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Bujumbura, Burundi. He also wrote and executive-produced the short film Fate. Lionel holds a master's degree in international business and is currently a doctoral candidate at the University of Burundi. He is the artistic director for Nonara Productions, a full-service independent production company, producing high-end creative content of any genre, medium, or scale for any platform dedicated to enhancing dialogue between the languages and cultures of Africa. Inspired by true events, on September 28, , Fate Vincent Winslow was approached by a stranger looking for 'two dime bags of weed', he decided to oblige the seemingly minute request, motivated by one thing: hunger. Bonaventure Nicimpaye is a lawyer by training, with a specialization in International Relations. He pursued a career that began in in the public sector as a Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Burundi, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then to the Presidency of the Republic. May you have roots and leave a name. A teenage boy flees war-torn Africa and treks across the world, from New York to Paris and back to Africa, desperate to find a greater meaning to life. Production Support. Post Production. Africa Rwanda Kigali Lionel N. Lionel N. Fate Short Film Inspired by true events, on September 28, , Fate Vincent Winslow was approached by a stranger looking for 'two dime bags of weed', he decided to oblige the seemingly minute request, motivated by one thing: hunger. Equipment Miscellaneous External Recorder. Post Production Video Editor - Documentary. Miscellaneous Copywriter Translator.

Guide to Buying Weed in Burundi Safely

Bujumbura buy weed

Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit. The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands. The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits. The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law. The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing. The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities. The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market. The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market. The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach. The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance. Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership. Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups. The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities. A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime. The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities. Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs. Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime. Human trafficking continues to be a significant issue in Burundi, exacerbated by the impact of the COVID pandemic, the regional political and security dynamics within the country and in the wider Great Lakes region, weak and ineffective governance and the lack of human and financial resources devoted to the issue. The country serves primarily as a source country, with internal human trafficking operations posing a greater threat than transnational operations. Labour and sexual exploitation are widespread, living conditions remain poor and human rights violations are common. Traffickers often target women and girls, especially for forced labour in the Gulf countries as domestic workers. While some measures have been taken to combat the crime, among them the closure of informal recruitment agencies and engagement in diplomatic negotiations with other countries to formalize labour immigration, such measures are open to exploitation by key political figures. The return of large numbers of refugees in recent years has compounded existing vulnerabilities, as both the returnees and those internally displaced remain in need of an income and are often left in situations that can be exploited. While tighter controls over the borders with Tanzania and Rwanda have increased the role of human smugglers in helping people wanting to leave the country, they have also made smuggling more difficult. Many Burundians who have been displaced by violence and regional instability seek refuge in neighbouring countries, primarily in Tanzania, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC and Uganda. Kenya and South Africa are also prime destinations for irregular Burundian migrants seeking employment opportunities. However, since the new president, Evariste Ndayishimiye, came to power it has become less problematic. Notwithstanding, Burundian militiamen have reportedly been establishing checkpoints along smuggling routes to extort money from passers-by. Trafficking of arms and ammunition has been a long-standing problem in the country and an important business, involving both civilian and military authorities. Many people own guns and Burundi is a transit country for the regional weapons black market. The demand for trafficked arms stems from the conflict and insurgency throughout the region. In addition, financial prospects in an environment severely lacking in other economic opportunities incentivize criminals to engage in arms trafficking. Corruption among border agents is also a significant factor, facilitating arms trafficking and other crimes. Evidence shows that there is a link between arms trafficking and the high crime rates in these areas. The most common counterfeit goods coming into the country are medical products, although there is a severe lack of data about the extent of the crime. Other types of illicit trade in excise goods