美国推进“芯片外交”：重塑全球供应链，减少对华依赖 - 纽约时报双语版
纽约时报双语版黄安伟, ANA SWANSON2024年7月9日
If the Biden administration had its way, far more electronic chips would be made in factories in, say, Texas or Arizona.
如果拜登政府能得偿所愿的话，更多的芯片将在得克萨斯州或亚利桑那州的工厂生产。
They would then be shipped to partner countries, like Costa Rica or Vietnam or Kenya, for final assembly and sent out into the world to run everything from refrigerators to supercomputers.
然后，这些芯片将被运往哥斯达黎加、越南或肯尼亚等合作伙伴国家进行最终组装，之后送往世界各地，用于运行从冰箱到超级计算机的各种设备。
Those places may not be the first that come to mind when people think of semiconductors. But administration officials are trying to transform the world’s chip supply chain and are negotiating intensely to do so.
提到半导体，人们可能不会首先想到这些地方。但政府官员正试图改变全球芯片供应链，并为此进行了紧张的谈判。
The core elements of the plan include getting foreign companies to invest in chip-making in the United States and finding other countries to set up factories to finish the work. Officials and researchers in Washington call it part of the new “chip diplomacy.”
该计划的核心内容包括让外国公司在美国投资芯片制造，并寻找其他国家建厂来完成剩下的工作。华盛顿的官员和研究人员称其为新的“芯片外交”的一部分。
The Biden administration argues that producing more of the tiny brains of electronic devices in the United States will help make the country more prosperous and secure. President Biden boasted about his efforts in his interview on Friday with ABC News, during which he said he had gotten South Korea to invest billions of dollars in chip-making in the United States.
拜登政府认为，在美国生产更多这些电子设备的微型大脑有助于使美国更加繁荣和安全。拜登总统周五在接受ABC新闻采访时夸耀了此番努力。他在采访中说，他已经让韩国投资数十亿美元在美国生产芯片。
But a key part of the strategy is unfolding outside America’s borders, where the administration is trying to work with partners to ensure that investments in the United States are more durable.
但该战略的一个关键部分正在美国境外展开，政府正努力与伙伴合作，确保在美国的投资更具持久性。
If the nascent effort progresses, it may help the administration meet some of its broad strategic goals. It wants to blunt security concerns involving China, which is growing its chip manufacturing while making threats against Taiwan, a global center of chip technology. And it wants to lower the risks of disruptions to the chip supply chain — risks that became evident during the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine, both of which threw global shipping and manufacturing into turmoil.
如果这一初步努力取得进展，可能有助于政府实现一些广泛的战略目标。它希望减弱涉及中国的安全担忧，中国正在扩大自己的芯片制造业，同时对全球芯片技术中心台湾构成威胁。它还希望降低芯片供应链中断的风险，这种风险在新冠病毒大流行和乌克兰战争期间变得明显，两起事件都使全球航运和制造业陷入动荡。
拉明·托洛伊说，拜登总统最近颁布了在美国创造更多制造业就业机会的立法，包括《基础设施法》和《芯片与科学法》，他之前所在部门的工作是其中的一项内容。“The focus has been to do our best to expand the capacity in a diverse set of countries to make those global supply chains more resilient,” said Ramin Toloui, a Stanford professor who recently served as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which is at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to set up new supply chains.
“我们的重点是尽最大努力扩大不同国家的能力，使这些全球供应链更具弹性，”斯坦福大学教授拉明·托洛伊说。托洛伊最近曾任美国国务院经济和商业事务局助理国务卿，该部门在建立新供应链的外交努力中走在前沿。
The administration aims to do that not just for chips, but also for green energy technology such as electric vehicle batteries, solar panels and wind turbines. China is by far the biggest player in those industries.
政府的目标不仅是芯片，还包括电动汽车电池、太阳能电池板和风力涡轮机等绿色能源技术。到目前为止，中国是这些行业的最大参与者。
Mr. Biden and his aides say that dominance by Chinese companies is a national security issue as well as a human rights problem, given that some of the manufacturing takes place in Xinjiang, a region of China where officials force members of some Muslim ethnic groups to work in factories.
拜登及其助手表示，中国公司的主导地位不仅是国家安全问题，也是人权问题，因为一些制造活动发生在中国新疆。那里的官员强迫一些穆斯林少数民族在工厂工作。
Over three years of the Biden administration, the United States has attracted $395 billion of investment in semiconductor manufacturing and $405 billion for making green technology and generating clean power, Mr. Toloui said.
