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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking is a growing phenomenon in Yemen. Many trafficking networks are based in Ethiopia or Somalia and operate with local partners. En route to Saudi Arabia, individuals are exploited, kidnapped, or even killed. Furthermore, organ trafficking from Yemen to Egypt is worsened by poverty and extortion. Profits are shared by hospitals, networks and mediators, and some Yemeni hospitals secretly conduct organ transplants. Yemeni children are also victims of trafficking, forced into temporary marriages, commercial sex tourism domestically and in Saudi Arabia, and used as child soldiers. Children collected by Saudi gangs are sent under military escort to the Gulf, and subjected to involuntary domestic service, begging, or drug smuggling into Saudi Arabia. Yemen is also a source, transit and destination for human smuggling. The irregular movement of Yemeni nationals for work in other Gulf countries also occurs. Smugglers are bound by strong social links, and Yemeni networks include Somali and Ethiopian facilitators. Smugglers are paid twofold when contracted by Yemen to return individuals to Africa. Migrants who seek the services of smugglers often subsequently face intimidation, threats, physical violence and extortion. Yemen has widespread gun ownership and one of the largest arms-trafficking markets in the world, with weapons redirected from military stores or acquired from foreign actors. Ongoing conflict has resulted in an increase of light and medium weapons such as Turkish pistols and silencers, but tanks, ammunition, grenades, machine guns and light armoured vehicles are also sold in open-air arms markets. Small arms sale, including coalition weaponry, thrives on social media, and the military, security forces, navy, and coast guard are accused of illegal arms shipments and facilitating black-market smuggling. The Houthis an Islamic armed political movement , STC, and IRG have historically collaborated on arms trafficking, and battlefield exchanges or sales between factions have occurred. Before the conflict, Yemen was a transit hub for East African and Gulf weapons, and weapons are now smuggled via Yemen into Palestine, Sudan and Somalia. An active weapons trade also exists between al-Qaeda factions, and Iranian weaponry, including drone technology, is smuggled to the Houthis. With regard to fauna, Yemen is a transit country for African wildlife, such as cheetahs, destined for wealthy consumers in the Arabian Peninsula. Deer, hyenas, monkeys and other fauna are also illicitly sold in the country. Yemen is a source and transit hub for endangered and other vulnerable species, including pangolins, Arabian leopards, golden sparrows, blue baboon spiders, Yemen veiled chameleons, falcons, and large cats primarily bred in Yemeni villages for Gulf markets. The market is enabled by corruption and bribery, with traders importing specimens from Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. Additionally, illegal, unreported and unregulated IUU fishing depletes fish stocks; although illegal, the market is largely socially accepted. IUU fishing overlaps with more lucrative criminal activities, particularly arms trafficking from Eritrea via fishing boats. Moreover, the illicit trade of stolen oil is on the rise in Yemen, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP , which once controlled various facilities, has now turned to smuggling. Meanwhile, intra-coalition fighting in southern Yemen focuses on extraction or storage-facility control. Gangs use ground tanks and oil tankers to store and transport oil from government to Houthi areas, resulting in systematic crude-oil looting from state-owned company fields. Illegal oil and gas sales transpire with Houthi and IRG facilitation, with cross-faction collaboration and military-commander involvement. Yemen is a transit country for drugs from the Gulf, Pakistan and Iran, with heroin from Afghanistan sometimes transiting Aden international airport into Egypt. Meanwhile, cocaine shipments have been apprehended in deliveries to government agencies, and opportunistic gangs transiting cocaine to Gulf and Arab countries primarily utilize sea routes. Yemen is also a transit country for cannabis from Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. Sana'a has seen unprecedented cannabis and hashish activity, and seizures are increasing. The Houthi secretly coordinate hashish smuggling with affiliates, in order to preserve their image. However, cannabis may be sidelined by Yemeni-produced khat, which although legal, invites organized-criminal activities and may utilize forced labour. The same networks facilitate khat and small-arms smuggling into Saudi Arabia, and Yemen exports khat to countries with Somali or Yemeni diaspora, the proceeds subsequently being laundered into Yemen through the hawala money broker system. Synthetic drug use is also increasing and inexpensive drugs, primarily prescription drugs and Captagon pills, are the most readily available. In Yemen, drugs are used to control and encourage youth involvement in conflict or in political smear campaigns. Although government-affiliated media claim that Houthi funding comes primarily from the drug trade, the Houthi militia have facilitated the disposal of Lebanese Hezbollah drug products, including Captagon. Large Yemeni tribes engage in banditry, kidnapping, and have significant weapons arsenals, allowing them to act with