are rife, with sugar, soft beverages and alcoholic beverages, illegally exported to neighbouring countries. These illegal businesses are generally in the hands of elite members of the ruling party and their associates. There is widespread abuse of regulations relating to the importation of certain goods and services. The programme is expected to run until While charcoal and other timber-based products are a common and vital source of household energy, there is no evidence of related organized crime. However, information about the nature and scale of possible flora crimes remains unclear and anecdotal. Burundi, a small country, lacks the wildlife diversity found elsewhere in the region. There are no statistics related to poaching and wildlife protection laws are not strictly enforced. It seems likely that it is primarily a transit country for fauna crimes. Nevertheless, poaching is believed to be an issue that is both under reported and largely unabated. Poached animals include elephants, pangolins, mountain gorillas and African grey parrots. Illegal fishing is a substantial problem in Lake Tanganyika. Burundi is also known as a transit country for wildlife trafficking from other regions, largely facilitated by corrupt Burundian officials. Ivory stockpiling in the country also continues to raise concerns. The country is a marginal producer of minerals in the Great Lakes region. Both its industrial and artisanal mining sectors are more limited than those in neighbouring countries. Gold is the main mineral smuggled from artisanal mines. Illicit gold is both produced locally and smuggled into the country from the DRC, primarily from South Kivu, although data about smuggling networks and smuggling routes remains limited. The 3TG minerals — tin, tungsten and tantalum — are by far the most profitable and most prevalently smuggled minerals in both Burundi and the wider region. Both drugs are believed to come into the country via Lake Victoria and other eastern border sites before being trafficked to Europe by air, or elsewhere in Africa by land. Given the high cost of cocaine and the extreme poverty in Burundi, domestic cocaine consumption is assumed to still be quite low. Burundi is both a source of cannabis and a transit country for cannabis produced in neighbouring countries. Although there is a domestic cannabis market, cannabis produced in the country is often trafficked to neighbouring Rwanda. Burundi is also believed to be a destination country for cannabis trafficked out of the DRC. There is limited evidence of a notable synthetic drug market in Burundi and consumption of synthetic drugs in the country is believed to be quite low. The fact that the Burundian economy and administration are poorly connected to cyberspace makes the country less vulnerable to this type of crime. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior was recently reported to have said that the Burundi National Police is now well equipped to deal with cases of cybercrime. Financial crimes are prevalent in the country. Refugees in Burundi are most likely to fall victim to cyber-enabled financial crimes, regularly becoming the targets of online fraud and scams involving social media and mobile money. Policies relating to telecommunications access, such as SIM card registrations, have also introduced risks for vulnerable users. There is widespread embezzlement of public funds. Public contracts, state subsidies, parastatals and local councils continue to be riddled with corruption. In the Minister of Home Affairs dismissed the accountants in all local councils for diverting local taxes. Despite the fact that incidents of corruption linked with illicit cash transfers to European bank accounts have been well documented, the revelations have not led to prosecutions. There is a high level of complacency and direct involvement of state-embedded actors in criminal activities. Research suggests that smugglers cooperate extensively with corrupt state officials. This is especially true of border control officials, who are known to facilitate the cross-border transportation of illicit goods, especially between Burundi and the DRC. Members of the state security apparatus are often the perpetrators of violence. Although it is not carried out for profit, this organized violence serves to consolidate repressive government rule through intimidation, enabling corruption to continue unabated. Petty corruption among Burundian police officers is also commonplace. The complicity of high-ranking officials in organized crime has made the country a logistical hub for gold smuggling and human and arms trafficking operations. State officials in various departments, including police officials, as well as teachers of human trafficking victims, are known to be complicit in human trafficking. Leading officials in the ruling party are said to be corrupt, as well as involved in both organized crime and illicit economic activities at the national level. While the evidence is sparse, it is believed that private transportation companies and banks are also involved in criminal activities. Private sector actors also collaborate with political actors to commit economic crimes such as the abuse of the exemptions policy, goods smuggling and human trafficking. Evidence suggests a prevalence of networks operating in various criminal markets, including drug, human and arms trafficking. These networks reportedly include both non-state armed militias and government-affiliated militias as well as state security chiefs, high-ranking civil servants, politicians, local authorities and