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These datasets underpin the analysis presented in the agency's work. Most data may be viewed interactively on screen and downloaded in Excel format. All countries. Topics A-Z. The content in this section is aimed at anyone involved in planning, implementing or making decisions about health and social responses. Best practice. We have developed a systemic approach that brings together the human networks, processes and scientific tools necessary for collecting, analysing and reporting on the many aspects of the European drugs phenomenon. Explore our wide range of publications, videos and infographics on the drugs problem and how Europe is responding to it. All publications. More events. More news. We are your source of drug-related expertise in Europe. We prepare and share independent, scientifically validated knowledge, alerts and recommendations. About the EUDA. Much of our knowledge about cocaine trafficking routes results from law enforcement activity and intelligence. Information on types and quantities of drugs seized and information on the origin and destination of shipments give indications of the main routes and modes of transport. However, such information is affected by factors such as law enforcement strategies, resources and priorities, as well as temporary changes to routes and practices in response to interdiction efforts or new opportunities. Hence, caution is needed in interpreting these data. The 1 tonnes of cocaine seized worldwide in was the highest ever to be reported. As in previous years, the vast majority of the global total was seized in the Americas, followed by western and central Europe. Although small in comparison with the Americas and Europe, quantities seized in emerging cocaine markets in Africa and Asia also reached record highs in UNODC, a see Figure Global quantity of cocaine seized. The source data for this graphic is available in the source table on this page. Record levels of cocaine production have been matched by record quantities seized, especially from containers handled in the numerous ports along the transatlantic cocaine routes. Most of the cocaine seized in the EU is transported by sea, primarily in maritime shipping containers. Cocaine is shipped to the EU directly from the countries of production but also from neighbouring countries of departure in South and Central America as well as the Caribbean. Based on quantities of cocaine seized in European ports and in ports elsewhere destined for Europe see Box Detailed analysis of cocaine seized in or destined for EU , Brazil about 71 tonnes , Ecuador The latter is a relative newcomer in the top countries of origin for shipments destined for Europe, confirming that Central America now has a more significant role EMCDDA and Europol, This is likely to reflect a diversification of trafficking routes within the Americas. In total, 25 countries in the Americas reported seizures of cocaine with Europe as the intended destination in In addition to the countries previously listed, also mentioned are Paraguay There have traditionally been two main areas through which maritime and air shipments of cocaine transit en route to Europe: the Caribbean, and the West African mainland and neighbouring islands of Cape Verde, Madeira and the Canaries. While these are likely to remain significant transit areas, there are indications that North Africa continues to grow in importance and that transhipment through the Western Balkans, while remaining more limited in scope, may also have increased. From the Caribbean, cocaine is typically shipped on pleasure craft via the Azores, or by air, either on direct flights or via a variety of transit points. The quantities of cocaine seized in the West African mainland and neighbouring islands, together with those seized in Europe coming from the region appear to be small in comparison to the amounts seized at departure points in the Americas. Data reported at the international level indicate that cocaine seizures in West Africa totalled This includes a finding that more than 16 tonnes of cocaine was seized in the region that year, reversing the dearth of seizures recorded since Bird, Large seizures were also reported in This includes a shipment of 2. According to media reporting, Gambian drug authorities were searching for the owner of the consignment, a French national, in connection with the incident News24, ; Reuters, Although considerably less cocaine was seized in North Africa 1. However, developments in the last four or five years suggest that the region, particularly its coasts on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, is a growing transit and storage hub for cocaine both arriving by sea directly from South America and coming via West Africa by land for onward transport to Europe or elsewhere, for instance the Middle East EMCDDA and Europol, ; GI TOC, The main cocaine hub of North Africa is probably Morocco. The country has traditionally seized the largest quantities of cocaine in the region, which continued in with seizures totalling 1. There are indications that the Moroccan total could be even higher. For instance, in October , more than 1. The drugs were concealed in a container on a ship that had departed from Brazil and was bound for Antwerp, Belgium, and Portbury, a middle-sized port in Bristol, United Kingdom Kundu, On a much smaller scale than Morocco, international cocaine trafficking activities in Algeria and Libya reported in the last edition of this report EMCDDA and Europol, ; Micaleff, appear to have continued in the recent period. In , Algeria reported seizing about kilograms UNODC, a , while there are indications that Libyan seizures amounted to over 44 kilograms. In December , there were two significant seizures from containers bound for Libya: one in Ecuador on a container bound for Libya and Syria kilograms , and another in Malta from a container originating in Ecuador kilograms Dixon, This area is a known hub for the transhipment of drugs at sea, particularly cannabis resin from Morocco, on ships bound for Europe or Libya, while significant quantities of cocaine have been seized in the port of Oran recently Ben Yahia and Farrah, For instance, non-routine data reported by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex on drug seizures at a number of border posts between the EU and the Western Balkans in and indicate that comparatively small amounts of cocaine enter the EU from that region. Meanwhile, Frontex data confirm the large quantities of cocaine seized in Spain, a traditional entry point for cocaine into the EU Frontex, Nevertheless, individual seizures in and could suggest that cocaine trafficking through ports in the Western Balkan region, particularly in Albania and Montenegro, may have increased. For example, kilograms was seized in the port of Durres, Albania in April