impunity and dictate their own governance. In northern and eastern Yemen, goods cannot cross territory without tribal permission. Oil- and arms-smuggling networks collaborating with Houthi, IRG, and STC actors share similar mafia-style characteristics, and military brigade commanders provide them with protection or documentation. Gangs and mafias linked to the Houthi militia are involved in arms, oil, drug, and human trafficking, looting, robbery, home raids, and kidnapping. Victims are subjected to violence and are kept in secret prisons while mafia members work as brokers. The Houthi also control cigarette smuggling, and oil companies are owned by Houthi officials or their relatives. Overlapping tribal, government and security membership makes it difficult to surmise the extent of collusion, and state actors involved in peace negotiations may have links to criminal markets, ignoring illicit practices to ensure constituent loyalty. Loose criminal networks involved in arms trafficking, human trafficking and human smuggling may also have mafia ties. With regard to the latter two, individuals from Somalia and Ethiopia act as facilitators and brokers, while Saudi members, as well as Saudi-residing Somalis and Ethiopians, receive victims. Meanwhile, Yemeni criminal networks connected to state actors interact with Egyptian organ-harvesting networks. The black market now encompasses everyday items, and criminal networks are violent and widespread. Yemeni networks with ties to militia and the Horn of Africa collaborate with Saudi traffickers, and these networks are often formed to carry out terrorist activities. State institutions, plagued by corruption, bribery, and cronyism, lack capacity and rely on UN funding. The war has damaged infrastructure and facilitated organized crime, and although the supreme national authority for combating corruption was established before the conflict, even then it lacked capacity. The security sector has long suffered from corruption, including ghost soldiers, preferential treatment, and the distribution of military commands for political gain. A decision facilitating oil trade by commercial companies affiliated with Houthi loyalists, resulted in financial losses for the state oil company, oil derivative purchases by fictitious companies, black-market expansion, and economic crisis. While access to information is fairly robust, monitoring, compliance, anti-corruption and transparency efforts have stalled. Yemen is party to international and regional agreements regarding organized crime, corruption, drug and arms trade, wildlife crime, and terrorism financing, also covered by domestic law. Despite expressing reservations regarding arbitration and extradition, Yemen has an extradition agreement with Egypt and a judicial cooperation agreement and protocol with Tunisia. Due to the fragile political situation, the government has faced internal security threats, weak institutions, law-enforcement and economic challenges, and systemic corruption. Although the penal code criminalizes slavery and child sex trafficking, it excludes sex trafficking as understood within international law, and despite efforts to combat trafficking and protect victims, laws are not enforced. Yemen lacks a comprehensive justice system, adequate courts, judges, staff and training, and no units focus specifically on organized crime. There is no monitoring mechanism and the transition to a paid system has increased corruption. Data is further skewed by the stigma regarding the arrest of women and the categorization of most violent crimes as politically motivated. The government lacks control over the court and prison systems, and by law, parties may settle informally outside of court. Most prisoners are pre-trial detainees, and conditions do not meet international standards due to overcrowding, lack of prison staff training, ineffective case management, underfunding, poor sanitation, inadequate access to justice, the intermingling of pre-trial and convicted inmates, and deteriorating infrastructure. While the Houthi militia arrests critics and subjects some to forced migration, others are held in secret UAE jails in Yemen and tortured. The military characteristics and criminal opportunism of policing structures has resulted in decreased public trust. Due to the conflict, resources have shifted, and military capabilities have been exhausted. Despite abetting crime, security officials benefit from impunity, and officers responsible for investigating organized crime have been involved in repressing peaceful demonstrations. Polarization and multiple loyalties exist, based on party, sectarian, regional and tribal affiliations. Territorial integrity is challenged by the conflict between the North and the South, ongoing counterterrorism campaigns against AQAP, tribal issues, extensive borders, and US drone attacks. The interior of the country is difficult to police, but as a result of a Yemeni—US—Saudi initiative, the border guard situation has improved, particularly in performing checkpoints, patrols, advanced methods of inspection, and confiscation. Yemen is one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Although laws and institutions exist to combat both, efforts are hindered by conflict, poor financial policies and low commitment to international standards. Control of the Central Bank has been fought over by the Houthis and the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and the hawala system lacks formal oversight and is used