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For most of its recorded history, from the Roman Empire into the Ottoman, under the French Mandate and up to the present day, Lebanon has been engaged in the cultivation, production, and trade of drugs. The Baalbeck-Hermel area, along with some of its surrounding regions, for instance, has been historically famous for the cultivation of cannabis. During the early years of the civil war — , Lebanon has seen the establishment of the culture of opium poppies Makhlouf ; Cwerman Despite the scarcity of resources and studies on the topic, Lebanon has been recognized as a main player in the international drug trade. A small country sitting on the edge of the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon has been marked by a long history of regional political turmoil. Due to its position in the heart of the Middle East, it has been for centuries the theater of military campaigns, the battleground of Empires and the battlefield for competing foreign and regional interests, as well as a hub for drug trafficking. Its political structure, characterized by a fragmented state and divided system, has allowed for the production and trade of controlled substances to flourish. And, while it no longer occupies the top ranks in terms of worldwide cannabis production, Lebanon is still one of the main cultivators in the Middle East, estimating between 20, to 40, hectares of land used for cannabis cultivation EMCDDA The implementation of these drug policies are moved by contradictory forces: opportunistic responses to international pressures on one hand, and an attempt to extract benefits from the industry on the other. The failure to enact sound drug policies and to effectively control the supply of drugs is the result of a network of political interests benefiting from the illicit drug trade. Going back as early as the beginning of the 20 th century, internationally imposed supply reduction measures have faced political obstacles from a ruling elite and its administration, which had vested interests in the sustainability of the drug trade. In , Egypt, one of the largest consumers of hashish, banned cannabis cultivation. This decision was reportedly in response to growing fears about the harms of cannabis and European pressure El Hadka This resolution shifted supplies to Greece and other neighboring countries, such as Lebanon and Syria. Faced with increased smuggling across its borders, Egypt brought the issue to the attention of the League of Nations in El Hadka As a result, the first ban on hashish production was enacted in by the French Mandate authorities in Lebanon and Syria. However, the policy remained nominal despite the ban on production, as the French authorities had to rely on local authorities for its implementation due their minimal territorial presence Shad The fate of this first ban of a controlled substance set the tone for the coming attempts to deal with drug cultivation and production in Lebanon. According to Felbab-Brown , illicit economies require political sponsorship and corruption to survive. For instance, large landowners on whose properties cannabis was cultivated often sought political positions that would guarantee their immunity and provide them with the political power to protect their interests Shad In addition to the landowners, other officials were involved in different aspects of the supply chain, either overlooking or facilitating transportation and smuggling of drugs Shad Illicit economies create their own network of political support, often reaching the highest ranks in the political decision-making hierarchy. The involvement of Lebanese statesmen in hashish production was highlighted throughout the years by a number of missions and reports. In September , after Greek authorities seized a plane transporting more than 1, kg of hashish, two MPs were accused publicly by the Minister of Interior: Nayef al Masri and Sabri Hamade, who was still occupying the position of Speaker of Parliament New York Times Neither men were prosecuted. The imbrication of the political system and the drug trade deepened with the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War and the unravelling of the central state. As the country devolved into chaos, warring militias took control of different areas of the country, fighting over strategic military positions and over strategic trafficking positions and routes Traboulsi Militias conducted drugs-for-arms trade to sustain their war efforts, which allowed them to arm themselves and pay their combatants Marshal Most militia leaders and their descendants remain in power to this day, along with the connection to the illicit economies that brought them to power. Today, a number of reports have linked Hezbollah—a Lebanese paramilitary party with representation in the executive and legislative branches of government—to the growing Captagon trade in the region GIATOC Even when law enforcement managed to arrest individuals in flagrante delicto , the Lebanese judiciary failed to prosecute them. As Marshall demonstrates several times in his book, the arrest of high-level traffickers usually does not lead to prosecution. And when it does, the well-oiled corruption machine present in the Lebanese state ultimately hinders the judicial process through the dismissal of cases or the recusal of judges as a result of political