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Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking, a prominent criminal market in Turkey, is characterized predominantly by trafficking for sexual exploitation and forced labour. Other forms of human trafficking in Turkey are forced marriage and forced begging, as well as human trafficking to harvest organs. Human trafficking is the lifeblood of entire quarters in Istanbul and other urban areas, and is key to the border economy along the Caucasian and Iranian borders. In , Turkey emerged as a key transit state for migration and smuggling to Europe from countries such as Syria. At the height of the refugee crisis, Turkey was home to some of the most active and far-reaching smuggling networks, which facilitated migrant smuggling using false documents and transporting the individuals. After the EU—Turkey deal on irregular migration was reached in , the human smuggling industry experienced an initial dramatic drop. Moreover, in February , Turkey lifted its strict controls on its land and sea borders, prompting thousands of migrants to head to the borders to try to reach Europe. It is clear, therefore, that the Turkish state is not averse to using migrant smuggling into Europe as a political tool. The illegal arms trade is pervasive in Turkey, with firearm use and arms trafficking on the rise in recent years. Overall, Turkey plays a role as simultaneously a source, transit and destination country to greater or lesser degrees. The players involved in the illegal arms market can be classified broadly under three main types. First, there are criminal networks that supply handguns and shotguns to neighbouring Iraq, Syria, Iran — and across the world. Second, there is a much more sophisticated arms trafficking coalition that works illicitly to supply more advanced and profitable weapons. Finally, state-embedded individuals are thought to be involved in illegally transferring weapons to Salafi-Jihadist groups fighting in Syria and Libya, as well as providing weapons to paramilitary groups in Turkey. In sum, the arms trafficking market, therefore, is used instrumentally by the Turkish state for external political objectives. Oil- and gold-related crimes are the two most significant. Oil smuggling is one of the more profitable sources of income for organized crime groups in Turkey, which exploit a demand for cheaper oil and the opportunity to earn tax revenue from the sale of smuggled oil, sourced primarily from Syria, Iraq and Iran. Illicit oil, which is considerably cheaper than the legal alternatives, is easily accessible in the country. With regard to gold-related criminal activity, most comes in the form of sanctions violations and associated money laundering, with recent cases illustrating the connections made by the Turkish state with Iran and Venezuela, among others. The intentional burning of forests, one of the most severe forms of environmental degradation in Turkey, to open the path for commercial developments, is a regular occurrence in coastal areas, a phenomenon in which government corruption and political interests are key factors. Domestically, however, fauna crimes are not particularly pervasive. Although most drug markets are important in Turkey, the heroin trade is by far the most pervasive drug market in the country. Turkish organized criminal gangs control the wholesale importation of heroin into Europe. An increase in acetic anhydride seizures, a key precursor for processing morphine into heroin, suggests that heroin production is on the rise in Turkey, with laboratories scattered across Istanbul and in eastern provinces at the border. There is thought to be a two-way trafficking route between the Netherlands and Turkey, whereby heroin and morphine are trafficked from Turkey to the Netherlands, while acetic anhydride, MDMA commonly known as Ecstasy , and other drugs are moved in the opposite direction. Turkey also acts as a transit country for Captagon the drug compound fenethylline hydrochloride , with tablets produced in south-eastern Europe smuggled through the country en route to the Middle East. Cannabis use is fairly common in Turkey and it has been increasing in recent years, particularly among young males. Cannabis cultivation, both licit and illicit, is widespread, with the latter concentrated predominantly in the south-eastern region of Turkey and controlled largely by the Kurdistan Workers' Party and its associated groups and individuals. The cocaine market is fairly limited. Turkey is not on the major transnational cocaine trafficking routes and does not play an important role as a transit route for cocaine, although the prevalence of cocaine trafficking does appear to have increased recently. Turkey has become known as a mafia state and the evidence suggests that this is the case, now more than ever. The Turkish government often leverages certain criminal markets, such as the gold and oil trade, human smuggling and arms trafficking, for its own benefit and political purpose. Depending on political circumstances and geopolitical relations with other countries, the Turkish government chooses to either tighten or ease its control over organized criminal activity. State-embedded individuals are thought to be involved in illegally transferring weapons to Salafi-Jihadist groups fighting in Syria and Libya, as well as providing weapons to paramilitary groups in Turkey. Organized crime and state-embedded individuals have extremely strong and complex links, dating back many decades and continuing to today. There are a significant number of mafia-style groups operating in Turkey, modelled on the traditional mafia typology, with a strong hierarchy centred on the head of family, known as a baba. But these have gradually declined in Turkey, increasingly replaced by looser, compartmentalized networks of semi-autonomous cells. There are a huge number of loose criminal networks predominantly in areas close to Turkey's sea and land borders, such as Adana, Izmir, Diyarbakir, Reyhanli, Gaziantep and Istanbul. These networks engage in a litany of cross-border smuggling activities, ranging from trafficking narcotics to smuggling migrants. The capacity and influence of these criminal networks has increased in recent years, as have their links with criminal networks in neighbouring countries and beyond. With the growth and increasing diversity of illicit economies in Turkey, ad hoc networks are far more influential and more reflective of the nature of both licit and illicit trade than mafia-style groups. Although organized crime in Turkey is dominated by domestic criminal individuals, foreign criminals operate in the country as well, primarily in cross-border smuggling, including migrants, drugs