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Attacking TrueCrypt - купить: гашиш, шишки, героин, кокаин, амфетамин, спайс, скорость кристаллы, мдма, мефедрон

Kernel, Hypervisor, Virtualization, Trusted Computing and other system-level security stuff. Do you ever sleep? I love your research and you poke in all of the deep dark corners bringing to light all kinds of evilness I never really thought about this aspect of attack against full disk encryption, but it makes sense. Would it also follow then that a modification of the Evil Maid Infecter could install a backdoor password into the TC loader that records the password and enters it whenever said backdoor password is entered? It seems for non-laptop toting Evil Maids that this would be an easier approach than merely displaying a password that for a reasonably paranoid person would be unreasonably long. Thanks for the interesting reading. Then the hackers are trusted. Zimmerman showed the way, always require a 2 key approach. Might be a good idea to sign the label side in your own hand, too. You could even take the CD into the pool: The problem here is that, with most full disk encryption programs, an average user cannot really protect his or her passphrase, even if he or she is reasonably careful. Evil Maid is not about exploiting carelessness of the user! Yes, I understand that. May be someone of them will implement it at spare time on Saturday evening: What about using a HDD with built-in hardware-based encryption. Joanna, thanks for an interesting post. I like that solution. Or they could install a camera which records you typing your password, or Great to see someone finally implement this and release publicly. Now if the user is really smart, the important things that may be on his or her laptop will be encrypted again with TrueCrypt or stored offsite for access later. Then alll that work just went to waste! On this usb stick i have linux kernel and specialy crafted initrd. Could you provide me more info why this is wrong solution? Means what you should always remember: First, with TrueCrypt you can have hidden volume inside encrypted volume. So being paranoid you could have hidden encrypted volume inside encrypted file-based volume on encrypted system drive. Should make life more complicated for everyone: It should beat keylogger for a moment, esp. If that was such a great solution why would anybody need full disk encryption at all? Of course this time it would have to be a slightly more complicated keylogger rather then a simple patcher. Of course there is still a problem of a potential e. Would keyfiles assist at all with protecting from such or not? At least then you would know your machine was messed with. Does something like KeyScrambler Premium http: No, software-enforced MBR integrity protection would not help. No, such tricky software gee, what people will not come up with! Evil Maid can always go directly after your e. AES key rather then a passphrase. Data Locker looks very interesting indeed. We might consider moving our DiskHasher onto such device. Hey, it has upgradeable firmware: Can the update mechanism be circumvented? I suggest another poor man solution: This would have to be implemented in the disk firmware, which shifts the attack level to the disk firmware and it has to be immutable as well. This seemed to be a very strong solution and often use by enterprise and maybe some government agencies. Does it mean we need to understand the function call used by Safeboot for the passphrase during preboot in order to modify Evil Maid to hook to it? For all who speak German: Locking HDD with password will prevent plug-it-in-another-system case. TPM-supported trusted boot, then it is vulnerable. Instead, we can implemented the sniffer as a resident keylogger, e. Relaying on BIOS to secure your laptop is a bit of a stretch to me Hi, I think this http: DiskCrypt store its keys in the smartcard instead of in the device itself such as Datalocker. Your setup would not prevent compromise of the laptop think e. Blue Pill Boot, instead of simple Evil Maid. This means the Maid can still infect your laptop and get access to any resource you will be accessing from your compromised laptop, no matter what authentication is used between the laptop and the other resource. If I have enabled 2-factor using smartcard with TC, does that make it safer since the evil maid need my smartcard to unlock my encrypted HDD? The maid could just replace your computer with an identical-looking model or swap drives, or set the bios to netboot, or whatever that had a bogus password entry program. Only use the built-in HDD as a volume-encrypted secondary drive, if at all. Store the laptop in a sealed envelope when left unattended, e. Easy to use sealings are available in many qualities, e. Good point about the sealed envelope though, it seems certainly better then carrying a strongbox. Although, personally, I still believe it is more difficult to break