Exit. Montenegrin authorities also suspect that more than 3 tonnes were smuggled through the port of Bar in the second half of Kajosevic, Furthermore, Kosovo seized a shipment of kilograms of cocaine in May after it had been smuggled through the Albanian port of Durres Halili, For the fourth consecutive year, record amounts of cocaine were seized in Europe in At Meanwhile, new records were also established elsewhere in , including Greece 1. This indicates that entry points of cocaine shipments are diversifying and that cocaine consumer markets are developing in eastern Europe including Turkey see Cocaine retail markets: multiple indicators suggest continued growth and diversification. Source: The source data for this graphic is available in the source table on this page. Data available for a few key countries indicate that even larger quantities of cocaine were seized in the EU in For instance, data on cocaine seizures in Belgium indicate that almost 92 tonnes of cocaine was seized in , almost all in the port of Antwerp. If seizures made elsewhere of shipments that were destined for Antwerp are taken into account, then close to tonnes of cocaine was seized in connection with Antwerp in Belgian Federal Police, personal communication. The preliminary data available from a few countries indicates that more than tonnes of cocaine were seized in the EU in , exceeding the previous record European total Cocaine traffickers flexibly use a wide range of innovative trafficking methods, which evolve over time in response to enforcement efforts and other factors. Although cocaine also enters the EU by air, the main route used to smuggle the drug into Europe is still the maritime route from South America to western Europe, especially taking advantage of the licit containerised trade. Maritime transport allows the smuggling of large quantities, and the nature of international commercial maritime traffic means that a vast number of routes can be and are used. In addition, smaller, private sailing boats or even semi-submersible vessels are capable of bringing in large quantities of cocaine in single shipments, entering Europe at many points see Box First two semi-submersible drug-smuggling vessels captured in Europe. Criminal networks involved in cocaine trafficking now also more frequently employ methods of transport such as mother ships, pleasure craft, fishing vessels, cruise ships and the drop-off method. Major European container ports have recorded many seizures of large cocaine shipments in recent years. In addition to targeting major ports, organised criminal networks are now increasingly shipping larger amounts of cocaine from South America to smaller ports in the EU or neighbouring countries, where security measures may be easier to circumvent. Corruption of maritime and aviation port employees and security officials throughout Europe is, in most cases, a key condition for the successful use of these facilities for cocaine importation by criminal networks. Most of the cocaine available in Europe continues to be smuggled into the largest container ports of the EU located in Belgium Antwerp , the Netherlands Rotterdam and Spain Valencia and Algeciras. The German authorities have attributed the recent increase in seizures in the port of Hamburg to the activities of Balkan and Albanian-speaking organised crime networks BKA, The use of these ports shows how criminal networks continue to exploit established commercial maritime routes between Latin America and Europe to smuggle cocaine into the EU. Taking advantage of the large volume of containerised trade in goods between the two regions, criminal networks are able to conceal large quantities of cocaine in individual shipments. As a result, the main European container ports have recorded increasing numbers of large-volume cocaine seizures in recent years. While these main container ports continue to be targeted, it is likely that law enforcement activities at these facilities have pushed some criminal networks to find alternative smuggling routes, resulting in a recent intensification of cocaine shipments to smaller ports in the EU or in neighbouring countries where security measures may be viewed as easier to evade. The available data suggest that cocaine trafficking towards the EU continued during the COVID pandemic without any apparent disruption. At least tonnes of cocaine destined for Europe was seized in Some tonnes was seized at departure ports located in Latin America, and approximately tonnes was seized at EU ports. As in previous years, the largest quantity of cocaine in the EU was seized in Belgian ports 69 tonnes , followed by Dutch 45 tonnes and Spanish ports 26 tonnes. In Latin America, the largest amount was seized at ports in Brazil 45 tonnes , Ecuador 24 tonnes and Colombia 18 tonnes see Figure Top 10 countries for quantity of cocaine destined for Europe seized at ports in A total of 60 tonnes of cocaine was seized in such secondary EU ports in see Figure Top 10 EU seizing ports for quantity of cocaine. For a description of different concealment methods, see Figure Maritime trafficking: diversification of modus operandi. The available data indicates that in Latin America, the largest quantities of cocaine destined for Europe were seized in Guayaquil, Ecuador 23 tonnes , and Santos, Brazil 21 tonnes. If all seizures departing from these ports are taken into consideration, totalling about 61 tonnes shipped from Guayaquil and 31 tonnes from Santos, it becomes clear that these two ports are used intensively by cocaine trafficking criminal networks. Analysis of concealment methods emphasises some key features that enable large quantities of cocaine to be smuggled to the EU. Criminal networks are creative and appear to be able to rapidly adapt to avoid detection, which explains why a range of modi operandi are implemented. The data indicate that the port of Antwerp is probably the main entry point for cocaine smuggled into the EU. Europol intelligence suggests that most of the cocaine entering Antwerp is destined initially for the Netherlands, where further distribution is arranged. Focusing exclusively on cocaine seized outside Europe and destined for Belgian ports in the period, a variety of modi operandi can be observed in the 10 main shipping ports see Figure Top 10 source ports for quantity of cocaine destined for Belgian ports. The reasons for this are unclear and require additional research and closer monitoring. That said, Ecuador, which shares land borders with both Colombia and Peru, two of the main cocaine-producing countries, seems to have transformed in the last decade or so from a transit country into a major trafficking hub. Furthermore, it is now also reportedly emerging as a cocaine-producing country Pichel, Such transformation is thought to have fuelled recent violence between local gangs rumoured to be used by important cocaine