A Generalist View on Iranian Power Projection and Saudi Strategic Thinking.

Due to the trend of the degradation of quality of US thinktanks and foreign affairs specialists since the 2000s, the vast majority of media outlets, "podcasters," and allegedly respected journalists have regurgitated oriental stereotypes and imposed false premises and ideas on the Middle East.

This has led to disastrous consequences, as uneducated decisions by policymakers affect their voter base in more than one way, ranging from soldiers being delivered home in coffins to gas prices spiking.

In this Telegraph article, I will try to give a simplified, back-to-basics view on the pillars of Iranian power projection on the Middle East, and the catalyst and causes of Iranian-Saudi tensions in general.

Every country tends to have a level of power projection, whether it is a minor, middle, or major power on the international stage.

The nature of this power projection is dictated by several aspects, such as geography (huge reserves of natural wealth), culture (language, shared cultural practices), ethnic admixture (ethnic groups and their dispersion), the psychology of a people (which is itself influenced by the aforementioned factors), its competitive advantage (in an industry or military force), and so on.

Based on these factors, a country can effectively utilize them to project its power, either on its regional stage or globally.

So, what is the Iranian power projection based on?

Middle Eastern countries have varying levels of power projection, and they all base it on their own unique factors. And just because you have these factors does not mean you can properly utilize them, as it takes immense administrative skills and a highly educated workforce and leadership to properly use them.

The level of Egyptian power projection in 2026 is not the same as it was in 1962, even though certain geographic and competitive advantages remain or have even been added to the roster (the Suez Canal, a small monopoly on subsea internet cables (almost 20% of all global internet traffic goes through Egypt), a large standing Arab army that was historically important in exporting ideals of republicanism and anti-colonial support to over forty countries, etc.), yet its power projection is on the lower end for what is supposed to be a middle power.

Iranian power projection in 2026, likewise, is not the same as it was in 1978.

Historically, Iranian power projection was based on several things; let us start with its geography.

Iran is a mountainous land bridge between Asia and Europe with vast mineral and oil wealth; this has led it to be exploited for security reasons, like the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran during World War II, and as an important Southern Front against the USSR during the Cold War by the United States. The geography of Iran directly led to heavy meddling in its internal affairs by foreign powers (Iran was a founding member of CENTO until it was formally dissolved in 1979), as the British Empire, and then the United States, found it worth their investment to support the Iranian monarchy against communists, socialists, liberals, and Islamists, to ensure a functioning ally against the USSR and to also profiteer from the natural resources of Iran.

Iran was generally considered a decaying empire, not a proper rival to the Ottomans, Imperial Russia, or Anglo holdings in the Indian subcontinent; this changed with the Cold War.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979

Due to social dynamics in Iran since the 1950s, a broad coalition mobilized against the Shah of Iran, eventually overthrowing him and establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Almost no foreign country was supportive of the Islamic revolution in Iran: the USSR was not delighted with a secular enemy being replaced by a religious one, the US had just seen CENTO effectively collapse over a period of five years and had just lost one of its most important Asian security partners, and Western economic interests were also threatened as Iran nationalized the oil and gas industries immediately after the 1979 revolution.

The geographic factor that had breathed new life into Iran with the beginning of the Cold War suddenly became moot, as it was unable to be used by its leadership due to political hostility and sanctions; Iran had little in the way of competitive advantage.

It was then that the political leadership of Iran came to the conclusion that they had another factor they could use.

Religion and Ethnic Admixture

Iran is considered the stronghold of the Shia world, with Iraq being the second. Ethnic enclaves of Persians have existed in Iraq and modern-day Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen; that is notwithstanding that the native population of Bahrain, the majority of Iraq, and a majority of Northern Yemeni tribes also subscribed to broad schools of Shiism.

Due to the nature of the 1979 revolution, the Iranian political leadership, isolated by the Western and Eastern blocs, decided it was prudent to establish its own small axis and power bloc, no matter how small it was; the geographic and cultural reality of Iran had made it essential for Iran to be the champion of all Shias in the world.

This does not mean that Iran was hostile to Sunnism; in fact, a "Shia-Sunni" conflict is mostly exaggerated as some millennia-old conflict, it is much more complicated. The Abbasid Caliphate was known to adore Persian culture, and circles within the caliphate had overlapped with Shiism. While tribal warfare broke out from time to time, it was rarely organized on the state level beyond decades of sporadic violence.