for both legitimate and illegitimate transactions. Yemen's economy has been dependent on the oil sector since the mids, but the sector faces declining productivity. While mineral ore reserves are still significant, the sector lacks investment, and Yemen depends heavily on aid. The Houthis have also enacted a tax regime, resulting in a continued stream of income. A pattern of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances has occurred in Yemen. Those targeted suffer torture, ill treatment, are denied access to lawyers and their family, and many detainees are held in secret. The killing of several preachers prompted others to flee, and Houthi militants are accused of hostage-taking, torture, and abuse. The government lacks capacity to protect trafficking victims, who are often incarcerated or deported. Furthermore, Yemen lacks specialized centres for drug-addiction treatment or meaningful crime-prevention measures. The non-governmental organization community within Yemen suffers due to the ongoing conflict, but some organizations have sought to shed light on organized crime. Tribes are involved in security provision, rule of law and justice, but their role in countering rather than enabling organized crime is ambiguous. Press freedom has been curtailed by all parties, and the Houthis have blocked online access, with several online newspapers being restricted to disseminating information via social media. Journalists are subjected to abduction, incarceration without trial, arbitrary detention, threats of kidnapping, arrest, torture, the blocking of news sites, and salary suspension. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Sanaa. Income group Low income. Population 29,, Geography type Coastal. Criminal markets 5. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 8. Human smuggling 7. Arms trafficking 9. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 4. Non-renewable resource crimes 7. Heroin trade 2. Cocaine trade 2. Cannabis trade 3. Synthetic drug trade 4. Criminal actors 7. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 8. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 6. Foreign actors 8. Political leadership and governance 2. Government transparency and accountability 2. International cooperation 3. National policies and laws 2. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 1. Law enforcement 2. Territorial integrity 2. Anti-money laundering 2. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 1. Prevention 2. Non-state actors 2. Analysis Download full profile english. People Human trafficking is a growing phenomenon in Yemen. Trade Yemen has widespread gun ownership and one of the largest arms-trafficking markets in the world, with weapons redirected from military stores or acquired from foreign actors. Criminal Actors Large Yemeni tribes engage in banditry, kidnapping, and have significant weapons arsenals, allowing them to act with impunity and dictate their own governance. Criminal justice and security Yemen lacks a comprehensive justice system, adequate courts, judges, staff and training, and no units focus specifically on organized crime. Economic and financial environment Yemen is one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Civil society and social protection A pattern of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances has occurred in Yemen. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking is one of the most prevalent organized-crime activities in Yemen, and has been exacerbated by high levels of instability and poverty, weakening law enforcement and social disintegration, as well as widespread corruption. Refugees and asylum seekers mostly coming from Somalia and Ethiopia have created a pool of people in the country who are vulnerable to human trafficking, facing abuse and exploitation, including forced labour. Human trafficking is mostly run by transnational criminal networks based in the Horn of Africa, specifically Ethiopia and Somalia, with branches in Yemen. These groups work closely with local partners and state-embedded actors to carry out trafficking activities. Yemeni children continue to be vulnerable to forced marriages, commercial sex tourism domestically and in Saudi Arabia, and being forced into becoming child soldiers. Children recruited by Saudi gangs are thought to be sent to the Gulf under military escort and subjected to involuntary domestic servitude, begging or drug smuggling into Saudi Arabia. There are also reports of foreign men being deceived by false job prospects in the United Arab Emirates UAE and subsequently being coerced into deployment as mercenaries in Yemen. Further, Yemen continues to be a source country for organ trafficking to Egypt, a phenomenon which is further exacerbated by poverty and extortion. Profits are shared by hospitals, networks and mediators, and some Yemeni hospitals secretly conduct organ transplants. Yemen continues to be a source and transit country for human smuggling. Irregular migrants from countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia continue to enter the country due to the persistent underlying factors driving migration in those countries. Their aim is typically to continue their journey towards the Gulf countries. At the same time the conflict in Yemen pushes Yemenis to seek safety and economic security in these same countries. Smugglers are bound by strong social links, and Yemeni networks include Somali and Ethiopian facilitators. Smugglers are paid twofold when