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Notas
1. http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/brazil.shtml
2. http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/usa_en.pdf
3. http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/philippines_en.pdf
4. http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/argentina.shtml
5. http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/080923_Sarkozy.doc.htm
6. http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/uk_en.pdf
7. P. H. Gordon y J. Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (Nueva York, McGraw-Hill, 2004).
8. J. Habermas y J. Derrida, «February 15, or What Binds Europe Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe», Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 de mayo de 2003, en Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe, D. Levy, M. Pensky y J. Torpey, eds., (Londres, Verso, 2005).
9. T. Purdum, «It Came from Wasilla», Vanity Fair, 39 (2009).
10. G. Jarvie, D. Hwang y M. Brennan, Sport, Revolution, and the Beijing Olympics (Oxford, Bloomsbury Academic, 2008); y M. E. Price y D. Dayan, Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2011).
11. G. Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2017).
12. D. Trump, «Remarks of president Donald J. Trump - As Prepared for Delivery, Inaugural Address» (discurso, Washington D.C., 20 de enero de 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address; y en vídeo, http://www.cnn. com/videos/politics/2017/01/20/trump-speech-america-first-sot.cnn
13. Para un excelente enfoque sociopsicológico de las consecuencias de la crisis en Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña, véase T. Clark, Hard Times: Inequality, Recession, Aftermath (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2014).
14. A. S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped (Nueva York, Penguin, 2014) es a un tiempo el mejor relato de la crisis de un economista y exclusivamente estadounidense. Y G. Packer, The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America (Nueva York, Farrar, Straus y Giroux, 2013).
15. Muy de acuerdo con L. Panitchin y S. Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (Londres, Verso, 2012); E. S. Prasad, The Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened Its Grip on Global Finance (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2014); H. M. Schwartz, Subprime Nation: American Power, Global Capital, and the Housing Bubble (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2009); y P. Gowan, «Crisis in the Heartland», New Left Review, 55 (2009), pp. 5-29.
16. I. Bremmer, «The Return of State Capitalism», Survival, 50 (2008), pp. 55-64; y J. Gyriel, «The Return of Europe’s Nation-States: The Upside of the EU’s Crisis», Foreign Affairs, 95 (2016), p. 94.
17. Atribuida al famoso libro de Douglas Adams Guía del autoestopista galáctico, la idea de una «parada súbita» la introdujo en la economía internacional G. A. Calvo, «Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops», Journal of Applied Economics, 1 (noviembre de 1998), pp. 35-54.
18. A. Tooze, Statistics and the German State: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001); y T. Mitchell, Rule of Experts (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001).
19. R. Skidelsky, Keynes: The Return of the Master (Nueva York, Public Affairs, 2010). [Trad. El regreso de Keynes, Crítica, 2013.]
20. Paul Krugman ha defendido enérgica y convincentemente que la IS-LM (inversión, ahorro, liquidez, dinero) de los años treinta es esencial para comprender los mecanismos de la recesión y la lenta recuperación; véase P. Krugman, «IS-LMentary» (Conscience of a Liberal Blog), The New York Times, 9 de octubre de 2011, y «Economics in the Crisis» (Conscience of a Liberal Blog), The New York Times, 5 de marzo de 2012.
21. R. Baldwin, «Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going», en Global Value Chains in a Changing World, D. K. Elms y P. Low, eds., (Ginebra, WTO, 2013), pp. 13-60.
22. H. S. Shin, «Globalisation: Real and Financial», BIS 87th Annual General Meeting, https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp170625b_slides.pdf
23. M. Obstfeld y A. M. Taylor, «International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously» (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12079, junio de 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980858
24. Entre los textos fundamentales, T. Adrian y H. S. Shin, «Liquidity and Leverage», Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19 (julio de 2010), pp. 418-437; C. Borio y P. Disyatat, «Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Link or No link?», BIS Working Papers 346 (2011); y S. Avdjiev, R. N. McCauly y H. S. Shin, «Breaking Free of the Triple Coincidence in International Finance», Economic Policy, 31 (2016), pp. 409-451.
25. Paradigmáticamente, D. Yergin y J. Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy (Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 2002).
26. B. Bernanke, «The Great Moderation», Eastern Economic Association, Washington D.C., 20 de febrero de 2004.
27. Entre muchos otros, D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2007). [Trad. Breve historia del neoliberalismo, Akal, 2007.]
28. Para un resumen de una compleja bibliografía pluridisciplinar, véase G. Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge, Polity, 2004).
29. Entre muchos otros, A. Roberts, The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture of Government (Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2011).
30. «Re-Thinking the Lender of Last Resort» (BIS Working Paper 79, septiembre de 2014), disponible en SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504682
31. Mientras las líneas de swap de billones de dólares solo se mencionan de paso, se dedica un capítulo entero a AIG en B. Bernanke, Courage to Act (Nueva York, W. W. Norton, 2015), pp. 270-291.
32. D. Coyle, GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2015); P. Lepenies, The Power of a Single Number: A Political History of GDP (Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 2016); y T. E. Shenk, «Inventing the American Economy», Columbia University Academic Commons (tesis, 2016), https://doi.org/10.7916/D8NZ87N1
33. Esto lo señala desde Francia M. Roche, Histoire secrète d’un krach qui dure (París, Albin-Michel, 2016). Sobre la contención alemana de la crisis, véase L. Müller, Bank-Räuber: Wie kriminelle Manager und unfähige Politiker uns in den Ruin treiben (Berlín, Econ, 2010).