托洛伊说，在拜登执政的三年里，美国吸引了3950亿美元投资于半导体制造业，4050亿美元投资于绿色技术和清洁能源的开发。
Many of the companies investing in that kind of manufacturing in the United States are based in Asian countries known for their tech industries — Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, for instance — and in Europe. One is SK Hynix, a South Korean chipmaker that is building a $3.8 billion factory in Indiana. The State Department says that the project is the largest-ever investment in that state and that it has the potential to bring more than 1,000 jobs to the region.
在美国投资这类制造业的许多公司总部都设在以科技产业闻名的亚洲国家——比如日本、韩国，以及台湾，还有欧洲。韩国芯片制造商SK海力士也是其中之一，该公司正在印第安纳州建造一座耗资38亿美元的工厂。国务院说，这个项目是该州有史以来最大的一笔投资，有可能为该地区带来1000多个就业机会。
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken mentioned that project in a speech last month at a conference in Maryland aimed at encouraging foreign investment in the United States. And he underscored how he hoped legislation enacted by Mr. Biden would draw foreign investment to U.S. high-tech manufacturing by “modernizing our roads, our rail, our broadband, our electric grid.”
上个月，国务卿布林肯在马里兰州一个旨在鼓励外国投资美国的会议上发表演讲，提到了这个项目。他还强调，他希望拜登制定的立法能够通过“使我们的公路、铁路、宽带和电网现代化”，吸引外国投资进入美国的高科技制造业。
The policy efforts, he added, are aimed at “strengthening and diversifying supply chains, turbocharging domestic manufacturing, spurring key industries of the future, from semiconductors to clean energy.”
他还说，这些政策努力旨在“加强供应链并使其多样化，为国内制造业注入强劲动力，刺激从半导体到清洁能源等未来关键产业的发展”。
The Commerce Department has also played a major role in the effort to shore up the chip supply chain and is disbursing $50 billion to companies and organizations to research, develop and manufacture chips.
商务部也在加强芯片供应链的努力中发挥了重要作用，并向研究、开发和制造芯片的公司和组织拨款500亿美元。
2023年，商务部长雷蒙多与巴拿马总统劳伦蒂诺·科尔蒂索讨论巴拿马城半导体供应链多样化问题。Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, led an in-depth study of global chip supply chains to identify vulnerabilities and has worked with foreign governments to discuss opportunities for additional investments overseas.
商务部长雷蒙多领导了一项对全球芯片供应链的深入研究，以确定漏洞，并与外国政府合作，讨论增加海外投资的机会。
The topic was a focus of Ms. Raimondo’s trip to Costa Rica this past spring as she met with local officials and executives from Intel, which runs a factory there. (Mr. Toloui spoke at a semiconductor manufacturing conference in Costa Rica in January.) She also discussed diversifying the semiconductor supply chain on trips to Panama and Thailand.
这个话题是雷蒙多今年春天访问哥斯达黎加时的焦点，当时她会见了当地官员和英特尔的高管。英特尔在那里有一家工厂。（今年1月，托洛伊在哥斯达黎加的一个半导体制造会议上发表了讲话。）在访问巴拿马和泰国期间，她还讨论了半导体供应链多元化问题。
But reworking global supply chains so that they are less dependent on East Asia will be a challenge. East Asian chip factories offer more cutting-edge technology, a larger pool of talented engineers and lower costs than American factories are projected to.
但是，重塑全球供应链、减少对东亚的依赖将是一项挑战。与预计中的美国工厂相比，东亚的芯片工厂提供了更多的尖端技术，有更多优秀的工程师，成本也更低。
Taiwan produces more than 60 percent of the world’s chips and nearly all of the most advanced chips, which are used in computers, smartphones and other devices.
全球60%以上的芯片和几乎所有最先进的芯片都是台湾生产的，这些芯片用于电脑、智能手机和其他设备。
By comparison, the U.S. semiconductor industry could face a shortage of up to 90,000 workers over the next few years, according to several estimates.
相比之下，据几家公司估计，未来几年，美国半导体行业可能面临高达9万名工人的短缺。
Governments in China, Taiwan, South Korea and elsewhere are also aggressively subsidizing their own chips industries.