and weapons, but also in transnational human trafficking operations. As such, their areas of operation are concentrated at the country's land borders and there is strong collaboration between these foreign and domestic-organized criminals. Foreign mafia groups and illegally armed groups, including terrorist groups that engage in organized criminal activity, are becoming increasingly visible in Turkey, exacerbated to a large extent by the spillover effects from conflict in neighbouring countries. In , the regime adopted constitutional changes that concentrated power in the hands of the president. Transparency and accountability are very limited and deteriorating. Almost all oversight mechanisms in the country are directly appointed and controlled by the government and are often used as a political tool to clamp down on dissent and political opposition. Corruption is rife across all levels of the state apparatus, due in large part to the ineffective anti-corruption agencies in the country and the inconsistent application of anti-corruption laws, all of which combine to create a culture of impunity. The extent to which the government not only abets organized crime but is the perpetrator of organized criminal activity on an industrial scale is the critical challenge facing policymakers and law enforcement generally. Turkey has a robust anti-organized crime legal framework, including legislation on most forms of organized crime, as well as legislation criminalizing the establishment and membership of an organized criminal organization. However, despite the strong presence of legislation pertaining to organized crime in Turkey, there is a major issue in the lack of application and enforcement of these laws. The problem in Turkey is not that anti-organized crime policies and legislation do not exist, but that such tools effectively become redundant when the entire system of government acts in such a way as to undermine them. Similarly, although extradition treaties are in place with a whole host of countries, there are severe concerns regarding the use of extradition processes and requests on the part of the Turkish government, which uses them only as a political tool, but also engages in illegal renditioning of suspected coup plotters. Stretches of the border, in particular those with Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan are particularly porous. However, many of the illicit flows across the Turkish borders are by design and are sanctioned by official authorities who do otherwise have the capacity to stop them. Overall, law enforcement capacity in Turkey is fairly strong, with a well-trained and well-equipped police and border force, as well as a number of special law enforcement units focusing on organized crime. The government has appointed thousands of judges loyal to the regime, which, with the purge of the judicial system following the failed coup in and the potential ramifications of ruling against the executive, has severely weakened judicial independence in Turkey. Long detention and pretrial periods are increasingly common in Turkey, and prison conditions are generally unsatisfactory, with severe overcrowding a major issue. Overall, therefore, as with many of the policies, legislation and institutional structures in Turkey, the judicial and detention systems look robust on paper but their effectiveness is severely compromised by the lack of independence and the extraordinary degree of interference and control by the Turkish state. Turkey is a regional financial centre for countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and faces significant money laundering risks, including the illicit proceeds from drug and human trafficking, and migrant and fuel smuggling. Although significant improvements to the anti-money laundering framework have been made in recent years, a number of serious shortcomings remain about issues such as proceeds of crime confiscation, managing frozen assets and the lack of restrictions on entering the country with substantial sums of cash, which makes tracking money laundering extremely difficult. The Turkish government has implemented and engaged in a number of organized-crime prevention initiatives, primarily in the trade of illicit drugs and human trafficking. Opioid substitution therapy is available in Turkey and the penal code provides for the option of treatment for drug users in place of a custodial sentence. Support for victims of human trafficking is relatively robust in Turkey, although there is a need for an increased number of victim shelters and an improvement to victim identification systems. Overall, both prevention, and victim and witness support measures in the country are sufficient. Where Turkey fails comprehensively with regard to civil society and social protection measures is in its treatment of non-state individuals. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Ankara. Income group Upper middle income. Population 83,, Geography type Coastal. Criminal markets 6. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 7. Human smuggling 9. Arms trafficking 9. Flora crimes 4. Fauna crimes 3. Non-renewable resource crimes 9. Heroin trade 8. Cocaine trade 4. Cannabis trade 5. Synthetic drug trade 5. Criminal actors 7. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 8. Criminal networks 7. State-embedded actors 9. Foreign actors 5. Political leadership and governance 3. Government transparency and accountability 3. International cooperation 3. National policies and laws 4. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 2. Law enforcement 3. Territorial integrity 6. Anti-money laundering 2. Economic regulatory capacity 4. Victim and witness support 4. Prevention 3. Non-state actors 3. Analysis Download full profile english. Trade The illegal arms trade is pervasive in Turkey, with firearm use and arms trafficking on the rise in recent years. Drugs Although most drug markets are important in Turkey, the heroin trade is by far the most pervasive drug market in the country. Criminal Actors Turkey has become known as a mafia state and the evidence suggests that this is the case, now more than ever. Economic and financial environment Turkey is a regional financial centre for countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, and faces significant money laundering risks, including the illicit proceeds from drug and human trafficking, and migrant and fuel smuggling. Civil society and social protection The Turkish government has implemented and engaged in a number of organized-crime prevention initiatives, primarily in the trade of illicit drugs and human trafficking. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

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