34. Véase a Marco Buti en el European Institute, Columbia, abril de 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aGtNbmvmTs
35. Al negarse a aceptar que las teorías de la zona monetaria óptima o los regímenes de crecimiento divergente condenan el euro y centrarse en la finanzas, esta interpretación coincide con M. Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan: The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2015); E. Jones, «The Forgotten Financial Union: How You Can Have a Euro Crisis Without a Euro», en The Future of the Euro, M. Matthijs y M. Blyth, eds., (Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2015); E. Jones, «Getting the Story Right: How You Should Choose Between Different Interpretations of the European Crisis (and Why You Should Care)», Journal of European Integration 37.7 (2015), pp. 817-832; y W. Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity: Understanding the Euro Experiment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017).
36. T. Wieser citado en C. Gammelin y R. Löw, Europas Strippenzieher: Wer in Brüssel Wirklich Regiert (Berlín, Econ, 2014), p. 65.
37. M. Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 73.
38. Según se admite con admirable franqueza en T. F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises (Nueva York, Crown, 2015).
39. Sobre la importancia esencial de la idea de «lío» para el liberalismo keynesiano, véase G. Mann, In the Long Run We Are All Dead: Keynesianism, Political Economy, and Revolution (Londres, Verso, 2017).
40. «From Clout to Rout: Why European Companies Have Become a Fading Force in Global Business», The Economist, 30 de junio de 2016.
41. M. Fratzscher, Die Deutschland-Illusion: Warum wir unsere Wirtschaft überschätzen und Europa brauchen (Múnich, Carl Hanser, 2014); J. Bibow, «The Euro Debt Crisis and Germany’s Euro Trilemma», Levy Economics Institute (Working Paper 721, mayo de 2012); y S. Dullien, «A German Model for Europe?», European Council on Foreign Relations, julio de 2013.
42. «CSU für Apple, Linke gegen Steuerdeals», Neues Deutschland, 1 de septiembre de 2016.
43. J. B. Stewart, «Deutsche Bank as Next Lehman Brothers: Far-Fetched but Not Unthinkable», The New York Times, 6 de octubre de 2016.
44. C. Goodhart y D. Schoenmaker, «The United States Dominates Global Investment Banking: Does It Matter for Europe?», Bruegel Policy Contribution (2016).
45. «Special Report: How Mario Draghi Is Reshaping Europe’s Central Bank», Reuters, 9 de enero de 2013; y L. Elliott, «Take a Bow Mario Draghi-Has the ECB Chief Saved the Eurozone?», The Guardian, 8 de junio de 2017.
46. Z. Micah, «The Myth of the Indispensable Nation», Foreign Policy, 6 de noviembre de 2014.
47. D. W. Drexner, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
48. E. Helleiner, The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 2008 Meltdown (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
49. B. Eichengreen, Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses and Misuses of History (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).
50. T. Frank, Listen, Liberal: Or, Whatever Happened to the Party of the People? (Nueva York, Macmillan, 2016).
51. Dos artículos especialmente reflexivos, entre muchos otros, son W. Davies, «The Age of Post-Truth Politics», The New York Times, 24 de agosto de 2016; y A. M. Rondón, «Donald Trump’s Fictional America», Politico, 2 de abril de 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/donaldtrumps-fictional-america-post-fact-venezuela-214973
52. C. Forelle, «Luxembourg Lies on Secret Meeting», The Wall Street Journal, 9 de mayo de 2011.
1. Conferencia moderada por P. Orszag, «Restoring America’s Promise of Opportunity, Prosperity and Growth», Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 2006, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_ links/Restoring_Americas_Promise_of_Opportunity_Prosperity_and_Growth_ Transcript.pdf
2. R. Rubin, In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington (Nueva York, Random House, 2003); y N. Prins, All the Presidents’ Bankers: The Hidden Alliances That Drive American Power (Nueva York, Nation Books, 2014).
3. R. Altman, P. Orszag, J. Bordoff y R. Rubin, «An Economic Strategy to Advance Opportunity, Prosperity, and Growth», The Hamilton Project, abril de 2006, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_ links/An_Economic_Strategy_to_Advance_Opportunity_Prosperity_and_ Growth.pdf
4. Para un análisis exhaustivo del vídeo de la intervención de Obama, véase https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/obama-at-the-hamilton-project2006-this-is-not-a-bloodless-process.html
5. Orszag, «Restoring America’s Promise».
6. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836, 26 de mayo de 2001, JCX-51-01.
7. P. Blustein, «Reagan’s Record», Wall Street Journal, 21 de octubre de 1985.
8. S. M. Kosiak, Cost of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Other Military Operations Through 2008 and Beyond, CSBA, 15 de diciembre de 2008; y J. Stiglitz y L. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War (Nueva York, W. W. Norton, 2008). [Trad. La guerra de los tres billones de dólares: el coste real del conflicto de Irak, Taurus, 2008.]
9. T. Oatley, A Political Economy of American Hegemony: Buildups, Booms, and Busts (Nueva York, CUP, 2015).
10. Datos procedentes de https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-eco nomic-data#2
11. A. Sinai, P. Orszag y R. Rubin, «Sustained Budget Deficits: LongerRun US Economic Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray», Brookings Institution, 5 de enero de 2004.