businessmen. The networks are also often based on political affiliations within the ruling party and long-standing relationships among veterans of the civil war. Smaller criminal syndicates appear to be heavily involved in organized criminal activity, although information about these groups remains limited. The Imbonerakure is allegedly involved in various illicit activities, including extortion, kidnapping, illegal taxation, smuggling and murder. In some areas it has more authority over the population than the police or local administrators. However, a decrease in the influence of the group was recorded in due to efforts made by the new government. Despite promises of fundamental reforms and other policies designed to address insecurity in Burundi since the election of the new president, including reining in the Imbonerakura, the group appears to have maintained its ties to the national intelligence services and security forces and to act as an arm of political repression. Most of the foreign actors involved in criminal activities in Burundi come from within the region, although their impact is marginal. Human trafficking networks are run by Congolese, Rwandans, Kenyans, Tanzanians and others. One example is Rwandan officials who have allegedly been involved in recruiting Burundian refugees into militias supporting the Burundian opposition. As Burundi is a transit country for drugs, weapons and gold, many foreign actors from the region are involved in smuggling. Chinese nationals are also believed to be involved in ivory trafficking out of Burundi. Foreign businessmen from Lebanon and elsewhere in Africa are involved in trafficking networks under the protection of corrupt officials. There is no evidence of the existence of mafia-style groups in Burundi, although some militias are known to have organized hierarchies and it is likely that they are involved in illicit trade. Burundian groups are more likely to be involved in criminal markets on an ad hoc basis, working in partnership with corrupt officials. However, they are known to not be involved in larger scale and more lucrative enterprises. Persistent political unrest and ethnic tension continue to undermine governance. As a result, the government has made minimal efforts to combat organized crime, with crimes such as human trafficking ignored entirely. Many corrupt government officials are, themselves, believed to be involved in organized crime. Ethnic tensions within the government and throughout the country further undermine the ability to govern. The persistent deficiencies in governance, together with the pandemic, have resulted in increased economic hardship, higher poverty rates and public dissatisfaction with the governing and ruling elites, perpetuating the absence of government accountability. President Ndayishimiye has made efforts to dismantle corrupt networks within the public administration by removing high-ranking corrupt officials and nullifying contracts in the mining sector and private-public partnership projects. However, no institutional reforms have been enacted to reinforce good governance. Accountability is nearly non-existent, with ruling-party securocrats, the police and local administrators engaging in corruption. Misuse of public office for private gain persists with impunity in the country. Corruption at all levels of the government and the private sector drains resources. Although Burundi is party to international organized crime agreements and is a member of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network, its efforts at regional cooperation fail to prevent or combat organized crime. The Burundian comprehensive legal framework addresses human trafficking, wildlife trafficking, arms trafficking and drug trafficking. However, the laws are generally not enforced, creating a large degree of impunity. The judiciary is rife with corruption and, in the absence of effective systems and programmes, continues to be inefficient. Control over the judicial system has been tightened by legislative amendments made in which increased the powers of the president. Prisons are poorly managed, understaffed and overcrowded and over half of the prisoners are pre-trial detainees. Given the lack of separation of powers and the tight grip of the ruling party on the state apparatus, law enforcement is undermined by politicization and rampant corruption. The country also lacks the capacity for supervisory, investigative and enforcement bodies to enforce anti-organized crime legislation. Instead, the government continues to focus its efforts on consolidating control and targeting the opposition. Burundi has moderate territorial integrity, with all its borders under state control and a range of international agencies involved in assisting it to improve its border control and management systems. However, border officials lack proper training and cross-border smuggling and trafficking activities take place unabated. Armed rebels based in South Kivu in the DRC have successfully organized several attacks across the border, the most recent in August and September As a landlocked country, Burundi depends heavily for import and export transit on the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam and the Kenyan port of Mombasa, which, because of its allegedly lax and weak security and management, is susceptible to corruption. Despite the fact that there is legislation in place and the country is party to the relevant conventions, it has no mechanism to combat money laundering. The government has now taken steps to develop its own financial intelligence unit, as