Buy Cocaine Algeria

__________________________

📍 Verified store!

📍 Guarantees! Quality! Reviews!

__________________________

▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼ ▼▼

▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲ ▲▲

Buy Cocaine Algeria

Africa is no stranger to cocaine trafficking. For about two decades, the continent has been used by drug-trafficking organizations seeking to transport their product securely from South America to the lucrative European consumer markets. West Africa and the Sahel have borne the brunt of the cocaine trade, which has spurred a rise in local addiction , corrupted institutions and hobbled governance. Cocaine trafficking continues, but the routes used by traffickers are changing. The three largest cocaine seizures recorded in the region this century occurred between and , including two in Morocco. They found kilograms of cocaine buried in a container of frozen meat. The Oran cocaine shipment can be traced to the Brazilian port of Santos, where, in April, a container with the hidden drugs was loaded aboard the MSC Amalfi. It was one of 15 containers of frozen meat. The shipment seemed routine, as Chikhi owned at least two meat import companies and had contracted with a Brazilian company over the last seven years for halal meat. The containers were offloaded in Valencia, Spain, on 23 May, where they were reportedly searched by Spanish police and customs officials. The results of this search are unknown, but Spanish authorities allowed the containers to be loaded onto a second vessel, the Vega Mercury , which then departed for Algeria. But it did not end there — a number of others were implicated, including prosecutors, the son of a former Algerian prime minister, and a driver for the national police chief , General Abdelghani Hamel, who was dismissed from duty by the president. The Chikhi affair has already led to the removal of some powerful figures, most notably Hamel, an ally of and potential successor to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and Major General Habib Chentouf, an army officer seen as a potential successor to the current army chief of staff. The size of the shipment suggests that the trafficking route connecting South America to Europe via Algeria is already well established. There is a risk that this route, as well as those through Morocco and other North African countries, will become more popular for traffickers in the coming years. This is due to various factors. Numerous logistics links — planes, ferries and commercial ships — connect the southern rim of the Mediterranean to the southern edge of Europe, with large numbers of people and volumes of goods moving between the two on a daily basis. These licit transport links offer significant benefits to drug traffickers, who, as in the Chikhi affair, can hide drug shipments among other commodities. Traffickers are also being driven to North Africa because of the growing risks they face along the established trafficking routes through the Sahel and the Sahara. In recent years, the number of armed groups, including terrorists, insurgents and militias, operating in areas transected by these routes has steadily risen. International actors, including the French, Americans and the UN, have consequently deployed in the region, focusing surveillance there. Neither the lucrative Europe cocaine market nor conflict in the Sahel and Sahara is likely to change significantly in the near future. Hence, there is a distinct likelihood that cocaine trafficking through North Africa will continue, and probably increase, in the years to come. In other areas in which cocaine traffickers have operated, such as Central America and West Africa, the impact of the trade on local communities and states has been significant. This is also likely to be the case in North Africa, though the threats are unlikely to be violent in nature, or even highly visible. Instead, the main impact of cocaine is likely to be the corrupting effect it will have on regional governments. Work by Global Initiative experts has underscored the corrosive impact that trafficking of cocaine has had on governments in Guinea-Bissau , Mali and Niger , sparking institutional decay, contestation among powerful figures over the narco-dividends and, in some cases, the direct involvement of state officials in drug trafficking. While profound political and socio-economic differences exist between West African and North African states, that does not render the latter immune to the risk of significant narco-corruption. But it goes further — the Chikhi affair seems to have become a pretext for high-level competition within the authorities, used by those in power to move against or sideline potential competitors. If cocaine trafficking continues to be a feature in the North African region, it is likely that such institutional impacts of the trade will increase in severity and frequency. It is essential that North African governments also prepare themselves to deal with local rising cocaine or crack use. Currently, few Algerians or Moroccans use the drug. South American cocaine traffickers, however, often pay local assistants in cocaine — a portion of which often gets sold on into the domestic market. In a number of transit countries, this has spiked local consumption levels. Due to the potential risks associated with cocaine trafficking, it is important for North African states and the broader international community to maintain strategic alertness on the issue, and be ready to systematically address a range of potential threats associated with cocaine trafficking. Governments must not presume that the Maghreb is an exception to the risk of narco-corruption, government corrosion or cocaine addiction. The cost to the region could be very high. Instead, they should strategically plan to address the worst — and act accordingly. Author s Matt Herbert. Posted on 21 Sep Cocaine and corruption in North Africa: Looking ahead In other areas in which cocaine traffickers have operated, such as Central America and West Africa, the impact of the trade on local communities and states has been significant. Related analysis.