trafficking networks from Colombia and Mexico. A recent surge in assassinations, which nearly doubled between and , including violent prison gang riots in which hundreds of inmates died in , are reportedly linked with cocaine trafficking in the country, particularly in the port of Guayaquil. Only the top 5 ports with data available for all years are shown. Operations supported by Europol have exposed the role played by corruption in the functioning of drug markets in Europe, a factor that may have been underestimated in the past. Corruption is a crime enabler for all types of criminal activities and is a significant facilitator of drug trafficking activities. In this regard, corruption is used by traffickers to gain entry to ports, to access drugs hidden in containers, to set up or ensure control over businesses used as covers for smuggling activities, such as renting transport vehicles or storage premises, and also to facilitate money laundering, among others. Indeed, various modi operandi used to smuggle cocaine through EU ports require corruption, and recent investigations in some EU ports have provided valuable insights on the methods used by criminal networks to retrieve cocaine shipments from containers in the EU. Of course, the threat of corruption is not restricted to EU ports, since it is also used in most other ports targeted by criminal groups globally. Subsequently, criminal actors will need to introduce the drugs into the container and replace the seal that has been broken during this process with a counterfeited one. Usually, this operation takes place after customs have cleared the container. In the destination port, the criminal network will, again, need inside help and information as they usually require the targeted container to be placed in a specific location in order to facilitate access to it, for instance on the ground and with unimpeded access to the doors. Additionally, they must receive confirmation that the container has been placed in the desired location and, depending on the type of rip-off method used, extract the cocaine from the container and transport it outside the port area. Other modi operandi may also require corruption as a facilitator. Concealing cocaine within shipments of legitimate goods can also use corruption, for instance in order to be informed and take necessary action if the container has been selected for physical inspection, or to receive customs clearance without such inspection. According to a law enforcement official from Seaport Police, a unit of the Dutch Police, interviewed in the press in , acts of corruption involving staff from shipping companies were identified in the port of Rotterdam in the previous two and a half years Driessen and Meeus, An investigation that led to the seizure of An ex-governor, a harbour master, three police officers and a lawyer were among the 22 suspects arrested during this operation Eeckhaut, Workers in other large EU ports such as Le Havre, France, or Alicante, Spain, have been targeted by criminal networks and engaged to facilitate cocaine importation. Recruitment into corrupt activities is usually carried out by offering large sums of cash or other valuable assets and services, but can also be achieved using violence and intimidation Gil, Kidnappings and murders of port workers have been reported in various EU ports in recent years Auvray, ; Europol, e. Cocaine smuggling by air primarily involves the use of commercial passenger flights, cargo aircraft and general aviation private aircraft. Fairly large shipments of cocaine are smuggled directly from South America and the Caribbean to western Europe by private business aircraft, and use of this method is expected to increase in the future. Stricter border controls and more effective security checks may encourage criminal networks to use secondary international airports and small airfields see Box Private jets: the Achilles heel in the fight against cocaine trafficking by air. With some travel restrictions remaining in place and significantly reduced air passenger traffic, it is likely that the use of air couriers will remain limited compared to the pre-COVID period. In the pre-pandemic period, smaller quantities of cocaine were smuggled using commercial flights. Couriers flew from airports in South and Central America and the Caribbean to major European airports, either directly or after stopovers in countries such as Morocco, Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates. After arrival at the main EU distribution hubs, cocaine shipments are primarily trafficked by road in passenger vehicles and lorries to local markets. Intra-EU trafficking of cocaine also involves commercial flights, light aircraft and helicopters, railway, sea transport, and post and parcel services. Cocaine loads are often hidden in sophisticated concealed compartments in cars, trucks and other vehicles, sometimes with shipments of other drugs. These compartments are also used to transport cash back to the distribution hubs. In addition, Europol intelligence indicates that some European criminal networks orchestrate cocaine shipments directly from South America to Asia without the drugs ever entering the EU. In , cocaine was the most frequently seized substance from air couriers intercepted at European airports and the third most frequently detected drug at European mail centres, after cannabis and other psychotropic substances Council of Europe, The COVID pandemic accelerated an expansion in the use of post and parcel services to fulfil orders placed online. Postal and parcel services are exploited for the distribution of drugs such as cannabis, cocaine, synthetic drugs Council of Europe, , new psychoactive substances, counterfeit currency, stolen and fraudulent documents, and many other illicit commodities. The distribution of illicit goods using post and parcel services is set to increase further in line with the expected growth of online retail activity. Consult the list of references used in this resource. Homepage Quick links Quick links. GO Results hosted on duckduckgo. Main navigation Data Open related submenu Data. Latest data Prevalence of drug use Drug-induced deaths Infectious diseases Problem drug use Treatment demand Seizures of drugs Price, purity and potency. Drug use and prison Drug law offences Health and social responses Drug checking Hospital emergencies data Syringe residues data Wastewater analysis Data catalogue. Selected topics Alternatives to coercive sanctions Cannabis Cannabis policy Cocaine Darknet markets Drug checking Drug consumption facilities Drug markets Drug-related deaths Drug-related infectious diseases. Recently published Findings from a scoping literature…. Penalties at a glance. Frequently asked questions FAQ : drug…. FAQ: therapeutic use of psychedelic…. Viral hepatitis elimination barometer…. EU Drug Market: New psychoactive…. EU Drug Market: Drivers and facilitators. Statistical Bulletin home. Quick links Search news Subscribe newsletter for recent news Subscribe to news releases. On this page. Europe and the global cocaine trade. PDF is being prepared. This make take up to a minute. Once the PDF is ready it will appear in this tab. Sorry, the download of the PDF failed. Last update: 6 May