12. Véase el influyente libro de B. Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 1994).
13. D. Wessel y T. T. Vogel Jr., «Arcane World of Bonds Is Guide and Beacon to a Populist President», Wall Street Journal, 25 de febrero de 1993, A1.
14. «The Long-Term Budget Outlook», CBO, Washington D. C., 2005, 26. Para una visión republicana, véase L. Ball y N. G. Mankiw, «What Do Budget Deficits Do?», (NBER Working Paper 5263, septiembre de 1995).
15. Una afirmación habitual en P. Anderson, American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers (Londres, Verso, 2015). [Trad. Imperium et consilium: la política exterior norteamericana y sus teóricos, Akal, 2014.]; y A. Negri y M. Hardt, Empire (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000). [Trad. Imperio, Paidós, 2002.]
16. La frase es de Robert Zoellick, por entonces subsecretario de Estado, y figura en R. Zoellick, «Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility», Nueva York, 21 de septiembre de 2005 (Nueva York, NCUSCR, 2005), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm
17. M. J. Dunne, American Wheels, Chinese Roads: The Story of General Motors in China (Singapur, Wiley, 2011).
18. Z. Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (Nueva York, Columbia University Press, 2012).
19. M. Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in the PostCold War Era (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016).
20. Véase la presentación de Perry Mehrling, en la que vincula su característico enfoque con el carácter jerárquico del dinero, el sistema bancario paralelo y la «visión monetaria»: «Shadow Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance», City University London, 2 de febrero de 2013, https://www. city.ac.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0018/163440/Mehrling_Future-Global-Finance126sn0t.pdf
21. E. Ilzetkzi, C. M. Reinhart y K. S. Rogoff, «Exchange Arrangements Entering the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?» (NBER Working Paper 23134, 2017).
22. M. Pettis, The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse (Nueva York, Oxford University Press, 2001).
23. Time (portada), febrero de 1999; y Rubin y Weisberg, In an Uncertain World.
24. G. A. Calvo, «Sudden Stop, Financial Factors and Economic Collapse in Latin America» (NBER Working Paper 11153, 2005).
25. «The Argentine Crisis, 2001-2002», Rabobank, 23 de agosto de 2013, https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/the-argentine-cri sis-20012002-/
26. M. Wolf, Fixing Global Finance (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
27. M. P. Dooley, D. Folkerts Landau y P. Garber, «The Revived Bretton Woods System», International Journal of Finance & Economics, 9 (2004), pp. 307-313.
28. D. A. Steinberg, «Why Has China Accumulated Such Large Foreign Reserves?», en The Great Wall of Money: Power and Politics in China’s International Monetary Relations, E. Helleiner y J. Kirshner, eds., (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 71.
29. E. M. Truman, «Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability», Peterson Institute for International Economics, agosto de 2007, https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf
30. P. G. Peterson, «Riding for a Fall», Foreign Affairs (septiembre-octubre de 2004), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-09-01/ riding-fall
31. N. Roubini, «The US as a Net Debtor: The Sustainability of the US External Imbalances», noviembre de 2004, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/ papers/Roubini-Setser-US-External-Imbalances.pdf
32. S. Edwards, «Is the US Current Account Deficit Sustainable? And If Not, How Costly Is Adjustment Likely to Be?» (NBER Working Paper 11541, agosto de 2005).
33. N. Ferguson y M. Schularick, «“Chimerica” and the Global Asset Market Boom», International Finance 10 (2007), pp. 215-239, http://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2362.2007.00210.x/abstract
34. Ferguson y Schularick, «“Chimerica”».
35. L. H. Summers, «The United States and the Global Adjustment Process» (discurso, Stavros S. Niarchos Lecture Institute, Washington D.C., 2004).
36. R. Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 2004), pp. 291-292.
37. B. DeLong, «I Belong to No Organized Political Party», Grasping Reality with Both Hands (blog), noviembre de 2006, http://www.bradford-delong. com/2006/11/index.html
38. A. Berman, Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild the Democratic Party and Reshape American Politics (Nueva York, Picador, 2010).
39. La cita es de Matthew Yglesias en B. DeLong, «I Belong to No Organized Political Party».
40. «Brad DeLong: The Democrats’ Line in the Sand», Economist’s View, 30 de junio de 2008, http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/ 2008/06/brad-delong-the.html
41. L. R. Jacobs y D. King, Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016).
42. Actas de la reunión del Comité de Operaciones de Mercado Abierto (FOMC), 29-30 de junio de 2004, https://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/ 20040630.htm
43. El llamado modelo Mundell-Fleming de la macroeconomía de una economía abierta surgió ya en los años sesenta; véase J. M. Boughton, «On the Origins of the Fleming-Mundell Model» (IMF Staff Papers, 50, 2003), pp. 1-9.
44. B. Bernanke, «The Global Saving Glut and the US Current Account Deficit», n.º 77, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2005.
45. B. Bernanke, «On Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday» (conferencia en honor de Milton Friedman, 8 de noviembre de 2002).
46. M. Friedman y A. J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 407-414.
47. Ben S. Bernanke, «Constrained Discretion and Monetary Policy», comentarios en Money Marketeers of New York University (Nueva York, New York University, 2003).