contracted by Yemen to return individuals to Africa, due to the increased risk in the country. Profits from smuggling are not accrued to Yemeni groups alone, but rather to multinational groups which operate in multiple countries along the smuggling route. Migrants who seek the services of smugglers subsequently often face unsafe conditions, intimidation, threats, physical violence and extortion. There are also reports indicating the involvement of military actors taking part in smuggling activities to raise funds for military initiatives. In addition to residents and businesses, prisoners and migrants are also regularly extorted in the country. Extortion practices are also linked to human smuggling and trafficking, as both money and labour are extorted from families. Yemen has among the most pervasive arms trafficking market worldwide, which is driven by ongoing conflicts and the demand they create for weaponry, coupled with the broader culture of gun ownership within the country. The country has historically been an arms-trafficking hub, both for weapons passing in and out of East Africa and for weapons moving in and out of the Gulf. Small-arms sales, including coalition weaponry, are booming on social media, and the military, security forces, navy and coast guard are accused of illegal-arms shipments and facilitating black-market smuggling. The Houthis an Islamic armed political movement , STC and ROYG have historically collaborated on arms trafficking, and battlefield exchanges or sales between factions have occurred. Ongoing conflict has resulted in an increase of light and medium weapons such as Turkish pistols and silencers, but tanks, ammunition, grenades, machine guns and light armoured vehicles are also sold in open-air arms markets. Recent seizures also indicate irregular transportation of Iranian weapons into Yemen to arm proxy groups, as well as to be further distributed towards Somalia and Ethiopia, posing a severe security threat in the region. Given its ongoing instability and lack of governance, Yemen has become a destination and transit point for different kinds of illicit counterfeit goods, predominantly counterfeit pharmaceutical products, electronics and foodstuffs. Similarly, Yemen also constitutes a destination and transit point for the illicit trade of tobacco products, which has been gradually increasing since the eruption of the conflict. Smuggling of these products is allegedly controlled by Houthis but relies on a network that includes officials with different rankings from various governing entities in Yemen, as well as loosely organized smuggling groups in the region. This activity has been listed among the sources of revenue for terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that are active in Yemen. Counterfeit alcohol, which mainly originates from Ethiopia and Djibouti, is also easily accessible in the black market, despite it being prohibited. As for the fauna market, Yemen continues to be a transit point for wildlife from the Horn of Africa and neighbouring countries destined for the Arabian Peninsula. Cheetah cubs are among the most trafficked wildlife in the country, and are usually sold as pets in the Gulf states. The country also remains a transit point for the trafficking of illicit wildlife and wildlife products, including rhino horns, pangolins and larger cats destined for Asia. Local animals such as falcons, Arabian leopards, Arabian golden sparrows, blue baboon tarantulas and Yemen veiled chameleons are captured and smuggled to different locations. Exotic animal breeding, mostly of large cats, has also emerged within Yemen to cater to the markets in the Gulf. The ongoing conflict has been exploited by wildlife traffickers. Additionally, illegal, unreported and unregulated IUU fishing continues to pose a threat to the Yemeni maritime environment by depleting fish stocks. IUU fishing also overlaps with other lucrative criminal activities such as arms trafficking in the region. The division of fuel production and storage facilities between the warring factions as well as the consequent fuel shortages have created a growing black market for petroleum products in the country. In this respect, smuggling and extrajudicial sales are now rampant in the market, largely with the complicity or active facilitation of government officials both the Houthi and the ROYG. In addition, military officials, both in the ROYG and in the Houthi, exchange services and benefit from the trade of crude oil. Gangs use ground tanks and oil tankers to store and transport oil from government to Houthi areas, resulting in systematic crude-oil looting from state-owned company fields. Yemen serves primarily as a transit country for drugs coming from source countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the Gulf states. Following the beginning of the conflict, drug trafficking has been exacerbated due to the porosity of borders and the fragmentation of the Yemeni security apparatus. Smugglers in Yemen are not usually market-specific and will opportunistically move items if profitable. Although reports indicate that the Houthi militia oversees the lucrative heroin trade, several major smuggling routes run exclusively through ROYG-controlled territory, which suggests their involvement in heroin trafficking as well. Heroin smuggling also takes places through the Aden International Airport into Egypt and other countries. Meanwhile, cocaine trade is also conducted on a regular basis with imports and exports