost that historically characterize LSCO in DUEs. Thomas D. Arnold, U. Army, is a strategist assigned to the U. European Command as a joint plans officer. Nicolas Fiore, U. He holds a BS from the U. Back to Top. An official website of the United States government Here's how you know. Official websites use. Department of Defense organization in the United States. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. Skip to main content Press Enter. Toggle navigation. Army Maj. Army Download the PDF.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham Captures Mosul and Advances toward Baghdad

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Enemy groups are moving south toward Baghdad on June 10, These groups have set conditions for a Baghdad offensive since January. The Iraqi Security Forces have one rally point north of Baghdad. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has asked retreating, dissolving ISF to rally at Taji, where he has a receiving force — but even if they do rally there, the ISF will fall behind the Samarra line that the Iraqi government has hitherto defended. ISIS reportedly freed some 3, prisoners in Mosul and overran key military installations once housing U. Additional reports indicate that checkpoints and outlying areas surrounding Tikrit have begun to fall to ISIS. The ISIS northern campaign is therefore proceeding systematically along a north-south avenue of advance toward Baghdad. A map of the offensive on June 10 can be found here. ISIS is also on the offensive elsewhere in northern Iraq. The complexity and simultaneity of the campaign indicate that the central ISIS military command has designed a major offensive to overwhelm Iraqi Security Forces by seizing control in multiple areas simultaneously. In addition to the southern advance from Mosul, ISIS has also launched offensives to take control of cities in Kirkuk province. These cities include Hawija, Riyad, and Zab in western Kirkuk. Offensives to take these cities were possibly launched by the same ISIS military element responsible for the Mosul attacks. This military force falls along western avenues of approach for foreign fighters and resources across the Jazeera desert from northern Syria, as well as at a hub of domestic financial flows from Mosul and Baaji. ISIS military elements there have likely been gathering strength for nine months or more. The ISIS system in this vicinity extends south in two directions, one to Udhaim, just north of the Khalis corridor which is close to Baghdad, and one through the mountain pass behind Lake Hamrin in northern Diyala. This corridor extends through the Diyala River Valley and on to the provincial capital at Baquba. The ISF posture has also been affected by its units repositioning to Anbar since January of this year. This is quite far south, and effectively cedes Tikrit and Samarra to the enemy. ISIS has multiple avenues of advance into Baghdad that are already behind this defensive line. If ISF seeks to surge forces from Baghdad in order to clear quadrants of the Baghdad belts and harden the line protecting Baghdad, it will face a difficult task of handling an enemy that has effectively encircled the capital. If Maliki draws forces from those locations to defend Baghdad, he will risk being defeated in detail. ISIS attacked Mosul now because it could. A professional military organization launches an offensive when the conditions have been set. ISIS has set conditions for this operation for more than a year, has had the initiative for months, and has achieved offensive momentum throughout Iraq. JRTN has portrayed its role as active in the current campaign even though ISIS has taken the lead in launching anti-ISF operations and was the main force to take control of Mosul and the other fallen areas. Notably, JRTN seeks to portray itself as only attacking the ISF and not civilians in order to ensure that it does not alienate the population. Moreover, JRTN has continued to portray its activities as part of a tribal anti-government uprising. Tension between the two groups continued including May 31 clashes that took place in Salah ad-Din. The Iraqi Security Forces have fractured in the northern provinces. The safe haven in ar-Raqqa, Syria is a training ground for foreign fighters, some of whom have returned to the west. ISIS will likely adopt Mosul as its capital. Iraq's security forces will not be able to retake all of the ground they have lost. They may not even be able to hold what they still have. The best-case scenario is a stalemate in which Iraqis manage to contain the ISIS state and army for now. The more likely case is the creation of another Syrian-style conflict pitting ISIS with increasing international support against desperate and increasingly brutal Iraqi Shi'a militias and ISF elements. The two civil wars, which have now completely merged, will continue to expand, destabilizing an already unstable Middle East and inviting further intervention by the Sunni Arab states and Iran. In the very worst case, the fall of Mosul could be a step down the path to outright regional war. It is likely to result in the meaningful creation of an al-Qaeda state straddling the Iraq-Syria border and erasing that border , giving al-Qaeda a secure base of operations such as it has not had since the fall of the Taliban. Skip to main content. Iraq Project.

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