48. B. Applebaum, «Bernanke, as Professor, Tries to Buff Fed’s Image», The New York Times, 20 de marzo de 2012; y B. Bernanke, «The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve», George Washington University School of Business, 20 de marzo de 2012.
49. T. Adams, «The US View on IMF Reform» (conferencia sobre la reforma del FMI, 23 de septiembre de 2005), https://piie.com/commentary/speechespapers/us-view-imf-reform
50. P. Blustein, Off Balance: The Travails of Institutions That Govern the Global Financial System (Waterloo, Ontario, CIGI, 2013), pp. 51-66.
51. «Paulson May Be Bringing Heft to China Currency Drive», Taipei Times,1 de junio de 2006.
52. Un firme partidario del enfoque del G2 fue el influyente Fred Bergsten; véase «A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China’s Economic Challenge», Foreign Affairs, 87 (julio-agosto de 2008), pp. 57-69.
53. «Fact Sheet Creation of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue», US Department of the Treasury, 20 de septiembre de 2006, https://www.trea sury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp107.aspx. H. M. Paulson Jr., «A Strategic Economic Engagement: Strengthening US-Chinese Ties», Foreign Affairs 87 (septiembre-octubre de 2008), pp. 59-77.
54. Para la citas que siguen, véanse «The Panic About the Dollar», The Economist, 29 de noviembre de 2007; G. Steingart, «A Pearl Harbor Without War», Der Spiegel, 13 de noviembre de 2007; «Supermodel “Rejects Dollar Pay”», BBC News, 6 de noviembre de 2007; M. Nizza, «Heads Turn over Model’s Disputed Dollar», The New York Times, 6 de noviembre de 2007; «Gisele Bundchen Doesn’t Want to Be Paid in Dollars», Fox News, 5 de noviembre de 2007; C. Giles, «Adjustment or Affliction?», Financial Times, 10 de diciembre de 2007; y D. Usborne, «Rappers Join Models in Insisting on Euros as Greenbacks Fall Further out of Fashion», The Independent, 17 de noviembre de 2007.
55. P. Krugman, «Will There Be a Dollar Crisis?», Economic Policy, 22 (2007), pp. 436-467.
56. D. W. Drezner, «Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics», International Security, 34 (otoño de 2009), pp. 7-45.
57. J. B. DeLong, «The Wrong Financial Crisis», Vox, 10 de octubre de 2008.
1. Y. Barnes, «Around the World in Dollars and Cents», Savills World Research, 2016, http://pdf.euro.savills.co.uk/global-research/around-theworld-in-dollars-and-cents-2016.pdf
2. Congressional Budget Office, «Housing Wealth and Consumer Spending Report», 110th Cong., enero de 2007.
3. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2010, Nueva York, p. 44.
4. O. Jordà, M. Schularick y A. M. Taylor, «Betting the House», Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, junio de 2014.
5. O. Jordà, M. Schularick y A. M. Taylor, «The Great Mortgaging: Housing Finance, Crises and Business Cycles», Economic Policy, 31 (septiembre de 2014), pp. 107-152.
6. W. L. Silber, Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence (Nueva York, Bloomsbury Press, 2012), pp. 125-215.
7. L. Silk, «The Interest Rate Issue», The New York Times, 21 de julio de 1981.
8. Sobre la política en este momento, véase S. Eich y A. Tooze, «The Great Inflation», en Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom, A. Doering-Manteuffel, L. Raphael y T. Schlemmer, eds., (Gotinga, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2015).
9. Comentarios del gobernador Ben S. Bernanke, «The Great Moderation», en la reunión de la Eastern Economic Association, Washington D. C., 20 de febrero de 2004. Para un examen de la bibliografía en que se basaba Bernanke, véase James H. Stock y Mark W. Watson, «Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?», NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 17 (2002), pp. 159-218.
10. R. K. Green y S. M. Wachter, «The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2005), pp. 93-114.
11. Simplificación de una historia más complicada analizada en W. H. Starbuck y P. N. Pant, «Trying to Help S&Ls: How Organizations with Good Intentions Jointly Enacted Disaster», en Organizational Decision Making, Z. Shapira, ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 35-60.
12. T. Curry y L. Shibut, «The Costs of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences», FDIC Banking Review, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/ banking/ 2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf
13. Schwartz, Subprime Nation, pp. 96-101.
14. R. K. Green y A. B. Schnare, «The Rise and Fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Lessons Learned and Options for Reform», n.º 8521, USC Lusk Center for Real Estate, 2009.
15. R. Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America (Nueva York, W. W. Norton, 2017).
16. J. B. Judis y R. Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (Nueva York, Macmillan, 2002).
17. La declaración más influyente sobre el caso es C. W. Calomiris y S. H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2014). Para un análisis crítico, véase M. Konzcal, «Guest Post: A Review of Fragile by Design», Roosevelt Institute, 3 de noviembre de 2017.
18. D. Jaffee y J. M. Quigley, «The Future of the Government Sponsored Enterprises: The Role for Government in the US Mortgage Market» (NBER Working Paper 17685, Cambridge, MA, 2011).
19. N. Fligstein y A. Goldstein, «A Long Strange Trip: The State and Mortgage Securitization, 1968-2010», en The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance, A. Preda y K. Knorr-Cetina, eds., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 339-356.
