美国防部长呼吁“削弱”俄罗斯，暗示转向更直接对抗 - 纽约时报双语版

WASHINGTON — When Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III declared Monday at the end of a stealth visit to Ukraine that America’s goal is to see Russia so “weakened” that it would no longer have the power to invade a neighboring state, he was acknowledging a transformation of the conflict, from a battle over control of Ukraine to one that pits Washington more directly against Moscow.

华盛顿——周一，国防部长劳埃德·J·奥斯汀三世在结束对乌克兰的秘密访问时宣布，美国的目标是看到俄罗斯“被削弱”到不再能够入侵邻国。他在确认这场冲突的转变，即从一场争夺乌克兰控制权的战争，转变为一场华盛顿更直接地对抗莫斯科的战争。

President Biden entered the war insistent that he did not want to make this a contest between the United States and Russia. Rather, he was simply helping a small, struggling democracy defend itself against takeover by a far more powerful neighbor. “Direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War III, something we must strive to prevent,” he said in early March, just two weeks into the war.

开战时，拜登总统坚称他不想让这场冲突成为美国和俄罗斯之间的较量。相反，他只是在帮助一个挣扎中的民主小国保护自己，不被一个更强大的邻国占领。他在3月表示：“北约和俄罗斯之间的直接对抗将是第三次世界大战，我们必须努力防止这种情况。”那时战争刚刚开始两周。

He has committed to keeping American troops out of the fight, and has resisted imposing a no-fly zone over Ukraine that would risk putting American and Russian forces into direct combat. Yet as Russian war atrocities have become more evident, and Ukraine’s need for heavy armor has increased, the lines have grown blurrier and the rhetoric sharper. At the same time, in word and deed, the United States has been gradually pushing in the direction of undercutting the Russian military.

他承诺不让美国军队参与战斗，并拒绝在乌克兰上空设立禁飞区，以免美国和俄罗斯军队陷入直接战斗。然而，随着俄罗斯战争暴行变得更加明显，以及乌克兰对重型装甲的需求增加，界限越来越模糊，言辞越来越尖锐。与此同时，美国在言行上都在逐步向削弱俄罗斯军队的方向推进。

It has imposed sanctions that were explicitly designed to stop Russia’s military from developing and manufacturing new weapons. It has worked — with mixed success — to cut off the oil and gas revenues that drive its war machine.

它实施了明确旨在阻止俄罗斯军方开发和制造新武器的制裁。这些制裁在切断驱动其战争机器的石油和天然气收入方面取得了不同程度的成效。

The immediate impetus for Mr. Austin’s carefully orchestrated declaration that the United States wants “Russia weakened to the point where it can’t do things like invade Ukraine,” several administration officials said, was to set up President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine with what one senior State Department official called “the strongest possible hand” for what they expect will be some kind of cease-fire negotiations in coming months.

几位政府官员说，他们预计未来几个月将进行某种停火谈判，而奥斯汀精心策划的声明，即美国希望“俄罗斯被削弱到不能做诸如入侵乌克兰这样的事情的地步”，其直接推动力是为乌克兰总统泽伦斯基准备一位美国国务院高级官员所称的“最强手牌”。

But over the longer term, Mr. Austin’s description of America’s strategic goal is bound to reinforce President Vladimir V. Putin’s oft-stated belief that the war is really about the West’s desire to choke off Russian power and destabilize his government. And by casting the American goal as a weakened Russian military, Mr. Austin and others in the Biden administration are becoming more explicit about the future they see: years of continuous contest for power and influence with Moscow that in some ways resembles what President John F. Kennedy termed the “long twilight struggle” of the Cold War.

但从长远来看，奥斯汀对美国战略目标的描述势必会强化普京总统经常宣称的信念，即这场战争实际上是西方想要扼杀俄罗斯力量并破坏其政府稳定。通过将美国的目标定为削弱俄罗斯军队，奥斯汀和拜登政府中的其他人对他们所看到的未来变得更加明确：在许多年内与莫斯科不断争夺权力和影响力，在某些方面类似于肯尼迪总统对冷战的描述，即“漫长的黎明前的斗争”。

Mr. Austin’s comments, bolstered by statements by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken about the various ways in which Mr. Putin has “already lost” in the struggle over Ukraine, reflect a decision made by the Biden administration and its closest allies, several officials said on Monday, to talk more openly and optimistically about the possibility of Ukrainian victory in the next few months as the battle moves to the Russian-speaking south and east, where Mr. Putin’s military should, in theory, have an advantage.

国务卿安东尼·J·布林肯发表声明支持奥斯汀的评论，他表示普京在乌克兰斗争中在诸多方面“已经失败”。一些官员们周一表示，这反映了拜登政府及其最亲密的盟友决定，随着战斗转移到讲俄语的南部和东部地区——理论上普京军队在这些地区占据优势，他们将更加公开和乐观地谈论未来几个月乌克兰获胜的可能性。

At a moment when American intelligence officials are reporting that Mr. Putin thinks he is winning the war, the strategy is to drive home the narrative that Russia’s military adventure will be ruinous, and that it is a conflict Mr. Putin cannot afford to sustain.