influence or bribery Picard The reach of the illicit drug industry is not limited to the upper echelons of the state. The importance and survival of the drug trade in Lebanon was not only made possible by the involvement of rich landowners, but also through the bribery and buy-in of most levels of power. This remains true today. In , the Customs Chief was issued an arrest warrant for illegally lifting a travel ban imposed on a Captagon smuggling Saudi prince before the latter had paid the multi-million fine imposed on him as part of his sentence Azhari In , the former Head of the Lebanese Drug Crimes Bureau was arrested after it emerged that a significant quantity of seized cocaine had vanished from evidence during his tenure Libnanews Due to the high revenues generated by the cultivation, production, and sale of drugs, most of those involved in the drug trade are ready to defend themselves against the state, which might want to curb and control their source of income Blanford Clashes between law enforcement, the army tasked with crop eradication, or the arrest of traffickers and dealers in the Beqaa often end in bloodshed Dagher ; Topalian ; Arab News It is noteworthy that these two high-profile cases ended with the imposition of the minimum sentences for crimes, denoting the performative nature of their arrest and prosecution. Political factors are not the only motives for the reluctance of the state to curb the drug trade. National economic interests have historically been a factor in the weakening of supply reduction measures as well. Hashish cultivation and trade profited the whole supply chain—from rich landowners, to smugglers, to the poorest farmers—at varying levels of revenue. The incomes of the illicit economy were and continue to be significant at the national level. Although imprecise, different estimates of the drug trade in Lebanon between the s and until put annual proceeds anywhere between million USD and 6 billion USD, underscoring the primordial importance of the drug trade to the inhabitants of the impoverished and marginalized Bekaa region of Lebanon. In , the consulting firm McKinsey was hired by the Lebanese Government to come up with an economic plan for the country. One of the recommendations was the legalization of the cultivation and export of cannabis for medical and industrial purposes, as it would contribute to bringing in over one billion USD a year McKinsey In light of the income generated by hashish cultivation, for Lebanon to effectively curb the drug trade, it would have to provide viable alternatives to the illicit crops and to compensate farmers for their loss of income by providing them with an alternative that is as lucrative as cannabis or poppies. In the s, the government introduced its first alternative crop program aimed at substituting cannabis with sunflowers Darwich , but the short-lived plan did not succeed in curbing the hashish trade. The beginning of the civil war in effectively ended the program. When the civil war ended, and in an attempt to regain its authority and foster the economic recovery of the country, the Lebanese state requested US funds to revive the alternative crops program Kaslow However, the funds never materialized. The authorities proceeded to destroy crops without an alternative program leaving scores of farmers without income Muir The eradication campaigns, however, did not reach all plantations, and the cultivation of hashish remained Blanford ; Muir In , the Lebanese minister of Agriculture blamed the lack of foreign aid for the return of the cultivation of cannabis Al Bawaba, Likewise, subsequent eradication campaigns failed due to the financial appeal of Hashish for farmers. The inability of the state to properly invest in the substitution of illegal crops thus becomes self-evident. If eradication program and crop substitution schemes failed in the past, the present financial crisis makes any similar policy highly unlikely. Since , Lebanon has faced financial turmoil, including the collapse of state institutions and finances. Following the crisis, a Voice of America report showed that in , amidst the protracted economic crisis in Lebanon, more farmers are turning to cannabis cultivation to make a living Russel In , a local newspaper reported that more and more cannabis farmers are turning to the manufacture and trade of Captagon given its higher profitability Sewell This show was primarily aimed to respond to the pressures of the international community. Local elites were also aware that such pressures would never materialize into real sanctions, as the international community was also committed to the stability of the country due to geopolitical considerations. Ironically, it emerged that this campaign was motivated by the need to eliminate drug competitors. In , the Single Convention on Drugs was signed by Lebanon and ratified in At the same time, in the s and s, the US consumption of hashish greatly increased Shad Around that time, Lebanon began its cannabis crop substitution program. A article describes the subterfuge and the collaboration between farmers and law enforcement:. But the cash crop is hash. His father grows it. His brothers grow it. His neighbors grow it in a hundred other villages of the Hermel-Baalbek area in northern Lebanon. Then the village gets together and selects someone to take the blame. They collect some