20. La historia está bien contada en M. Lewis, Liar’s Poker (Nueva York, W. W. Norton, 2010) [trad. El póquer del mentiroso, Alienta, 2011.]; y B. McLean y J. Nocera, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis (Nueva York, Penguin, 2010).
21. K. Dennis, «The Ratings Game», University of Miami Law Review, 63 (2008-2009); y L. J. White, «The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle», Critical Review, 21 (2009), pp. 2-3, 389-399.
22. N. Fligstein y A. Goldstein, «The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis», en Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the US Financial Crisis, Part A, M. Lounsbury y P. M. Hirsch, eds., (Bingley, Emerald Group, 2010), pp. 29-70.
23. Jaffee y Quigley, «The Future of the Government Sponsored Enterprises».
24. A. B. Ashcraft y T. Schuermann, «Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit», Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 318 (marzo de 2008).
25. A. Goldstein y N. Fligstein, «The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown», Mimeo, 2014.
26. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (Londres, Verso, 1999).
27. P. Augar, The Greed Merchants: How the Investment Banks Played the Free Market Game (Londres, Penguin, 2005).
28. G. Tett, Fool’s Gold: The Inside Story of J.P. Morgan and How Wall St. Greed Corrupted Its Bold Dream and Created Financial Catastrophe (Nueva York, Free Press, 2009).
29. G. Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2011).
30. Z. Pozsar, «Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the US Banking System» (IMF Working Paper 11/109, agosto de 2011).
31. P. Gowan, «Crisis in the Heartland», New Left Review, 55 (enero-febrero de 2009).
32. Augar, Greed Merchants, p. 34.
33. Tobias T. Adrian y H. S. Shin, «Liquidity and Leverage», Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19 (2010), pp. 418-437.
34. D. MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2006), pp. 211-242.
35. G. F. Davis y M. S. Mizruchi, «The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the US System of Corporate Governance», Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (junio de 1999), pp. 215-239.
36. Lo que sigue se basa en Goldstein y Fligstein, «The Transformation of Mortgage Finance».
37. K. Grind, The Lost Bank: The Story of Washington Mutual-the Biggest Bank Failure in American History (Nueva York, Simon & Schuster, 2012).
38. A. Blundell-Wignall, P. Atkinson y S. H. Lee, «The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues», OECD Financial Market Trends (2008). Como señalan los autores, «2004 es crucial a la hora de pensar en la causalidad».
39. W. Poole, «The GSEs: Where Do We Stand?», Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 95 (noviembre-diciembre de 2013), pp. 601-611.
40. Una excelente introducción a los aspectos económicos de la financiación estructurada y la crisis en general es A. Milne, The Fall of the House of Credit: What Went Wrong in Banking and What Can Be Done to Repair the Damage? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009).
41. Un resumen de la bibliografía sobre la escasez de activos seguros en R. J. Caballero, E. Farhi y P. Gourinchas, «The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31 (verano de 2017), pp. 29-46.
42. D. Clement, «Interview with Gary Gorton», Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1 de diciembre de 2010.
43. G. Gorton, «The History and Economics of Safe Assets» (NBER Working Paper 22210, abril de 2016).
44. Goldstein y Fligstein, «Transformation»; V. V. Acharya, P. Schnabl y G. Suarez, «Securitization Without Risk Transfer», Journal of Financial Economics, 107 (2013), pp. 515-536; y E. Engelen et al., After the Great Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 61.
45. Tett, Fool’s Gold, pp. 124-143.
46. V. V. Acharya, P. Schnabl y G. Suarez, «Securitization Without Risk Transfer».
47. T. Adrian y H. S. Shin, «Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics», Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 398 (revisado en mayo de 2010).
48. T. Adrian et al., «Repo and Securities Lending», Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 529 (revisado en febrero de 2013).
49. G. B. Gorton y A. Metrick, «Who Ran on Repo?» (NBER Working Paper 18455, octubre de 2012).
50. E. Callan, «Lehman Brothers-Leverage Analysis», Lehman Brothers, 7 de abril de 2008, https://web.stanford.edu/~jbulow/Lehmandocs/docs/DEB TORS/LBEX-DOCID%201401225.pdf
51. S. Olster, «How the Roof Fell In on Countrywide», Fortune, 23 de diciembre de 2010.
52. Ibid.
53. Engelen et al., After the Great Complacence, p. 56.
54. https://web.archive.org/web/20090226105739/http://oversight.house. gov/documents/ 20081022112154.pdf
55. «Ker-ching: The Thorny Issue of Bankers’ Bonuses», The Economist, 26 de enero de 2008.
56. A. Haughwout et al., «“Flip This House”: Investor Speculation and the Housing Bubble», Liberty Street Economics (blog), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 5 de diciembre de 2011.
57. R. G. Rajan, «Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?» (NBER Working Paper 11728, noviembre de 2005).
58. M. D. Knight, «General Discussion: Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?», Kansas City Federal Reserve, 2005, https://www.kansasci tyfed.org/publicat/sympos/2005/pdf/ GD5_2005.pdf
59. E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996).
60. D. Rosato, «Confessions of a Former Real Estate Bull», CNN Money, 6 de enero de 2009.
61. D. Lereah, Why the Real Estate Boom Will Not Bust (Nueva York, Crown, 2005).
62. L. Kudlow, «The Housing Bears Are Wrong Again», National Review, 20 de junio de 2005.
63. Acharya, Schnabl y Suarez, «Securitization Without Risk Transfer».
64. E. R. Morrison y J. Riegel, «Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges», American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review, 13 (2005), pp. 641-644.
