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Balikpapan

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After capturing mostly-destroyed oilfields at Tarakan , Japanese forces send an ultimatum to the Dutch that they would be executed if they destroyed the oilfields there, to no avail. After destroying the oilfields, Dutch forces retreated inland, taking up positions in and around Samarinda II Airfield, while the Japanese landed and seized the also-destroyed refineries. Shortly thereafter, an American naval task force ambushed the invasion convoy and sank multiple transport ships, but they ultimately failed to stop Japan from swiftly occupying Balikpapan. Before the war, Balikpapan was a crucial center for Dutch economic enterprises in Borneo. Within the city were two crude oil processing plants, a paraffin and lube oil plant, a cracking plant, a sulfuric acid plant and a precious petroleum refining plant, a tin and drum factory and several workshops. As the Dutch contemplated the possibility of a Japanese military aggression, they began to bolster defenses to protect the facilities. In , a detachment of six infantry brigades was stationed to defend the oilfields of Balikpapan, as well as that of Semboja and Sanga Sanga supported by three additional brigades from Samarinda. Just as the detachment at Tarakan, troops from Java would reinforce the Balikpapan detachment if a threatening situation occurred. In , a battalion staff and two companies were sent to strengthen Balikpapan's defenses, as tensions in the Pacific were rising at the time. After four months, the reinforcement returned to Java. Afterwards, the detachment at Balikpapan was reduced to a single infantry battalion. In Japan's plan to conquer the Dutch East Indies, Balikpapan held both strategic and tactical significance as a target. Strategically, its oil refinery was vital for Japan's own petroleum production; by occupying it, Japan could have direct access to the large oilfields in Borneo's interior. Tactically, the city also possessed both a harbor and an airfield Manggar that would be critical for Japan's occupation of southern Borneo and the capture of Java itself. Commander: Rear. Shoji Nishimura. Harusame , Samidare , Yudachi. Asagumo , Minegumo , Natsugumo. Umikaze , Kawakaze , Yamakaze , Suzukaze. The Dutch garrison in Balikpapan was ordered to defend the city, particularly its oil refineries, against a coup de main and to engage in a delaying action to provide time to destroy the facilities. Once it seemed clear that the city was about to fall into enemy hands, the troops would have to wage a guerilla war in the hinterlands. For the facility destruction, the Dutch demolition detachment allotted three hours and eight hours for Balikpapan and Sambodja, respectively. However, a demolition exercise showed that it would take much more time if the destruction was to be carried out accordingly. For the defensive preparations, van den Hoogenband established a defensive position at Klandasan to block the road from Manggar Airfield to the city. A second defensive line surrounded the radio station Radio position , with a third line Rapak position constructed to cover the retreat into the hinterlands for the guerrilla campaign. Finally, to prepare for the guerrilla campaign, van den Hoogenband set up evacuation camps that could accommodate about 3, people around 6 to 9 km from Balikpapan. Shortly after the fall of Tarakan, he evacuated Balikpapan civilians to these camps. In addition, food depots were also constructed on the river banks every 10 km from the city and near the oil pumping stations in Wain River and Mentawir to sustain the troops during the guerrilla campaign. As the capture of Tarakan went faster than their predicted timetable, the Sakaguchi Detachment and Western Attack Unit moved up their date to occupy Balikpapan. Their orders were: \[ 4 \]. Despite being already ahead of schedule, the debarkation and construction activity to ensure the readiness of Tarakan airfield made little progress. Delaying the airfield's capacity to be used a staging ground for the attack on Balikpapan, Nishimura and Sakaguchi eventually postponed the landing in Balikpapan from 21 January to 24 January. Still, as the postponement did not provide enough time to ready the Tarakan airfield for transport planes, the plan to attack Balikpapan using paratroopers were scrapped. Concerned that the Dutch defenders intended to destroy the oilfields in Balikpapan, the Japanese planned to release several Dutch POWs with a warning that swift reprisal would fall on defenders and civilians alike should they destroy the refineries. To carry the aforementioned ultimatum to the defenders, Sakaguchi tasked Capt. Gerard Reinderhoff , former chief of staff to the Tarakan garrison commander, Lt. Simon de Waal and Capt. On the morning of 16 January, they steamed to Balikpapan aboard the captured BPM motor schooner Parsifal with an Indonesian captain and three Japanese interpreters \[ 4 \] other sources say two Japanese naval lieutenants and two sailors; \[ 15 \] others mentioned three Japanese interpreters and two Indonesian police