TPM, then it is to open a sealed envelope in a clear way any 'research' done in this area? See you in Hamburg next week. The problem for envelopes becomes control strength is inversely related to the number of times you can use one so you then must carefully maintain an inventory. A general note to the last 30 or so people whose comments were rejected by the cruel moderator: RTFA and other comments too , before posting. That way she only needs to retrieve the password from the machine, not the whole HDD. This could be done via wifi, bluetooth, etc. Any chance of getting Disk Hasher from you folks? Yes, yes, I know, it follows the same risks as having the Hasher key stolen, so I also have a toughbook with a quickrelease HD.. Click my name for details. The scenario we consider is when somebody left an encrypted laptop e. Now, this is where our Evil Maid stick comes into play. As any smart user might have guessed already, this part is ideally suited to be performed by hotel maids, or people pretending to be them. So, after our victim gets back to the hotel room and powers up his or her laptop, the passphrase will be recorded and e. Please be careful, as choosing a wrong device might result in damaging your hard disk or other media! Also, make sure to use the device representing the whole disk e. On Windows you would need to get a dd-like program, e. Now, Evil Maid will be logging the passphrases provided during the boot time. To retrieve the recorded passphrase just boot again from the Evil Maid USB -- it should detect that the target is already infected and display the sniffed password. The current implementation of Evil Maid always stores the last passphrase entered, assuming this is the correct one, in case the user entered the passphrase incorrectly at earlier attempts. You should always obtain permission from other people before testing Evil Maid against their laptops! The provided USB image and source code should be considered proof-of-concept only. Use this code at your own risk, and never run it against a production system. Invisible Things Lab cannot be held responsible for any potential damages this code or its derivates might cause. If it does, the rest of the code is unpacked using gzip and hooked. We also take care about adjusting some fields in the MBR, like the boot loader size and its checksum. After the hooking is done, the loader is packed again and written back to the disk. You can get the source code for the Evil Maid infector here. Possible Workarounds So, how should we protect against such Evil Maid attacks? There are a few approaches Protect your laptop when you leave it alone Several months ago I had a discussion with one of the TrueCrypt developers about possible means of preventing the Evil Maid Attack, perhaps using TPM see below. Our dialog went like this reproduced here with permission from the TrueCrypt developer: We generally disregard 'janitor' attacks since they inherently make the machine untrusted. We never consider the feasibility of hardware attacks; we simply have to assume the worst. After an attacker has 'worked' with your hardware, you have to stop using it for sensitive data. It is impossible for TPM to prevent hardware attacks for example, using hardware key loggers, which are readily available to average Joe users in computer shops, etc. And how can you determine that the attacker have or have not 'worked' with your hardware? Do you carry your laptop with you all the time? Given the scope of our product, how the user ensures physical security is not our problem. Anyway, to answer your question as a side note , you could use e. If I could arrange for a proper lock or an impenetrable strongbox, then why in the world should I need encryption? If you use it, then you will notice that the attacker has accessed your notebook inside as the case or strongbox will be damaged and it cannot be replaced because you had the correct key with you. Plus it means we need to carry a good strongbox with us to any travel we go. I think we need a better solution Note that TrueCrypt authors do mention the possibility of physical attacks in the documentation: If an attacker can physically access the computer hardware and you use it after the attacker has physically accessed it, then TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the computer. This is because the attacker may modify the hardware or attach a malicious hardware component to it such as a hardware keystroke logger that will capture the password or encryption key e. However, they do not explicitly warn users of a possibility of something as simple and cheap as the Evil Maid Attack. Sure, they write 'or otherwise compromise the security of the computer', which does indeed cover e. The examples of physical attacks given in the documentation, e. Of course it is a valid point, that if we allow a possibility of a physical attack, then the attacker can e. But doing that is really not so easy as we discuss in