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Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have entered a perilously new era in their history. Caught between the rise in criminal violence domestically and the presence of the international drug trade, the so-called Northern Triangle of Central America is fighting for its survival. A bleak economic landscape has fostered youth gangs known as maras and domestic smugglers to build a relationship with the great drug syndicates of Mexico and South America with impunity permitted by a corrupt police and government. How have the cartels exerted such dominance over Central America with most of the US bound cocaine now going through these countries? And what can be done to regain control of an isthmus in free fall? But in the aftermath of the tumultuous political cycles of strongmen, coups and civil wars, the sub-continent is now witness to the dizzying levels of violence brought on by gangs of nihilistic youths and powerful foreign drug trade organizations. In the past decade criminality has risen exponentially throughout the region. Yet the crime wave has overwhelmingly been felt much more strongly in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. Honduras has had nearly 50, violent deaths in the last decade alone. Among security circles, these countries are referred to as the Northern Triangle due to their relative positions to one another, shared history, and more recently their combined role in the Latin American drug trade. The main narrative tropes that have shaped the isthmus can be best typified by the experiences of Honduras and Guatemala. It is their recent past that can explain why such a distinct criminal silhouette has been cast over Central America. The tormented region is slowly coming back to the fore of international press but hardly for an enviable reason: the drug war has metastasized into an existential threat for the isthmus. The ease with which foreign criminal enterprises have made their presence felt in Central America has been partly due to their keen eye in finding suitable conditions for their businesses. In the case of the Northern Triangle, they have found dispossession to exploit, corruption to exacerbate but more than anything they have found a vast labor pool to hire from. The smuggling clans of Central America known as transportistas and the larger transnational elements hire maras to perform smaller scale criminal such as drug running, targeted murders and extortion. Generally speaking, maras are violent criminal organizations that began as turf gangs who originally engaged in local opportunistic delinquencies, and have now internationalized into networked and complex structures with a growing political consciousness. The maras phenomenon finds its origin on the streets of the poor and racially segregated neighborhoods of s Los Angeles. The first recognizable mara to take shape was the 18 th Street gang comprised of Mexican and Central American immigrants. The original maras were formed by Latino workers who were shunned by the established American gangs that existed in the Rampart area of the city eponymously on 18 th street ; namely the Chicano or Mexican-Americans and African-American gangs. At first in order to put an end to the harassment dispensed by the dominant gangs, the migrants banded together to defend themselves. But with time they ended up adopting the profile of an inner city American gang eventually growing to a powerful force in their own right. Twenty years later in the same area of LA, scores of Central American refugees, predominantly Salvadoran settled into the same dispossessed communities of the Rampart area. The Salvadoran refugees, some being former members of both the death squads and guerillas, organized themselves into self-defense groups to defend against the established gangs. They entered in a feud with the 18 th street gang, the Bloods, the numerous Chicano gangs and finally came together in forming the Mara Salvatrucha or MS13 , slang for Salvadoran mob. The bitter rivalry that has since left thousands of MS13 and 18 th Street gang members dead was first seeded in these early turf wars in LA. Other gangs that are not affiliated with the MS13 or M18 find their roots in the political hooliganism of the Cold War where bands of leftwing and rightwing youths would clash across ideological lines. These groups were much smaller and usually kept to their immediate neighborhoods. Though at one point the maras were all relegated to the slums of east LA, they were soon exported to other parts of the United States once other illegal Central American immigrants joined the gangs in other diaspora communities throughout the country, most notably those of Chicago, Montgomery county in Maryland and New York City. In the case of the Northern Triangle states, no others have been as significant as the 18 th Street and MS In the case of the younger deported mareros , they were sent to a country they had never even set foot in. Galvanized by the experiences of the ghetto life in LA, most mareros began to build informal marginal communities on the peripheries of the major cities of Central America. It was at this point in the mids that barrios marginales began to grow on the outskirts of cities, growing after each subsequent wave of deportation. With little state presence in these barrios many would ultimately come under