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Credit: ACT. Namely, Wolfgang Lehmacher, Head of Supply Chain and Transport Industries at the World Economic Forum addressed that the logistics field is important for economic development, also referring to the regional opportunities Jordan could have. As Lehmacher highlighted, Jordan has a stable, safe and economically attractive potential that it enables it to become the Dubai or Singapore of the Wider Levant region. Also, private sectors, as ACT, bring digital competence, investment and knowledge. At 1, meters, the quay length is capable of dealing with all types of ships and has become an important economic station in Aqaba, boosting the movement of imports and exports. ACT has now become one of the three main terminals on the Red Sea following the introduction of advanced technology across all procedures. Concluding, organised by the Aqaba Container Terminal ACT in co-operation with ASEZA, the conference discussed about global practices for developing a sustainable transport and logistics infrastructure and focused on the most crucial challenges and opportunities for the region. Your email address will not be published. Subscribe to our Mailing Lists It's free! Monday, October 21, Aqaba terminal transforms into a transport and logistics hub by The Editorial Team. December 21, Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin. This is being driven by improvements in infrastructure, capacity and digital systems spearheaded by the container port. Greek shipowners go on multi-billion order spree. IEA: Key trends in the oil industry during and Related News. Baltic Exchange: Maritime market highlights 7 — 11 October October 11, New report offers key insights on maritime employee retention October 2, Xeneta: Red Sea diversions disrupt reefer trade September 30, Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Explore more. Useful Links. This website uses cookies. By continuing to use this website you are giving consent to cookies being used. Visit our Disclaimer. I Agree.

Aqaba terminal transforms into a transport and logistics hub

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Matthew Levitt , Lauren von Thaden. Share via:. This is despite peace treaties with both Jordan and Egypt and parallel efforts on the part of those countries to patrol their sides of the border. The study focuses on the borders Israel shares with Jordan and Egypt, where disruptions of smuggling operations increased during this period. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officials interviewed by the authors independently reported that it has, both in terms of an increase in known smuggling cases and in the complexity of smuggling operations and the dangers of addressing the challenge. The authors further believe it is reasonable to infer from the growth in detected smuggling activity that more smuggling is taking place, but this cannot be assumed with certainty. The guns and drugs that are flowing into Israel are creating societal problems and public safety issues. The influx of weapons is also a major counterterrorism concern. Smuggled weapons have been a contributing factor to the surge of violence that has plagued the West Bank and Israel. The brothers knowingly sold the weapons to members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and to criminals in southern Israel. Indeed, this increased arms smuggling 5 occurred against the backdrop of over a year and a half of violence that began with an day battle between Israeli forces and Hamas in May and continued through a string of terror attacks in the spring of that prompted a sweeping Israeli military campaign with nightly West Bank raids targeting terrorist operatives. Alongside the extensive collection of chemical materials to make explosives and hundreds of assembled explosive devices seized, authorities also found thousands of rounds of ammunition and weapons such as Ms, pistols, and shotguns. Of the terrorist attacks foiled by Israel security forces in in the West Bank or Jerusalem, were shooting attacks, underscoring the centrality of small arms smuggling to this spike in violence. The study then focuses in turn on smuggling attempts at the borders Israel shares with Jordan and Egypt, where authorities on both sides of the border report a significant increase in detected smuggling activity has taken place in the past two years. It is important to stress that the approximately two-year time duration means that their data sheds light on recent and what may only be short-term trends. The dataset draws from IDF and Israeli government press releases, news articles, and information gleaned from meetings with Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian government officials. The dataset is, by definition, not comprehensive because it is limited to information that is either publicly available in media reports or IDF press releases or that could be gleaned from documents shared with the authors and author interviews. Publicly available data does not uniformly report the details of each smuggling operation. For example, the types of detail provided in reports varies regarding the specific locations where smugglings take place, the identities of those involved, and even the quantities of contraband smuggled. Any quantity of drugs smuggled is especially difficult