For example, the Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia had supported, with material, men, and arms, the Shiite Zaydi Kingdom of Northern Yemen against Egyptian republican troops; none in the circles of the Saudis had noticed an illogical inconsistency, as the Zaydi clerics had existed in their enclaves and were unmolested.

Religious differences were rarely the reason wars began, to the frequency that Western commentators would like you to think; it just happened to be effective lighter fluid for brighter conflagrations. Muhammed Ali of Egypt did not slaughter the Alawites of Syria because they were Alawites, but only because they opposed his conscription efforts, yet none point to that as an example of a religious war.

Forging alliances and improving power projection factors.

Iran proceeded to establish more active ties with Shia communities abroad in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. The realities of the Iraq-Iran war made the political leadership of Iran realize that proactive, instead of reactive, policies would be necessary for the survival of the Islamic Republic. The IRGC, which was established to ensure the survival of the mode of governance for the Islamic Republic, was sent abroad to Lebanon, helping in the formation of Hezbollah. Iranian interests and effective usage of power projection dictated that the survival and flourishing of these groups was necessary for Iran. This did not go smoothly, as Iranian interests in Lebanon conflicted with Syrian interests in the 1980s, alongside the then Israeli invasion of Lebanon. But nonetheless, the nucleus of Hezbollah was formed, and Iran had a reliable partnership with a group on the other side of the Middle East.

With the fall of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, Iran noticed it was also being geographically isolated again, akin to the immediate geographic isolation that took place immediately after 1979. This redoubled Iranian efforts in helping establish more security arrangements with disenfranchised Shia groups in Iraq. Political convenience also led to shared security agreements with the Baathist government of Syria, more out of necessity than any shared ideological belief. Iran also decided to excel in any competitive advantage it could have, and for Iran, that would be the industry of drones, missiles, and warfare based on attrition and asymmetric conflict.

But other countries noticed.

Saudi Responses and Logical Thinking.

Saudi power projection became based on two things: a geographic factor (huge oil reserves and being the heartland of the Arabian Peninsula) and a cultural factor (the guardian of the two holiest sites of Islam), and they maximized them to great effect.

The issue with one of these factors, the one relating to the oil fields, is that these oil fields sat in the middle of a population that was majority Shia. The geographic reality between Iran and Saudi Arabia put them both on an inevitable collision course, because Iran, to Saudi security experts, could easily rile up the Shia population in Saudi Arabia.

It is not about your opponent's intention, but about what he is capable of.

Saudi Arabia had initially used its cultural factor and religious authority to oppose the Republicanism of Nasser in the '50s and '60s; they thought they could use the same factor against the Shia world. However, it had disastrous consequences, as religious polarization between two schools of thought was different from polarization between a political system and a whole religion.

Saudi political leadership became especially paranoid after the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014: if Iran had managed to successfully secure armed formations and political weight among the Shias of Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iraq, and Yemen (the Houthis), what would prevent the Shias of the Eastern Province and Najran from demanding their rights by force? Therefore, Saudi Arabia involved itself against the Houthis in Yemen, and is generally anti-Hezbollah and anti-PMF, as the success of these projects would undermine the legitimacy of the Saudi government to its own Shia population, because the success of these projects would mean an alternative.

And not just an alternative, it would mean that Saudi Arabia would be surrounded in the South, North, and East by a coalition of countries and groups that could be hostile to core Saudi interests.

Saudi Arabia, as a middle power, also had its own interests to consider of, which can generally be summarized in two points, although there are many more relating to economic interests and Israel/Palestine.

1) The continuation of power of the Al-Saud on the throne.
2) The inability for a neighbor to threaten their model of governance (Monarchy - which is why they were hostile with Egypt in the 50s and 60s) and the state (Fear of being surrounded by a Shiite Axis)

Conclusion

This was only supposed to be a generalist, simple guide for any reader to understand the very basics of Iranian national security thinking and why Saudi Arabia replied to it the way it did.

Affairs in the Middle East are much more complex than chucking it to ethnic and sectarian conflict, almost no conflict in the world nowadays can be readily explained with the fact that there are just two different people.

Deeper moves and strategic thinking are what moves this world, it might bring in the clicks to simply explain that these "people" are different from the "others", but it was never this easy.