officers. Differing sources indicate that Colijn and Reinderhoff either overpowered or deceived their captors — some accounts claim the Japanese were drunk — and managed to lock them inside a cabin. As the seas were too rough for a landing, the Dorniers flew off and returned the next day. The Dorniers returned and landed the following morning, picked up Colijn and Reinderhoff and flew them to Balikpapan, where they delivered the ultimatum directly to van den Hoogenband. The destruction had actually already begun ahead on 18 January. In the Louise oilfields located north of Balikpapan, Dutch demolition teams dismantled the well tubing, cut off to a depth of 15 meter, which were then dropped down the holes together with pump plungers and accessory rods. To complete the work, materials such as bolts, nuts, and heavy drilling bits was thrown after them. Finally, a tin containing four pieces of TNT was thrown in to destroy the casing strings. Within a few days 'all motors, pumps, dynamos and turbines were blown up. The destruction of the installations then continued throughout the region and at the port itself. First, the teams set fire to the wharves by encircling the channels with burning oil from ignited gasoline drums. They then blew up the factories; the paraffin-wax factory, the packed lubricating-oil drum store, the saltwater pumping station were all dynamited. A newly constructed tin plant in the Pandansari factory was also burned down. The destruction efforts ended with the obliteration of laboratories, tank farms, and the power station, with chains of explosions shattering windows throughout the town. From mid-January , BPM personnel and civilians still left behind began to be airlifted out of Balikpapan. From January 20, however, evacuations from the city were only possible by flying boats. On the night of 20 January, the two officers, along with 25 other evacuees left for Java. At the same time, BPM sent out a Grumman Goose to evacuate their company officials and employees, the last one done on 23 January. They evacuated the city port's naval commander and his personnel, as well as demolition teams who had destroyed the Samboja drilling site. On the next run on 22 January, two additional Dorniers joined the convoy, but only two made the landing on Wain River and evacuated 58 BPM members of the demolition team and the remaining MLD ground personnel. Despite the bad weather and fuel concerns, the planes managed to land in Surabaya. Of the two other Dorniers, one had to return because of the bad weather, while the other one crashed and exploded while trying to land on Sungai Wain, killing four of the five flight crew. Throughout the evacuation, blazing fires from the town helped to guide the planes in, as they were visible a full hour's flight time away. The rest of the demolition team, 87 Europeans and 10 Indonesians from BPM and other companies, aided by Indonesian porters, marched to Banjarmasin. When Japanese troops cut off the route, the porters ran off and the team decided to split into smaller groups that would try to reach Samarinda II at their own pace. The largest of the group eventually reached the airfield at the end of February and were evacuated to Java and another group reached the airfield on 8 March, when the Netherlands capitulated. From the rest of the small groups, several reached Banjarmasin using perahus boat , two groups reached Java after capitulation and one reached Lombok. Yet there were also those who were captured and killed by Japanese troops. In all, out of the 87 Europeans, 41 survived. At on the 21 January, the Japanese invasion fleet of one light cruiser, ten destroyers, four minesweepers, three submarine chasers, three patrol boats and sixteen transport ships left Tarakan for Balikpapan. A MLD Dornier spotted the fleet that same day, but heavy clouds with strong winds and prolonged rain prevented the plane from shadowing the fleet. On the next day, U. Sturgeon fired several torpedoes on the convoy and reported sinking three ships. However, postwar records failed to confirm any damages to the convoy. From , as many as three waves of Dutch Martin B bombers 19 in total escorted by up to 12 Brewster Buffalo attacked the fleet. The first and second wave scored no hits, and many were forced to return due to bad weather. On the third wave, the Dutch planes narrowly struck the Kawakaze , lightly damaged the transport ship Tatsugami Maru , and sank the transport ship Nana Maru , for the cost of a Martin bomber shot down. Despite these attacks, at the Japanese began their landing on Balikpapan as Col. Kanauji's Raid Unit disembarked and made their way through the bay to land behind van den Hoogenband's defense lines. Later at on 24 January, Gen. Sakaguchi's Airfield Seizure Unit and Assault Unit embarked on their landing craft and also began making their way to the beaches. Around midnight, reports reached van den Hoogenband of craft movements in Balikpapan Bay, heading towards the Klandasan position. Dense smoke from the burning facilities made it difficult for Dutch searchlights to observe the water front ahead of them, enabling Kanauji's Raid Unit to sail