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development

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Cocaine trafficking has a significant but understudied influence on Central American economies. The economic implications of this trade have repercussions for both regional development and drug control policy debates, and therefore deserve greater attention. Towards that end, in this paper we provide estimates of 1 the value of trade of primary cocaine movements that were delivered to Central America, by country excluding El Salvador between and ; and 2 the value added by the cocaine trade to Central American economies. Due to limits in data availability, we compare several estimation approaches to impute missing price and volume data using information available to us. We then use available and imputed figures to estimate the value of cocaine movements for each country over time, and the value added as a measure of difference between the Central American country of arrival and the source country of Colombia. In interpreting and discussing our findings we draw attention to the economic pressures, volatility, and development challenges faced by countries that have become important waypoints in the cocaine trade because of supply-side cocaine control efforts. Cocaine transshipment has become an engine of dramatic socioeconomic and environmental change in Central America in the last decade and a half, as supply-side cocaine control efforts pushed trafficking routes further, and more often, into and through the isthmus Arnson et al. The economic injection brought by cocaine trafficking into Central American countries has the potential to distort the development of relatively small local and regional economies, yet the scale of this distortion is unknown. Studies to-date highlight the distorting and corrupting power of illicit cocaine-generated funds, and their impacts on micro- and macroeconomic development by perverting wage, land, and product markets; generating corruption, violence, exploitation, and dispossession; and financing the socially and environmentally harmful growth of unregulated extractive and agribusiness sectors McSweeney et al. Missing from these important studies are reliable estimates of the value of trade represented by the movement of cocaine through the countries of Central America and the region as a whole, and the weight and impact of those estimates. These are vital to a more comprehensive appreciation of the economies of countries that have become waypoints in the drug trade. These figures are also vital to a greater appreciation of the economic ramifications of counterdrug policies in the region. Cocaine control efforts keep prices high, and traffickers shift their approaches to evade interruption, bringing inundations of cash to new places Magliocca et al. This study offers a preliminary corrective to this data gap, providing estimates of 1 the value of trade of primary cocaine movements bulk shipments directly from South America that were delivered to Central America, by country excluding El Salvador , 1 over an eighteen-year period — ; and 2 the value added by the cocaine trade to Central American economies. We focus only on primary cocaine movements shipments arriving in Central America directly from South America, because data for secondary movements, i. Here we provide what is to our knowledge the first use of CCDB data for this purpose. In what follows, we first review the state of the literature on estimating cocaine movement values, then explain the context that has contributed to the flow of cocaine into countries of Central America and describe some of the actors who capture rents from cocaine transshipment. We then present our data, methods, and findings, followed by a discussion of the implications of our findings for development in Central America. Empirical data on the value of drug markets have largely been absent from academic and policy literatures, due to the complexities and dangers associated with researching illicit processes and obtaining reliable data. Quantitative estimates of cocaine value and impact commonly use data from the value and volume of estimated coca production and transit routes, or from estimates of consumption in consumer countries. However, to the extent that they exist, estimates of cocaine flow values and their economic impact during transit rely on problematic proxy data to measure the extent and impact of this lucrative market. For example, the volume of cocaine moving from sites of production into particular markets is often derived from the number of law enforcement seizures made in a given place, or through calculations involving the amount of land under coca cultivation and its productivity in the Andes, which are recognized to be crude at best. Furthermore, the methodologies used to obtain these estimates are typically vague or unstated e. This is a neglected area of research, despite the severity of political, social, and environmental consequences brought to these spaces by cocaine flows. Current research on cocaine transshipment through Central America specifically, and its effects on development, has focused mainly on outcomes such as corruption, violence, market perversion, and investments McSweeney et al. While these studies have been vital to understanding the array of challenges likely to be faced by cocaine transit countries, missing are nuanced empirical data on the value of this cocaine, or the product of wholesale price per kilogram and volume in kilograms on landing in countries of Central America. This report estimates the amount of cocaine that traversed Central America in and its wholesale value. Without working estimates of these figures, and their changes over time, it becomes difficult to assess the economic impacts of cocaine transshipment on development. Some of these concerns, however, are mitigated in the case of CCDB data McSweeney b , which we apply to this question for the first time here to provide a preliminary estimate of the value of cocaine primary movements moving through Central America from — To avoid their interdiction, Drug Trafficking Organizations DTOs began shipping primary cocaine movements from export zones in Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela first to remote spaces of Central American countries for secondary transit towards Mexico, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Cocaine transport from producer and export countries in South America 4 to destination countries is