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Each member is a full service law firm with expert knowledge and experience in both local law and the local business, political, cultural and economic environment. Our members and their lawyers are recognised by clients and major legal directories as leaders in various practice areas. Find out more about our members. We look at the complex problem. Mozambique hit the headlines in March when armed Islamic extremists rampaged through the town of Palma in northern Mozambique. The insurgents have killed hundreds of people and driven tens of thousands from their homes. Cabo Delgado is a historically neglected Muslim area in a Christian-majority country. The place is full of expat workers and services and supplies infrastructure — which was targeted by the armed gangs who claim allegiance to Islamic State and call themselves al-Shabaab. It was easy to conclude that the Islamists aimed to annex the gas fields and their cash flows — much as IS did when it seized territory in Iraq and Syria to establish its short lived Caliphate. However the attack on Palma helps distract from the crime and corruption at the heart of the problem. Mozambique has until recently shown great promise. After a grueling civil war that dragged into the s, the award-winning president Joaquim Chissano and his team of young technocrats like prime minister Luisa Diogo worked to turn the country around. There were new mining and energy projects, a smelter that had brought back international capital, a useful balance of Chinese infrastructure and European budget support. Tourists flooded over the border from South Africa. The economy was creating jobs. Nacala Port in northern Mozambique has been identified as a key channel for much of the illicit cargo that comes in and out of Mozambique. The amounts trafficked are eye watering. Heroin goes from Afghanistan to the Makran coast of Pakistan, and is taken by dhow to northern Mozambique. It is not just drugs. The loans were a front for bribery and kickbacks, and have been the subject of many legal investigations. Remember, at the time, people were jumping up and down about how Mozambique would be the next big thing, one of the largest gas producers in world, and people wanted to get in early. With limited other opportunities, the bonds provided a way in. He had cult leader status for his youthful supporters from the Ansar Muslim Youth Council, who were slowly pushed south. Radical imams in Tanzania welcomed them. The Islamist radicals were joined by artisanal miners kicked out of the Monte Puez ruby mine in northern Mozambique. In early , an insurgency known locally as Al-Shabaab, inspired by but unrelated to the Somali insurgents, briefly seized the port town of Mocambique de Praia in Cabo Delgado. It was the first time they would do so, but not the last. Those efforts squeezed drug traffickers south down the coast. As with all successful trading, it is useful to have goods travelling in both directions; the grim trade of heroin met with Asian demand for illicit Mozambican produce. The drugs syndicates were joined by gem and timber smugglers, wildlife traffickers and human traffickers — including those selling human body parts. To what extent do the insurgents and syndicates overlap? For certain, criminals have the run of the province, and they pay off the authorities or attack them if they get in the way. Collusion goes to the highest levels of military intelligence, argue some analysts. As the Mozambique government has not been able to end the insurgency, some international partners are calling for an international intervention force. There were also question marks over the length of time — several months — that the insurgency was able to hold on to Mocambique de Praia. Even former president Guebuza has told journalists that the government was not sending the best soldiers and commanders to the north. Journalists, academics and aid workers are mostly barred from the area. A UK journalist, Tom Bowker, was deported for reporting on the insurgency. Some local people are also being driven off the land. Brazilian media report Fuminho as having already made several smuggling deals across multiple African countries. Despite the arrest, cocaine busts continue. In January , five men were arrested by police on cocaine smuggling charges. Nyusi was wavering between the two options but still prefers to use forces from outside the region, such as trainers from Portugal and the United States. They are also huge investments for the energy companies and banks involved. There is also a rush to sew up the remaining large liquefied natural gas contracts — the huge China-Iran deal, for example, should shrink global gas appetite. A planned industrial hub will likely not happen. They would need all the services, creating opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises to go. The Palma attack is a turning point for the insurgency: not just in its methods of attack, but in its victory, says security analyst Jasmine Opperman. The rebels stole between vehicles during the raid, busted into bank vaults and picked up telecoms equipment. They have money, wheels and communications, and perhaps now greater ambition. Queface expects larger towns like Nangade to be hit. Some analysts argue that the international