to quantify over time, as reports sometimes describe the amount of drugs seized by estimated cash value and other times by weight. Despite these constraints, the dataset tracks available information regarding event location, perpetrator identity, and smuggled items almost always weapons or drugs, but several cases involve money or gold. What Authorities Say Indeed, while the dataset is not an exhaustive list of each smuggling attempt during the March to April time period, the overall numbers in the dataset are nearly identical to those reported by Israeli authorities. Neither Jordanian nor Egyptian authorities provided overall figures to the authors. Israeli authorities confirmed to the authors the trendlines accurately reflect those observed by national counter-smuggling authorities. Where available, the authors provide these numbers for greater context. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian authorities all report significant increases in known cross-border smuggling between early and early The actual pace of known smuggling fluctuates from month to month, but authorities in these countries report that the overall trendlines point up during the past two years. See Figure 1. See Figure 2. Israeli forces embarked on a concerted anti-smuggling campaign in alongside efforts by Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts. According to the IDF, the number of identified, thwarted, or disrupted smuggling attempts along the Egyptian border increased from in to in See Figure 4. Others point to changed circumstances to explain what they see as an ongoing threat from cross-border smuggling, even as the number of known smuggling attempts began to drop in early Figure 1. Due to the lack of other opportunities, more people were drawn into the growing smuggling industry. Because of these circumstances, authorities expect cross-border smuggling to remain an ongoing challenge. Subsequent investigation revealed that the Jordanian lawmaker reportedly carried out a dozen earlier smuggling runs starting in early In each, he leveraged his diplomatic passport to smuggle illicit goods: namely guns, electronic cigarettes, gold, and birds. This incident stood out both for the number of weapons smuggled and the fact that a parliamentarian was used to drive them across an official border crossing at the Allenby Bridge into the West Bank. Most smuggling attempts from Jordan involve criminal smuggling networks that span the Israeli-Jordanian border using members of Bedouin tribes as runners to deliver illicit goods to and across the border, typically at isolated portions of the border far from official border crossings. Israeli and Jordanian officials report that the level of arms smuggling from Jordan into Israel and the West Bank has increased over the past two years, in terms of what is being detected. As already noted, more detected smuggling is likely indicative of more smuggling getting through, and this appears to have fueled instability and a surge in terrorist and other violent activity. Figure 3. As already noted, many smuggling plots on both sides of the border are not publicly reported. Weapons smuggling benefits both terrorist and organized criminal groups but is primarily driven by criminal smuggling networks that recruit members of Bedouin tribes to help facilitate their smuggling operations. According to Jordanian officials, cross-border smuggling incidents as of late were occurring about once or twice a week. And there are likely more still that we never find out about. The Jordanian border spans the geographic areas of responsibility of three IDF commands north, central, and south , requiring robust coordination within the Israeli military to address security concerns. While the Jordanian military is fairly well-deployed along its side of the border, the Israeli military is more sparsely deployed along large portions of the border since the terrorism threat is comparatively lower there than in other parts of the country. Cases along the Jordan-Israel border mostly involve weapons smuggling attempts conducted by West Bank Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs from Bedouin communities in the Negev desert and their counterparts on the Jordanian side of the border, many of whom come from the same Bedouin tribes. What Is Smuggled, and Where? In some spots along the long and sparsely populated southern desert border, there is no security fence at all, just barbed wire. Here you can dig under, or simply cut a hole. Smuggling succeeds here because the border is too long to effectively patrol and the area is a sparsely populated wilderness. North of the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley is a rollercoaster of small hills running along the Jordan River marking the borderline between Israel and Jordan. The few smuggling attempts that did not occur within these aforementioned boundaries occurred south of the Dead Sea Map 1. As noted earlier, Jordanian MP al-Adwan allegedly attempted to smuggle three bags of weapons across the Allenby Bridge, including some handguns and about a dozen AR style assault rifles. On average, weapons busts along the Jordanian border include roughly 15 handguns and one or two assault rifles. Only after his arrest did authorities learn that starting in February , the Jordanian parliamentarian allegedly made