65. H. M. Schwartz, Subprime Nation, p. 180.
66. «Shorting Home Equity Mezzanine Tranches: A Strategy to Cash In on a Slowing Housing Market», Deutsche Bank, febrero de 2007, http://www.va luewalk.com/wp-content/ uploads/2015/ 05/2007_Subprime_Shorting-HomeEquity-Mezzanine-Tranches-1.pdf
67. M. Nakomoto y D. Wighton, «Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buyouts», Financial Times, 9 de julio de 2007.
1. La frase «el capitalismo salvaje de Bush» se debe a Robin Cook, antiguo ministro de Exteriores de Tony Blair; véase R. Cook, «A Strong Europe - Or Bush’s Feral US Capitalism», The Guardian, 28 de octubre de 2004.
2. «Lessons from a Crisis», The Economist, 2 de octubre de 2008.
3. «Le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy à Toulon», Le Monde, 25 de septiembre de 2008.
4. S. Zedda, «Italian Banks’ Paths Through the Crisis», Scientific Research, marzo de 2016.
5. B. Setser, «Too Chinese (and Russian) to Fail?», Follow the Money (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, 12 de julio de 2008; y Schwartz, Subprime Nation, pp. 101-104.
6. C. Bertaut, L. P. DeMarco, S. Kamin y R. Tryon, «ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global Financial Crisis», Journal of International Economics, 99 (2012), pp. 219-234; y B. Bernanke, C. Bertaut, L. DeMarco y S. Kamin, «International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007» (International Finance Discussion Papers, 2011).
7. D. O. Beltran, L. Pounder y C. Thomas, «Foreign Exposure to AssetBacked Securities of US Origin» (International Finance Discussion Papers 939, agosto de 2008, tabla 6, línea 6).
8. Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (22 de octubre de 2007), tabla 2.14.
9. M. Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (Nueva York, W. W. Norton, 2010); y United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations, «Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse», 13 de abril de 2011.
10. HSBC, «Fact Sheet», abril de 2005, http://www.banking.us.hsbc.com/ personal/pdf/fact_sheet_4-05.pdf
11. M. Zaki, UBS, les dessous d’un scandale: Comment l’empire aux trois clés a perdu son pari (Lausana, Favre Sa, 2008), p. 121.
12. «Deutsche Bank to Acquire MortgageIT Holdings, Inc.», Deutsche Bank, 12 de julio de 2006.
13. V. Acharya y P. Schnabl, «Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09», Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, 5-6 de noviembre de 2009.
14. N. Baba, R. N. McCauley y S. Ramaswamy, «US Dollar Money Market Funds and Non-US Banks», BIS Quarterly Review, marzo de 2009.
15. H. S. Shin, «Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium», Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, 10-11 de noviembre de 2011.
16. Bertaut et al., «ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global Financial Crisis».
17. T. Norfield, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance (Londres, Verso, 2017); D. Kynaston, City of Londres, The History, vol. 4 (Londres, Penguin, 2002); y N. Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens (Nueva York, St. Martin’s Press, 2012).
18. E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996).
19. J. Green, «Anglo-American Development, the Euromarkets, and the Deeper Origins of Neoliberal Deregulation», Review of International Studies, 42 (2016), pp. 425-449.
20. P. Augar, The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism: The Rise and Fall of London’s Investment Banks (Londres, Penguin, 2000).
21. Lehman heredó las oficinas de Enron en 2001, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/25_Bank_Street
22. «Triennial Central Bank Survey: Report on Global Foreign Exchange Market Activity in 2010», Monetary and Economic Department, Bank for International Settlements, diciembre de 2010, http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx f10t.pdf
23. L. Jones, «Current Issues Affecting the OTC Derivatives Market and its Importance to London», City of London, abril de 2009, https://www.cityoflon don.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-publica tions/Documents/research%202009/Current%20issues%20affecting%20 the%20OTC%20derivatives%20market%20and%20its%20importance%20 to%20London.pdf
24. G. Morgan, «Supporting the City: Economic Patriotism in Financial Markets», Journal of European Public Policy, 19 (2012), pp. 373-387.
25. R. Wade, «Financial Regime Change?», New Left Review 53 (septiembre-octubre de 2008).
26. «Financial Regulation: Industry Changes Prompt Need to Reconsider US Regulatory Structure», US Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-61, 6 de octubre de 2004.
27. A. Baker, «Restraining Regulatory Capture? Angloamerica, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance», International Affairs, 86 (2010), pp. 647-663.
28. Wade, «Financial Regime Change?».
29. M. Singh y J. Aitken, «The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System» (IMF Working Paper WP/10/172, julio de 2010).
30. Green, «Anglo-American Development».
31. M. Hirsch, Capital Offense: How Washington’s Wise Men Turned America’s Future Over to Wall Street (Hoboken, NJ, Wiley, 2010), p. 200.
32. Zaki, UBS, p. 75.
33. L. S. Talani, «The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the City of Londres, Towards the End of Hegemony?», Competition and Change, 15 (febrero de 2011), pp. 11-30.