fines and go away. However, the show served its purpose and dazzled its audience. When seizures or crop eradication were conducted more seriously, the government was getting something in return from the international community. For instance, as a response to international pressure, and under Syrian occupation, the Lebanese government conducted massive eradication campaigns from to However, according to the same act, the US President may require that foreign assistance be provided to identified countries engaged in the drug trade for national interest imperatives US Government In his Majors Determination, President Clinton justified providing aid to Lebanon by mentioning eradication efforts undertaken since , which have allegedly led to the near disappearance of cannabis cultivation for hashish production US Federal Register The Determination document concludes that. The fact that Lebanon was also allowed foreign aid due to its classification as a national interest asset rather than a country fully cooperating with US anti-narcotic efforts also explains why the state could continue effecting performative actions rather than actually combating drug traffic and production. In other words, the theatrical implementation of drug policy continues to this day. In view of the contradictory interests behind the implementation of drug control measures, state institutions have no interest or ability to truly respond to the challenges posed by the illicit drug markets. What remains within their reach to respond to international pressure are the weakest links in the chain, whether at the supply or demand level. The results have been particularly disastrous for people who use drugs in Lebanon—with up to 10, individuals arrested or charged every year Mansour Simultaneously, major kingpins appear on television programs, with their faces uncovered, seemingly unencumbered by the possibility that they may be identified by the state. Due to the limited sources studying the history of the drug trade in Lebanon, the historical aspect of this paper will mostly focus on cannabis. A local farmer, whose name was changed by the journalist. Arab News. Azhari, T. Al Jazeera , 5 November. Bawaba, A. Lebanese minister blames donor nations for return of bekaa pot crop , 16 June Blanford, N. Christian Science Monitor , 7 August Congressional Research Service. Cwerman, R. Lebanon: Valley of drugs. The Washington Post , 18 November Dagher, L. Three soldiers killed during raid on drug traffickers. Darwich, S. Politiques Publiques et Cultures Illicites. In Michel Picouet, et al. El Hadka, A. Forty years of the campaign against narcotic drugs in the United Arab Republic. Bulletin on Narcotics. Evans, B. Evolution of a Drug Economy: The case of Lebanon. Felbab-Brown, V. The nexus between the illicit narcotics trade and corruption. France Fredericks, L. The Washington Institute for Near East. Captured by Captagon? Herald Journal. Hashish Growers Prosper in Lebanon. Herald Journal , 11 March, p. Kareem, C. Daraj , 9 August. Kaslow, A. New Lebanese plan would fight hashish in the Bekaa valley. Christian Science Monitor , 7 March. Libnan News. Libnan News , 8 February. Makhlouf, H. Culture et Trafic de Drogue au Liban. Mansour, H. Beirut, Lebanon. Marshall, J. California: Stanford University Press. Lebanon Economic Vision and How to Achieve it. Muir, J. Christian Science Monitor , 7 August. Picard, E. Trafficking, Rents, and Diaspora in the Lebanese War. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Reston, J. Beirut: The dope traffic in the Middle East. The New York Times , 18 February. World news briefs; Syria and Lebanon off U. The New York Times , 11 November. Ross, A. Lebanon battles narcotic traffic; Steps taken to destroy crops of marijuana after appeal by Egypt for action. New York Times , 2 July, p. Russel, J. Voice of America ,16 June. Sewell, A. Shad, A. Drug trafficking networks in Lebanon: Their history and formation, — Sharp, J. Washington: Congressional Research Service. The New York Times. New York Times , 29 May. Lebanon orders inquiry into production of hashish after political scandal. New York Times , 19 September, p. Topalian, N. Lebanese army pursues Baalbek drug barons in ongoing raids. Al Mashreq , 13 June. Traboulsi, F. A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto Press. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. World Drug Report Booklet 5, p. United States Department of State. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. United States Federal Register. Presidential Determination No. United States Government. Home About. Research Integrity. Crime Beyond Borders. Year: Submitted on Jun 30, Accepted on Oct 12, Published on Dec 7, Peer Reviewed. CC Attribution 4. Corruption, Political Interests, and the Failure to Control the Supply of Drugs The failure to enact sound drug policies and to effectively control the supply of drugs is the result of a network of political interests benefiting from the illicit drug trade. Economic Interests Behind Illicit Economies Political factors are not the only motives for the reluctance of the state to curb the drug trade. Notes Due to the limited sources studying the history of the drug trade in Lebanon, the historical aspect of this paper will mostly focus on cannabis. Competing Interests The author has no competing interests to declare. References Arab News.