unhindered into Wain River behind the Dutch lines. A Dutch patrol soon reported this movement to van den Hoogenband, who ordered 2nd Company to secure the Dutch mm guns and sent out overvalwagen armored cars to patrol and report for any enemy troop activities in their inland retreat route. At on the 24th, the Raid Unit entered mouth of the Wain River, where they were greeted by two Indonesian police officers who guided them inland. At daybreak, 2nd Company reported that they managed to prevent Kanauji from reaching Balikpapan and threatening their retreat route. Yet at , van den Hoogenband received reports of Japanese troops advancing east towards their defensive lines, and by , Japanese troops were nearing the Klandasan position. With little reserve at his disposal, van den Hoogenband was left to choose on whether he should reinforce the Klandasan position, or attempt a break out through the Raid Unit and retreat inland. As there was little merit in defending a ruined city, van den Hoogenband chose to do the latter. He informed the General Headquarters in Bandung of his decision and ordered his troops to destroy the guns, searchlights and radio station and bolster the rear defenses for the breakout. Later, even though there were no reports from them, van den Hoogenband was under the impression that 2nd Company managed to hold the pumping station and that the overvalwagen patrols have kept the retreat routes safe from Japanese troops. At , he assembled his troops and their families, in all in about trucks and other vehicles. Led by an overvalwagen, they began their breakout push inland and retreated to Batoehampar Batu Ampar. Kanauji's forces eventually landed at that day. On the 25th, the Raid Unit split up, with one element advancing to seize the pumping station, another advancing toward Balikpapan, and the rest of the main force moving up on the road between Batu Ampar and Balikpapan. At , when the main force advanced into Batu Ampar, they defeated a Dutch force unknown, either 2nd Company or parts of van den Hoogenband's column and taking them prisoner, effectively cutting off any line of retreat inland. Earlier, at on the 24th, the Airfield Seizure and Assault Units landed without meeting any resistance and by daybreak, they seized the airfield and the bridges. Even though van den Hoogenband's troops have destroyed the bridges on the coastal road, Yamamoto's troops managed to reach the north end of Balikpapan by night. By on the 25th, the Assault Unit entered Balikpapan unopposed. After all the torpedoes missed Naka, the submarine fired another torpedo that hit and sank the transport ship Tsuruga Maru between and , taking one crewmember and 39 troops of the Sakaguchi Detachment down with it. Admiral Thomas Hart , commander of the U. Glassford served as the overall commander, while Talbot lead the destroyers. At that time, Marblehead had only one working turbine, which limited its speed to 15 knots. On 21 January, Boise struck an uncharted reef off Kelapa Island in Sape Strait that caused a ft long gash in the ship's port keel. Along with Marblehead , the two cruisers were forced to retire to Waworada Bay under the escort of Bulmer and Pillsbury. The remaining four destroyers under Commander Talbot went on towards Balikpapan. To maintain the element of surprise, Talbot ordered his destroyers to use their torpedoes as their primary attack weapon for that night and only fired their guns when these were expended. At , they ran straight into the path of the cruiser Naka and four destroyers. One of the destroyers signaled a challenge, to no reply from Talbot's ships. Assuming that they were friendly ships, the Japanese destroyers passed TF 5 without raising any alarm. Ten minutes later, Talbot spotted the Japanese transport fleet, silhouetted by fire from the burning oilfields before them and guarded by three patrol boats, four minesweepers, and four submarine chasers. At , W spotted the destroyers, but assumed that it was Naka. Parrott , followed by John D. Ford and Paul Jones , fired a total of seven torpedoes at the minesweeper, but all missed due to poor angle. As they reached the northern end of the transport fleet, Parrott fired three torpedoes at , hitting Sumanoura Maru and caused a tremendous explosion that sank the ship, as it was carrying depth charges and mines at the time. Soon afterwards, W alerted Admiral Nishimura that the transport fleet were under attack. Despite the alarm, he refused to believe that enemy ships could penetrate the anchorage and assumed that the attack must be coming from K-XVIII. In the midst of the newly created confusion, Pope , Parrott and Paul Jones fired a total of 10 torpedoes at , one of which hit the Tatsugami Maru. Compounded by damage from the Dutch air raid the previous day, the munition-loaded ship exploded and sank 30 minutes later. Talbot then turned TF 5 southward at , aiming to attack the southern end of the fleet. Five minutes later, Pope and Parrott fired five torpedoes at what they assumed was a destroyer, but was actually the patrol boat P The former World War I destroyer received three torpedo hits that badly damaged the vessel