34. D. K. Tarullo, «Regulating Large Foreign Banking Organizations», Harvard Law School Symposium on Building the Financial System of the Twentyfirst Century: An Agenda for Europe and the United States, 27 de marzo de 2014.
35. «Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades Depfa Entities to A2, BFSR at D+», Moody’s Investors Service, 30 de septiembre de 2008.
36. G. Robinson, «Hypo to Buy Depfa Bank for €5.7bn», Financial Times, 25 de julio de 2007.
37. W. Munchau, The Meltdown Years (Múnich, McGraw-Hill, 2010), pp. 19-28.
38. D. K. Tarullo, «Banking on Basel», Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008.
39. R. Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 88.
40. Abdelal, Capital Rules, pp. 193-194.
41. A. Blundell-Wignall, P. Atkinson y S. H. Lee, «The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues», OECD Financial Markets Trends (2008).
42. A. Blundell-Wignall y P. Atkinson, «The Subprime Crisis: Causal Distortions and Regulatory Reform» (2008), en P. Bloxham y C. Kent, Lessons from the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, actas de una conferencia, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sídney.
43. «The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy», 111th Cong., US Government Printing Office, 10 de junio de 2010; y R. Peston, «How Banks Depend on AIG», BBC News, 16 de septiembre de 2008.
44. «The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on markets», 111th Cong.
45. A. Baker, «Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance», International Affairs, 86 (2010), pp. 647-663.
46. M. Thiemann, «In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis», Review of International Political Economy (5 de febrero de 2014), pp. 1203-1239.
47. M. Berlin, «New Rules for Foreign Banks: What’s at Stake?», Business Review, Federal Reserve of Philadelphia, 2015; y «Letter SR 01-1: Application of the Board’s Capital Adequacy Guidelines to Bank Holding Companies Owned by Foreign Banking Organizations», Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 5 de enero de 2001, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0101.htm
48. S. Bair (discurso, «Risk Management and Allocation Conference», 25 de julio de 2007).
49. S. Bair, Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself (Nueva York, Free Press, 2012), pp. 38-39.
50. S. G. Cecchetti, «Five Years in the Tower» (discurso, BIS Annual Conference, 2013). En 2008, el apalancamiento del Deutsche aumentaría a 70:1. Sobre UBS, véase Zaki, UBS, p. 117.
51. C. Hughes y J. Grant, «City Limits: London Counts the Cost of Six Stormy Months for Banks», Financial Times, 20 de enero de 2008.
52. J. R. Dearie y G. J. Vojta, «Reform and Modernization of Financial Supervision in the United States: A Competitive and Prudential Imperative», Mimeo, 2007.
53. A. Appadurai, Banking on Words: The Failure of Language in the Age of Derivative Finance (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2015).
54. P. Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis That Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF (Nueva York, PublicAffairs, 2003).
55. Roche, Histoire secrete d’un krach qui dure, pp. 99-100; y P. Blustein, Off Balance, pp. 113-114.
56. M. Obstfeld, J. C. Shambaugh y A. M. Taylor, «Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008» (NBER Working Paper 14826, 2009).
57. P. McGuire y G. von Peter, «The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking», BIS Quarterly Review, marzo de 2009.
58. Para una revision de los argumentos, véase J. Aizenman y L. Jaewoo, «Financial Versus Monetary Mercantilism: Long-Run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding», World Economy, 31 (2008), pp. 593-611.
1. La historia mejor documentada es H. James, Making the European Monetary Union (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2012); una útil introduction de un economista es J. Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). Sobre la política, véase D. Marsh, The Euro: Battle for the New Global Currency (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009).
2. R. Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2007).
3. M. E. Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2009).
4. Entre muchos otros, T. Mayer, Europe’s Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the Euro (Nueva York, Anthem Press, 2012). El autor fue economista jefe del Deutsche Bank entre 2009 y 2012.
5. Una preocupación expresada con anterioridad por D. Gros, «Will EMU Survive 2010?», Center for European Policy Studies, 17 de enero de 2006.
6. T. Bayoumi y B. Eichengreen, «Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification» (NBER Working Paper 3949, 1992).
7. M. Feldstein, «The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (1997), pp. 23-42.
8. U. G. Silveri, «Italy 1990-2014: The Transition That Never Happened», Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 20 (2015), pp. 171-175.
9. K. Dyson y K. Featherstone, «Italy and EMU as a “Vincolo Esterno”: Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State», South European Society and Politics, 1.2 (1996), pp. 272-299.
10. «The Sick Man of the Euro», The Economist, 3 de junio de 1999.
11. R. R. G. Heinze, Blockierte Gesellschaft (Opladen, VS Verlag, 1998); y K. v. Hammerstein et al., «Die blockierte Republik», Der Spiegel, 21 de septiembre de 2002.
12. A. Hassel y C. Schiller, Der Fall Hartz IV (Fráncfort, Campus, 2010); y S. Beck y C. Scherrer, «Der rot-grüne Einstieg in den Abschied vom “Modell Deutschland”: Ein Erklärungsversuch», Prokla, 35 (2005), pp. 111-130.