from and to the Gulf and other Arab countries, which is facilitated by the geographical position of Yemen and the expansion of its unmarked seaports. The Houthi continue to control the cannabis trade as a source of funding and a recruitment tool, by increasing their role in drug smuggling between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan through Yemen to the Gulf countries. However, cannabis has been largely side-lined by khat produced in Yemen which, although legal, invites organized-crime activities and may utilize forced labour. The same networks facilitate khat and small-arms smuggling into Saudi Arabia, and Yemen exports khat to countries with Somali or Yemeni diaspora members, the proceeds subsequently being laundered into Yemen through the hawala money broker system. Even though the synthetic-drug market is mostly limited to prescription drugs, there are reports suggesting the introduction of other types of drugs such as Captagon and amphetamines smuggled from the Horn of Africa and some Arab and foreign countries. Drugs are dispensed to youth in an attempt to exercise control over them as well as to facilitate their polarisation and entice them, pushing them to the front-lines of the conflict. The ongoing conflict in Yemen has also been characterized as cyber-warfare due to the use of surveillance and cryptocurrency as strategic tools. As the Houthis control most telecommunication companies providing services in the country, they are able to engage in intelligence gathering, spying and surveillance by adding eavesdropping systems to the networks, allowing them to target government leaders and journalists. Houthis also blocked internet and mobile phone networks for their military advantage. However, even though technology is not absent in Yemeni territories, its use as a weapon is limited because of the limited reach of both electricity and internet infrastructure in the country. Yemen also allegedly hosts a hacker group, the Yemen Cyber Army, which carries out cyber-dependent attacks against Saudi corporations and government as well as other states. However, there are allegations suggesting that the group serves as a front for Iranian hackers. Despite the underdeveloped financial sector in the country, financial crimes including fraud, tax evasion and the embezzlement of public funds and humanitarian aid, as well as corruption, are prevalent in Yemen. Private-sector actors are also involved in financial crimes, such as the misappropriation of funds and running Ponzi schemes. Foreign actors continue to play a major role in the numerous criminal markets of the country, including human trafficking and smuggling, transnational arms trafficking, drug trafficking, and environmental crime, to varying degrees and with the nature of their involvement depending on the criminal market. For instance, while members of certain diaspora communities in the country act as facilitators and brokers in human trafficking and smuggling markets, some foreign actors have a certain level of control, together with their Yemeni counterparts, over markets such as arms trafficking and drug trafficking. The fractionalization of foreign-actor support of the combatant parties, both for the purposes of conflict and for those of profit, play a significant role in the war economy and incentivize the fighting to continue. Parallel governance structures in Yemen, such as tribal, government and security apparatus, make it difficult for any authority to combat criminal actors operating in the country, in turn worsened by widespread corruption and political collusion. Due to extensive corruption within Yemen and the fragmented security environment, state actors, most notably security actors, are thought to be complicit in organized-crime activities, but the overlapping membership makes it difficult to surmise the extent to which there is collusion between the tribes and the state. Numerous criminal networks continue to carry out their activities within both Houthi-controlled areas and ROYG-controlled areas, and have possible ties to mafia-style groups active in the country. They are involved in a range of activities, from arms trafficking to human trafficking and human smuggling. Due to the dire economic situation in the country, the black market has been gradually expanding with everyday items under the control of criminal networks as well as state-embedded actors. Criminal networks active in human trafficking and smuggling as well as arms trafficking extend beyond domestic territory, with connections in both source and destination countries. Yemeni networks with ties to militia and the Horn of Africa collaborate with Saudi traffickers, and these networks are often formed to carry out terrorist activities. Although Yemen does not have mafia-style groups in the traditional sense, large tribes such as the Houthis that are active in the country have mafia-like characteristics and are heavily involved in a variety of criminal markets. For instance, the Houthis are mostly involved in human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms trafficking and oil smuggling through the use of violence. Other actors displaying similar characteristics to mafia-style groups are oil-smuggling and arms-smuggling networks collaborating with the Houthis and the ROYG, as well as the STC. Private-sector actors are also characterized by fragmentation of authority and are mostly controlled by political groups, militant Islamist organizations and militias. Although