and killed 35 of its crew. John D. Ford and Paul Jones followed on with an attack on the Kuretake Maru , but it managed to evade the first two torpedoes. A second torpedo from Paul Jones then hit amidships and the transport ship soon sank. Pope , Parrott , and Paul Jones now signaled Talbot that they'd used all their torpedoes, and he authorized them to use their 4-inch guns on the transports. At this time, however, TF 5's formation began to break up. Ford went on a northwesterly course at , followed shortly by Pope. Ford then fired its last two torpedoes on the wreck of Tsuruga Maru , before attacking Kumagawa Maru and Asahisan Maru concurrently. Shells from its 4-inch guns and. As it did so, however, a shell hit John D. Ford 's aft at , wounding four of her crew. Avoiding running aground in shoal waters, the commander of the destroyer, Lt. Jacob D. Cooper, made a port turn and doubled back to catch up with the rest of TF 5, who were already steaming away from Balikpapan Bay. It was not until when he finally ordered the 9th Destroyer Division to cut off TF 5's escape route. However, because none of them had knowledge of where the American ships were, Nishimura eventually ordered the destroyers of the 9th to resume their previous task. As his flagship Naka sailed into the anchorage to ascertain the condition of the transports, it was separated from the 9th Division and rejoined the transport echelons alone. Upon reaching Batu Ampar, van den Hoogenband realized that Japanese troops had occupied defensive points leading into the pumping station. His forces now had to retreat through the evacuation camps, upon which several hundred women and children, mostly families of the Indonesian soldiers, joined his column. On 25 January, they received report that the Wain River pumping station was already under Japanese control. Considering that his troops were too fatigued by now, van den Hoogenband refrained from attacking the pumping station and persuaded the women and children to return to Balikpapan, as there's better chance there to obtain food. Part of them went back to the evacuation camp, while others remained in the kampungs villages around Wain River. The remainder of soldiers continued the retreat north. Throughout the retreat, Dutch troops encountered difficulties in replenishing their equipment and obtain food, as most of the food depots had been taken over by Japanese forces. It was not until they reached the road between Mentawir and Semoi that they managed to find rice stores in a labor camp. On 3 February, the column reached the Boeat Buat kampung , where they obtain more provisions, as well as additional intelligence. Local officials informed van den Hoogenband that Japanese troops had occupied Samarinda city that same day, but the Samarinda II airfield was still under Dutch control. The sick from the column were moved using wooden boats perahu directly from Buat downstream to the Mahakam. After three days of marching, van den Hoogenband and soldiers reached Kota Bangun on 5 February and arrived at Samarinda II the next day. From 7 to 8 February, they were flown to Java, though some infantrymen from the column ended up reinforcing the garrison defending the airfield. On 24 January, the first wave struck Japanese forces at Despite heavy Japanese AA fire, no Dutch planes were shot down. Dutch pilots claimed that they sank a transport ship, damaged another one and struck the destroyer Kawakaze again. Yet Japanese reports showed that the attack failed to damage or sunk a single ship. A group of Dayak people and a missionary later saved them, though one of the BPM evacuee died of his injury beforehand. Dutch AA fire from the airfield shot down a Zero that crashed intact, thus enabling Dutch forces to obtain intel on the fighter's strengths and weaknesses. Between and , eight B Flying Fortresses of the U. The Bs shot down two Zeros who intercepted the formation, for a cost of three bombers slightly damaged and no hits scored. Thick clouds and Japanese AA fire scattered the formations and the attack scored no hits, but they managed to shoot down two Mitsubishi F1M 'Pete' scout planes. Three Zeros strafed and destroyed three Martin Bs. One Zero was eventually badly damaged by AA fire and ditched in the sea. Once again, bad weather scattered the formation. When the bombers reached Balikpapan at , they were immediately engaged by four Zeros. In a minute aerial battle, the Zeros shot down one Martin and damaged three other, while losing one to the bomber's defensive fire. The remaining bombers then were moved to Oelin Airfield in Banjarmasin. The flight yielded no results as the heavy smoke layers and dense rain obscure the pilot's visions. Three Buffalos took off and attempted to intercept them, but did not damage or shoot down any bombers. The raid rendered Samarinda II's runways partially unusable and damaged two Buffalos. Later, at , four Zeros and a Babs strafed the airfield and destroyed a Martin and a Buffalo. The Americans followed up on this attack by sending eight Bs of the 7th and 19th Bomb Group at Bad weather forced four of them to turn back to Malang along the way, with three