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The new administration, which will be sworn in on July 28, , and govern the country until , will have public safety as one of its greatest challenges. But other factors are also at work. These valleys also serve as havens for Sendero Luminoso Shining Path insurgents who, in turn, provide protection to drug traffickers. At least 50 security force members lost their lives, while no terrorists were killed in combat or arrested. Meanwhile, public opinion polls register a growing perception that urban safety is deteriorating, exacerbated by media organizations sympathetic to former president Alberto Fujimori now serving a year sentence for human rights violations during the civil war against Sendero who have magnified public safety issues to promote the candidacy of his daughter Keiko in the April presidential election. Drug trafficking has spread significantly in recent years. Several indicators point to this fact. Since , the land area dedicated to coca crops has increased 38 percent. In spite of this increase, levels are still far below those seen during most of the s. Although the figure steadily decreased between and , from , to 96, acres , to 39, hectares , at the close of the decade it had climbed back to , acres 60, hectares. As a result, Peru has increased its potential production of cocaine by nearly percent while Colombia has seen a 32 percent drop. These numbers not only show disturbing production trends, but also demonstrate how ineffective the police have been. It is true that Peru did not receive the amount of cooperation that its neighbor to the north did through Plan Colombia. However, other indicators point to a lack of political will to tackle the problem. Daily, thousands of liters of chemicals used in cocaine manufacturing enter the coca-growing valleys without any controls. Plans have existed for years to develop mobile checkpoints along major transit routes in those areas to prevent this from happening. But so far no such checkpoints have been purchased. The institutions in charge of preventing the illegal diversion of these chemicals have not been able to agree on a computer system to track the movement of these components throughout the country. This unit, created in and tied to the Banking and Insurance Authority, is responsible for prevention and detection of money laundering and financing of terrorist activity. Today, Mexican cartels are responsible for purchasing cocaine from dozens of small local clans operating in a fragmented market. Mexicans are responsible for exporting the drug through the Pacific ports to consumer markets in the United States and Europe. Part of the Peruvian production has also been going to the Southern Cone and Brazil. The growth in drug trafficking has been accompanied by an increase in killings by sicarios hired assassins. In Lima, for example, such killings increased between and by over 50 percent. Although the public attributes the growth in crime to increased drug use, the rise in production of cocaine-related drugs in the country has not led to a significant increase in consumption. When Sendero Luminoso was strategically defeated in , what was left of its army withdrew into the wild, inhospitable and inaccessible regions of the VRAE and Huallaga. The insurgency remains largely ineffective, with only sporadic military action to counter the actions of security forces against illicit crop cultivation and drug trafficking. Today Sendero has two brigades: one comprising 60 men in the Huallaga and another comprising fighters in the VRAE. In the Huallaga, Sendero has been reduced to its lowest point as a result of police action, crop eradication and alternative economic development initiatives. The greater relative strength of the group in VRAE is explained partly by the lack of government presence and a preference for military action at the expense of policing efforts. The and military offensives were the largest of the decade after years of inaction. But the high casualties and lack of results brought them to a halt. Thus, although the VRAE force is geographically isolated, it remains a serious threat. This deterioration in public safety has occurred during a period that has seen rapid economic growth, poverty reduction and even a slight decrease in inequality. Paradoxically, the cities that benefited the most from this growth were those with reputations for being unsafe due to high crime rates. At the same time, the police, far from growing stronger, have continued to show a tendency toward weakness and retreat. On the one hand, they suffer from serious management problems, lack of transparency and corruption. On the other hand, police workplace rules have seriously undermined the public nature of policing. In practice, the days they work for the police department become their rest days. In recent years, opinion polls reflect the widespread perception that there has been a sustained increase in crime with an accompanying deterioration in urban safety. With few exceptions, police statistics reflect this deterioration. But this needs to be examined more closely. The most serious deterioration has been in homicides. During the period —, the national homicide rate per , inhabitants was five, while in the last five years it rose to 11—an increase of percent. The rate of homicides in Peru is far lower than the most violent countries in the region, but it is also true that it exceeds those of several countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, where rates have been below the global average of 8. Reported felony crimes between and stabilized at per , inhabitants, only to dip 10 percent and then average over the next five years. At least two-thirds of these complaints were for nonviolent property crimes, especially those committed in public. This trend is not reflected by reported stolen vehicles, which increased 50 percent between the first and the second