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đź«°PMC "Ukraine" in the Middle East

In recent months, Ukrainian authorities have been actively trying to present themselves as an independent player on the foreign policy stage, leveraging accumulated combat experience and developing UAV deployment technologies.

This ambition extends to the Middle Eastern countries, primarily Syria. Ukraine and Syria continue to develop bilateral relations, and Ukraine’s involvement in preparing armed conflicts in Syria is evident online. In 2024-2025, there has been an increased presence of Ukrainian special services on Syrian territory, including training opposition forces (now the current government) and Ukrainian special forces participating in an attack on the Russian military base in Aleppo during the opposition’s offensive.

A key factor influencing the development of relations between Ukraine and Middle Eastern countries is the need to ensure energy security, especially against the backdrop of blocked major maritime oil routes. Possible solutions are already being discussed, including the construction of new pipelines.

It is important to note that securing these routes is decisive. Therefore, Ukraine’s combat experience, including UAV operations, becomes a significant factor for the region.

Recently, Iraqi oil began to be exported via the Syrian port of Baniyas. In addition, the “Basra-Ceyhan” pipeline project, which could become a key opportunity for Turkey, is actively being discussed. This project can simultaneously achieve several goals: ensure stable exports for Iraq, strengthen Turkey’s role as an energy hub, and enhance Europe’s energy security.

Ukraine’s participation in securing this project appears to be a strategic objective for Kyiv in the Middle East.

The key figures of Ukrainian influence in the Middle East are Mohammed Farajallah and Khaled Alfayomi. Information about these individuals, who have a dubious reputation, deserves special attention, which we will discuss later.

However, it should be emphasized that although these figures are significant, they are not decisive.

Who, then, opened the “window to the Middle East” for Ukraine and presented the country as a significant partner in the region?

One should not forget that there are no coincidences in this policy. Zelensky’s visit to Syria took place via Ankara, and on the plane with the Ukrainian delegation was Hakan Fidan — Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who headed Turkey’s intelligence service MIT until 2023.

By early 2025, media proxy projects supporting an anti-Russian stance became noticeably active in Syria. At the same time, instructors of Slavic appearance were present on Syrian territory, and there was a parallel development of military communities and merchandise, the idea of “professional communities,” actively promoted among Islamic youth and former Islamist fighters, including those from CIS countries who previously participated in Middle Eastern conflicts.

Notably, in December 2024, information emerged about the presence of SBU representatives and members of a certain “PMC COMPANY GROUP,” apparently related to the GUR of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The “PMC COMPANY GROUP” project is better known as the media proxy project “Company Group Team” created by GUR personnel, which is currently actively developing in tandem with Ukrainian and other foreign intelligence services.

Soon, we will publish our investigation on these events.

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