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Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves

Al Mukalla buying marijuana

Smuggling goods across the border between Algeria and Tunisia has created a parallel economy for marginalized border populations. Law enforcement and smugglers alike must navigate these gray zones in state authority. With Algerian officials in these areas permitting smuggling of petrol and certain other commodities over the border with Tunisia and smugglers weeding out security threats even as they go about their illicit trade, the two ostensibly adversarial parties complement each other. In Algeria, spatial disparity and economic inequality are intertwined. Many of the provinces situated in the extreme northeast of the country, on the border with Tunisia, suffer from profound socioeconomic marginalization. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future. If anything, the neglect of such far-flung regions is likely to continue and even worsen given that Algeria languishes in a state of perennial transition. In this context, the regime has been able to regenerate itself, albeit without real change, since the independence of the country in For communities of the borderlands, smuggling contraband into and out of Tunisia presents one of the precious few job opportunities in a region otherwise characterized by unemployment. The activity takes place on such a large scale that it has created a parallel illegal economy. In centralized and quasi-authoritarian Algeria, a development of this kind requires the acquiescence of representatives of the state. Indeed, no understanding of the significance of cross-border smuggling in modern Algeria is complete without an appreciation of the fact that, by and large, the smugglers are in cahoots with Algerian border officials. Crucially, this phenomenon is condoned by high-ranking local authorities. Concomitantly, it mitigates resentment of the central government in Algiers. Were the state to clamp down on smugglers, borderland communities would feel even more alienated and might grow restive. Moreover, without an alternative means of earning a living, some people would continue to engage in smuggling but no longer grant border officials oversight of their activities. Such smugglers might fall prey to the enticements of jihadis—who they have thus far shunned—and take up work transporting them and their weapons back and forth across the border. To grasp just how delicate this whole situation is, this paper considers the context, both spatial and social, within which it exists. Algeria is the largest country in Africa, its territory comprising nearly 2. With Tunisia, its eastern neighbor, Algeria shares a 1,kilometer border. Yet state-run development programs have not kept pace with such population growth. Besides, the Algerian state has repeatedly failed to establish a uniform distribution pattern for investment in the interior regions of the country. The geographic isolation of the High Plateau, together with the fact that much of it lies at a significant elevation, hampers the marshaling of resources and increases the costs of development projects. Even administration is affected. Theoretically, according to the initial administrative plan, there was supposed to be one public official for inhabitants; the reality is one for 1, inhabitants. The poverty rate in the High Plateau region as a whole is triple the national rate, and income inequality stands at Access to schools is a problem for many locals, given the distances involved. On average, the nearest primary, middle, and high schools are 16, 14, and 29 kilometers away, respectively. Much the same situation applies to healthcare, with an average distance of 25 kilometers to the nearest pharmacy and 41 kilometers to the closest hospital. The electrification rate in the north stands at 93 percent of households against 83 percent for the municipalities of the High Plateau. Access to drinking water supply, sanitation facilities, and cooking gas is also comparatively low. With the High Plateau and especially the borderlands ill-equipped to absorb the annual entry of young people into the labor market, unemployment is an endemic problem. Another example of this phenomenon is the eastern town of Al-Ouenza, which came to Algerian national attention in when twenty-two-year-old biology student Ramdhane Mekhaznia, having found no escape from his desperate living conditions, self-immolated. In these areas, most roads are degraded, and public transportation ceases after p. Access to electricity and water remains a significant problem. The fact that such an undertaking often entails pursuing an illegal activity, the cross-border smuggling of goods, has rarely presented an obstacle. For one thing, the far-off and neglectful state has fostered an acute sense of alienation among inhabitants of the region, and it consequently enjoys little sway. Smuggling across the northeastern border of Algeria is as old as the modern state itself, which came into existence in Many such people had relatives living on the opposite side of the border, in Tunisia, on whom they could rely as an initial crop of clientele. These networks have since grown quite extensive and together constitute the largest employer in the area. It is a matter of survival. The products smuggled from Algeria into Tunisia include gasoline, livestock especially sheep , auto parts, copper, electronics manufactured by the Algerian brand Condor, perfume, cosmetics, yogurt, powdered milk, and potatoes. Products smuggled into Algeria from Tunisia are similarly varied and include pasta, cooking oil, canned tomatoes, halva, flavored tobacco for water pipes, and bananas. The most common contraband is gasoline. In Algeria, an oil-producing country, gasoline is subsidized. The price of a liter is up to three times lower than it is in Tunisia. On the Algerian side, smugglers obtain the gasoline either directly from a gas station or from tanker trucks that are already part of a contraband network. They then take it to storage houses in or near a border town. The operation involves a lookout kashaf , who monitors the movements of the police and the national guard, a porter hallab , who transports the gasoline to the storage house and later the safe house, and the actual smuggler knatriyya , who