required by the Financial Action Task Force, to bring the country in line with international anti-money laundering standards. Unemployment rates continue to be high and most people live in rural areas without economic prospects, triggering an increase in human smuggling and trafficking. There is almost no system of registration of individual mineworkers, reflecting inefficient regulation. Another problem is that state-embedded actors infringe on property rights and land conflict management is often driven by political motives, with the properties of prominent opponents in exile seized illegally. The rise of the informal economy also hinders the state's limited economic regulatory capacity and doing business in Burundi is extremely difficult. However, the government is taking steps to diversify its exports, to increase investment in certain sectors and to modernize its systems to facilitate trade. The limited support available to victims of organized crime in Burundi is provided exclusively by NGOs. However, there is a lack of financial resources to carry out proper preventative work. As state officials or their associates are involved in most of the crimes, there are no meaningful mechanisms in place to control them. Drug rehabilitation centres are insufficiently stocked and understaffed. Burundi also lacks prisoner reintegration programmes and support for victims of human trafficking and modern slavery and has failed to update human trafficking statistics. Despite the deficiencies in victim identification and support, the Burundian government has made significant efforts to comply with minimum standards, including during the pandemic, a time when resources for vulnerable groups were increasingly at risk. Government repression has severely restricted the capacity of civil society and since the outbreak of conflict only civil society organizations that serve as government allies have been allowed to operate successfully. NGOs have been banned, and repressive state policies target independent media and anti-corruption activists. As a result, most of the work of tackling organized crime is done by a small group of civil society organizations with limited capacity and almost no political leverage. Corruption has also infiltrated these bodies and many local NGOs are involved in embezzlement. Media freedom has deteriorated substantially, with many journalists forced into exile, detained on false charges or intimidated when reporting on the misuse of public funds. Human rights activists have been arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel. A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index. We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource. This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State. Capital Bujumbura. Income group Low income. Population 12,, Geography type Landlocked. GINI Index Criminal markets 4. An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type. Human trafficking 8. Human smuggling 6. Extortion and protection racketeering 4. Arms trafficking 8. Trade in counterfeit goods 5. Illicit trade in excisable goods 6. Flora crimes 2. Fauna crimes 4. Non-renewable resource crimes 4. Heroin trade 3. Cocaine trade 2. Cannabis trade 3. Synthetic drug trade 3. Cyber-dependent crimes 2. Financial crimes 6. Criminal actors 5. An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society. Mafia-style groups 2. Criminal networks 4. State-embedded actors 9. Foreign actors 4. Private sector actors 6. Political leadership and governance 3. Government transparency and accountability 1. International cooperation 2. National policies and laws 3. A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime. Judicial system and detention 2. Law enforcement 1. Territorial integrity 3. Anti-money laundering 1. Economic regulatory capacity 2. Victim and witness support 1. Prevention 2. Non-state actors 2. Analysis Download full profile english french. People Human trafficking continues to be a significant issue in Burundi, exacerbated by the impact of the COVID pandemic, the regional political and security dynamics within the country and in the wider Great Lakes region, weak and ineffective governance and the lack of human and financial resources devoted to the issue. Trade Trafficking of arms and ammunition has been a long-standing problem in the country and an important business, involving both civilian and military authorities. Cyber Crimes The fact that the Burundian economy and administration are poorly connected to cyberspace makes the country less vulnerable to this type of crime. Financial Crimes Financial crimes are prevalent in the country. Criminal Actors There is a high level of complacency and direct involvement of state-embedded actors in criminal activities. Leadership and governance Persistent political unrest and ethnic tension continue to undermine governance. Criminal justice and security The judiciary is rife with corruption and, in the absence of effective systems and programmes, continues to be inefficient. Economic and financial environment Despite the fact that there is legislation in place and the country is party to the relevant conventions, it has no mechanism to combat money laundering. Civil society and social protection The limited support available to victims of organized crime in Burundi is provided exclusively by NGOs. Read the analysis Listen the podcasts View all events. Next Skip. How to measure organized crime? Read more on globalinitiative. Give us feedback We're constantly working to improve the Index.

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