control of the maras. It is estimated that nearly 70, mareros exist in Central America alone, with an equal high number living in the United States. Honduras is accountable for over half at 36,, while Guatemala has 14, and El Salvador has 10, mareros. The nearest count in any neighboring country is 2, in Costa Rica. It also bears mentioning that not all of these mareros are 18 th or MS13, there are a great deal many more gangs, however these two that are the most developed and complex organizations. In fact, Honduras has the dubious distinction of having the most number of different gangs in Central America with over different maras vying for control , while El Salvador and Guatemala are almost neatly split between the feuding 18 th and MS Modern maras have become untethered from their Angelino origins. The identity of such maras as the M18 and MS13 in the Northern Triangle are contoured by the experiences of the barrio they are based from. Central American gangs are made up of individuals washed up as detritus in the periphery of a society that simply does not have time for them. These people are often the orphaned, those left behind by immigration, the disenfranchised, the destitute, the wayward, and simply put those that society has cast aside and government has routinely criminalized. Once the initiated become part of their neighborhood clica , they are imbued with a sense of pride, kinship and, most importantly, of belonging that was not there before. This is reinforced by the application of armed violence to empower themselves by way of open defiance towards the state, and more importantly war against rival maras. That is to say that a MS13 gang member will be treated as a brother in arms whenever he is in MS13 territory. The opposite is also true: the blood feud between gangs stops at no border. The members of the transnationalized maras are thus part of every barrio their gang controls, making each marero part of a far greater subculture stretching beyond their communities and countries. And for the aimless and disenfranchised youths of Central America this has proven to be an important enough reason to seek membership. In their place social exclusion has been more strictly demarcated, poverty has risen and the dispossession of the youth has crippled development in Central America, with the Northern Triangle being disproportionately affected. Furthermore, with a deficient education system, governments incapable of creating jobs, in a region where unemployment and poverty are endemic, an ideal climate for gangs to permeate is easily fostered. The only growth sector in most Central American cities is the informal job market, in which seven out of ten new jobs are illicit. The unprecedented growth of informal economies in Northern Triangle states has contributed to the widening of inequality in as the middle class continues to disappear, pushing many into the grips of unmonitored and often dangerous sources of employment. Distrust of government and a historical opprobrium to authority have also left communities without support as social workers are simply not allowed into the more troubled areas of the cities. The heavy burden migration has on the families of the at risk communities in the Northern Triangle has been the major cause for the development of maras. Family units are being destroyed as paternal and maternal figures leave to richer countries with their children in the custody of an equally struggling family member or friend; many times never coming back. The returning criminal deportees also easily relapse into a life of crime when faced with the realities of the streets. In the Northern Triangle there is no such thing as simply quitting a gang. It is a lifelong commitment that leaves many individuals with very few alternatives. The local authorities have not been able to keep up with deportation rate. Often times the authorities incarcerate the deportees without being charged and send them to dangerously overcrowded prisons where conditions are rated among the worst in the world. Essentially, Mano Dura legislation is a series of zero tolerance policies that have enhanced the power and authority police have, set harsh jail time for mareros, outlawed maras altogether, and allowed the military to patrol alongside police forces amongst others. The Mano Dura approach is seen as a populist measure, and is criticized as a less than effective method of dealing with the gang problem; moreover, it is now considered a catalyst to further escalation. Since then maras have adapted and changed their modus operandi , making them less identifiable. Maras as a whole continued to operate, even grow, unabated. El Salvador and Honduras have unsurprisingly been on the forefront of harsher penalties against gang members, yet this has only resulted in increased police brutality, overcrowded prisons and rising gang membership. Since , over inmates have died in Honduras due to the routine riots and prison takeovers that plague the system. The ramshackle overcrowded prison that was designed for convicts had at the time of the inferno nearly full time prisoners. So far Honduras has had five deadly prison fires in the past 15 years where more than 80 people die. Many in the country believe this indicates a far more sinister plot, hinting of social cleansing on behalf of the government when likely the case is the government simply does not