community needs to get involved. Mayotte is France. Beyond that, there are fears that other kinds of international interventions could lead to calamity. There is a French military base in Mayotte. For Mahtani, there is a security stalemate in the north that requires intervention, but not at the risk of hurting Mozambique sovereignty. Does President Nyusi have a plan to keep Palma safe? Can the government retake Mocambique de Praia? That would be a start, but does it have the resources to do it on its own? That is where Mozambique could perhaps give some ground, suggests Mahtani. Although conditions have been deteriorating fast over the past six months, most regional analysts say that a decisive response now could stop that trend. The raid on Palma marks a watershed moment. Bukarti also highlighted the relative sophistication of the assault, with tactics to target banks and warehouses — for money and food — derived from other Islamist groups in Africa. The situation in Mozambique is complex. Amnesty also accuses Mozambique security forces of engaging in violent reprisals, including summary executions, when they have restored control after previous raids, making any future security partnerships potentially fraught. But the concern is that any emerging western support may struggle to keep pace with the worsening security situation. Search Close this search box. 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For a subset of six focus countries (Eswatini, Kenya,. Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania), the retail market for cocaine was estimated by following a.
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Mozambique is becoming recognised as an emerging hub for cocaine trafficking, with links stretching back to Brazil. Political elites have played a key role in other illicit flows, and there is no reason to suggest cocaine would be any different. Brazil has been playing a vital role in cocaine trafficking to Africa. Within Africa itself, Mozambique has gained significance as a hub for the transit of cocaine. The existence of a Lusophone route, linking Brazil with Lusophone countries in Africa is not new — cocaine has been moving from Brazil to Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau for decades; however, the emergence of Mozambique as a hub for cocaine trafficked from Brazil is relatively recent. It intersects with an already well-founded route for the movement of heroin and now methamphetamines, arriving on the Mozambican coast, and being redirected north and south overland. The rise of Mozambique as a transit hub for cocaine is part of well-established displacement effects, where increased law enforcement attention on one part of a route results in the shift of trafficking elsewhere. In Africa, this has mostly been analysed in relation to the opening of West Africa as a transit hub for cocaine in the late s following significant seizures of vessels shipping cocaine directly from South America to Europe. Within Africa, analysts have focused on shifts in cocaine trafficking from West Africa to North Africa Herbert , or heroin trafficking from the Makran Coast of Pakistan and Iran to Kenya moving further south, first to Tanzania, and then to Mozambique Haysom Mozambique provides a very conducive environment for cocaine trafficking because of the other illicit commodities moving in and out of the country, as well as the involvement of political elites, and more recently the cover of insurgency in northern Mozambique. However, the interests of political elites in Mozambique should not be underestimated. This article reviews the addition of Mozambique to the Lusophone route for cocaine trafficking and the role of the PCC in trafficking cocaine into Mozambique. It begins by charting the rise of the PCC as the primary actor involved in cocaine trafficking in Brazil, followed by the rise of a Lusophone route to Europe, including through West African countries. The article then explores the shift into Mozambique, discussing the existing criminal environment in Mozambique, the convergence of multiple commodities, considering how cocaine trafficking fits within the criminal marketplace and highlighting the potential for conflict between the PCC and Mozambican elites. Brazil represents an attractive hub for cocaine trafficking organisations in South America. The country has a sizeable domestic market — the National Drug Use Survey found that 4. Local criminal groups, such as the Commando Vermelho and the PCC started as local organisations controlling cocaine flows into specific neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the main Brazilian cities. These neighbourhoods provided a stronghold for local criminal organisations to resist attempts by the state to undermine their operations. Prisons played a similar role, as local kingpins used their financial resources to corrupt penitentiary officials, turning prisons into unofficial headquarters for their organisations. The PCC was potentially the most effective at exploiting this vulnerability, resulting in significant expansion. The PCC was formed in , when several inmates of the Taubate prison in Sau Paulo established an alliance and killed other leaders in the prison. The second stage was defined by domestic consolidation and diversification of criminal