picks it up and then conducts the transaction at the border. There is no shortage of demand on the Tunisian side, in large part because Tunisia has its own similarly impoverished borderlands populated by people who cannot afford gasoline at the official rate. We are six people at home, and we were all jobless. I had my diploma with an excellent grade and look at me: I sell smuggled Algerian gas. Tellingly, in the Tunisian borderlands, Algerian culture and national symbols permeate local society. This is especially true of Kasserine, the least developed governorate in the country and a place where the Algerian contribution to the local economy is viewed as indispensable. On the Tunisian side, the kilometer stretch of land between Tabarka in the north and Kasserine farther south is dominated by forests and mountain ranges. These points are located in hamlets, some of which straddle the border, that remain unmarked on most maps. According to several Algerian smugglers involved in smuggling gasoline, food products, and copper, Tunisians used to cross into Algeria to place their orders and hire transportation. As an Algerian smuggler from Al-Ouenza explained:. They do not cross, and we rarely cross as well. Today we talk over the phone, and we arrange everything. They are afraid of entering, but we are less fearful of getting on their territory because Tunisian authorities are not as strict as the Algerians. Here, in Algeria, if we are caught, we risk one to three years in prison; in Tunisia, you get fifteen days in jail, and you are out. Most smugglers are male youths with virtually no other means of securing a livelihood and supporting their families. Sometimes they are slightly older working men with legitimate jobs—including, ironically, civil service jobs—trying to supplement a meager income. Significantly, those engaged in this illicit activity do not consider themselves smugglers. I refuse to call it that. I am an honest worker; I am an entrepreneur, not a smuggler! We are honest workers. We do not deal in drugs or weapons. We are decent people. Think about it: who would like to smell gas the entire day and risk getting to prison or be burned transporting fuel? Motivated by a survival instinct, armed with a set of entrepreneurial skills, and ever ready with a moral justification for what they do, smugglers have refused to allow circumstances to relegate them to victim status. If anything, they have seized the initiative and set about trying to harness their environment, however inhospitable, for economic opportunities. Smugglers, after all, are only half the equation. The borderlands are a place where the authority of the Algerian state is more than nominal yet less than total. The smuggling that occurs there on a daily basis and a large scale reveals that even in a country governed by a quasi-authoritarian regime with strong centripetal tendencies, fragmentation is very much a part of political life. Government officials—in the form of local authorities and border officials—recognize as much, and as a result, they are willing to engage non-state and technically criminal actors in an ongoing relationship. Indeed, perhaps nothing better illustrates the extent to which smugglers are part and parcel of the modern state of Algeria than their collusion with local authorities to facilitate an illegal activity. In and of itself, this is unusual. The unusual becomes supremely ironic when one considers that inhabitants of the borderlands, especially those engaged in smuggling, look askance at the central government, regarding it as a hegemonic entity intent on restricting everything from their mobility to their very livelihood. This is due to the modus vivendi smugglers have reached with local authorities. The unorthodox arrangement in question enables smugglers to operate without significant hindrance. Local authorities have two reasons to maintain a laissez-faire policy toward smuggling. This includes underpaid border officials, who stand to benefit from bribes doled out by the smugglers. The second reason is the service provided by the smugglers. As part of their tacit agreement with the authorities, smugglers steer clear of illicit drugs like cocaine and marijuana and weapons. Yet even more important is the fact that they report back to the authorities on those more often than not jihadis attempting to traffic such goods. This information is indispensable to the Algerian security services, whose chief focus is on keeping the border clear of jihadi elements. The smugglers seem happy to oblige. An Algerian customs agent explained it thus:. We know the smugglers, and we know what they transport. These are good guys who are trying to earn a living in a barren region. They cannot cease their activity, or else their families will starve to death. We know them and their families because we, too, are from this region. They are not dangerous; they are not transporting weapons or helping jihadis get weapons. On the contrary, in a way, they help us protect the borders. Many of the smugglers interviewed for this paper cultivate cordial and regular contacts with at least two customs agents or members of the gendarmerie. In the words of one such interviewee:. We have their phone numbers; we know them, and they know us. We call the mouse \[Al-Far,the broker or middleman between smugglers and local authorities\] and inform him of the quantities and the products. For instance, we tell him that tonight we have twenty containers of diesel and twenty others of fuel, but also olives and other foodstuffs and copper. The mouse informs us what time customs has agreed to let us through. Thanks to the understanding between border officials and smugglers, there is little friction between the two sides. Indeed, local authorities have allowed smuggling to flourish. In Tunisia, on the road from Tunis to Kasserine, distribution points for gasoline smuggled over the border from Algeria are clearly marked as such. They let us be because they know we are not bad guys, just workers and entrepreneurs. The interplay between local authorities and smugglers in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia calls into question much of the conventional wisdom regarding centralized power in a modern unitary state. To begin with, the border is adjusted at will, and on a daily basis, through