中国、台湾、韩国和其他地方的政府也在大力补贴自己的芯片行业。
Still, billions of dollars of new U.S. investment are expected to somewhat shift global supply chains. The U.S. share of global chip manufacturing is projected to rise to 14 percent by 2032, from 10 percent today, according to a May report from the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Boston Consulting Group.
不过，美国数十亿美元的新投资预计将在一定程度上改变全球供应链。根据半导体工业协会和波士顿咨询集团5月的一份报告，到2032年，美国在全球芯片制造业中的份额预计将从目前的10%上升到14%。
韩国安森美半导体工厂。韩国政府正在积极补贴国内芯片产业。Some administration officials have engaged in a more coercive form of chip diplomacy to prevent China from developing versions of American technology. That approach has focused on persuading a handful of countries — Japan and the Netherlands, in particular — to stop companies from selling some chip-making tools to China.
一些政府官员采取了更具强制性的芯片外交形式，阻止中国研发基于美国技术的版本。这种做法的重点是说服少数几个国家——尤其是日本和荷兰——阻止企业向中国出售一些芯片制造工具。
Alan Estevez, who leads the bureau within the Commerce Department in charge of export controls, visited Japan and the Netherlands last month to try to persuade the countries to block companies there from selling certain advanced technology to China.
美国商务部负责出口管制的部门负责人艾伦·埃斯特维兹上个月访问了日本和荷兰，试图说服这些国家阻止企业向中国出售某些先进技术。
By contrast, Mr. Toloui and his aides have flown around the world to scout out countries and companies that might want to invest in the American industry and set up factories that would form the endpoint of the supply chain. Mr. Toloui said his bureau’s work was an element of Mr. Biden’s recent enactment of legislation to create more manufacturing jobs in the United States, including the infrastructure act and the CHIPS and Science Act.
而托洛伊和助手们则飞往世界各地，寻找可能想要投资美国工业，并在美国建厂，形成供应链终端的国家和公司。托洛伊说，拜登最近颁布了在美国创造更多制造业就业机会的立法，包括《基础设施法案》和《芯片与科学法案》，他的部门的工作也是其中的内容。
The CHIPS act includes $500 million of funding annually for the administration to create secure supply chains and to protect semiconductor technology. The State Department draws on that money to find countries for supply chain development. Officials are organizing studies on a range of countries to see how infrastructure and work forces can be brought up to certain standards to ensure smooth chip assembly, packaging and shipping.
《芯片法案》包括每年为政府提供5亿美元资金，用于建立安全的供应链和保护半导体技术。美国国务院利用这笔资金寻找发展供应链的国家。官员们正在组织对一系列国家的研究，以了解如何将基础设施和劳动力提高到一定的标准，确保芯片组装、包装和运输的顺利进行。
The countries now in the program are Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The U.S. government is bringing in Kenya.
目前参与该项目的国家有哥斯达黎加、印度尼西亚、墨西哥、巴拿马、菲律宾和越南。美国政府正在引入肯尼亚。
Job training is a priority in this supply chain creation, Mr. Toloui said. He has talked to Arizona State University about being a partner with overseas institutions to develop training programs. One such institution is Vietnam National University in Ho Chi Minh City, which he visited in May.
托洛伊说，在这条供应链的创建过程中，工作培训是首要任务。他与亚利桑那州立大学讨论了与海外机构合作开发培训项目的问题。今年5月，他访问了胡志明市的越南国立大学。
Martijn Rasser, the managing director of Datenna Inc., a research firm that focuses on China, said this network of alliances was a strategic advantage that the United States has over China.
关注中国的研究公司Datenna Inc.的董事总经理马丁·拉瑟说，这种联盟网络是美国对中国的战略优势。
For the United States to try to do everything itself would be too expensive, he said. And going it alone would not recognize the reality that technology today is much more diffused globally than it was a few decades ago, with various countries playing important roles in the chip supply chain.
他说，如果美国想自己包揽一切，成本将过于高昂。如果单打独斗，就等于没有认清这样一个现实——今天的技术在全球范围内的传播比几十年前要广泛得多，各国在芯片供应链中都发挥着重要作用。
黄安伟(Edward Wong)是一名外交记者，在时报任职超过24年，曾驻纽约、巴格达、北京和华盛顿。他是因报道伊拉克战争入选普利策奖候选名单的团队成员。点击查看更多关于他的信息。
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