Global initiative against transnational organized crime

Buy Cocaine Algeria

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking in Algeria is a highly sophisticated criminal market that emerged in southern Algeria, particularly in Tamanrasset, and has since spread to northern cities such as Algiers, Oran and Annaba, among others. There is a high degree of external involvement in the humantrafficking market, which is driven primarily by criminal networks originating in Niger, which is also the country of origin of most trafficking victims in Algeria. Labour standards and regulatory capacity in Algeria are poor, and therefore instances of exploitative and bonded labour are common and largely unremarked upon. Irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. However, this tends to occur on an ad-hoc basis, or with local groups and businesses, rather than as a systematic form of transnational organized crime. Human smuggling is a dynamic, long-standing but increasingly risky market in Algeria, a country that is both a destination and a transit country for irregular migrants. Over the past two years, increasing numbers of migrants have been making the sea crossing from coastal points in Algeria towards Spain. The migrant smuggling hub of Tamanrasset,in particular,is an important transit site for migrants journeying towards Morocco and Libya, with migrants crossing from Mali and Niger. Border officials are known to collaborate in the illicit market, and despite harsh rhetoric and strict enforcement measures employed by the government, including the construction of a sand berm to counter human smuggling, this environment has empowered violent and specialized networks which operate across multiple routes in central Sahara. Arms trafficking is a thriving market in southern Algeria due to the outflows from neighbouring Mali and Libya. Seizures of large stocks of small and light weapons are a regular occurrence. The Salvador pass in Niger, at the convergence with Libya and Algeria, is situated at a strategic corridor for traffickers and is considered a primary transit point. The mostimportant corridor for arms trafficking connects the city of Djanet in the southeast to Bordj Baji Mokhtar in the southwest. To a lesser extent, a network of arms trafficking also exists between Algeria and Tunisia. Although this market is smaller thanthat of Niger and Libya, the presence of terrorist groups around Mount Chaambi at the Tunisia—Algeria border, where heavy armed conflict has occurred in the past years, is significant. Although illegal logging of cedar and fir by local people is common in neighbouring countries, there is no evidence to suggest the presence of organized criminal activity pertaining to flora in Algeria. However, thousands of animal species in the country are in danger of extinction as a result of poaching and trafficking, including gazelles, the bearded mouflon and a number of rare bird species, in particular goldfinches. Actors from various Gulf countries play an important role in the fauna crimes market in Algeria, in both the poaching and the purchasing of animal trophies. The most pervasive environmental criminal market, however, is that of non-renewable resources crimes. Algeria experiences high levels of oil smuggling, the value of which is estimated at more than a billion dollars per year. Algeria is an oil-rich country where fuel is extensively subsidized. As a consequence, due to large price differentials, massive quantities of oil are diverted to neighbouring countries, primarily Tunisia, but also Morocco, Mali, Niger and Mauritania, through local smuggling networks. While oil-smuggling activity in the country is geographically limited, the net loss for Algerian people overall is immense, in part due to the widespread cronyism that culminates in substantial losses to the public purse. In recent times, gold trafficking has become increasingly prevalent in the far south of Algeria. However, with mobility restrictions and the closure of borders due to the COVID pandemic, this activity experienced a temporary slowdown. While cannabis cultivation in Algeria is low, criminal networks involved in the cannabis trade have longstanding regional connections with their Moroccan counterparts, and Algeria is a major destination and transit market for Moroccan cannabis. The supply chain is composed of a limited number of major players, hundreds of wholesalers across the country and thousands of smaller trafficking networks commercializing cannabis to the endconsumer. Algeria has turned, fairly rapidly, from an origin point for smuggled synthetics to a destination country and is considered the largest market in North Africa. Tramadol and codeine smuggling dominate the market, but Subutex also plays an important role. Although the illicit trade was originally limited to urban hubs such as Algiers and Oran, the market has expanded across most of the country over the past two years. Conversely, the cocaine and heroin markets only have a limited influence in Algeria, although there is evidence to suggest that both markets may be experiencing an uptick in activity in recent times. For cocaine in particular, Algeria is emerging as a new and significant trafficking hub linking Latin American cocaine production sites with drug markets in Europe. Criminal networks are among the most active, geographically widespread, and economically dominant criminal actors in Algeria. Criminal networks with significant transnational linkages are involved in long-standing hashish-trafficking activities, the smuggling of basic products particularlyalong the southern border of the country , the illicit trafficking of oil, human smuggling, the illicit gold trade and arms trafficking. However, there is increasing evidence of foreign actors who are physically present in the country, particularly in the south, engaged in illegal gold extraction. While not necessarily exerting full control of these markets, foreign criminal actors, including Nigerien, Malian and Libyan nationals, take part in four major markets: food and oil trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, gold trafficking, and arms trafficking. Such actors are concentrated and often established in Tamanrasset and the borderlands of Timiaouine and In Guezzam. Despite the prevalence of criminal networks, both domestic and foreign, the most pervasive criminal actor type in Algeria is the state-embedded actor. Corruption in Algeria remains so pervasive that high-level criminal actors have been increasingly linked to state institutions. Such actors continue to enjoy a high level of protection from the state, while high-level politicians and