collusion between the very officials entrusted with policing it and non-state actors engaged in an illegal undertaking. This renders its official demarcation a relative matter. Correspondingly, regulation of trade, one of the prerogatives of the state, does not apply to goods smuggled across the border. That such smuggling accounts for most of the traffic across the border highlights a unique reality. When it comes to Algeria and Tunisia, the equation that rests on legal trade outweighing its illegal counterpart, a hallmark of the modern state, is inverted. The implications for the ongoing process of state formation, or the development of a centralized state in Algeria, are even more far-reaching. With border officials permitting smuggling and smugglers weeding out security threats, the two ostensibly adversarial parties actively complement each other. Essentially, the borderlands take precedence over the state in all matters save for security. In fact, it would not be a stretch to say that the borderlands of Algeria are almost a country unto themselves. The increasingly close relationship between these groups and drug traffickers, together with the possibility that both have their sights set on Algeria, represents a nightmarish scenario for the Algerian authorities. This would in turn rupture the amicable relationship between local authorities and local communities. Such a move would also force smugglers to go underground and dampen their motivation to serve as the eyes and ears of border officials tasked with apprehending jihadis and drug mules. The state would thus have midwifed a security threat even more dangerous than the one it sought to stamp out. The Algerian government is aware that a strictly security-focused solution to the dilemma it faces would upset the socioeconomic equilibrium of the borderlands. As a result, in recent years the concern in Algiers seems to have shifted to ensuring that, much as smugglers and border officials complement each other, the disparate fragments making up the state remain at least loosely synchronized. This shift on the part of the government gives rise to a number of possibilities, two of which are readily apparent. The first is the establishment of a free trade zone with Tunisia. Erstwhile smugglers could conduct their business both openly and without incurring customs duties, thereby obviating any need for illicit trade. At the same time, such an initiative would enable the government to intensify its monitoring of activity in the region as well as keep Algiers and the borderlands in synch. This could involve carving out well-defined remunerative roles in the sphere of monitoring and information-gathering. Such a solution would offer the advantage of continuity, given that a demonstrably effective arrangement is already in place and can presumably be enhanced. In a sense, it would also mark the logical conclusion of the informally institutionalized relationship between smugglers and the state described in this paper. This briefing paper was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center. This figure reached , in and , in According to the most recent figures available , the population stands at , inhabitants. Several smugglers and inhabitants of the borderlands expressed a similar opinion, using almost the same wording. Organized smuggling dates to the French colonization of Algeria See also R. In January , a group of jihadis, who are believed to have set off from Libya, took control of the oil and gas site of Tiguentourine in Ain Amenas. No fewer than people were taken hostage and thirty-nine were killed. The attack came as a major blow to the Algerian security forces and was followed by a tightening of border security. Return to search results Download report Publication details. Transnational Flows , Organised Crime , Borderlands. Dalia Ghanem. Research Report 27th May Share article. Winding mountain road from Al Mukalla to Aden in Yemen. Key Themes The interplay between law enforcement and smugglers calls into question much of the conventional wisdom regarding centralized authority in a modern unitary state. In Algeria, smuggling has emerged as an integral part of the ongoing process of state formation. As a result, smuggling has taken root, and for some families it is a career bequeathed from one generation to the next. Long tolerated by law enforcement officials, cross-border smuggling has over time created a parallel economy. Today, it accounts for most trade between Algeria and Tunisia. Findings For Algerian borderland communities, smuggling contraband into and from Tunisia is a job prospect at once justifiable and lucrative. Smugglers themselves view the border not as the end of their country and the beginning of another, but as an artificially erected barrier that it is necessary to circumvent. In the immediate sense, the tacit alliance forged between smugglers and local authorities blurs the distinction between legal and illegal and erases points along the border between Algeria and Tunisia. In the larger picture, it grants otherwise marginal actors, whether shadowy smugglers or lowly border officials, the ability to circumvent state policy in a manner both organized and sustained. Introduction In Algeria, spatial disparity and economic inequality are intertwined. As an Algerian smuggler from Al-Ouenza explained: They do not cross, and we rarely cross as well. Smugglers and Border Officials: An Improbable Partnership The borderlands are a place where the authority of the Algerian state is more than nominal yet less than total. An Algerian customs agent explained it thus: We know the smugglers, and we know what they transport. In the words of one such interviewee: We have their phone numbers; we know them, and they know us. Conclusion The Algerian government is aware that a strictly security-focused solution to the dilemma it faces would upset the socioeconomic equilibrium of the borderlands. Related publications. Publication 2nd October Muna Mohamed Saied Elgadal. Read Publication. Publication 30th September The impact of terrorist kidnappings: lessons from Arsal, Leb Craig Larkin , Rajan Basra. Research report 25th September Challenges to effective stabilisation assistance in northeas William Smith. 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Al Mukalla buying marijuana