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The result has been a disaster. This piece originally appeared on Lawfare. Rather than dissuading their good buddies in Riyadh from this dangerous course, the UAE too has plunged into the morass, also hoping to set back Iran. Unlike in Egypt, where the two helped bring about a coup that put President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in power, the result has been a disaster. This is true not only for Yemen, whose war and humanitarian crisis only seem to worsen by the day, but also for the UAE and Saudi Arabia themselves, with Iran in particular gaining influence at their expense. Saudi Arabia has intervened periodically in Yemen since the start of the modern Saudi state. For many centuries, the Zaydi Imamate of Yemen controlled part of what is now the Asir Province in Saudi Arabia, and the two countries fought a border war in Border clashes continued as late as the mids, and an agreement defining the border would only be finalized in Aside from territorial disputes, Saudi Arabia feared the wrong faction would come to power in Sanaa. In a lesson the foreigners would fail to heed in the future, the intervention fueled the war but left the outside powers exhausted. In , a negotiated agreement put the Arab nationalists in charge, but the Imamate faction received several prominent positions and a share of the patronage. Yet Yemen remained weak. The South never fully integrated, the country was desperately poor, and resentment and anger at Saleh simmered. To change the country from the bottom-up, Riyadh encouraged the spread of Salafism in Yemen, funding mosques and preachers and otherwise trying to advance its austere and anti-Shiite interpretation of Islam. However, while Saudi Arabia at times won over a particular leader or killed or stopped a terrorist, most Yemenis remained fiercely nationalistic and suspicious of Riyadh. Instability intensified in the s. Houthi rebels based primarily in the Saada region posed a particular problem. The Houthis resented their poor treatment by Sanaa and loss of state patronage. They became more radical, however, when they realized that the years of negotiations and the revolution during the Arab Spring would not restructure power in Yemen as they hoped. In addition, the bitter anti-Shiite message of the Salafi proselytizing angered the Houthis. The latest round of intervention began in Houthi rebels took advantage of the chaos , conquering Sanaa and eventually much of Yemen in and , and Hadi fled first to Aden in the South and then to Saudi Arabia. Saleh, always opportunistic, allied the military forces still loyal to him with the Houthis, despite having fought them fiercely when he was in power. Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened to put Hadi back in power, and Saudi officials declared the intervention would be over within weeks. Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia opened their airspace and facilities to the coalition. The United States quietly supported the intervention with intelligence, aerial refueling, and munitions. At first, the Saudi and Emirati campaign seemed to make progress, helping forces loyal to Hadi take Aden and then much of southern Yemen. The UAE loathes the Brotherhood and has undermined its power in Libya, Egypt, and elsewhere and supports southern secessionists and Salafists, who distrust Islah and see the Houthis as apostates. Progress slowed and then largely came to a halt, however, as Saudi and Emirati-backed forces tried to move on areas closer to the Houthi heartland. Saudi hopes of a quick victory, like most of their hopes for Yemen, proved an illusion. More than three years later, Riyadh has flown more than , sorties and spends billions a month on the war. Look here to see who held what as of June Meanwhile, the factions often turned on each other. Saleh turned his coat and agreed to work with the Saudis in , but the Houthis killed him before this flip could pay off. At least some of the forces once under his command now work with the UAE, but the anti-Houthi forces are divided. For obvious reasons, Riyadh also focuses more on border security than does the UAE. More than 1, Emirati forces are deployed throughout Yemen, mostly in the South , and it trained thousands of locals, including many southern separatists who are trying to seize the day and end the dominance of the north. Not surprisingly, the UAE has taken casualties— more than The Saudis claim that Iranian weapons also flow through the port. The UAE assembled as many as 25, fighters backed by air cover and with armored vehicles against a few thousand Houthis , most of whom are recent recruits. In addition, the UAE forces are better trained than in The urban battlefield, however, heavily favors the defenders, and Iran and Hizballah probably taught the Houthis how to exploit this terrain. Hodeida, moreover, is not the only port available to the Houthis, and smuggling is a proud Yemeni tradition. As such, the Houthis will likely have access to arms in any event. In addition, they have Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles that can harass Saudi Arabia. An outright coalition military win is unlikely, though the UAE-backed forces have a tremendous advantage in weaponry, numbers, and money, making the capture of Hodeida seem likely. Additionally,even if they lose Sanaa and other major cities, they have proved that they can and will wage a relentless guerrilla campaign. To back their claim, they still have tens of thousands of men under arms. Even putting the Houthis aside, it is not clear what political solution would satisfy the disparate coalition the UAE and Saudi Arabia have put together. Even ignoring the disaster in Yemen, the Saudi and Emirati intervention failed on its own terms. They are caught in the Yemeni quagmire. Hadi is not in power, their allies fight one another, Al Qaida is stronger, and Yemen is less stable than before. Although the Houthis are hardly Iranian puppets, they work with Iran by necessity, and its influence has grown as a result. Around 10, people have died in the war, roughly half of them civilians. Yet, that pales before the high but unknown death toll from the other horsemen that ride along with war: disease and famine. More than 50, children died of starvation and disease in , and hundreds of thousands of Yemeni children suffer from acute malnutrition. Three million Yemenis are now displaced. In parts of the country, the UAE provides some humanitarian aid , and Saudi Arabia also provides limited support—but not nearly enough to offset the disaster facing the entire country. Somewhat belatedly, Saudi and Emirati airstrikes began to strike AQAP bases , and the intervening powers tried to create a coalition of Yemeni military and tribal forces. They succeeded in dislodging the group from Aden and several other important areas, including the port of Mukalla. Saudi Arabia and the UAE both look incompetent and cruel, a deadly combination. An end to their interventions would leave both of them, and Yemen, better off. Gulf States Saudi Arabia Yemen. Foreign Policy. Center for Middle East Policy. Sections Sections. Sign Up. Daniel L. Related Books Kings and Presidents. Why engage in proxy war? Foreign Policy Why engage in proxy war? Byman May 21, More On. How the Houthis joined the Israel-Gaza crisis. Why globalization is now in the crossfire. America and the Yemens.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a disastrous Yemen strategy