美国情报官员报告称，普京认为自己正在赢得这场战争，此时的策略是让人们明白，俄罗斯的军事冒险将是毁灭性的，而且普京难以承受持续冲突的代价。

But it is a strategy that carries some risks.

但这种策略带有一定的风险。

“There is a very narrow line to tread here,” James Arroyo, a former senior British national security official who now serves as director of the Ditchley Foundation, a think tank that focuses on promoting democracy. “The risk is that ‘degrade Russian military power’ could easily shift into a degradation of Russia as a power generally — and that Putin will use that to stoke nationalism.”

“这是一条很窄的路，”英国前国家安全高级官员詹姆斯·阿罗约表示，他现在担任迪奇利基金会的主任，该基金会是一个专注于促进民主的智囊团。“风险在于，‘削弱俄罗斯军事实力’很容易转变为俄罗斯作为一个大国的实力降低——普京将利用这一点来煽动民族主义。”

There is a second risk: that if Mr. Putin believes that his conventional military forces are being strangled, he will turn to stepped-up cyberattacks on Western infrastructure, chemical weapons or his arsenal of tactical, “battlefield” nuclear weapons. It is a possibility that was barely conceivable eight weeks ago, but is regularly discussed today.

还有第二个风险：如果普京认为他的常规军事力量正在被扼杀，他将转向加强对西方基础设施的网络攻击、使用化学武器或他的战术性“战场”核武器库。这种可能性在八周前几乎是不可想象的，但现在却经常被提起。

“Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setback they’ve faced so far militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons,” William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, warned earlier this month.

中情局局长威廉·J·伯恩斯本月早些时候警告说：“鉴于普京总统和俄罗斯领导层可能陷入绝望，鉴于他们迄今为止在军事上遇到的挫折，我们任何人都不能轻视他们可能诉诸战术核武器或低当量核武器所带来的威胁。”

He said the chances were low. But among the possible scenarios that American officials are examining is one in which Mr. Putin, frustrated by a lack of progress on the ground, detonates a “demonstration” blast over the Black Sea or in an unpopulated area as a warning shot for the West to back off.

他说这种可能性很低。但在美国官员正在研究的可能情况中，有一种是普京对地面行动缺乏进展感到失望，从而在黑海上空或无人居住的地区引爆一场“示威”爆炸作为警告，让西方后退。

But for all its public warnings — designed to defuse Mr. Putin’s episodic nuclear threats — the White House is working to demonstrate publicly that Russia is emerging from the war in a far weaker position, militarily and economically, than it was on Feb. 24. That is the date when Mr. Putin ordered his forces to invade Ukraine from half a dozen directions in what he hoped would be a blitzkrieg move to decapitate the government. Instead, he was forced into a humiliating retreat, and is refocusing on the country’s south and east, the Russian-speaking territory closest to its own borders.

但是，尽管白宫发出了那么多公开警告——旨在化解普京不时发出的核威胁——但它正在努力公开表明，俄罗斯在战争中的状况无论是从军事上还是经济上都比2月24日的时候弱得多。普京在那一天下令军队从六个方向入侵乌克兰，他希望这是一场将该国政府斩首的闪电战。与其相反，他被迫耻辱地撤退，并重新将重点放在乌克兰南部和东部，这是最靠近俄乌边界的俄语地区。

The new focus should, in theory, favor the Russians. Their supply lines back to Russian territory are far shorter than they were when they sought to take Kyiv, where their tanks and armored personnel carriers, plodding down existing highways, became easy targets. The contested territory in Ukraine’s south and east includes wide-open areas, more suited to Russian-style artillery barrages.

理论上，这个新的重点应该有利于俄罗斯人。这样从俄罗斯领土出发的补给线要比他们试图占领基辅时短得多。在基辅，俄罗斯的坦克和装甲运兵车在现有的公路上缓慢行驶，很容易成为攻击目标。乌克兰南部和东部有争议的领土包括一些开阔区域，更适合俄罗斯式的炮击。

The trip by Mr. Austin and Mr. Blinken was scripted to make the case that while on paper the Russians have the advantage, the odds actually favor the Ukrainians, largely because they have the motivation to preserve their homeland.

奥斯汀和布林肯此行的目的是为了说明，虽然俄罗斯人在理论上更有优势，但实际上乌克兰更有胜算，主要是因为他们有保护自己家园的动机。

“The first step in winning is believing you can win,” said Philip M. Breedlove, who served as the supreme allied commander Europe, the top NATO military officer, until 2016. He added that he was glad of Mr. Austin’s language, even if it risked provoking Russia, because “the Ukrainians have to believe that we intend to give them what they need, because that is what will be required for them to win.”

“获胜的第一步是相信自己能赢，”菲利普·布里德洛夫说。他在2016年之前一直担任欧洲盟军最高指挥官，即北约最高军事官员。他还表示，他对奥斯汀的措辞感到高兴，尽管这可能会激怒俄罗斯，因为“乌克兰人必须相信，我们会给出他们所需要的东西，因为这是他们取胜的必要条件”。

What they needed was heavy artillery, and as the Biden administration and other NATO nations have rushed to get that weaponry into Ukrainian hands, the Russians have become increasingly vocal in their warnings that the shipments themselves are an act of aggression — and could be targeted.