have the reformation of the prison system, law enforcement or courts as a priority. The more developed gangs are those that are transnational, organized into interconnected cells and represent a challenge to the authority of the state. Both the MS13 and 18 th Street, who began as small time inner-city gangs in the failed neighborhoods of Los Angeles, are now present throughout the Americas. Their presence in most major US metropolitan areas has been connected with the directives of leaders in prison, or as was the case in an assault against 18 th Street gang members in Talanga, Honduras, an MS13 leader was found guilty of ordering the hit from a prison in North Texas. Much like in Colombia, where the absence of a state left armed actors such as the paramilitaries and guerilla as de facto authority, the maras have similarly taken control in the barrios of Central America. Made up of the lost children of the failed communities of the Americas from Los Angeles to San Jose, mareros have been described as a criminal insurgency, with violent death rates exceeding even those of conflict zones. The violence these countries suffer is of course not sourced exclusively by the dispossessed youth of the slums. Recently the main point of contact after cocaine leaves South American has become Honduras. The country has always had a fecund environment for criminal groups to take root on account of the its ideal geographic location and more importantly its chaotic political system, something that has yet to change. The transportistas , essentially smugglers, first emerged during the s as the civil wars and dictatorships in the adjacent states created a black market for goods from the less restricted Honduras. In fact, the first Honduran transportistas were set up in order to smuggle cheese to El Salvador and Guatemala. Presently, Honduran transportistas are the middlemen between the polar extremes of the drug trade. Two major groups are currently making their presence felt in Honduras: Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel. With different focal points of influence Sinaloa affiliated networks to the West and those aligned with Los Zetas to the North , the Mexican gangs essentially franchise out the northward acquisition and movement of cocaine, human trafficking particularly the Zetas and weapons sectors to the Honduran middlemen, while maintaining a presence in the countries themselves for purposes of oversight. Most of the illicit narcotics arrive in Honduras by either air or sea, and most of this is focused in the barely accessible easternmost region of the country, La Mosquitia. The area is densely forested with very little state presence and an absence of opportunities for the inhabitants transforms the communities into an ideal port for the drug trade. Generally understood to be the main drop off point, La Mosquitia is the main point of contact between the South Americans and the transportistas. Go-fast boats named so because of their capability to outrun all law enforcement vessels , and narco-subs homemade submersibles that sail by night, and are submerged by day , take to the seas inching off the coasts of Central America from Colombia and Venezuela. Landing on the Pacific or Caribbean coast, the people in the local communities will bring in the illicit cargo onto the mainland and take it to the subsequent point of contact. Not surprisingly, the turf wars that have erupted amongst the factions of newer criminal clans, older transportistas and maras have resulted in creating two of the most violent regions on the planet. The Mexican cartels have had little difficulty in cementing their presence by linking their networks with the native criminal elements of the maras and transportistas. The maras are contracted both by the dominant transportistas and the larger transnational elements to do more small-time activities. This includes extortion, protection, kidnapping, assassinations and intimidation. San Pedro Sula is now facing a turf war between the Sinaloa associated criminal groups and the Zetas hired guns. The city is the narcotics clearing house of Honduras earning the dubious honor of having highest homicide rate in the world with 82 homicides for every , inhabitants or three murders per day , compared to the national index of 78 homicides per , inhabitants comparatively, conflict zones such as Colombia, Somalia and Sudan are all well below 30 homicides per , inhabitants. As for the transshipment into Guatemala and El Salvador, these actions are carried out from areas in Copan and Ocotepeque which have been effectively seized from the state and are now mostly narco-run. El Paraiso has become the go to destination for the more established Honduran transportistas to reside in relative comfort. Just as in Honduras transportistas naturally emerged to trade with the military and guerillas of the country and its neighbors. Notoriously, domestic Guatemalan smugglers gained prominence as suppliers to the military. The smugglers would at first supply the pervasive armed forces with contraband, while conducting their own smalltime crimes. Yet unlike the civil war which lead to a significant degree of accountability being demanded for the atrocities committed by both sides, the current criminal insurrection has only sown the seeds of impunity. The Mendozas and Lorenzanas, the ruling smuggling clans of Guatemala, have in turn affiliated