Lebanon | Greener Grass

Baalbek where can I buy cocaine

Hezbollah may be best known for its armed activities, but it also runs one of the largest and most sophisticated criminal operations in the world. In July, the European Union officially designated the 'military wing' of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation. This was a long overdue step, making clear to Lebanon's Party of God that it will pay a political price for continued acts of terrorism, crime and militancy. For decades, Hezbollah felt a measure of immunity. Europe was hesitant to hold it accountable for its conduct due to its political position within the delicately balanced Lebanese political system. But the sheer weight of evidence about Hezbollah's activities on European soil, not least the bombing that killed five Israelis and their Bulgarian driver in Burgas in , made the case for avoiding confrontation with Hezbollah untenable. The EU's decision to blacklist Hezbollah was made partly due to information revealed in March, when a Cypriot court convicted Hossam Yaccoub -- a dual Swedish-Lebanese citizen and Hezbollah operative -- and sentenced him to four years in prison. Among other charges, Yaccoub was convicted of participation in an organised crime group and the preparation of a criminal act. The head of the three-judge panel declared: 'It has been proven that Hezbollah is an organisation that operates under complete secrecy. There is no doubt that this group has multiple members and proceeds with various activities, including military training of its members. Therefore, the court rules that Hezbollah acts as a criminal organisation. This is only the most recent and prominent case of Hezbollah being proven in court to be acting as an organised criminal group in Europe. In fact, Hezbollah has been acting as such for years, involved in criminal enterprises, including narcotics trafficking and counterfeiting European currency. Hezbollah's involvement in crime stems from its need for funding, and in particular to establish independence from its patrons in Tehran and Damascus at a time when both are facing financial insecurity. In the past few years, however, these partners have not been as generous. Iran is undergoing devastating economic sanctions and the Syrian state is caught up in a civil war. Hezbollah's criminal activities are designed to help plug that gap. Hezbollah operatives run one of the largest and most sophisticated global criminal operations in the world. These criminal activities have strengthened the organisation and made it more difficult for Western nations to undermine it. Most of what has been uncovered of Hezbollah's activities in Europe comes from US investigations. Hezbollah has long been designated as a terrorist organisation by the US government, therefore its law enforcement and intelligence agencies have legal authority to pursue investigations into Hezbollah activities. This had not been the case in Europe until recently. However, nearly all the cases involving Hezbollah are transnational in nature, allowing even US investigators to uncover some Hezbollah activity in Europe. It is likely that there is more activity that will now be discovered due to Europe's policy change. Hezbollah has taken advantage of cross border opportunities to traffic arms, cash, and drugs. The two had trained in Hezbollah camps, however they were not arrested for terrorist or militant activities, but for cocaine trafficking. Traces of cocaine were found on the bills, along with the fingerprint of an infamous Dutch drug kingpin. A year later, two other men from the same ring, involved in moving drugs from Beirut into Europe, were arrested in a house raid in Speyer. In , Admiral James Stavridis, then commander of US Southern Command, noted an expanded presence of terrorist drug traffickers in West Africa, which had become their 'springboard to Europe. In January , one of the largest Hezbollah narcotics trafficking and money laundering schemes was disrupted. The U. Department of Treasury identified Hezbollah operative Ayman Joumma, along with an additional nine individuals and 19 businesses, as being involved. Joumma's network laundered money through Lebanese Canadian Bank LCB accounts, which he used to execute sophisticated trade-based money laundering schemes. The FBI uncovered a broad Hezbollah plot not only to sell counterfeit and stolen currency, but also to procure a long list of sophisticated weapons. According to law enforcement officials, in the late s Hezbollah militant Hassan Karaki was helping to lead a broad criminal conspiracy to sell counterfeit and stolen currency to