13. S. Dullien, «A German Model for Europe?», European Council on Foreign Relations, 1 de julio de 2013.
14. M. Fratzscher, Verteilungskampf: Warum Deutschland immer ungleicher wird (Múnich, Carl Hanser, 2016); y C. Odendahl, «The Hartz Myth: A Closer Look at Germany’s Labour Market Reforms», Center for European Reform, junio de 2017.
15. H. Geiling, ed., Die Krise der SPD: autoritäre oder partizipatorische Demokratie (Münster, LIT, 2010).
16. A. Crawford, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Sussex, Bloomberg Press, 2013); y M. Qvortrup, Angela Merkel: Europe’s Most Influential Leader (Nueva York, Overlook Press, 2016).
17. «The Merkel Plan», The Economist, 15 de junio de 2013.
18. Rede von Bundeskanzlerin, «Dr. Angela Merkel beim Weltwirtschaftsforum am», 25 de enero de 2006 en Davos, https://www.bundesregierung.de/ Content/DE/Bulletin/2001_2007/2006/01/07-1-Merkel.html
19. C. Egle y R. Zohlnhöfer (eds.), Die zweite Große Koalition: eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2005-2009 (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010).
20. Peer Steinbrück, Unterm strich (Hamburgo, Hoffmann und Campe, 2010).
21. Un término acuñado por Colin Crouch en 2000 que adquirió más fuerza en Alemania que en la angloesfera. C. Crouch, «Coping with Post-Democracy», Fabian Ideas, n.º 598 (2000); C. Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge, Polity, 2004); y «Postdemokratie?», Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1 de febrero de 2011.
22. S. Lessenich, «Die Kosten der Einheit», Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 30 de marzo de 2010.
23. «Steinbrück setzt auf schwarze Null», Der Tagesspiegel, 4 de julio de 2007.
24. W. Wolfrum, Rot-Grün an der Macht: Deutschland 1998-2005 (Múnich, C. H. Beck, 2013).
25. Para un analisis perspicaz pero acrítico, véase N. Irwin, The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire (Nueva York, Penguin, 2013). [Trad. Los alquimistas. Tres banqueros centrales y un mundo en llamas, Deusto, 2014.]
26. C. Ban, Ruling Ideas: How Global Neoliberalism Goes Local (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016).
27. D. Gabor y C. Ban, «Banking on Bonds: The New Links Between States and Markets», Journal of Common Market Studies, 54 (2015), pp. 617-635.
28. S. Cheun, I. von Köppen-Mertes, y B. Weller, «The Collateral Frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the Financial Market Turmoil», Occasional Paper n.º 107, Banco Central Europeo, 2009; y D. Gabor, «The Power of Collateral: The ECB and Bank Funding Strategies in Crisis» (18 de mayo de 2012), disponible en SSRN: https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2062315 o http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062315
29. W. Buiter y A. Sibert, «How the Eurosystem’s Treatment of Collateral in Its Open Market Operations Weakens Fiscal Discipline in the Eurozone (and What to Do About It)», CEPR Discussion Papers n.º 5387, 2005; y el análsis en Schelkle, Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity, pp. 145-148.
30. Para dos ejemplos, Bernanke, Courage to Act, p. 477; y M. Lewis sobre Grecia, la zona euro y la garantía implícita de Alemania, «How the Financial Crisis Created a “New Third World”», NPR Fresh Air, 30 de septiembre de 2011, http:// www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=140948138
31. S. Storm y C. W. Naastepad, «Myths, Mix-ups and Mishandlings: What Caused the Eurozone Crisis?», conferencia anual del Instituto para un Nuevo Pensamiento Económico, 11 de abril de 2015, tabla 2.
32. P. Lourtie, «Understanding Portugal in the Context of the Euro Crisis», en Resolving the European Debt Crisis, W. R. Cline y G. Wolff, eds., (Washington D.C., PIIE, 2012).
33. C. Wyplosz y S. Sgherri, «The IMF’s Role in Greece in the Context of the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement», Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, BP/16-02/11, 2016.
34. S. Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015); y M. Husson, «The Greek Public Debt Before the Crisis», marzo de 2015, http://hussonet.free.fr/graudite.pdf
35. Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan, 24.
36. P. R. Lane, «Capital Flows in the Euro Area», Economic Papers (abril de 2013), p. 497.
37. G. Gorton y A. Metrick, «Securitization» (2011), en Handbook of the Economics of Finance, G. Constantinides, M. Harris y R. Stulz, eds., (North Holland, Elsevier, 2012); y T. Santos, «Antes del Diluvio: The Spanish Banking System in the First Decade of the Euro», en After the Flood: How the Great Recession Changed Economic Thought, Edward L. Glaeser, Tano Santos y Glenn Weyl, eds., (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2017).
38. Schelkle, Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity, pp. 180-185.
39. Storm y Naastepad, «Myths, Mix-ups and Mishandlings».
40. P. R. Lane, «The Funding of the Irish Domestic Banking System During the Boom», Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 44 (2014), pp. 40-71
41. S. Royo, «How Did the Spanish Financial System Survive the First Stage of the Global Crisis?», Governance, 26 (octubre de 2013), pp. 631-656; Santos, «Antes del Diluvio».
42. A. Cárdenas, «The Spanish Savings Bank Crisis: History, Causes and Responses», documento de trabajo 13-003, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 2013; y Santos, «Antes del Diluvio».