activities. In , the PCC attracted government attention for taking control of 29 prisons in 19 cities, forcing authorities to negotiate Kaminsky and Squeff, The PCC conducted coordinated attacks on police stations, transport facilities and state buildings Coutinho A fourth phase is evident in the groups international expansion — first regionally, and then across the Atlantic Coutinho Regionally, the PCC took control of the entire cocaine supply chain. More recently, the PCC started to explore new routes, evading competition from other criminal organisations. Due to an increase in commerce, cultural affinity and institutional weakness, the Lusophone countries appeared to be an attractive entry point. While West Africa has received the most notoriety for cocaine trafficking, connections between Lusophone countries have expanded the sphere of influence of Brazilian organised crime groups in particular. While the Lusophone route is not the primary entry point to Europe, particularly as the Netherlands and Belgium have overtaken the Iberian Peninsula as key European ports for cocaine, it can reasonably be expected that strong links remain between Lusophone countries UNODC The Brazilian port of Santos plays a vital role in this route. Cocaine seizures rose from 1, kg in to 27, kg in Proinde Large cocaine seizures were registered from —, mainly in three transhipment hubs: the northern hub, comprising of Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Gambia and Senegal, the southern hub, comprising of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana and the eastern hub comprising of Mali and Mauritania, with Brazil identified as the main departure point UNODC a. Maritime trafficking coexists with trafficking by air, both through commercial and general aviation. Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau are frequently associated with the Lusophone route, particularly during the time periods noted above, when cocaine flow through West Africa peaked UNODC b , however Lusophone countries in southern Africa have also grown in importance. In , nine Angolans were arrested in Portugal linked to cocaine trafficking, and in every passenger was screened on two flights to Luanda from Sao Paolo, resulting in the identification of over 20 cocaine couriers on each flight UNODC b. The cocaine was hidden inside Renault cars manufactured in Brazil and exported to Angola. While Angola has become less of a recognised hub for drug trafficking, with a low ranking for drug trafficking according to the Organised Crime Index — cocaine is still the most prevalent drug moving through the country GITOC a. In , two individuals were detained at Luanda airport coming from Brazil with 12 kilos of cocaine Macau Business In June , an Angolan individual was arrested at Recife airport for attempting to traffic 4. Alongside Angola, Mozambique has become a growing concern. The country is already well established for heroin trafficking from the Makran coast, and there have been increased levels of cocaine arriving in the country for onward transit to South Africa and Europe. Mozambique became a hub for illicit flows as heroin transiting the Indian Ocean began to move further south after successful interdictions in Kenya and Tanzania. Heroin is currently the primary illicit commodity moving through Mozambique. Mozambique is also a hub for illegal logging, trafficking of ivory and rhino horn and the illicit trade in rubies, as well as migration crimes and arms trafficking GITOC b. The growth of Mozambique as a hub for illicit activity is also linked to allegations that key party officials are profiting from organised crime. There is also limited public trust in government institutions, particularly the criminal justice system and anti-corruption infrastructure. This creates a conducive environment for the movement of illicit goods. The emergence of an Islamist insurgency in northern Mozambique in has expanded the enabling environment for illicit activity, as well as the number of actors seeking to profit from it. Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique has been the primary hub for illicit activity, as dhows transporting heroin from the Makran coast to East Africa have moved down the coast from Kenya and Tanzania following significant seizures. Initially dhows were landing near Mocimboa de Praia, and transferring heroin to fishing boats Haysom Mocimboa de Praia has been a hub for the trafficking of heroin, arms and people, but since the town was taken over by the insurgent group Ahlu Sunna wa Jammu ASWJ in August , dhows have been moving further south to Pemba and even Nacala to avoid risks posed by the insurgency. Dhows have also been used to transport people from the Horn of Africa to the Mozambican coast. Once landed, drug shipments move in different directions. Methamphetamines are primarily destined for the South African market, whereas heroin moves both north and south overland Eligh As well as being the entry point for heroin and methamphetamines, ports in Cabo Delgado — particularly Pemba and Nacala — are also being used to export commodities, particularly wildlife, Illegal timber, rubies, ivory and pangolin scale have all been identified USAID Weak governance in Cabo Delgado has provided an opening for illicit activity, and this is further exploited