an undercover FBI informant posing as a member of the Philadelphia criminal underworld. An undercover officer posed to the group of suspected Lebanese crooks as someone who could fence stolen goods. Members of the group bought what they believed to be stolen property from the undercover agent and sent the merchandise to destinations as diverse as Michigan, California, Paraguay, Brazil, Slovakia, Belgium, Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. According to details revealed by law enforcement officials, and in a subsequent US trial, the money for these purchases came from Danni Tarraf, a German-Lebanese procurement agent for Hezbollah with homes in Lebanon and Slovakia. Tarraf wasted little time before asking whether the agent could supply guided missiles and 10, 'commando' machine guns from the United States. With that, a massive Hezbollah criminal fundraising and weapons procurement case was all but delivered to US investigators on a silver platter. In a parallel plot, overseen by Hezbollah politician Hassan Hodroj, Hezbollah sought to procure a long list of sophisticated weapons in a black market scheme involving operatives across the globe. Given Tarraf's global contacts, investigators saw him as the most valuable target of their operation. But their next priority was Dib Harb, the son-in-law of Hodroj and a close associate of Karaki. An FBI source would finally get close to Harb, who revealed that Iran produces high-quality counterfeit currencies using facilities in the Baalbek area of Lebanon, working 18 hours a day to crank out the fake bills for Hezbollah's use. Harb was shopping for a buyer for the fake money. Karaki offered stolen as well as counterfeit money and stressed to the source that the stolen currency could not be spent in Lebanon because it was 'blood money' Hezbollah smuggled from Iran through Turkey and Syria into Lebanon. This explained why Hezbollah was so keen that the funds be spent in small amounts only, and not in Lebanon. In April , Karaki sent Harb to a meeting in southern Florida with the source and the source's purported Philadelphia crime boss. The men negotiated terms for the sale of stolen U. At one point, Harb showed the undercover agent a Swedish krona bill with stains from a dye pack security system used by banks to mark stolen funds. He explained that Hezbollah cells conduct robberies all over the world and send the money to Iran, where it is held before ultimately being distributed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Harb also explained that Hezbollah does not just produce counterfeit currency, but false European documents as well. Karaki is a major figure in Hezbollah's forgery operations -- a role that would also allow for the production of forged passports and visa stamps if desired. He offered several varieties of passports including genuine books from Italy and the Czech republic. A few months after the meetings in Florida, Harb and Karaki delivered fraudulent British and Canadian passports to the FBI source using the pictures and biographical information he had provided Author interview with law enforcement officials, March 11, These US investigations reveal a global criminal network with a major presence in Europe. Hossam Yaacoub's arrest and conviction in Cyprus has opened another window into the types of activities that Hezbollah undertakes. He was arrested after performing a surveillance operation on the airport in Cyprus having already helped carry out other 'missions' in France and Holland, using his legitimate Swedish passport to act as a courier. With Hezbollah becoming more active in Europe, the EU has taken an important step in beginning to counter Hezbollah by designating its military wing. But by limiting the designation to Hezbollah's 'military wing,' the EU has effectively undermined its ability to seize any funds under its asset forfeiture regime. Hezbollah accounts in Europe are not likely to list as account holders 'Hezbollah military wing. Money being fungible, Hezbollah will likely continue soliciting funds in Europe but under the rubric of political and social activities. Siphoning off funds for less altruistic purposes such as the group's militia or terrorist activities will not be difficult, and therefore its criminal and terrorist activities will remain at high levels in Europe without determined and coordinated action to stop them. This article originally appeared in the Autumn issue of Fathom. Oct 2, About the Authors. Matthew Levitt. To top. Brief Analysis. Assessing U. Topics Terrorism. 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Baalbek where can I buy cocaine