the next paragraph. On the other hand, spending two minutes to boot the machine from an Evil Maid USB stick is just trivial and is very cheap the price of the USB stick, plus the tip for the maid. The Trusted Computing Approach As explained a few months ago on this blog, a reasonably good solution against Evil Maid attack seems to be to take advantage of either static or dynamic root of trust offered by TPM. Namely the Evil Maid for Bitlocker would have to display a fake Bitlocker prompt that could be identical to the real Bitlocker prompt , but after obtaining a correct password from the user Evil Maid would not be able to pass the execution to the real Bitlocker code, as the SRTM chain will be broken. Instead, Evil Maid would have to pretend that the password was wrong, uninstall itself, and then reboot the platform. The dynamic root of trust approach DRTM is possible thanks to Intel TXT technology, but currently there is no full disk encryption software that would make use of it. This is not the case, as the TPM is used only for ensuring trusted boot. After cracking the TPM, the attacker would still have to mount an Evil Maid attack in order to obtain the passphrase or key. Without TPM this attack is always possible. As signalized in the previous paragraph, if an attacker was able to mount a hardware-based keylogger into your laptop which is non-trivial, but possible , then the attacker would be able to capture your passphrase regardless of the trusted boot. A user can prevent such an attack by using two-factor authentication RSA challenge-response implemented in a USB token or e. But the attacker might go to the extreme and e. As for the great majority of other people that do not happen to be on the Terrorist Top 10, these represent a reasonable solution that could prevent Evil Maid attacks, and, when combined with a proper two-factor authentication, also simple hardware based attacks, e. I really cannot think of a more reasonable solution here. We call it Disk Hasher. The correct hashes are stored also on the stick of course everything is encrypted with a custom laptop-specific passphrase. Of course there are many problems with such a solution. Another problem with Disk Hasher solution is that it only looks at the disk, but cannot validate e. So if the attacker found a way to bypass the BIOS reflashing protection on my laptop, then he or she can install a rootkit there that would sniff my passphrase or the decryption key in case I used one time passwords. Nevertheless, our Disk Hasher stick seems like a reasonable solution and we use it often internally at ITL to validate our laptops. Is this Evil Maid Attack some l33t new h4ck? Nope, the concept behind the Evil Maid Attack is neither new, nor l33t in any way. So, why did you write it? Because we believe it demonstrates an important problem, and we would like more attention to be paid in the industry to solving it. While a two-factor authentication or one time passwords are generally a good idea e. How is Evil Maid different from Stoned-Bootkit? Alternatively, you can install it from a bootable Windows CD, but this, according to the author, works only against unencrypted volumes, so no use in case of TrueCrypt compromise. Taking out your HDD, hooking it up to a USB enclosure case and later installing it back to your laptop increases the attack time by some minutes at most. A maid has to carry her own laptop to do this though. What about using a HDD with built-in hardware-based encryption? There are many open questions here: Using software stored on the disk or in the BIOS? If on the disk, is this portion of disk made read-only? If so, does it mean it is non-updatable? Of course that would make the attack non-trivial and much more expensive than the original Evil Maid USB we presented here. Why did you choose TrueCrypt and not some other product? Because we believe TrueCrypt is a great product, we use it often in our lab, and we would love to see it getting some better protection against such attacks. Acknowledgments Thanks to the ennead truecrypt. Posted by Joanna Rutkowska at Friday, October 16, Newer Post Older Post Home. View my complete profile. Labels qubes general trusted computing attack os security philosophical fighting for a better world exploit company news trusted execution technology xen hacking tpm chipset conferences disk encryption hypervisor rootkits smm virtualization based rootkits backdoors bad guys attacking joanna cloud rootkits usb xen heap exploiting BIOS bitlocker challanges formal verification nested virtualization odyssey personal r3 saving-the-world-afterhours secure architecture.

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Attacking TrueCrypt - купить: гашиш, шишки, героин, кокаин, амфетамин, спайс, скорость кристаллы, мдма, мефедрон

Attacking TrueCrypt - купить: гашиш, шишки, героин, кокаин, амфетамин, спайс, скорость кристаллы, мдма, мефедрон

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