it is not clear whether or not there are areas in the private sector specifically controlled by organized-crime groups, these actors are heavily influenced by corruption and extortion. Some private-sector actors are also known to have connections with criminal groups. For instance, the Houthis are reported to legitimize looted funds through the use of newly established exchange companies. The ongoing conflict in Yemen has not only led to the widespread destruction of governmental infrastructure, preventing effective governance in the country, but also has brought the country into a very fragile situation together with the emergence of a variety of organized-crime markets, which were not successfully addressed even before the conflict. In addition to the fragmentation of power into two competing forces — one being a fragile and weakened but legitimate government, ROYG, and the other being the armed rebellion, the Houthis — the political leadership within the ROYG has been further fragmented into factions, comprising the northern political actors and the leaders belonging to the STC, which further undermines the government. State institutions continue to be plagued by corruption, bribery and cronyism, and the influence of tribal sheikhs, senior leaders of the administrative apparatus, and military and security leaders. The existing institutions and systems to ensure governmental transparency and accountability have been functioning with limited capacity and have been relying on international funding. Both the Houthis and the ROYG continue to be accused of corruption, money laundering and diverting funds, leading to a lack of trust and accountability. The security sector has also been plagued by widespread corruption, including preferential treatment in the military and the distribution of military commands for political gain. At the international level, Yemen is party to most of the international and regional treaties regarding organized crime and corruption. Despite expressing reservations regarding arbitration and extradition, Yemen has an extradition agreement with Egypt and a judicial cooperation agreement and protocol with Tunisia. The international community is engaged in Yemen, but the primary focus is on bringing an end to the fighting and providing humanitarian assistance. Despite the reliance on international cooperation, some of the international tools, such as international means of investigating human-rights and humanitarian-law violations, have ceased in recent years. At the national level, there is a legal framework pertaining to organized crime, although with certain limitations. However, a legitimate law-making body has not been operating in the country, and no entity is capable of enforcing laws or policies across the territory. Yemen continues to lack a comprehensive justice system due to the inadequate number of courts, judges and staff as well as judicial units dedicated to organized crime. The government has lost control of the court and prison systems and hence the judicial system has had limited reach nationally. Political polarization, corruption and exertion of power on judges and prosecutors have progressively undermined the trust in judicial integrity and independence. As there is also a fragmentation within the judicial system, the parties to the conflict have resorted to courts to prosecute political opponents which has resulted in an increase in the number of political detainees in the country. Due to the existence of both formal and informal justice mechanisms, criminal activities organized by tribesmen are unlikely to be met with local justice, as the informal tribal dispute resolution mechanism is preferred. As for the penitentiary system, pre-trial detainees continue to comprise most of the prison population. In general, difficult conditions are prevalent within the prison system, with security and health concerns being the most serious. There are reports of torture, sexual exploitation, solitary confinement and violation of due process in prisons operated by the Houthis. Law-enforcement authorities in the country have been inefficient. Due to their focus on providing informal security, they have had conflicting priorities and lacked coordination in addressing criminality in the country. The ongoing conflict has resulted in a shift of resources away from law enforcement to the military conflict. Polarization and multiple loyalties continue to exist, based on party, sectarian, regional and tribal affiliations. The country experiences several distinct security crises, which means that the official government has minimal administrative control over its territory. The interior of the country is difficult to police, but as a result of a Yemeni—US—Saudi initiative, the border guard situation has improved, particularly regarding checkpoints, patrols, advanced methods of inspection and confiscation. Yemen is also vulnerable to cyber-infiltration due to the widespread use of cyber-attacks as part of the ongoing war, as well as the lack of capacity to prevent such infiltration. Yemen continues to be one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. While Yemen has, to a certain degree, a regulatory framework on money laundering and terrorist financing, these have been ignored due to the ongoing conflict. Yemen lacks a sophisticated financial system but is, nevertheless, vulnerable to money laundering because of the ongoing conflict and lack of oversight or relevant information. The conflict has also