half of the decade. Perhaps this deterioration has to do with declining police recovery rates for stolen vehicles, which decreased from 62 percent in the first five years of the decade to 50 percent in the second. Also bucking the trend of lower reported felonies is the increase in bank and financial institution robberies, which, although low, has doubled from 13 to 27 between the first and the second half. The same is true for the expansion of extortion, especially in the last two years in northern coastal towns like Trujillo and Chiclayo. Reported misdemeanors also showed an inverse relationship to felonies, having increased by 26 percent from to per , inhabitants. To a large extent, this is explained by the increase in domestic violence and gender-related violence complaints, which were first recorded by the police in and have since continued to grow exponentially. In spite of all of this, urban violence and crime have not overwhelmed the country. There are five reasons why. First, the increasing role of local governments, mainly through the emergence and development of civilian constabulary units serenazgos , which have begun to fill the void left by the police in crime prevention. Starting in , the number of serenazgos increased from just over 5, to 8, in Lima. At the national level, the number has grown from 10, to 15, A second factor is the growth of neighborhood watch groups, with police encouragement, along with the adoption of self-protection measures by the citizenry, and the exponential growth of the private security sector. The police have organized around 16, neighborhood patrols, comprising more than , individuals. There are registered private security companies, with nearly 88, employees. It is estimated that there are at least 35, additional agents in informal companies, not to mention informal vigilantes who work for hire, especially in low-income neighborhoods. These figures are not negligible when compared with the , police and the 15, local civilian constabularies. A third factor corresponds to the growing attempts at coordinating public, private and community efforts by local public safety committees inter-institutional bodies chaired by mayors with the purpose of diagnosing problems concerning safety, violence and crime. Currently, there is a National Council, 26 regional committees, provincial committees, and 1, district committees. Fourth, specialized police units in the investigation and prosecution of organized crime have been reinforced, which has provided at least some level of control over more sophisticated criminal activities. This may reflect the progressive toughening of criminal laws, the greater propensity of judges to order incarceration and a more effective penal system. Peru is a country beset by socioeconomic and environmental conflicts. Other conflicts are the result of disputes between regions for control over resources; opposition to public investment and infrastructure projects by the national government in those regions; disputes over access to jobs in the construction industry; disputes over prices, taxes and agricultural tariffs; and finally, claims by citizens against local governments. These are compounded by a crisis in political representation. Political parties are not seen as appropriate tools to solve these problems peacefully. Often, such conflicts result in protests that easily turn violent, with demonstrators resorting to actions such as property invasions and the blocking of local roads to draw the attention of the national government. While representing a recurring challenge to democratic governance over the past decade, these conflicts have also been a particular challenge for law enforcement officials responsible for maintaining and restoring public order. A handful of interior ministers, and even cabinet ministers, have had to leave office because of public safety crises. Protests reached their highest point following the fall of the authoritarian regime of Fujimori and Montesinos, in late , which had repressed popular mobilization. But since then the number of protest actions such as hunger strikes, roadblocks and strikes—particularly in the interior of the country—has declined. Indeed, civilian deaths in demonstrations rose steadily, from one in to 17 by , while injuries increased from in to in At the same time, the number of wounded policemen also increased steadily, from 90 in to in More significant is the rise in the number of police officers killed: one in , two in and 25 in , the latter during the Bagua incident mentioned above. Peru can solve its combined security and public safety problems. But it will require a coherent and comprehensive set of measures. First, it is necessary to stop the expansion of land cultivated with coca to minimize the production of cocaine. Though current levels of coca leaf production are far from what they were in the s, the steady increase in output over the past several years is still worrisome. The installation of mobile checkpoints at strategic locations in the coca-growing valleys and the establishment of an electronic control system for the transportation of chemicals used in the manufacture of cocaine can reduce the chances of illicit diversions. There should also be more determined fiscal and judicial investigations into the suspicious transactions identified in recent years by the Financial Intelligence Unit. Authorities should focus on the strategic pursuit of crime—that is, on investigations meant not only to arrest those responsible for the production and export of drugs, but to identify the modus operandi of criminal organizations, their main components and especially their leadership. These efforts should include the identification of micro-marketing drug networks in the country. Finally, it is crucial to treat drug addiction as a serious public health problem and allocate resources to expand treatment options, which are currently very limited. At the same