military elites have been associated with massive money-laundering, tax-evasion and embezzlements cases. Algeria is the main security power in the region and is often labelled as a stabilizing force. It maintains strong law enforcement and military leadership against transnational organized crime. The security apparatus connects the fight against organized crime and the fight against terrorism. However, high levels of corruption, impunity and lack of transparency are significant issues in Algeria. There is little evidence to suggest that the end of the regime of former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the transition to the new government of Abdelmadjid Tebboune has brought about any material change to levels of transparency and accountability. Indeed, the purported objectives of increasing transparency and accountability by way of the new constitution have failed to win over the protesters of the Hirak movement and significant sections of the population. On the whole, adequate standards and systems for international cooperation are in place. Algeria is party to all relevant international treaties and conventions pertaining to organized crime, with the exception of the Arms Trade Treaty. However, information-sharing related to high-level tax evasion cases or common judicial trials is low, and the near complete lack of cooperation with Morocco is a serious gap, given that the shared border hosts a large variety of criminal markets. Domestically, Algeria has extremely tough and punitive laws on organized crime, including on drugs, human and arms trafficking and human smuggling. However, there is no clear political vision on how to effectively tackle the challenges of organized crime, nor a consolidated strategy to combat the rise of criminal economies. New legislation adopted in September ostensibly with the purpose of tackling bandes de quartiers gangs is viewed by many as a way of strengthening the judicial arsenal against groups acting as important driving forces behind the Hirak movement. There are high levels of government interference in the judiciary and recent evidence suggests a significantly limited ability on the part of the judicial system to bring high-level organized crime figures to trial. Furthermore, physical and other forms of abuse are widespread within the detention system. The state has a strong grip on the economy in Algeria, which is supported by significant protectionist policies. However, the country is on the verge of an economic crisis, largely as a result of falling oil prices. The government has shown limited capacity to exert control over the informal economy, which accounts for more than half of the overall economy. Excessive bureaucracy makes engaging in the formal economy difficult, which, when combined with a general lack of avenues toward prosperity for most Algerians, presents optimal opportunities for informal practices, illicit trade and numerous black markets. With regard to the anti-money laundering framework, while established systems of reporting through financial intelligence units exist, they have been ineffective in blocking capital flight. There is little evidence to suggest any of the relevant institutions have sought to tackle the primary means of laundering money in Algeria— the property market. In December , the government did, however, establish a committee tasked with developing a national anti-money laundering strategy, among other objectives. Civil society and social protection measures are extremely weak in Algeria. Accessing effective treatment and support is very difficult for people who use drugs, and the country meets only a small fraction of the necessary measures to help victims exit modern slavery. Although there is a national anti-trafficking plan in place, its implementation is slow, largely due to the fact that there are no public mechanisms to screen, identify and refer potential victims to protection services. With regard to the prevention of organized crime, measures are in place but fall considerably short of the necessary standards. The majority of organized-crime prevention measures fall under the remit of law enforcement agencies in the country, focusing primarily on drug-related crimes. While civil society in Algeria is dynamic and vocal, it is at the mercy of an authoritarian regime. The state has undermined civil-society groups with severe restrictions in terms of funding and capacity. The legal space in which such groups can operate is shrinking. At the end of there were about 60 political prisoners in detention, several of whom are journalists. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Algiers. Income group Lower middle income. Population 43,, Geography type Coastal. Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 4. Human smuggling 6. Arms trafficking 5. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 4. Non-renewable resource crimes 6. Heroin trade 2. Cocaine trade 3. Cannabis trade 6. Synthetic drug trade 5. Criminal actors 4. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 1. Criminal networks 5. State-embedded actors 7. Foreign actors 4. Political leadership and governance 4. Government transparency and accountability 4. International cooperation 5. National policies and laws 6. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 4. Law enforcement 6. Territorial integrity 6. Anti-money laundering 4. Economic regulatory capacity 4. Victim and witness support 3. Prevention 4. Non-state actors 3. Analysis Download full profile english. People Human trafficking in Algeria is a highly sophisticated criminal market that emerged in southern Algeria, particularly in Tamanrasset, and has since spread to northern cities such as Algiers, Oran and Annaba, among others. Trade Arms trafficking is a thriving market in southern Algeria due to the outflows from neighbouring Mali and Libya. Environment Although illegal logging of cedar and fir by local people is common in neighbouring countries, there is no evidence to suggest the presence of organized criminal activity pertaining to flora in Algeria. Criminal Actors Criminal networks are among the most active, geographically widespread, and economically dominant criminal actors in Algeria. Leadership and governance Algeria is the main security power in the region and is often labelled as a stabilizing force. Economic and financial environment The state has a strong grip on the economy in Algeria, which is supported by significant protectionist policies. Civil society and social protection Civil society and social protection measures are extremely weak in Algeria. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

Buy Cocaine Algeria