by OCGs to expand their activities. InsightCrime argues that the routes established by the heroin trade have attracted Brazilian organised crime to begin shipping cocaine Ford With InsightCrime first raising the alarm regarding cocaine trafficking into Mozambique in , seizures have steadily increased. However, there are also instances where cocaine has been seized in Pemba, arriving in containers from Brazil All Africa Once in Mozambique, cocaine uses the same routes as heroin and methamphetamine to reach markets in South Africa and Europe. The link to Brazil has been well established through the seizure of containers mentioned above. Cocaine destined for Mozambique is also being seized in Brazil. On 7 June , two people were arrested at Rio de Janeiro airport enroute to Maputo with 18 kg of cocaine. This followed a March arrest at Sao Paolo airport with 5kg, and a January arrest at Fortaleza airport with 32kg, the latter travelling to Mozambique via Portugal Ford As mentioned above, prior to Covid, many more incidents were recorded with smaller amounts of cocaine, including the five incidents in at Sao Paolo airport Ford Travel restrictions in forced traffickers to rely on post and commercial freight, as in the case of cocaine disguised in soap bound for Mozambique Brazilian Ministry of Economy A trade agreement signed between Brazil and Mozambique in that facilitated the import of containerised goods from Brazil eased container movements, even though it is not the shortest route Johnson In October , 5 tons of cocaine disguised in washing powder was seized in the port of Rio de Janeiro port, about to depart for Mozambique El Pais However, seizures only represent a fraction of the current flow of cocaine to Mozambique, particularly given the allegations on the involvement of state officials. As discussed above, cocaine shipments are not new in Mozambique. A more recent trend has been attempts by the PCC to consolidate control over Mozambique as a cocaine hub for eastern Africa and the far east. According to the local newspaper Carta MZ Carta de Mozambique Fuminho, at the moment of his detention, was already in control of the main cocaine supply lines in Mozambique and coordinated shipments to South Africa, from where cocaine could easily reach other parts of Africa and Europe. Senior sources at the Brazilian Federal Police have confirmed that the PCC is exploring new routes to Africa and that Fuminho had been operating in Africa for at least 10 years. According to the Brazilian press, the main mission of Fuminho was to secure the African route in a move that would have represented the second international expansion of the PCC after consolidating its control of Paraguayan cocaine routes. In recent years, Fuminho trafficked both cocaine and arms to several African countries and built an association with Nigerian partners Diniz Nigerian organisations frequently rely on the PCC to export cocaine to Nigeria through the port of Santos Adeleye The role of Tuta may have been to provide a similar connection to Mozambique. On the contrary, to date the PCC has collaborated with other organisations. In this case, the PCC acted as the main wholesale supplier for the Italian organisation. However, when it comes to domestic groups, the PCC has been more forceful. Cocaine routes through Paraguay used to be controlled by local criminal organisations, the most prominent of which was the Rotela Clan. This clan was eliminated when the PCC sought to control cocaine trafficking chokepoints into Brazil, more specifically in Pedro Juan Caballero. As the PCC moved into Paraguay, it became one of the dominant actors, controlling jails, opening new routes and eliminating local organisations by force. While pushing out local criminal organisations, local corrupt elites took advantage of new opportunities brought by the PCC, and quickly established alliances with the group. The first hint is that Fuminho, the PCC associate, had been operating in Southern Africa for 10 years without clashing with any other local organisations, or raising any significant alarms among local institutions. In addition, it is likely that Paraguay was seen by the PCC as an open market, ready to be captured and transformed into a drug trafficking hub that was tied into Brazil. In other areas, the PCC has revealed an interest in colluding where necessary, rather than clashing, as evidenced in the partnership with Nigerian organisations. The PCC has potentially also tapped into their networks with other international organisations to access senior officials and elites to provide protection, infrastructure and financial services. The PCC has also demonstrated that it prefers operating in states that are already criminalised, or are in an advanced state of criminalisation. This allows them to operate with a lower profile, exploiting existing routes, facilitators and corrupt local elites. In sum, investment needed to consolidate new routes is significantly lower than in places where they must replicate those conditions through the use of force. The challenge with Mozambique will be the extent to which the PCC can support the interests of the political elite cashing in on organised criminality rather than compete. Criminal markets in the country are not dominated by domestic criminal groups, rather they are