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The Berlin Attack and the “Abu Walaa” Islamic State Recruitment Network

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Share via:. Abstract: The Berlin truck attack last December by Anis Amri, a Tunisian extremist suspected of communicating with Islamic State operatives in Libya, was not just the first fatal Islamic State-linked attack on German soil. It also exposed the danger posed by a radical network that Amri belonged to in northwestern Germany. The network, led by Iraqi preacher Abu Walaa, is believed to have recruited dozens to travel to join the Islamic State, communicated extensively with Islamic State operatives in Syria and Iraq, and encouraged attacks on German soil. What investigators are learning about the network could have severe implications for European security. Prior to the attack, German law enforcement agencies were well aware Amri was a sympathizer of the Islamic State and had talked about committing an attack. It details key figures of the Abu Walaa network and how they operated, indoctrinated, recruited, and communicated. It then also examines what is known about the links between the Abu Walaa network and Islamic State operatives in Syria. Finally, this article examines the implications for the threat moving forward in Germany and Europe. He grew up in Oueslatia in the Kairouan Governorate in northern Tunisia 13 with three brothers and five sisters. Instead, he was a troublemaker who dropped out of school when he was 15, lived off occasional jobs, and turned to drugs and alcohol. When Amri entered the European Union on April 4, , 18 via the Italian island of Lampedusa, he claimed to be 16 years old. The Italian authorities asked Tunisia for travel documents in order to return Amri to his home country, but the request went unanswered. It was during his incarceration in different Italian jails b that Amri became radicalized. On June 17, , Italy was legally required to release Amri from a deportation facility because Tunisian authorities had not responded to its request to send travel documents for him. In the first six months after his arrival in Germany, between July and December , Amri registered at least five times as an asylum seeker under different identities. Under his different names, 28 he attracted police attention several times—for example, for stealing a bicycle, hitting a security guard with a fist in the face, e and having pictures of people in black robes posing with AKs on his cell phone. He also had keys to the building and often slept there overnight. Also on the list is Hasan Celenk, a year-old Turkish-Kurdish preacher who, alongside Simeonovic, was allegedly the other top deputy to Abu Walaa. According to investigative files, in December and January , Simeonovic talked to others in the Abu Walaa network about organizing the logistics in order to send Amri to Syria. He was occasionally under police surveillance, and his phone calls were intercepted. One was an investigation into three Tunisian nationals, where Amri was flagged for being a contact person of a contact person of the three. Nevertheless, in early February, federal criminal police BKA assessed the probability of an attack carried out by Amri at 7 out of 8, which, under its definition, means an attack can nearly be ruled out. When law enforcement agencies learned that Amri was planning on stealing goods from the house of a wealthy Lebanese outside Berlin in order to acquire money for the purchase of weapons, the Berlin prosecutor launched an official investigation. From April , Amri was placed under surveillance in Berlin and his phone wiretapped. Then, on July 30, he was arrested in a bus when he tried to leave for Switzerland with falsified Italian identification cards. Investigators believe Amri was possibly on his way back to Tunisia. After two days in custody pending deportation, he was released because German authorities had no verification of his identity from Tunisia. Most of what Amri did between the end of the wiretap of his phone on September 21 and the attack on December 19 is still unclear. Five days before the attack, on December 14, Amri came to Berlin. On the day of the attack, Amri repeatedly called a former roommate investigators have not said which one , but it remains unclear if they actually spoke. On his way, he sent a voice message and a picture from within the truck via the Telegram messaging app to several individuals in Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia. I am inside the vehicle now. Pray for me, my brother, pray for me. Anis Amri in the attack claim video he filmed on the Kieler Bridge Amaq. The truck was stopped by an automatic braking system after it was driven approximately 70 meters through the market, preventing even greater loss of life. It is very likely that he went to Emmerich, close to the Dutch border, where he had previously lived and where a witness has claimed to have seen him. On December 21, CCTV subsequently reviewed by investigators picked him up at train stations in the Dutch town of Nijmegen u and then in Amsterdam and Brussels, from where he apparently took a bus to France. Two hours later, he opened fire on two police officers who, in a random search, asked him for his ID at the suburb station of Sesto San Giovanni. Using the same Erma gun he had used to kill the Polish truck driver, Amri shot one officer in the shoulder before he himself was shot and killed. It remains unclear where he was heading when he left the Sesto San Giovanni station. Seventy-seven hours had elapsed since the attack at Breitscheidplatz. After when DIK opened the mosque, 70 Hildesheim emerged as one of hotspots of the salafi scene in Germany, and many extremists moved there. In North Rhine-Westphalia, German police simultaneously arrested two other leading figures in the network. One was Boban Simeonovic also known as Abu Abdurahman , a year-old Serbian and German national, who holds a degree in chemical engineering and ran the madrasa in Dortmund. The other was Hasan Celenk also known as Abu Yaha al-Turki , a year-old Turkish national who preached in his travel agency in nearby Duisburg. These two were the leading figures in the Abu Walaa network with whom Amri had repeated contact. All five individuals were arrested for supporting a foreign terrorist organization 73 and are currently awaiting trial in pre-trial confinement. Investigators believe they were the central figures in a network that recruited people for the Islamic State and facilitated their travel to join the group in Syria. According to Anil O. Anil O. Abu Walaa was born in al-Tamim, Iraq, in Abu Walaa came to Germany in and obtained permanent residency in through marriage. Abu Walaa, as identified to the author by a source. When prior to his arrest Abu Walaa was asked by German police for the reason for his trips, he claimed he wanted to visit relatives in Iraq. Simeonovic, described by Anil O. Celenk stressed the obligation of participating in jihad and made his students watch Islamic State execution and decapitation videos. The informant claimed that both men were supportive when Amri mentioned several times he would seek to commit an attack in Germany. The number of people the Abu Walaa network recruited for the Islamic State remains unknown. The official case file names 12 male individuals recruited by the network who successfully made the hijra and seven who attempted it. Abu Walaa also had a wide presence in the digital sphere. His content also appeared on the social media channels of Islamic State members and supporters. Abu Walaa was careful in other respects. He made sure there were no phones in the room when he talked about sensitive issues. Members of his network used the encryption app Telegram to communicate with each other and jihadis overseas. His words were well understood in the salafi scene as supportive of the Islamic State as Claudia Dantschke, who works in the field of prevention and deradicalization for the NGO Hayat has noted. It was from here that he gave money to those who wanted to travel to Syria. Fifen Youssouf was considered a close contact of Simeonovic, with the two having studied together at Dortmund University. The travelers simply stopped paying the monthly fees and gave the phones to Fifen Youssouf and Omeirat so they could resell them. They instructed him to contact them from Turkey once he had established contact with al-Almani. They had the means to forge or arrange for others to forge—Anil O. The Abu Walaa network was also linked to another attack in Germany. On April 16, , a bomb detonated outside a Sikh temple in the city of Essen, injuring three. Investigators believe that they were part of a group of teenagers who were radicalized by Celenk. As already noted, among these is Lemke, the year-old German national from Zeitz in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, who converted to Islam and later moved to Hildesheim and then left Germany for Syria with at least one wife and one child in November The fact that Anis Amri was able to upload a video pledging allegiance to the Islamic State before the Berlin attack, which was subsequently broadcasted by the Islamic State, also showed that members of the Abu Walaa network had ways to transmit information to the group. Siala was the former chairman of the DIK e. Another individual apparently in contact with Simeonovic was Silvio Koblitz also known as Abu Azzam al-Almani and Abu Soumaya al-Almani , who appeared in an Islamic State video in and threatened to attack Germany. Mahmoud is one of the most prominent German-speaking figures in the Islamic State, has run a mosque for German speakers in Raqqa, and has allegedly led a German-dominated Islamic State brigade. The fourth individual Simeonovic was allegedly in touch with was only identified by his kunya Abu Qatada, an Islamic State operative who apparently functioned as a warrantor for seven Germans who were about to leave to the caliphate at the time Simeonovic wrote the notes. State criminal police in North Rhine-Westphalia believe or at least did so in October that Abu Qatada is Christian Emde, a leading figure in the German-speaking Islamic State propaganda branch and a former member of the Millatu Ibrahim movement. Emde, born in Solingen in , converted to Islam and joined the Islamic State in It should be noted that Abu Qatada is also the kunya of an ethnic Albanian from Hamburg who was a close friend of Lemke, and research by the author suggests that this may actually have been the individual with whom Simeonovic was in contact. He was, as a result, confronted by Lemke who told him and Anil O. In the conversation recalled by Anil O. Lemke also told Anil O. Celenk had also organized at least one bus trip from Dinslaken to the Hildesheim mosque. These were not the only links between Abu Walaa network and the Islamic State. In traveling to join the group, Anil O. Ilhami told Anil O. Ilhami also said that Abu Walaa was a longtime supporter of the Islamic State and had been to Islamic State territory several times. Islamic State operatives in Syria were aware of the aspirations of at least one member of the Abu Walaa network to carry out an attack. Omeirat had in , according to Anil O. It seems clear that Abu Walaa knew of the alleged attack plans since Anil O. When Anil O. Yunus S. Shortly after the incident, when Anil O. Sheikh Hassan also told Anil O. They were sharing information in real time, coordinating on security-related issues and the logistics for hijra, and in at least one instance communicating on attack plans. The remaining parts of the Abu Walaa network could still pose a threat. In the Hildesheim mosque community, there are individuals still proselytizing who were very close to Abu Walaa and were possibly involved in the activities of