第137集－攻擊性武器

喺之前【續濫權後門】有曾引用過黃啟暘所撰一文，非常精采。當中指出警方嘅濫權同肆意扭曲法律，成為佢哋濫權嘅工具，以及就攻擊性武器嘅部分定義解述。

瑕不掩瑜，鮮花亦要綠葉襯托，今集係講 ——

一、攻擊性武器（餘下嘅定義）；

二、違禁武器；

三、武術兵器。

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攻擊性武器

《公安條例》第2(1)條指出，攻擊性武器 (Offensive weapon) 係指 ——

一、任何被製造或改裝以用作傷害他人，或
二、適合用作傷害他人的物品，或
三、由管有或控制該物品的人擬供其本人或他人作如此用途的任何物品。

i. any article made, or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or
ii. any article suitable, for causing injury to the person, or
iii. any article intended by the person having it in his possession or under his control for such use by him or by some other person.

喺【續濫權後門】一文當中，提及方仲賢被捕後，周學賢總督察喺記招嘅解話，其實佢係針對住：

ii. Suitable for causing injury to the person 同
iii. Intended by the person for such use。

就iii.，持有者意圖用佢有嘅物品傷害他人，喺黃啟暘嘅撰文已有篇幅闡述，故不贅論。

就ii.，判斷一件物品是否「適合用嚟傷害人」其實係好主觀嘅假設，因此可以好廣泛、好一般咁去解讀，只要比較下「似係」用嚟傷害人就夠做。

喺喱個時候，我哋就需要睇一個案例 ——

R v Chong Ah Choi and Others (04/10/1994, HCMA281/1994)

判詞第17段，法官提到，能夠以「似係」作為定罪標準（除非被告能提出反證），喺 AG v. Lee Kwong-kut [1993] AC 951 中個官講過：

17. ...unless, as was pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Leary v United States (1969) 23 L. Ed. 2D 57, 82, 'it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."

不負責任&不專業人話版：

除非可以合乎美國最高法院嘅案例 Leary v US 嘅標準，就係「能夠充分保證，以使喱種假設 更有可能 源自所需要證明嘅事實」。

我知可能難明，唔緊要。

睇埋判詞第21-22段，法官就「更加有可能」喱個條件加以論述：

21. But it is otherwise where, towards the other end of the scale, one is dealing with something like a hammer, which is not made for causing injury to the person but can, in the hands of someone with evil intent, fulfil that function. In such a situation, everything turns upon the surrounding circumstances. And the question whether the implement is an offensive weapon merges with the question whether the person in possession of it had it in his possession for an unlawful purpose.

不負責任&不專業人話版：

例子：鐵鎚並非為傷人而造，但若在心存惡念嘅人之手，就可傷人。所有事情就需在乎當場周邊環境，而有關該物件是否一件攻擊性武器，就會與物件持有人是否具備心存傷人嘅目的，合併為單一問題。

喺判詞第46段，法官指出，對於攻擊性武器嘅定義中，「適合」嘅含意可以非常廣。

46. ... The inclusion of the formula "or suitable" casts that definition very widely indeed.

故此，判詞第22段，法官指出不能以「更有可能」去判斷。

22. Taken as a whole, the second basis does not meet the "more likely than not" criterion.

因為以喱種原則去假設，物件持有人只係因為單純有件嘢，就認為佢「更有可能」心存惡念去傷人，從而犯咗法，而需要佢反證明自己無咁嘅犯罪目的，咁樣係違背《香港人權法案條例》第8條中香港人權法案 Article 11(1) ——

受刑事控告之人，未經依法確定有罪以前，應假定其無罪。

喱個原則，其實亦係普通法系當中非常重要嘅基石，就係：要將嫌犯定罪 ——

然後喺第48-49段：

48. A possible solution to any problem under the Bill of Rights created by that formula may be one along these lines... The result of that would be to leave the statutory definition of "offensive weapon" in this form: "any article made, or adapted for use, for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it in his possession or under his control for such use by him or some other person."