resulted in the increased use of informal channels, such as the hawala system, which is widely used for both legitimate and illegitimate transactions, making it more challenging to monitor financial transactions within the country and to assess its compliance with anti-money laundering laws. Control of the Yemeni central bank has changed hands between the warring parties throughout the conflict, making it challenging to take steps against money laundering. Although Yemen has major resources such as oil and industrial mineral ores, the country continues to depend heavily on aid, as the conflict continues to adversely impact legitimate trade, resulting in a struggling economy and growing informal market. The struggling economic situation has been further exacerbated by the socio-economic consequences of the COVID pandemic and recent civil unrest. Doing business in Yemen continues to be extremely difficult not only due to security concerns and entrenched corruption, but also as a result of illicit taxes and fees imposed on private entities and individuals outside of the legal framework. Yemen continues to lack the ability to identify and protect trafficking victims. It also lacks specialized centres for drug-addiction treatment. Similarly, the country does not have meaningful organized-crime prevention measures. Although civil-society organizations continue to work in Yemen, mainly focusing on humanitarian assistance and shedding light on organized crime in the country, their reach and resources have become progressively limited due to violent retaliation, extortion and intimidation. In addition to civil-society organizations, there are also tribes that are involved in security provision and upholding the rule of law and justice, but their role in countering rather than enabling organized crime remains ambiguous. As for the media environment, extreme difficulties prevail in obtaining neutral reporting on the war due to media control exerted by warring parties. Killing and the arbitrary detention of journalists, as well as censorship and information manipulation, continue to be widespread in Yemen. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Sanaa. Income group Low income. Population 32,, Geography type Coastal. GINI Index Criminal markets 5. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 9. Human smuggling 9. Extortion and protection racketeering 8. Arms trafficking 9. Trade in counterfeit goods 6. Illicit trade in excisable goods 6. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 4. Non-renewable resource crimes 7. Heroin trade 2. Cocaine trade 2. Cannabis trade 4. Synthetic drug trade 4. Cyber-dependent crimes 1. Financial crimes 8. Criminal actors 7. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 7. Criminal networks 8. State-embedded actors 8. Foreign actors 8. Private sector actors 6. Political leadership and governance 1. Government transparency and accountability 1. International cooperation 3. National policies and laws 2. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 1. Law enforcement 2. Territorial integrity 1. Anti-money laundering 2. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 1. Prevention 1. Non-state actors 2. Analysis Download full profile english. People Human trafficking is one of the most prevalent organized-crime activities in Yemen, and has been exacerbated by high levels of instability and poverty, weakening law enforcement and social disintegration, as well as widespread corruption. Trade Yemen has among the most pervasive arms trafficking market worldwide, which is driven by ongoing conflicts and the demand they create for weaponry, coupled with the broader culture of gun ownership within the country. Drugs Yemen serves primarily as a transit country for drugs coming from source countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and the Gulf states. Cyber Crimes The ongoing conflict in Yemen has also been characterized as cyber-warfare due to the use of surveillance and cryptocurrency as strategic tools. Financial Crimes Despite the underdeveloped financial sector in the country, financial crimes including fraud, tax evasion and the embezzlement of public funds and humanitarian aid, as well as corruption, are prevalent in Yemen. Criminal Actors Foreign actors continue to play a major role in the numerous criminal markets of the country, including human trafficking and smuggling, transnational arms trafficking, drug trafficking, and environmental crime, to varying degrees and with the nature of their involvement depending on the criminal market. Leadership and governance The ongoing conflict in Yemen has not only led to the widespread destruction of governmental infrastructure, preventing effective governance in the country, but also has brought the country into a very fragile situation together with the emergence of a variety of organized-crime markets, which were not successfully addressed even before the conflict. Criminal justice and security Yemen continues to lack a comprehensive justice system due to the inadequate number of courts, judges and staff as well as judicial units dedicated to organized crime. Economic and financial environment Yemen continues to be one of the most at-risk countries for money laundering and terrorist financing. Civil society and social protection Yemen continues to lack the ability to identify and protect trafficking victims. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

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