achieved through the cooperation of a variety of actors Table 1. The Central American nodes where planes and boats carrying cocaine first arrive from cocaine producing countries are often in remote rural areas far from law enforcement or military presence, and include forested regions, oil palm plantations, conservation zones, indigenous territories, mangrove coastlines, lagunas, and communal lands Devine et al. Once on the ground, cocaine shipments are transferred to new modes of transport that will carry the product to its next destination secondary movements , by road, waterway, or air. Rents are captured from the process of cocaine transshipment at various stages and by a variety of actors. These middlemen oversee payments to local residents in exchange for silence and the services those communities offer often under duress, and in fear of violence , such as manual labor in carrying cocaine from one vehicle to the next, keeping landing strips clear of debris, and acting as guards along trails and riverways to prevent people from coming near a landing point McSweeney et al. The state therefore plays a crucial role in cocaine transport. Authorities at all levels across much of the region have become increasingly implicated in cocaine movements whether by choice or force e. Given what we know about the variety of actors who benefit financially from cocaine transshipment through Central American countries, we assume that a large percentage of rents earned remain, are spent, or are invested or laundered in-country e. However, due to the absence of data, we do not estimate total rents captured in-country; instead, we focus our estimates on the value of the cocaine trade, and the value added by the cocaine transport process in its trajectory crossing national boundaries toward consumer markets. These data have limitations, however: they may overrepresent cocaine flows through established trafficking zones, where interdiction assets radar and other forms of surveillance are focused, and correspondingly underrepresents flows through zones that are not being monitored as actively. In addition, the CCDB underrepresents smuggling in commercial vessels such as container ships and overland smuggling McSweeney b. The net effect is that the CCDB should be considered to overall underestimate all cocaine flows through the transit zone, including Central America. The UN Economic and Social Council ECOSOC collects wholesale cocaine price information directly from governments annually, and so depends upon those governments to self-report prices accurately see, e. The wholesale prices allow for better comparisons across countries than street prices, which reflect a greater number of pricing factors related to the nature of local retail practices, purity, consumption patterns, country risks, local distribution costs, competition, and market segmentation. It is important to note that we exclude El Salvador from our analysis due to suspect pricing data reported for that country. In this section we discuss how we use available data on movements, volumes, and wholesale prices to estimate annual country-level total values and value added of cocaine movements. The Appendix discusses our estimation strategy in greater detail. Values of cocaine arriving in each country each year are important because movements alone do not paint a full picture of the economic effects of illicit cocaine transshipment, as prices and volumes of cocaine in a given shipment differ across countries and over time see Figure 1 below. Composition of the total value of cocaine transshipments by country over time A, and composition of primary movements by country B. Restricting our attention to only complete cases, where both variables are available to us, we would be limited to 28 or about a quarter of possible observations representing 19 years and 6 countries. Table 2 summarizes the availability of information on prices and volumes, as well as information on the number of movements, which are available for all observations. Our strategy for estimating the total value of cocaine shipments is based on imputation of missing values of prices and volumes using available information on the number of primary movements, prices, and volumes. The estimation is carried out following these steps:. Our approach to imputing the missing values recognizes that the missing data arise from a process that shares common components with the observed values, while allowing for an idiosyncratic component. The estimation process uses statistical techniques to estimate those common components recognizing the presence of idiosyncratic country-year components. The imputed values are then based on the estimated time and country components without the idiosyncratic term. We compare several estimation approaches to recover the common components: using a linear model, logarithmic model, and a Poisson model. For each model we estimate four different versions of the common time component: year effects, deterministic common linear trend, country specific linear trend, and country specific trends with year effects. Our preferred model for prices is a model that includes country-specific trends estimated by the pseudo maximum likelihood Poisson. The preferred model for volumes per movement is a model that includes country-specific trend and year effects estimated by the pseudo maximum likelihood Poisson. See the Appendix for more details on the procedure. In order to provide a measure of reliability for the imputed values we calculate standard errors of the predictions relative to the predicted values. Despite this high precision the usual caveats for diagnostics of reliability of the imputations remain, as aptly reviewed for example in Abayomi et al. The stacked shares comparison in Figure 1 illustrates that while the decrease in the shares of primary movements to Belize and Nicaragua turned them into insignificant transshipment nodes, Honduras remains significant in terms of cocaine value entering the country, despite quick decline in its share of movements. Table 3 summarizes our estimates of the value of cocaine transshipments by country and year, and totals per country, in Millions of US dollars. Figure 2 presents a time series visualization of the value of primary movements. Value of cocaine transshipments by country and year, and country and year totals, in Millions of US dollars. This volatility can be explained by the ephemeral nature of primary movement nodes and transportation routes, resulting from interdiction efforts that constantly push trafficking routes into readily available new spaces in nearby countries, as noted above e. Magliocca et al. Figure 3 shows the distribution of year-to-year changes in total values of transshipments within a country. Note that the year-to-year changes in values on the horizontal scale are expressed as multipliers to capture substantial