Attacking TrueCrypt

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The need to defend confidentiality of our sensitive information against persistently rising cyber threats has turned most of us toward using encryption on a daily basis. This is facilitated by easy-to-use GUI tools like TrueCrypt that offer advanced encryption without hassles. Many of us have come to trust TrueCrypt to defend extremely sensitive personal and business secrets. However, there is no such thing as absolute security. This paper seeks to address TrueCrypt users who wish to understand known attacks against TrueCrypt, and forensics analysts who are interested in defeating TrueCrypt during the course of criminal investigations. In this paper, we will progress via attacks that are easily understood, and move toward attacks that require advanced understanding of TrueCrypt functionality and encryption systems. The concept of a dictionary attack is simple. We sequentially try all entries in a dictionary file as potential passphrases until we succeed. However, there are obvious downsides to this approach. Most users who are using TrueCrypt to protect their sensitive information are smart enough to use complicated passphrases that would not be found in dictionaries. Also, this attack can get very time-consuming, depending on the size of the dictionary selected. We created a dummy dictionary with 7 phrases, the last of which was the correct passphrase \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 1\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. Brute force attacks deploy a similar concept to dictionary attacks, except here every possible combination of characters is tried from a pre-determined set. First, we point it to the encrypted volume \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 2\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. Next, we set the parameters to be used while implementing the attack \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 3\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. These parameters will determine the total number of possible combinations. For example, in this case we knew the password to be 4 characters long and having all lower case characters. The tool sequentially tried all possible combinations until it got to the correct passphrase, which was then displayed to us \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 5\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. The attacker can then take a full memory dump even if a computer is locked or logged off. If the protected TrueCrypt volume is mounted while the memory dump is taken via a FireWire port, the resulting image would contain the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt and mount the TrueCrypt volume as explained later in this paper. The best mitigation against this attack is to simply disable the FireWire drivers in the Operating System and render the port non-functional. Rootkits are a form of advanced malware that facilitate stealthy deployment and operation of programs on a system. In case full disk encryption is being used, such bootkits are capable of manipulating the original bootloader and replacing it with an infected copy. The idea is that even if the user is protecting his sensitive information using full disk encryption, the MBR itself is not encrypted and can be infected. This passphrase is then extracted by the attacker at a later time. If you wish to replicate this experiment, you would need a copy of the Evil Maid infector image see Downloads above , and a device that is using full disk encryption. Also note that it is best to use TrueCrypt 6. Cached passphrases allow automatically mounting containers without requiring the user to enter the passphrase every time. Note that once the attacker has access to the passphrase, he would not need to know the details of the encryption algorithm used or the cryptographic keys. The first thing we need to do is make sure that we are, in fact, dealing with an encrypted TrueCrypt volume. TrueCrypt volumes are identified based on certain characteristics such as sizes that are multiple of block size of cipher mode , missing headers, etc. Looking at the results, we know that TrueCrypt 7. By default, TrueCrypt uses AES encryption along with XTS, and the bit primary and secondary keys are concatenated together to form one master key of bits. Here, it is important to note that hiberfile. In case the protected volume was dismounted during hibernation, it is futile to look for the cryptographic keys on the RAM dump or hiberfile. The keys are not stored on disk due to obvious security concerns Mic 3. Before we can extract keys from memory, we need to identify them. One approach is to attempt decryption of known plaintext using every possible combination of bytes. However, in the presence of bit errors in memory, this approach gets highly convoluted JAl08 4. Another approach is to cycle through each byte in memory and to treat the following block of a certain size as a key schedule. Then, a hamming distance is calculated pertaining to this word and the word that should have been generated based on surrounding words. If the number of bits that violate constraints germane to correct key schedule is small, the key is discovered JAl08 4. Note that this tool also locates other information in memory such as emails, IP addresses, URLs, etc. At this point, we know the two bit primary and secondary AES keys and we can use these to mount the protected volume. However, we first need to fake a header. Since we do know the actual passphrase pertaining to the protected volume, we will create a template containing a known passphrase and copy this to the protected volume. Later, we can use this known passphrase and the extracted AES keys to mount or decrypt the protected volume. Please note that the size of the encrypted volume is We need this TrueCrypt volume with known password to be of the same size \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 12\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. Here, we have patched TrueCrypt 7. Now, we compile this modified source code and attempt to mount the protected volume using the known password \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 15\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. We can now view the sensitive file inside the volume \\\\\\\\\\\\\[Figure 16\\\\\\\\\\\\\]. The purpose of this paper—like many researchers who studied and implemented attacks on TrueCrypt—is to make a TrueCrypt user aware of what protection is truly being offered. A false sense of security is highly perilous. For instance, it is imprudent to neglect physical security of the device while using TrueCrypt lest you fall prey to a bootkit attack or a DMA attack. On the other hand, keeping the protected volume mounted at all times, or for extended periods, increases the likelihood of getting cryptographic keys stolen from memory. Note that we have intentionally avoided discussing any commercial recovery software in this paper. Feldman, Jacob Appelbaum, Edward W. Your email address will not be published. InfoSec institute respects your privacy and will never use your personal information for anything other than to notify you of your requested course pricing. We will never sell your information to third parties. You will not be spammed. Ethical Hacking Boot Camp Our most popular course! Evil Maid USB image. Memory image and encrypted TrueCrypt volume. He has authored several papers in international journals and has been consistently hired by top organizations to create technical content. He has been a technical reviewer for several books. Currently, he also does independent research for InfoSec Institute. In his free time, he enjoys listening to classic rock while blogging at www. You can contact him at bajpai \\\\\\\\\\\\\[dot\\\\\\\\\\\\\] pranshu \\\\\\\\\\\\\[at\\\\\\\\\\\\\] gmail \\\\\\\\\\\\\[dot\\\\\\\\\\\\\] com or LinkedIn: February 18, at 5: Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published.

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