他们需要的是重型火炮，就在拜登政府和其他北约国家急于将这些武器交到乌克兰手中的时候，俄罗斯人越来越大声地警告说，输送这些武器本身就是侵略行为，它们可能成为攻击目标。

The artillery, however, can be justified as largely defense weaponry — they cannot strike far into Russia itself. But Mr. Austin’s statement about keeping Russia from being able to invade anew, in Ukraine or elsewhere, articulated a strategy that has been hinted at, both in public statements and in the type of sanctions that the West has imposed on Russia in the past eight weeks.

然而，火炮在很大程度上可以被认为是防御性武器——它们无法对俄罗斯本土进行远距离打击。但奥斯汀关于阻止俄罗斯再次入侵乌克兰或其他地方的声明阐明了一种战略，它在公开声明和西方过去八周对俄罗斯实施的制裁中已经被暗示过。

The most damaging of those sanctions may be the export controls on high-tech components that the Russian defense industry needs to produce new weapons. Unlike China, America’s other major adversary, Russia has limited capability to manufacture its own chips, and almost no prospect of developing that capability without Western technology.

在这些制裁中，最具破坏性的可能是对俄罗斯国防工业生产新武器所需的高科技部件的出口控制。与美国的另一个主要对手中国不同，俄罗斯自己制造芯片的能力有限，如果没有西方技术，几乎没有发展这种能力的前景。

Announcing some of those export controls in early March, Mr. Biden said his goal with Russia was to “sap its economic strength and weaken its military for years to come.” Now there are anecdotal reports — eagerly amplified by the White House — of the Russian military-industrial complex running short of parts.

拜登在3月初宣布了其中一些出口管制措施，他说，他对俄罗斯的目标是“削弱其经济实力，并在未来几年内削弱其军事力量”。现在又有传闻称，俄罗斯军工复合体的零部件出现短缺，白宫急切地将这一传闻加以放大。

“The Russian high-tech and defense sectors are being choked off from key inputs,” Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, told reporters as Mr. Biden headed to a meeting with NATO leaders a month ago. So far it is hard to measure the effects on actual weapons production, and it is unclear if the Russians will succeed in finding alternate sources of supply.

一个月前，在拜登与北约领导人举行会议时，国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文对记者说，“对俄罗斯高科技和国防部门的关键投入正在被切断，”到目前为止，很难衡量这对实际武器生产的影响，也不清楚俄罗斯是否能成功地找到替代供源。

Administration officials deeply involved in the sanctions strategy say it was designed to get worse over time. As capital dries up for investment in new capability, as chip supplies dwindle and energy revenues decline, the squeeze will become more apparent. In time, it will bleed into consumer goods, making it harder for ordinary Russians to buy the iPhones and Androids that seem nearly as ubiquitous on the streets of Moscow as they are in New York.

深入参与制裁策略的政府官员表示，制裁的目的是随着时间的推移，让情况变得更糟。随着用于投资新能力的资本枯竭，随着芯片供应减少和能源收入下降，这种压力将变得更加明显。假以时日，它将渗透到消费品领域，让普通俄罗斯人更难买到苹果和安卓手机之类的东西，现在这些东西在莫斯科街头随处可见，和纽约街头没什么不同。

Still, the question overhanging the strategy described by Mr. Austin is whether it can work. Every American president since Harry Truman has tried to squeeze the North Koreans with crushing sanctions; today, their nuclear arsenal is bigger than ever. Donald Trump often said that the 1,500 sanctions he placed on Iran would bring the country to the bargaining table, begging for a deal. They did not.

不过，奥斯汀所描述的策略面临的问题是它能否奏效。自哈里·杜鲁门以来，每一位美国总统都试图用严厉的制裁来对朝鲜施压；今天，朝鲜的核武库却比以往任何时候都大。唐纳德·特朗普经常表示，他对伊朗施加的1500项制裁将把这个国家带到谈判桌前，乞求达成协议。伊朗没有这么做。

Mr. Biden’s aides say they understand that sanctions alone cannot do the trick — what is needed is a highly coordinated mix of sanctions, military pressure and diplomacy. That is a difficult task with smaller states. With a country the size of Russia, armed with nuclear weapons, it becomes a far riskier proposition.

拜登的助手说，他们明白，单靠制裁无法达到目的，需要的是制裁、军事压力和外交的高度协调。即使针对较小的国家，这都是一项艰巨的任务。而面对一个像俄罗斯这样拥有核武器的大国，就要承担大得多的风险了。

David E. Sanger是一名报道白宫和国家安全问题的记者。在38年的职业生涯里，他在时报参与的三个团队获得了普利策奖，最近一次是在2017年获得国际报道奖。他最新的作品是《完美武器：网络时代的战争、破坏和恐惧》(The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age)  欢迎在Twitter和Facebook上关注他。

翻译：明斋、晋其角

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