the network. Investigators believe there were more people involved in the recruitment of individuals and the logistics of sending them to Syria than the five arrested. History shows that banned organizations like Millatu Ibrahim or Dawa FfM were replaced by similar associations with other figures rising up to fill leadership gaps. This interconnectedness provided and likely continues to provide what would otherwise be only groups aligned with the Islamic State and acting independently the ability to pool know-how and resources, making them significantly more effective and dangerous. The interconnectedness between the Abu Walaa network, other extremist networks in Germany, and the Islamic State provides the latter with a support network in Germany that is familiar with the country and its culture, law, and language. This could provide assistance to any attack cells the Islamic State has dispatched or might dispatch to the country. Online encryption messaging platforms such as Telegram have allowed Islamic State operatives in caliphate territory to keep in touch with recruiters and guide plotters in Europe. Celenk and Simeonovic used Telegram to communicate with Islamic State members in Syria, aw and Amri used Telegram to communicate with Islamic State operatives in Libya, as well as other members ax of the network in Germany. The presence in Europe of die-hard supporters of the Islamic State like Simeonovic with significant influence over young men, ongoing communication with Raqqa, and a deep commitment to launch attacks on European soil only makes the threat more severe. The case of Amri shows how difficult it is to predict which individuals will switch from radical rhetoric to radical action and how difficult it is to judge when individuals have shed their radical views. Amri dealt drugs and consumed them, a fact that appears to have led German police to mistakenly conclude that he no longer posed a threat. It seems unclear how similar networks will act now that the hijra to Syria becomes more and more difficult, but it seems that the threat for Germany and Europe will not grow smaller because of this reality. The case also underlined the high level of operational security maintained by radical networks in Europe, with the Abu Walaa network using encrypted communications and other security protocols. It took a long time for the leaders of the Abu Walaa network to be arrested as police had to rely on an Islamic State defector to get the necessary proof for arrest warrants. The Berlin attack demonstrated time is not on their side. Georg Heil is a Berlin-based investigative journalist who focuses on national security and Islamist terrorism. He has worked for public German broadcaster WDR and was part of a team that investigated the Abu Walaa network for more than a year for a documentary, which aired on ARD on November 8, —the day Abu Walaa was arrested. As part of his reporting, he spoke to one of those recruited by the group—Islamic State defector Anil O. Amri was not allowed to enter Germany because he did not have a visa and passport. Under the Dublin regulation, Germany was not responsible for examining any application under the Geneva Convention because Amri must have entered through another European Union country in which he could have applied for asylum. However, he could not be deported because he had no documents. Author interview, German intelligence official, January Abdulaziz Abdullah. VP01 did not participate in the hike. Author interview, German police official, February Ben Ammar, who used 18 different identities in Germany, denied those accusations. He claimed he did not know anything about the attack and that he had bought cocaine and hashish from Amri. Ben Ammar was deported to Tunisia on February 1, The official said a second suspected visit has not yet been proven. A significant number of them are German foreign fighters in Syria, and an estimated of them are foreigners within Germany. The wiretap on his phone was terminated on September 21, But the request was declined because the General Consulate claimed the person was unknown. It was not until two days after the attack that German authorities received the travel documents from Tunisia that were needed to deport him. Author interview, German counterterrorism expert and intelligence official, February While living there, he came into contact with salafis in He was in Syria between August and January 15, , according to the warrant. After he entered Turkey, he was detained and later released from prison but had to stay in Turkey until his case was resolved. The author, together with his colleague Volkmar Kabisch, first met Anil O. This first meeting with Anil O. Excerpts from a hidden camera interview with Anil O. He held Islam seminars in different German cities and was also present several times at al-Madina mosque in the city of Kassel in the state of Hesse, close to Hildesheim. Author interview, Anil O. Author interview, German police official, October He later crossed the border with others close to the Turkish village of Elbeyli. When he saw a Turkish military vehicle, Anil O. This indicates Abu Walaa had connections to the group before June when the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, renamed itself the Islamic State and declared the creation of a caliphate. The biographical detail on Lemke is from an author interview with a German counterterrorism official in the summer of Author interview, German intelligence official, fall Author interview, source, February As the mosque is now owned by a private individual, it cannot be seized by the state. Simeonovic used Telegram, according to an intelligence official. The last update on the document obtained by the author was made on December 14, The incident is also mentioned in the official file without a reference to where the Germans were from.

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