Address Poisoning / Address Mapping (How does Chainalysis work with mixers); Dusting Attack
officercia.ethOne also make a sort of banking compliance machine (if you find know each bank has a sort of a computer which always counts and checks that if money have gone - they should appear somewhere, in other words, it watches total monetary system balance and flows), and apply it to blockchain, thus notice anomalies.
And see who got money from whom and also which sum - this method is used to break mixers and performed usually via scanning and analyzing Big Data taken from blockchain and other sources. It was inspired by SWIFT/Alliance/BGP and all that creepy banking Haskel XML push stuff.
That’s a very rough TLDR - from easiest ways to Chainanalysis style, maybe I missed something but in general this is how things are going. They also use methods described in the section No 5 above - dusting attack, to measure “distance” between addresses, entities and other metrics in the sense of Euristica...
Go to arxiv/reserachgate and see what does “distance” mean in the sense of Heuristics, also what dusting attack is! You can also see what tutela.xyz is doing...
The same laws work everywhere (roughly speaking) and the point is always either to find the mistake made by a bad actor or to find the truth by representative sampling (which includes backwards investigation and exclusionary investigation - Novacula Occami)...
..and here for a better understanding I suggest to compare such a technique with the installation of AirTag into someone's car (this is the point of the dusting attack). Speaking very roughly. Not sure what I can reveal and what - cannot.
Also check out:
- Awesome On-Chain Forensic HandBook
- What you should do if you think someone has stolen your crypto-assets
- The Atypical OSINT Guide - Article | Repo
- Attacks via a Representative Sample : Myths and Reality
- How can you become a one-man-army OSINT specialist?
- How I investigate crypto hacks and security incidents: A-Z
- 100 BTC deadman drops: Silk Road
- All known smart contract-side and user-side attacks & attack vectors
- How one can deanonymize Monero to a certain degree of probability?
- If you have been scammed…
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