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Vanda Felbab-Brown outlines what she calls the steady deterioration of the U. They do have many real and lasting practical negative implications for the public safety of both countries. The Mexican government hopes that the Biden administration, like its predecessor, will focus on migration and post-coronavirus Covid economic recovery, and will ignore how the Mexican government gutted the important security cooperation. But the Biden administration should not do that. At stakes are lives of U. The exoneration of Cienfuegos is bad for Mexico and for the United States: it reveals the continued spinelessness of Mexican prosecutors and their persisting vulnerability to political manipulation and pressure from powerful actors — whether the Mexican military or the drug traffickers. On the heels of other U. Under massive pressure from the Mexican government, including the threat to prohibit access of U. This unprecedented U. Mexico promised to conducts its own investigation into Cienfuegos. To add injury to that insult, the Mexican president then unilaterally released the pages of U. One can only hope that the United States in handing over the evidence file, purged it of all sensitive information about sources and methods. The U. Department of Justice called the Mexican government in breach of the U. But the damage to the U. Before exonerating Cienfuegos and compromising the U. Without consulting the United States about how to meaningfully improve security cooperation to the mutual satisfaction Mexico passed a new foreign agent law in December. That law limited the ability of U. With its lasting negative restrictions and other problematic effects, the law brought the U. Its disastrous handling of its own anti-crime policy, its apathy to the continual growth of the multifaceted power, brazenness, and impunity of Mexican criminal groups and their increasing violence, and its willingness to shield corrupt high officials and powerful institutions like the army from justice, make U. And to a considerable some extent, the Mexican government appears not to care. It is time for the United States to get tough with its southern neighbor on security, public safety, and rule of law issues. What are the policy implications? In any discussion of how to revise and adapt Merida, the United Should never accept simply funding drug treatment programs in Mexico, as the Mexican government has proposed. Yes, such programs, when rigorously and effectively designed, are very important. But they cannot be the entirety of anti-crime and rule of law efforts. In fact, the United States may well consider conditioning any expansion of U. Exploring how to move from high-value targeting in Mexico to simultaneous middle-level targeting of the operational levels of Mexican criminal groups and their corrupt government patrons is an important, if difficult, part of the agenda. High-value targeting creates serious problems since the resulting fragmentation of criminal groups exacerbates the disastrous violence levels in Mexico. But the answer is not allowing people like Cienfuegos to get away with the most serious crimes. A better anti-crime strategy would focus on bringing down much of the middle-operational layers of a criminal groups and government-corruption network in one sweep. That remains difficult in Mexico because of the continuing corruption there and the lack of capacity and trustworthiness of Mexican law enforcement agencies to undertake such lengthy investigations, avoid leaks, and meaningfully execute sweep arrests. Even so, that should be the direction of efforts to strengthen Mexican law enforcement capacities and U. The United States needs to carefully monitor the practical damage the new foreign agent law has inflicted on U. On the same day Mexican prosecutors exonerated Cienfuegos, the Mexican government published guidelines of how to operationalize the foreign agent law. To an extent, the new guidelines show some responsiveness to U. The guidelines were formulated subsequent to the passage of the law based on U. Positively, the scope of information that needs to be shared with high levels of the Mexican government about any meeting between U. But this improvement does not fully redress the chilling effect of the law on sharing sensitive information, with the possibility of leaks and threats to honest Mexican law enforcement officials from their corrupt counterparts persisting. To overcome some of the damage of the law, the United States should insist that much of its collaboration takes places through joint special vetted unit s. And from now on, the United States should not tolerate the higher-level Mexican officials in the units being exempted from the vetting , something the Mexican government had previously insisted on with disastrous effects for collaboration, meaningful law enforcement, and the safety of Mexican civilians. In fact, the United States should insist that the representatives of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs whom the foreign agents law mandates to sit in on all the U. Michael R. Glass, Taylor B. Seybolt, Phil Williams. Vanda Felbab-Brown Bruce Riedel. Abraham F. Nonetheless, until really meaningful improvements in Mexico take place, the United States should no longer extradite high-level Mexican suspects indicted and arrested by the United States for drug trafficking, money-laundering, and serious corruption. And the U. Department of Justice should not be deterred from persisting with such investigations and launching new indictments and apprehensions. Clearly, Mexico is not willing and able to promote justice by itself and has sabotaged meaningful anti-crime collaboration with the United States. The Biden administration should be wary of designing its ambitious efforts to address root causes of migration in Central America jointly with Mexico. The effectiveness of any development projects and institution-building there depends on addressing the egregious levels of criminal corruption, poor rule of law, and the pervasive impunity and abusiveness of government forces and officials. Until U. Finally, the United States should keep at the ready two powerful tools: designating Mexican drug trafficking groups as terrorist organizations and decertifying Mexico for failing to collaborate with U. Both are fraught, blunt, and outright problematic tools that are normally best avoided. To demonstrate some willingness to dig the U. Mexico should strengthen the power and work of U. And, in close collaboration with the United States, Mexico should develop a serious joint strategy for reducing the flows of fentanyl through Mexican ports and for cracking down on fentanyl labs and pill mills, with U. Foreign Policy. Central America Mexico. Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors. The US-Mexico security relationship in Sections Sections. Sign Up. Commentary The US-Mexico security relationship in Vanda Felbab-Brown. Seybolt, Phil Williams January 21, Aspiration and Ambivalence. The Obama Administration and the Americas. Cienfuegos and the US-Mexico firestorm. A dangerous backtrack on the US-Mexico security relationship. More On. Mutually assured disruption: Globalization, security, and the dangers of decoupling. Global Trade Mutually assured disruption: Globalization, security, and the dangers of decoupling Thomas J. Christensen January 30, Daniel S. Hamilton, Angela Stent November 14,

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