overseen by powerful individuals. Organised crime in Mozambique is dominated by political elites, with commodities split between different actors. To maintain this division, law enforcement have also been recipients of significant bribes related to drug trafficking, such as the Chief of Customs Domingos Tivane Wikileaks Mohamed Bashir Suleman, identified in as one of the largest drug traffickers in Mozambique, was linked to then President Guebeza president from — and former President Chissano president from — , and provided substantial campaign finance to both Wikileaks A major scandal involving Guebeza was the take-over of the Northern Development Corridor in July by Insitec Ltd, a company of which Guebeza was a major shareholder Wkileaks The contract involved management of Nacala port and the northern rail network — both key conduits in the movement of illicit commodities. Celso Correira was installed as the head of Insitec Ltd, later becoming the campaign manager for current president Filipe Nyusi, and later Minister for Land and Rural Development Norbrook The current president, Filipe Nyusi incumbent since January has taken a stronger stance against some forms of illicit activity, particularly the illegal wildlife trade. Criminal markets have involved foreign criminal actors until established, at which point domestic actors take over. This is likely because the profit margin in Mozambique, as a transit hub, is not high and political elites are eager to capitalise on the profits that are available. The most long-standing illicit trades are flora and fauna. The trade in timber is controlled by Chinese syndicates, but they work in partnership with Mozambican police as noted above. Chinese syndicates operate fishing vessels along the coast that are used to transport wildlife products USAID Initially, the heroin trade was dominated by Pakistani organised crime groups but has since shifted to Mozambican actors. As stated, the arrest of Fuminho in indicates interest from the PCC in controlling the cocaine trade into Mozambique, with Fuminho working to build partnerships in Mozambique. As with the other illicit flows, there is an expectation that Mozambican elites will be keen to profit from the growth of a cocaine route through the country. In recent years, Mozambique has become a central hub for multiple illicit commodities. The ports in Cabo Delgado province have become points of convergence with different commodities being imported and exported. While weak rule of law initially encouraged Pakistani OCGs to use Mozambique as a transit hub, political elites have been known to take advantage of heroin flows in particular, using other illicit commodities to appease law enforcement. While there is some appetite among law enforcement to respond, the operating environment is difficult. The impact of Covid and the insurgency in northern Mozambique both created a distraction, justifying the lack of government response. The growth of organised crime in Mozambique is facilitated by the involvement of political elites, who have an interest in increasing profits. Political involvement also ensures that the criminal justice system remains weak. Most seizures that have occurred in Mozambique are as result of investigations conducted alongside international actors. Police that are not corrupt are reluctant to pursue criminal actors because of the linkages to politicians Wikileaks In addition, government agencies do not coordinate, which limits those investigations that do go ahead USAID Democratisation is reported to be in retreat in Mozambique, and the response to corruption is also in decline USAID Journalists reporting on corruption or other sensitive issues are at risk of violent attacks Freedom House Money laundering is also relatively straightforward as a result of a casino law introduced by President Guebeza in January to reduce gambling restrictions, reducing the minimum investment for a casino from 15 to 8 million USD, legalising online gambling and allowing slot machines to be positioned in otherwise non-gambling environments Wikileaks As a hub for illicit flows, Cabo Delgado province is highly marginalised, with few livelihood options and limited state presence. As a result, it has also become a hub for exploitative practices in other industries, with human trafficking networks using forced labour in ruby mines USAID The lack of state presence has been a factor in the emergence of ASWJ insurgency since ASWJ does not appear to be directly involved in illicit activity in Cabo Delgado, although the group does reportedly tax flows moving through towns and areas under their control Haysom It is likely that the presence of insurgents is making it more difficult for political elites to benefit from illicit flows moving through ports in northern Mozambique. As a result, there have been increased raids on drug traffickers. In , a government taskforce intercepted multiple vessels resulting in arrests of several foreign drug traffickers, who all received a year prison sentence USAID More recent analysis points to the resilience of trafficking routes in northern Mozambique, shifting away from areas controlled by insurgents and taking alternatives such as through south Cabo Delgado and Nampula Stanyard et al. The growth of cocaine trafficking in Mozambique can be