a dozen smuggling runs moving a variety of contraband across the border. In April , Israeli police confiscated 63 handguns and arrested a Bedouin Israeli citizen suspected of smuggling weapons from Jordan. Earlier, in December , Israeli authorities arrested two Israeli Bedouin brothers and a Palestinian from the northern West Bank on charges of smuggling weapons and ammunition that was then sold to members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank and criminals in southern Israel. The overwhelming majority of smuggled weapons coming in through Jordan are handguns, which account for about 90 percent of smuggled weapons seized at or near the Jordan-Israel border, according to the IDF. Not all reported smuggling cases fully document what weapons were seized at or near the Jordan-Israel border, but collating the data from those that do reveals over weapons were seized from March to April , including handguns and 90 assault rifles. Without providing details other than the total number of weapons seized per year, the IDF reported in May that were seized in , in , and in the first five months of not including weapons parts, which appear in about 50 percent of smuggling runs. The other 10 percent of guns smuggled across the Jordan-Israel border are M and AK style assault rifles and shotguns, officials report. Many of these are stolen from IDF armories or sold on the black market by IDF soldiers, 59 but some are also smuggled into the country from Jordan. In fact, one reason Israeli officials believe they have had more success thwarting arms smuggling from Jordan is an intelligence collection shift from drugs to guns. The precise location of each smuggling operation from Jordan is often unknown. Both government press releases and media reports identify where arrests take place, which is typically near the border, but not where the actual cross-border smuggling occurred. Rarely do smugglers cross the border themselves, instead preferring to come up to the border fence and either throw bags of weapons over the fence or leave them there for someone on the other side to pick up after cutting a hole in the fence. At some points, the space between the border and the fence can be as wide as meters. In July , Jordanian armed forces thwarted an attempt to smuggle 54 handguns, five shotguns, and ammunition from Syria. The sharp increase in prices appears to be a function of both the impact of counter-smuggling efforts, which have put some constraints on the supply of weapons and ammunition, and continuing high demand for weapons in Israel and the West Bank. In fact, demand is so high that guns are often smuggled across the border before buyers are lined up. As the February terrorism wave spread, applications for gun licenses by Israelis spiked by percent. In , 51 Israeli-Arabs were reportedly killed by organized criminal gangs in Galilee, the so-called Triangle bordering the northern West Bank and the Negev. You want a gun? You can buy a gun in an hour. You can buy a handgun. You can even buy a machine gun, an assault rifle. But demand is very high. So it is a very good business. Israeli organized criminal networks are another source of violence and instability in the West Bank. In , seven criminal gangs were active in Arab communities, and over Palestinians were killed by organized gangs. The influx of guns has factored in the sharp increase in terrorist activity in the West Bank. Smuggled weapons are flowing in from Jordan, but that is by no means the only source of black-market arms. In November , for example, thieves stole approximately 70, bullets and 70 grenades from an IDF base in the north of the country. Israeli forces confiscated 92 kg of heroin and cocaine and 28 kg of hashish from the vehicle. Bedouin smugglers in the Negev typically traffic marijuana and hashish grown in the Sinai Peninsula. In rare cases like this one, harder drugs such as cocaine and heroin have been smuggled as well. Here, drugs are the primary illicit commodity smuggled across the border. Israeli authorities said that, as of late , there were typically one to two smuggling attempts a day along this border. While some reports imply that the increase in drug smuggling is tied to terrorism, 96 evidence suggests otherwise. Iran, they assess, has not done so either. Israeli and Egyptian authorities point to increased identified, thwarted, or disrupted drug smuggling from Figure 4 , which is the result of several factors including long-term neglect by the Egyptian government and rampant unemployment. In , a tribal leader pointed to unemployment as the primary driver behind crime and violent extremism in the Sinai. Egypt flooded tunnels under the popular Rafah crossing, collapsing the tunnels and the illicit economy they created. Between the two, smuggling pays far better and is the only growth industry in the area. Until then, there was no need for, and thus market for, dedicated smugglers, because anybody could smuggle items across the then-open km border with an easily-breached fence. The new fence includes sophisticated sensors and is 5 to 8 meters high, depending on the location. Due to the lack of economic opportunities in the region, some of these tribesmen, now better armed, are believed to have turned to smuggling once the Islamic State in Sinai was effectively defeated. The Egyptian-Israeli border