time, the next administration must put an end to the remaining insurgencies. The lessons learned from defeating Sendero Luminoso in the early s and the experience of the Alto Huallaga should be applied to a new strategy that combines military presence, intelligence initiatives, alliances with the local population, and economic and social development efforts. Significant improvements in public safety can be achieved by reinforcing the coordinated efforts of public, private and non-governmental organizations in the prevention and prosecution of crime at the local level, with support from the central government. This implies strengthening the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana National System for Citizen Safety , with the establishment of a monitoring unit to collect and analyze criminal information on a regular basis. It also requires the establishment of a fund to finance local crime prevention initiatives. Jurisdictions of national institutions should be changed to coincide with political jurisdictions to enable them to participate more effectively in the design and implementation of local security policies. Mayors should also have expanded powers in their role as chairpersons of local public safety committees. Moreover, police and municipal governments should join forces under a single command the police commissioner , with a single political control the mayor. The serenazgos should be professionalized, and their operational, communication and education efforts should be coordinated. Finally, an interministerial committee for early warning and conflict management should be established under the control of the chief of the Council of Ministers. The committee should be assigned a technical team that analyzes and collects relevant data and facilitates the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts. All of these measures imply the reform and modernization of the Ministry of Interior and of the police. It is imperative for the ministry to have a stable team of security professionals, immune to constant political shifts, while the police must rethink workplace rules, strengthen criminal investigation capacity, modernize resource management, and develop mechanisms for transparency and accountability. Legislation that rewards merit and good conduct, and which promotes police professionalization and specialization, should also be explored. And there needs to be a re-evaluation of police deployment of manpower, which currently favors more affluent areas to the detriment of the poorest. The administration entering office next July must have an action plan for the next five years that is clear, coherent and bold. The new president must exert leadership, and he should have the broadest political support necessary to ensure implementation and continuity. There is really no alternative. Drug Trafficking On the Rise Drug trafficking has spread significantly in recent years. Persistence of Armed Insurgency When Sendero Luminoso was strategically defeated in , what was left of its army withdrew into the wild, inhospitable and inaccessible regions of the VRAE and Huallaga. Deteriorating Urban Safety This deterioration in public safety has occurred during a period that has seen rapid economic growth, poverty reduction and even a slight decrease in inequality. Increases in Social Violence Peru is a country beset by socioeconomic and environmental conflicts. Like what you've read? Subscribe to AQ for more. Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.

Security Challenges in Peru

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Arequipa is the second largest and most populated city located in southern Peru framed by three volcanoes. The region is home to 1. Arequipa is a crucial processing centre for alpaca, llama, and sheep wool. In the past years, and partly as a result of COVID, there has been an increase in the number of families who are living in poverty. Some people in the Arequipa region are involved in the illegal growing, trafficking and selling of cocaine. Recent studies have shown that there is an increase in demand for cocaine, and that this is directly linked to the rise in local production. Consumption increases in areas where drugs are being produced. In these cases children are exploited, working from 4am to 4pm collecting coca leaves, unable to attend school. Throughout Peru, many children experience violence and abuse. Violence comes in many forms and can be physical or mental. Children who live in poverty, especially in rural areas, have an increased chance of experiencing violence. We always work in the best interest of the children, young people and families. Children playing after school. How your support helps in Arequipa. When parents face hardships, they can sometimes struggle to give children the care they need. Each family needs different support so that they can stay together. We also run trainings so that parents can get the skills they need to get a job or start businesses. Likewise, we ensure that children can get medical help and go to school. We help them learn and develop in a safe and supportive environment. Young children spend time playing and learning at kindergarten. This prepares them for primary school. Some children cannot stay with their families, even with additional support. Here the children can build safe and lasting relationships. All the children in our care have access to education and healthcare. If children can return to live with their families, we help them adapt to this change. To help young people become confident and independent, our local team works closely with each young person to develop a plan for their future. We support young people and also help them prepare for the labour market and increase their employment prospects. They also improve their skills through taking part in different projects with local mentors and businesses.

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