seen as an expansion of the Lusophone route. Links between Brazil and Europe have been strengthening, even as Antwerp and Rotterdam have overtaken Portugal and Spain as the primary entry points. While the importance of African transit hubs has waxed and waned depending on international law enforcement attention, the expansionist objectives of the PCC have evidently resulted in investment into the cultivation of Mozambique as a new frontier for the movement of cocaine. Viewed objectively, the country presents as a strong candidate. Mozambique has become a major hub for heroin and methamphetamine arriving from the Makran coast, with well-established routes to distribute drugs to other parts of Africa and Europe. Accordingly, Mozambique has the infrastructure to support the entry of another commodity. However, unlike other countries where the PCC has taken a key role in cocaine trafficking, such as Paraguay, the political elite are not looking for an external actor to support their interests. For other commodities, these elites have taken control of criminal markets once they have proved to be profitable. As a result, the arrest of Fuminho in may have been collateral damage as Mozambican elites appease donors keen to strengthen the fight against organised crime in the country, or it may be evidence that the PCC has established a criminal market these elites are eager to capitalise on. As of August , Rwandan forces had pushed insurgents out of Mocimboa de Praia. The authors were contracted by the Royal United Services Institute. Adeleye, P. How Nigeria has become key transit hub for global cocaine trafficking. The Africa Report , 16 June. Available at. Mozambique: 25 kilos of cocaine seized in Pemba. All Africa , 27 April. UOL Noticias , 20 December. Benjamin, R. Dakar cocaine seizure shows West African ports are easy transit hubs. The African Report , October Brazilian Ministry of Finance. Brazil Ministry of Finance , 13 September. Clavel, T. Insightcrime , 26 September. Coutinho, L. PRISM , 8 1 : 57— Diniz, K. El Pais , 6 October. Eligh, J. A synthetic age: The evolution of methamphetamine markets in Eastern and Southern Africa. Quantities kg of cocaine seized to Ford, A. Insightcrime , 18 June. Freedom House. Global Organized Crime Index: Angola. Issue 8. Global Organized Crime Index — Mozambique. Observatory of illicit economies in Eastern and Southern Africa. Issue 16, February—March. Globo , 17 June. Haysom, S. Herbert, M. Johnson, RW. PoliticsWeb , 17 May. Kaminsky, K and Squeff, L. Eles tomaram o poder. VEJA, February Linsell, I. Drug trafficking via commercial passenger flights from Brazil. Osprey , 25 August. Macau Business. Angola: Citizens detained at Luanda airport with 12 kilos of cocaine from Brazil. Macau Business , 22 September. Mimi, Y. Insightcrime , 22 April. Norbrook, N. The Africa Report , 10 April. Portal de Angola. Portal de Angola , 17 September. Drug smuggling on bulk carriers out of Brazil on the rise. Proinde , 4 May. Radwin, M. Insightcrime , 17 April. Shaw, M. Rethinking the significance of cocaine seizures. Issue 23, October Insurgency, illicit markets and corruption: The Cabo Delgado conflict and its regional implications. Thomas, S and Jenkins, M. Transparency International , 13 December. Trading Economics. Brazil exports to Africa. Cocaine from the Andes to West Africa to Europe. Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa. World Drug Report Cocaine Insights 1. Ver Angola. Brazilian police detain Angolan at Sao Paulo airport for drug trafficking. Ver Angola , 23 March. Narcotrafficking on upswing, concerns about government connections. Home About. Research Integrity. Crime Beyond Borders. Abstract Mozambique is becoming recognised as an emerging hub for cocaine trafficking, with links stretching back to Brazil. Year: Submitted on May 7, Accepted on May 12, Published on Feb 19, Peer Reviewed. CC Attribution 4. The Lusophone Cocaine Trade Brazil represents an attractive hub for cocaine trafficking organisations in South America. The Emergence of a Lusophone Route to West Africa While West Africa has received the most notoriety for cocaine trafficking, connections between Lusophone countries have expanded the sphere of influence of Brazilian organised crime groups in particular. The Rise of Mozambique as a Criminal Hub Mozambique became a hub for illicit flows as heroin transiting the Indian Ocean began to move further south after successful interdictions in Kenya and Tanzania. An Elite Driven Criminal Environment Organised crime in Mozambique is dominated by political elites, with commodities split between different actors. A Contested Market In recent years, Mozambique has become a central hub for multiple illicit commodities. Conclusion The growth of cocaine trafficking in Mozambique can be seen as an expansion of the Lusophone route. References Adeleye, P.
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South African police display a half ton of seized cocaine. Tons of cocaine are washing over the coasts of East and Southern Africa. As global.
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The South African police suspect the involvement of some of Mozambique's political elite in this trade. DRUGS. Mozambique is an integral part of a major heroin.
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