Al Mukalla buying blow

Climate change in Yemen is hitting hard, stressing the vital agriculture sector with erratic weather, rising temperatures, and droughts. This worsens the existing food crisis, leaving millions hungry. In Hodeidah Governorate, climate change has delivered a double blow to agriculture, with intense floods ravaging farmlands and scorching heatwaves decimating crops across Al-Sukhnah and Al-Mansouriyah districts. This devastating combination has further exacerbated the already dire food insecurity situation in the region. SFD carries out several interventions in Hodeidah as part of the FSRRP project: constructing water reservoirs to facilitate complementary irrigation and to provide water to livestock, as well as irrigation spillways to regulate and improve rainwater irrigation, ultimately contributing to improved livelihoods and food security. The project restores public assets that have become impaired due to flooding, to mitigate the impact of climate change and improve food security and the living conditions of local residents. Many spillways were constructed in Al-Sanif village to regulate water flow between farms, mitigate the impact of floods and eliminate the risk of erosion during the rainy season. She explains that land degradation and soil erosion had left her unable to grow anything at all. Things are different today. I have expanded my farm considerably, with crop productivity increasing and a steady supply of food available. We eat what we grow at home as well as using it as fodder for livestock. Sudden and significant climatic changes in Yemen are impeding food security efforts, largely due to flooding and torrential rains that have damaged so much land, as well as droughts-induced desertification. The Food Security Response and Resilience Project is tackling water scarcity caused by climate change by building five complementary irrigation and livestock rainwater harvesting reservoirs in the villages of Belila and Al-Misbar, Al-Sukhnah District, Hodeidah Governorate. FSRRP constructed rainwater harvesting tanks to support farmers with irrigation and ease their struggle with water scarcity and well depletion. The agricultural assets built by local farmers under the FSRRP project provide short-term cash-for-work opportunities that have had a far-reaching impact on local households, who see their incomes boosted as they work to build long-term food security. According to Elham Al-Attas, the irrigation reservoir project has already benefited nearly hectares of agricultural land, while the spillways have helped protect hectares of land. Explaining that many in the region had given up farming, leading to a further decline in agricultural production and even less food security, Elham says the project has helped restore damaged lands. These interventions will ultimately contribute to improving food security for both the farmers and the local community. UNDP Yemen Floods and rising temperatures In Hodeidah Governorate, climate change has delivered a double blow to agriculture, with intense floods ravaging farmlands and scorching heatwaves decimating crops across Al-Sukhnah and Al-Mansouriyah districts. Restoring assets SFD carries out several interventions in Hodeidah as part of the FSRRP project: constructing water reservoirs to facilitate complementary irrigation and to provide water to livestock, as well as irrigation spillways to regulate and improve rainwater irrigation, ultimately contributing to improved livelihoods and food security. Empowering women farmers 'The construction of spillways has had a huge impact on farmers. Improving livelihoods and increasing income The agricultural assets built by local farmers under the FSRRP project provide short-term cash-for-work opportunities that have had a far-reaching impact on local households, who see their incomes boosted as they work to build long-term food security. Related content. Found 0 results. Did you mean? Sort by Relevancy Date. This summary is generated by Google AI, and its accuracy and relevance may vary. Please consult the detailed list of results for greater precision.

Al Mukalla buying blow