amount of variation for some countries in some years. Distribution of year-to-year changes in total values of cocaine movements. Note : x8 means that the value increased 8 times from one year to the next for the same country. An annual change of greater than one means an increase, and a number that is smaller than one means that there is a decrease, in total value. We also report the coefficients of variation of the de-trended values of movements in Table A3 of the Appendix. These calculations confirm substantial volatility of the values, with Guatemala exhibiting the largest amount of variation over time. This comparison reveals that variation in movements is substantially larger than variation in prices. Central American economies are affected by the overall increase in the value of cocaine primary movements since the early s coupled with the sudden changes in values. Any calculation of the economic or developmental impact of these movements needs to begin with an estimation of how much of that money actually remains in activities associated with transiting the country. Calculating the portion of the value that is staying in the transit country would be an extremely data demanding exercise given the illicit nature of cocaine transshipment. For example, we would need comprehensive data on the specific payments to participants in the delivery process, which is not recorded reliably across the entire region. However, we can estimate the increase in the value of the shipments associated with the transshipment of cocaine from the difference in wholesale value between the source country of Colombia and the country of arrival. This calculation estimates total value added associated with the transshipments of cocaine to primary destination countries see Table A4. Even though this integrated approach does not allow for a precise understanding of financial flows, it gives a credible approximation of the total value added that is associated with transshipment activities. Our estimates of the value of cocaine primary movements into Central American countries Figures 1 and 2 ; Table 3 , and estimates of the value added to Central American economies this Century Table A4 of the appendix , demonstrate the importance of the cocaine trade to economic development in this region. While previous studies have noted the violent and destructive effects of cocaine movements into the region as a result of drug policy pressures see above , our study offers the first reliable quantitative estimates of potential macroeconomic development impacts in dollars over time. It is important to note that not all rents from the cocaine trade are inherently problematic and may even be used toward providing important financial resources in rural nodes of cocaine transfer e. However, the size of our estimated values in these historically poor countries has engendered problematic economic distortions at local and national scales as described elsewhere McSweeney et al. Furthermore, as we show, cocaine movement values are highly volatile over time, which brings further distortion to economies see Figure 2. Boom and bust cycles have traditionally had serious implications for development in small resource dominated economies Venables Our research therefore provides a clearer picture of how so much social, environmental, economic, institutional, and governmental change has been facilitated in the region. In particular, we see that the relative importance of Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica as a share of total value of primary movements has grown especially since Figure 1 also highlights the economic importance of cocaine movements to three of the six countries in particular since the diversion of cocaine movements into Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica in response to counternarcotic actions in Mexico and Columbia. Table 3 breaks down the wholesale value of cocaine movements by country over time. In Figure 2 we see that value changes by country typically fell between. This illustrates high inter-annual variations, suggesting regional and local economies that are likely subjected to wide swings in potential economic stimulus See also Table A3. The economic influence of cocaine trafficking through Honduras and Guatemala, as compared to Foreign Direct Investment FDI , offers an illustrative comparison. Estimations of value added for each country over time are impressive in and of themselves Table A4. However, our estimates of value added as a percentage of GDP are astonishing Table 4. Some noteworthy figures: the value added of cocaine movements represented In Table 5 we compare country averages and 90 th percentile values to country averages of other economic indicators also expressed as percentages of the GDP, for the period of to World Bank a ; b ; d ; e ; f ; g. The relative importance of cocaine primary movements exceeds or is comparable the first four economic indicators in Table 5 and is also substantial even if compared to such aggregates as the last two indicators. Tax revenue can be used as a measure of government size; we see here that some years for Guatemala cocaine movements approach or exceed; see Table 4 average tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. The same is true of Belize. Cocaine primary movement value added as a percentage of GDP in relation to other economic indicators averaged for the years — In addition to the obvious deleterious effects stemming from the criminal nature of cocaine transshipments, the revenues from these transshipments have the potential to distort economic activities and hinder economic development. The revenues from cocaine transshipments share important characteristics with natural resource revenues in that the magnitude and the timing of both of these revenues are determined to a large extent by global forces external to the national economy. Van der Ploeg and Frankel survey this literature and identify channels for possible distortions. Relevant here is that the resources employed in facilitating cocaine transport are diverted from other sectors of the economy, possibly causing such undesirable outcomes as deindustrialization, inflation, and rent grabbing. Furthermore, the reallocation of resources away from the legitimate sectors of the economy can distort incentives to accumulate physical or human capital see Stijns The case of human capital is especially worrisome because of its central role in development. The tools include taxation of production, production subsidies, price controls, hedging, and other tools that implicitly rely on the traceability of the revenue. Needless to say, the severity of these distortions depends on the weight of these revenues and the associated value added in the rest of the economy. Our measures of the value added created by primary cocaine transshipments relative to the GDP provide a measure of their