runs for just over km, along which there are several hotspots where most of the cross-border smuggling takes place. Three of the most significant hotspots are along a km run of the border starting at the Nitzana border crossing border stone 26 and running south to Mount Harif border stone 49 and Mount Sagi border stone Smuggling also occurs further north, near the Kerem Shalom crossing at the point where the Israeli, Gaza, and Egypt borders meet, and closer to the city of Eilat and the Red Sea. The topography of the Egypt-Israel border area favors smuggling, with its many dry river beds wadis that complicate surveillance and reconnaissance efforts by military and police and block lines of sight. Large water pipes run under some of the roads and provide cover. Periodic bluffs overlooking the border provide natural lookout spots for smugglers. On the Egyptian side of the border, smugglers emerge from staging areas around Jebel Khali and other mountains and cross the flat plateau that leads to the border fence. On the Israeli side, they do much the same, exiting from staging areas around Mount Hanif and Mount Sagi. Many more drug-smuggling runs were not disrupted. Office on Drugs and Crime report on the global cocaine market, cocaine seizures in Israel increased dramatically from to Though much smaller in scale, there is also some limited smuggling from Israel into Egypt. This typically involves marijuana plant seeds first smuggled into Israel from the Netherlands onward into Egypt for cultivation there. The final product is later smuggled back into Israel for sale. As the pace of disruption rose, disrupting the flow of drugs in both directions across the border, smugglers developed more sophisticated and aggressive tactics to move their product. Countermeasures to evade counter-smuggling efforts include investing in surveillance and intelligence collection, fine-tuning smuggling tactics at the border and developing aggressive maneuvers for situations when military or police encounter smugglers. If needed, they will move on to another area or wait until security forces leave to patrol another area. The criminal networks running drugs across the Egypt-Israel border also invest significant sums of money to hire teams of couriers, drivers, lookouts, and scouts, as well as operations officers to oversee each smuggling operation. Smuggling operations officers seek financially unstable Bedouin in the Negev Desert area who have either completed their IDF service or still serve in the IDF, including as trackers in anti-smuggling efforts, to obtain advanced knowledge of Israeli patrols and other intelligence. While smugglers along the Jordanian border operate in small groups, one-way smugglers along the Egyptian border cope with increased patrols is to overwhelm them by sending groups of up to 30 people at a time. Large groups of well-armed smugglers can effectively keep such Egyptian forces at bay while they withdraw from the border fence and escape. A typical smuggling run takes just two to three minutes at the border fence, with smugglers converging from either side to send and receive goods. A long smuggling operation might run up to eight minutes, but they are intended to be quick to decrease the risk of disruption or capture. At the Egypt-Israel border, smugglers typically throw bags of drugs and other contraband over the security fence, which is five meters tall in most places but six to eight meters tall at smuggling hotspots along a 17 km stretch of the border. Smugglers operating on the Egypt-Israel border tend to be more violent in cases when they are engaged by authorities and have large quantities of drugs in their possession. In some cases, smugglers run off into the wilderness carrying the drugs and leave their vehicles behind. The cost of losing a car is the cost of business, as long as the drugs are not confiscated. Smugglers on the Egypt-Israel border are growing increasingly sophisticated and are known to operate quadcopter drones to collect intelligence and evade patrols. They have also been known to run chains or place other impediments across roads to disable military or police vehicles, which must stick to the roads. Smugglers about to be cornered and desperate to evade capture have been known to attempt to ram military and civilian vehicles with their SUVs. According to the World Drug Report, many countries, including Israel, reported overall growth in drug consumption and relapses since the start of the pandemic. While the majority of drugs consumed in Israel are smuggled into the country from abroad, domestic marijuana production is on the rise, with organized criminal groups growing the illegal crop in greenhouses in parts of the Negev desert classified as live firing zones. The plants were grown in trenches dug in a live fire zone with beige nets spread over them to make the area blend in with the desert. Aside from the public health threat posed by the flow of drugs into the country, Israeli officials are concerned about the increasingly aggressive and militant nature of these drug smuggling operations. In December , Israeli soldiers shot dead a suspect attempting to smuggle drugs from Egypt after smugglers fired at the soldiers as they arrived at the scene. When IDF forces arrived at the various smuggling scenes, the smugglers fired at them. In the nearby