of the four eventually making emergency landings on the beach of Madura Island due to lack of fuel. Meeting the same fate as the Dutch planes before them, the remaining Flying Fortresses were promptly intercepted by Japanese Zeros. The B defenses managed to shoot down two of them, but one of the four B was so badly damaged that it had to made an emergency landing at Oelin. By the end of the day, the attacks failed to generate any damages or losses to the Japanese fleet. The next raid took place two days later, as heavy cloud cover have been preventing both the Japanese and the Allies from launching any attacks at all. The Martins were withdrawn to Makassar on 25 January, from there they flew for Bandoeng Bandung on the next day. The Buffalos, on the other hand, retreated to Banjarmasin before flying to Surabaya. Even though one of them had to turn back due to bad weather, at the bombers scored hits on the seaplane tender Sanuki Maru , forcing it to withdraw to the Makassar Strait. At around the same time, six Zeros and a Babs from Tarakan raided the fleet of Martin Bs at Oelin that were still assigned to continue the attacks on Balikpapan. Two days later, five Flying Fortresses made another run on the Japanese fleet. One of the bombers returned while en route, while the remaining four were attacked by 13 Zeros for 30 minutes over Balikpapan. One B crashed on the return flight due to its damage. The Americans believed that they managed to shoot down six Zeros, but Japanese records indicated that only one was shot down, while another one was damaged on landing at Manggar Airfield. The day after, the 19th Bomb Group conducted two separate raids, both of which did not inflict any damage as well. The first raid during the day by three B did not succeed, as all three bombers had to turn back en route due to bad weather and engine failure. Later that night, two LB bombers attacked the fleet individually, about an hour apart, to no avail. This night attack was the last Allied attempt to stem the Japanese fleet advance in the context of the battle of Balikpapan. After completed occupying Balikpapan's urban area the previous day, the Sakaguchi Detachment began mopping up any remaining Dutch resistance and setting up Manggar Airfield on 26 January. Although the Dutch had thoroughly destroyed the refineries and other supporting facilities, Japanese defense details managed to repair the oilfields and kept them running from June until August , when the first Allied air raids began bombarding them once more. With a high octane rating, the Balikpapan refinery was greatly utilized in supporting Japanese military operations in the southwestern Pacific theater. Manggar Airfield was repaired on 27 January and on the next day, nine Zeros of the 23rd Air Flotilla landed there, and its established its headquarters on the airfield by the 30th. The Sakaguchi Detachment also placed its main force and established a military administration in the city. In all, the loss sustained by the Sakaguchi Detachment in the operation was eight men killed on land and 39 at sea when Tsuruga Maru sank. For the Japanese Navy, at least naval crews perished. Out of 1, Dutch defenders, only managed to reach Samarinda II on 6 February, where a majority of them were evacuated to Java. This poor performance is mainly caused by the unreliability of the Mark 15 torpedo that have the tendency to either run deeper than set or became duds when hitting its target. Even though the battle did not have any effect on preventing the capture of Balikpapan, it was still the first surface engagement in Southeast Asia that the U. Navy had participated in since the Battle of Manila Bay in Balikpapan remained under Japanese control until July , when an Australian-led force liberated the city. Contents move to sidebar hide. Article Talk. Read Edit View history. Tools Tools. Download as PDF Printable version. In other projects. Wikimedia Commons. World War II battle on Borneo. For other uses, see Battle of Balikpapan disambiguation. Balikpapan , Dutch East Indies. Dutch East Indies campaign. Background \[ edit \]. Order of battle \[ edit \]. Japan \[ edit \]. Ground forces \[ edit \]. Naval forces \[ edit \]. Netherlands \[ edit \]. United States \[ edit \]. Dutch plans \[ edit \]. Japanese plans \[ edit \]. Battle \[ edit \]. Ultimatum and demolition January \[ edit \]. Evacuation January \[ edit \]. Fleet interception January \[ edit \]. Land engagement January \[ edit \]. Naval engagement 24 January \[ edit \]. Allied air attacks on Balikpapan 24 - 30 January \[ edit \]. Aftermath \[ edit \]. Casualties \[ edit \]. Sumanoura Maru , part of Eihuku Maru -class ships on the right. Analyses \[ edit \]. Notes \[ edit \]. References \[ edit \]. Japanese troops of the Sakaguchi Detachment advancing through Balikpapan's burning oilfields. Date 23—25 January Allied air raids continued until 30 January. Netherlands United States. Cornelis van den Hoogenband Paul H. Shizuo Sakaguchi Shoji Nishimura. Troops deserted or surrendered Only evacuated 1 destroyer lightly damaged 1 submarine heavily damaged.

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