importance. In addition to the magnitude, the revenue volatility we found is by itself detrimental to development as volatility makes planning and investments difficult. It is impossible to know with precision how much of the value of trade and value added we estimate remain in-country. Lobo , much of which would have had to be laundered. It is widely recognized that money laundering in general leads to perverse development—distorting prices, consumption and investment; undermining traditional economic activities, diminishing competitiveness and engendering corruption Ferwerda ; OAS The development implications would be felt differently depending on the size of the economy in question. In addition to distortionary impacts on the macroeconomy, money laundering in Central America—particularly in Honduras and Guatemala—is achieved through rural land acquisition and investments in land-based enterprises such as mining, cattle ranching, and African oil palm production, which has led to the displacement of rural and indigenous peoples from their lands and the destruction of tropical ecosystems McSweeney et al. Furthermore, recent reports of narco-corruption reaching the presidential offices in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala illustrate the overall challenges to governance and economic stability caused by narco-capital entering these relatively small economies. We have some knowledge about rent capture by local middlemen, and other people living in spaces that become cocaine movement nodes, from the previous ethnographic work of authors KM, EAN, and ZP e. In McSweeney et al. Still, they illustrate the potential of cocaine transshipment to stimulate local development. The populations receiving such payments are some of the poorest and most isolated of already-poor populations in Central America. Rents entering rural communities like the ones we have investigated are likely to be spent and invested locally and nationally and are thus significant for poor rural communities and individuals, greatly affecting possibilities for local agricultural, economic and household development. Nonetheless they too can have important negative and positive development impacts cf. Blume ; McSweeney et al. Our estimates demonstrate the overall value of trade and value added of primary cocaine movements entering countries of Central America this century, and the potential economic distortions and opportunities these represent. These estimates are, to our knowledge, the first to utilize what is the best existing source of available data on cocaine trafficking movements, and the first to quantify the value and value added of cocaine movements through Central American trafficking routes, adding a more nuanced economic context for the corruption, crime, power, and social and environmental change that has long been described qualitatively see above. The conservative estimates we present here demand an appreciation of the development challenges faced by Central American states and their citizens, and furthermore, demand renewed attention to yet another measure of failure for business-as-usual counternarcotic policy norms. It is worth repeating: the development impact of cocaine transshipment on Central America is not incidental or natural: it is a direct result of drug control policies, and should therefore be considered a factor in evaluating the effectiveness and collateral damages of those policies. This is a drug policy issue in the sense that cocaine prohibition keeps its prices high—as with any illicit good. And continued support for supply-side policies like interdiction keeps traffickers nimble, which is why they were driven to shift the bulk of their trafficking operations into Central America in the first place Magliocca et al. Legitimate economic activity is disadvantaged in competition with potential rents earned through cocaine trafficking; that effect is magnified in the rural spaces through which most cocaine moves first McSweeney et al. More research estimating the flow of illicit goods and their implications for economic development in Central America is needed. We encourage others to continue this line of research on quantitative estimates of the illicit narcotic trade to encourage a greater appreciation of the economic pressures and distortions faced by involved states, governments, and individuals, and to contribute to a more holistic picture of counterdrug policy outcomes. In addition, we encourage the use of our findings to explore the relationship between the cocaine economy and licit industries: Is there evidence of economic distortions that can be explained by cocaine value of trade? Do some industries prosper, and others fail, in direct relationship to cocaine flows? Cocaine-generated dollars, drug control approaches, and the corruption they foster at multiple scales of governance—in concert with often compatible licit political economic processes of enclosure and state- and corporate-led resource extraction—are transforming Central America. Resulting environmental and social change dovetail with or exacerbate migration patterns, food insecurity, and climate-induced insecurities see McSweeney a. More research is needed to deepen our understanding of the role of the cocaine trade in licit and illicit forms of development, as well as the role of contemporary counternarcotic policies in this development cf. Paley Details of the estimation procedure. The wholesale cocaine price data for El Salvador was problematic given the prices reported for surrounding countries. This lack of cocaine primary movements seen there can probably be attributed to militarization and a radar station on the coast. Colombia is the primary producer of northbound cocaine; northbound cocaine is exported mainly from Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. For example, from FYFY of an average of 5, alerts of suspicious movements out of South America alerts, only We thank our Central American colleagues for their input and encouragement of this project, and the LIT-CA research group for their ongoing insights and support. We thank Dushka Crane for methods guidance early in the conception of this paper, Bridger Scholten for consultation, and anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and feedback. ZP: Designed research; performed research; data collection; interpreted data; wrote the paper; revised the paper. KM: Designed research; performed research; acquired data; data collection; wrote sections; revised the paper. Diagnostics for Multivariate Imputations. Andreas, P and Greenhill, KM. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Bagley, BM. Oxford: Oxford University Press. BBC News. Blume, L. World Development , : Buuren, SV. New York, NY: Routledge. Extreme Poverty and Poverty by geographic region. International Journal of Drug Policy , — Land Use Policy , 95 : Narco-Cattle Ranching in Political Forests. Antipode , — Department of Defense. Arlington: Drug Enforcement Administration, U. Department of Justice. Dudley, S. Honduras Elites and Organized Crime: Introduction. Annual Report Questionnaire. Farah, D. Ferwerda, J. The Effects of Money Laundering. In Unger, B and van de Linde, D eds. Frankel, JA. Drug Control: Difficulties in measuring costs and results of transit zone interdiction efforts , 25 January Gelman, A and Hill, J. Journal of Illicit Economies and Development , 1 1 : 1—8. Grandia, L. University of Washington Press. Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime: Introduction. Idler, A. International Narcotics Strategy Report. Washington, DC: U. Jackson, EB. Koren, M and Tenreyro, S. Volatility and Development. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1 : — La Prensa. Proceedings of the National Academiy of Sciences , 16 : — May, C. Transnational Crime and the Developing World. McSweeney, K. Cocaine Trafficking and the Tansformation of Central America. Journal of Latin American Geography , 19 3 : — Drug policy as conservation policy: Narco-deforestation. Science , : — McSweeney, K and Pearson, Z. Why do Narcos Invest in Rural Land? Journal of Latin American Geography , 16 2 : 3— Geoforum , 95 1 : — Mejia, D and Restrepo, P. Cocaine Smuggling in Paley, D. Drug War as Neoliberal Trojan Horse. Latin American Perspectives , 42 5 : — Palmer, E and Semple, K. Parkinson, C. Reuter, P. The Mobility of Drug Trafficking. In Collins, J ed. Reuter, P and Greenfield, V. World Economics , 2 4 : — The Log of Gravity. The Review of Economics and Statistics , 88 4 : — Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. A spatio-temporal analysis of forest loss related to cocaine trafficking in Central America. Environmental Research Letters , 12 5 : 1— Sohnen, E. Stijns, J. Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation. World Development , 34 6 : — Thoumi, FE. Journal of Drug Issues , 35 1 : — United States v. Lobo 2nd Cir. Global Illicit Drug Trends. World Drug Report Crime and Development in Central America. Van der Ploeg, F. Natural Resources: Curse or blessing? Journal of Economic Literature , 49 2 : — Van der Ploeg, F and Poelhekke, S. Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse. Oxford Economic Papers , 61 4 : — Venables, AJ. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 30 1 : — World Bank. ZS \[last accessed 22 October \]. CD \[last accessed 22 October \]. Global Environmental Change , 1— Yashar, DJ. Home About. Research Integrity. Crime Beyond Borders. Abstract Cocaine trafficking has a significant but understudied influence on Central American economies. Year: Submitted on Jul 16, Accepted on Feb 4, Published on Dec 2, Peer Reviewed. CC BY 4. Introduction Cocaine transshipment has become an engine of dramatic socioeconomic and environmental change in Central America in the last decade and a half, as supply-side cocaine control efforts pushed trafficking routes further, and more often, into and through the isthmus Arnson et al. Estimating Cocaine Market Value Empirical data on the value of drug markets have largely been absent from academic and policy literatures, due to the complexities and dangers associated with researching illicit processes and obtaining reliable data. Table 1 Main actors and their role in cocaine transshipment see citations in text above. Other: retail gangs, public servants, lawyers, law enforcement, military, businesspeople, politicians Direct or indirect involvement: Operations support, logistical support, political support, money laundering services. Estimation of the Total Value and Value Added of Primary Cocaine Movements Through Central American Countries Value In this section we discuss how we use available data on movements, volumes, and wholesale prices to estimate annual country-level total values and value added of cocaine movements. Figure 1 Composition of the total value of cocaine transshipments by country over time A, and composition of primary movements by country B. Table 2 Data availability and the extent of imputation. Table 3 Value of cocaine transshipments by country and year, and country and year totals, in Millions of US dollars. Figure 2 Time series of the value of cocaine movements. Figure 3 Distribution of year-to-year changes in total values of cocaine movements. Value added Central American economies are affected by the overall increase in the value of cocaine primary movements since the early s coupled with the sudden changes in values. Table 4 Value added as a percentage of GDP. Interpretation of Findings Estimated cocaine primary movement values Our estimates of the value of cocaine primary movements into Central American countries Figures 1 and 2 ; Table 3 , and estimates of the value added to Central American economies this Century Table A4 of the appendix , demonstrate the importance of the cocaine trade to economic development in this region. Estimated value added of cocaine to Central American economies The economic influence of cocaine trafficking through Honduras and Guatemala, as compared to Foreign Direct Investment FDI , offers an illustrative comparison. Table 5 Cocaine primary movement value added as a percentage of GDP in relation to other economic indicators averaged for the years — Rent capture and development It is impossible to know with precision how much of the value of trade and value added we estimate remain in-country. Conclusions Our estimates demonstrate the overall value of trade and value added of primary cocaine movements entering countries of Central America this century, and the potential economic distortions and opportunities these represent. Additional File The additional file for this article can be found as follows: Supplementary File 1: Appendix Details of the estimation procedure. Notes The wholesale cocaine price data for El Salvador was problematic given the prices reported for surrounding countries. Acknowledgements We thank our Central American colleagues for their input and encouragement of this project, and the LIT-CA research group for their ongoing insights and support. Competing Interests The authors have no competing interests to declare. Author Contributions ZP: Designed research; performed research; data collection; interpreted data; wrote the paper; revised the paper. AS: Designed research; analyzed data; wrote the paper; revised the paper. EAN: Designed research; performed research; data collection; wrote sections; revised the paper. JTP: Designed research. Broker connections and ensure supply of coca leaf and paste to processing groups. Other: retail gangs, public servants, lawyers, law enforcement, military, businesspeople, politicians. Direct or indirect involvement: Operations support, logistical support, political support, money laundering services.

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