Israeli border community of Kadesh Barnea, farmers complained that chickens were killed in the crossfire when they shot at the vehicles of arriving Israeli forces. Conclusion In early June , Israeli forces thwarted a smuggling attempt in the middle of the night, and hours later, an Egyptian police officer crossed the border into Israel and shot and killed three Israeli soldiers. This case along with that of Jordanian Parliamentarian Imad al-Adwan attest to the increased need for cross-border security cooperation. The Jordanian foreign ministry released a statement noting it was following up on reports of the arrest with the relevant authorities. The reason all sides displayed such restraint in these cases is that the three countries work diligently to prevent terrorist and criminal activities across and along their shared borders. It should therefore not come as a surprise that while al-Adwan was detained in Israel, Jordanian authorities ran a parallel investigation and arrested several suspects believed to be involved in the smuggling. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian authorities all report a sharp rise in cross-border smuggling over the past couple of years. The downward slope in detected smuggling attempts since late see figure 1 suggests that counter-smuggling efforts may be having the intended impact; however, it is still too early to draw firm conclusions. Some of the counter-smuggling success is attributable to enhanced cooperation between Israeli military and security agencies and the completion of border defenses. Furthermore, Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officials all stressed to the authors the importance of their cross-border coordination and cooperation. Officials are increasingly willing to make such statements publicly. In the final analysis, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt all see counter-smuggling and border security as a shared interest and a security function they perform for their own benefit. Many of the circumstances that have contributed to the increase over the last two years in detected smuggling are highly likely to persist, from regional instability and the ready availability of guns to the massive profits criminals stand to make from narcotics sales. Commercial incentives mean that smugglers will likely become more violent and more creative, from digging tunnels under border fences to deploying drones to transport packages over them. Cooperation between the three countries will continue to be crucial. Treasury Department. He has written for CTC Sentinel since Substantive Notes \[a\] For every smuggling attempt identified, thwarted, or disrupted, an unknown number of others presumably get through without authorities ever learning about them. The authors believe the numbers detected by authorities is likely to be indicative of the true larger total. Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian authorities also made this point in interviews with the authors. Significant caveats apply, however. It should also be noted that, all other things being equal, more thwarting and disruption of smuggling could be expected to lead to a reduction in smuggling attempts over time. In other words, a higher number of interdictions could theoretically be associated with a decreasing rather than increasing problem set, though this would likely occur over a longer period of time than that studied here. Indeed, while most officials interviewed for this study reported that increased disruption of smuggling attempts was taking place against the background of an increased trend in smuggling activity, one Israeli official expressed the opinion that what has changed at the Jordanian and Egyptian border is not the overall level of smuggling, but rather the number of smuggling attempts that are identified, thwarted, or disrupted. Determining why the rate of detected smuggling goes up or down is complex, is not a result of any one factor, and may elude simple explanation. It only includes data on assembled guns smuggled across the Jordanian border. It does not include weapons parts or grenades. The IDF compiled higher numbers of weapons seized in the past three years because they include smuggling attempts that were not made public, but they do not differentiate between types of weapons. The larger number of weapons seized at or near the border appears to reflect a broader category than just those seized in specifically counter-smuggling operations. Author Levitt interview, Israeli official, May Sometimes it quantifies the amount of drugs seized by weight, and sometimes by estimated worth in dollars or shekels. Some material was shared at these meetings, and more was provided in follow up communication via email, WhatsApp, and Zoom. Field research along the Israeli-Jordanian border was conducted in September Anything Goes! The red dots represent areas where there have been thwarted smugglings at or near the borders of Jordan and Egypt. The red pins show smuggling hot spots. IDF data relayed to the authors 95 While some reports imply that the increase in drug smuggling is tied to terrorism, 96 evidence suggests otherwise. The line shows the wider area where smugglings most frequently occur according to Israeli officials interviwed by the authors. CTC Dr.

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