themselves with one of two of the stronger cartels that rule the turf of Southern Mexico: the Sinaloa or the Zetas. The men and women who make up the raw labor of the domestic criminal networks are typically maras who are hired by the clans. However, the most outstanding and uniquely Guatemalan and to a degree Salvadoran as well is the participation, collaboration and collusion from members of the civil war era military in developing the criminal networks of the country. As the internal violence came to an end, the next and second source of Guatemalan organized crime emerged. In the immediate disarray of post-war Guatemala, the security forces were downsized and scaled down as a result of the peace agreement, leaving a great deal of men who had participated in paramilitary actions, secret police activities or had simply spent years in the highlands without an alternate path of life. While the rural guerillas were afforded a more conscious demobilization and integration program through the government, security forces were simply left out on the street. Many of the demobilized soldiers had come into contact with the heads of organized crime that used to relay information on guerilla movements during the war. Once free of military service, many low and high ranking men joined the next generation of Guatemalan organized crime syndicates. The most notorious example of this track has been the defection of many former Kaibiles to the Zetas in Mexico and the Mendozas of Southeastern Guatemala. The Kaibiles are the elite forces division of Guatemala who specialize in counter-insurgency, and special operations formed at the height of the civil war to eliminate guerilla leaders. However, since the peace accords, there has been evidence that demobilized or retired Kaibiles are in high demand amongst criminal groups for both training and recruitment. The Northern Triangle is sliding past the point of no return. With the highest homicide rates in the world, amongst the most dangerous places in the world for journalists, dangerous levels of political instability and corruption, compounded by paralyzing levels of poverty, insecurity and unemployment, the situation for many of the transit countries stands to deteriorate further in the coming years. Without the capacity to fight back against the now metastasized threats, transnational criminal elements that have been preying upon the transit states will continue to exploit the weaknesses of these desperate communities. The combat fatigue of the Northern Triangle will likely continue to worsen. Be it either a compromised security apparatus nearly gone rogue, the apocalyptic youth of the barrios with nothing to lose, or the powerful transportistas of the countryside and their ability to ply local politicians into their fold, the Central America criminal ground is bustling. The reason Colombia is slowly taking back the towns lost to the guerillas and cartels is because they have the resources the political will to rid themselves of the slightest perception of corruption and a court system to prosecute them in. Colombia has taken a counterinsurgency approach to their law enforcement: take back territory lost to criminal groups, secure it by establishing a preventive police presence and holding by setting up social programs in the afflicted communities. The Northern Triangle and the greater Caribbean basin are in greater peril as meager resources with which to combat the crime, often squandered by corruption, are simply not enough to prevent these debilitated countries from becoming a chain of narco-states. Elsewhere in the region, several parishes in Kingston, Jamaica went to war over the arrest of local drug lord Christopher Coke which resulted in people being arrested, and over dead. In the wake of the brief but vicious turf war, the credibility of Prime Minister Bruce Golding has been cast into question as evidence of collusion between the ruling party and the Jamaican narcotraffickers has been exposed. The weak states caught in between the upstream narcotics business that is to say producing countries in the Andes, as well as harbors for traffickers such as Venezuela and the downstream suppliers such as Mexico , are under threat of becoming overrun by criminal organizations. The power and money the trafficking syndicates wield is at times greater than the budget, aid and succor countries like Guatemala, Guinea Bissau and Dominican Republic receive. For instance, since Guatemalan security elements have seized The level of corruption and criminal penetration into government particularly the policing and judicial structures of Central America has left many places, like El Paraiso in Honduras, to turn a blind eye to narco-activity at the cost of access to the wealth that comes from the drug trade. Other places in which the government has been effectively replaced by transnational criminal organizations, such as in Coban in Guatemala, or many barrios throughout the Northern Triangle where the local criminal groups, be they smuggling clans or maras hold de facto control of marginal areas with impunity under blind eye of the police and military either by fear of reprisals, or bribery. In Honduras the collusion between the police and criminal elements has given rise to a new phenomenon, that of a Police Cartel: police that moonlight as criminals to complement their meager wages. These examples of corruption and impunity continue to foment a strong distrust of governments in the region that will only make a resolution that much more remote. A weak judiciary, a discredited police force and a decrepit penal system have only continued to hoist the banner of impunity with which all the criminal groups act under. From the maras in the barrios , to the transportistas in their clandestine airfields and the dirty cops that cover their tracks, their ability to act without any worry of punishment for their crimes has allowed violence to skyrocket. While poverty, education and work assistance programs are often at the fore of developmental packages from many donor countries, the dire need to focus on law enforcement has yet to receive the attention it deserves. The historically reactionary justice thus far executed in the Northern Triangle has yielded nary any positive dividends, and while there have been some signs of progress in El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras has yet to even gesture towards changing the rigid status quo. The reformation of archaic security and judicial practices has left violent crime to grow unabated throughout the isthmus. Be it due to budgetary limitations, corruption or even collusion, the incapacity to rein in the domestic criminal violence aside from the entrenchment of transnational elements has derailed the development in the Northern Triangle. Before the litany of social issues that need to be redressed even begins to be considered, the governments of the Northern Triangle must regain control of the unraveled societies left in the wake of the dizzying homicide rates. While social factors such as poverty, family disintegration and lack of opportunities create the fertile environment for smugglers to thrive, youth gangs to coalesce and international actors to exploit, they do not in and of themselves force the violence to spiral out of control. An atmosphere in which murder, robbery, rape and other such crimes are seldom investigated, prosecuted or punished renders progress in any social front almost null. To accomplish the aforementioned the governments of the Northern Triangle would have to practice a bit of self-cauterizing; that is to reform themselves by manner of investigating any leads of corruption and cleaning house as it were of all compromised officials without quarter. Honduras and Guatemala have begun to do so with the police force, but so far the process has been mired in delays intimidation and obstructionism. It is of course absolutely vital to continue the mandate until completion, but the risks remain considerable. A recent casualty was Alfredo Landaverde, a Honduran government adviser who pointed fingers and named names of corrupt police officers and ended up shot dead soon after he made his accusations on national television. When the imperative concerns of impunity and criminal violence are addressed by means of purging the corrupt state employees and rebuilding the rule of law, the intractable social issues should be considerably easier to manage and target. The success of the Colombian experience at the brink of its own collapse at the peak of their drug war has demonstrated this to be a path worth pursuing. Until the political will, ample resources and courage are amassed to push back against the drug fueled criminal violence of the besieged Northern Triangle, their fate will remain in the hands of the violent few to the detriment of the victimized many. Back to top of the page. The Militancy of the Marginalized The ease with which foreign criminal enterprises have made their presence felt in Central America has been partly due to their keen eye in finding suitable conditions for their businesses. Criminals without Borders Recently the main point of contact after cocaine leaves South American has become Honduras. Notes Sullivan, John and Adam Elkus. Working paper. Washington, DC. Working Paper Ser. May-June National Drug Threat Assessment. July
In recent years, a top priority has been to stop cocaine, then other drugs such as heroin, Comayagua, Honduras, is a support facility of about
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Coast Guard Cutter Diligence crew returns to Wilmington after interdicting kilos of cocaine. Marine task force deploys to Central America. As part of the Beyond the Horizon humanitarian and civic assistance exercise, U. Air Force traveled to Lima, Peru as part of a subject matter expert exchange with the Peruvian air force May , During the five-day engagement, the U. Airmen worked closely with their Peruvian counterparts to share information on medical training, standards and evaluation, and public. David G. Bellon assumed command of U. Coast Guard offloads more than 18 tons of cocaine in Port Everglades. The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton offloaded approximately Wyoming National Guard provides medical care in Belize. BTH is a U. Partnership and camaraderie, the key to fighting fires in Central America. An official website of the United States government Here's how you know. Official websites use. Department of Defense organization in the United States. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites. Skip to main content Press Enter. Home Media News. May 30, U. May 25, U. May 24, Maj. News Archives 94 58 1. Counter Threats. Build Our Team.
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